

# ***PROBLEMS AND DEBATES IN CONTEMPORARY INDIA***

**IV SEMESTER**

**CORE COURSE**

**HIS4 C01**

**M.A. HISTORY**

**(2019 Admission onwards)**



***UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT***

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# UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT

School of Distance Education

Study Material

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## *PROBLEMS AND DEBATES IN CONTEMPORARY INDIA*

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<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>CONTENTS</b>	<b>PAGES</b>
<b>I</b>	<b>Debates in Contemporary India</b>	<b>5-22</b>
<b>II</b>	<b>Issues in Contemporary India</b>	<b>23-45</b>
<b>III</b>	<b>Changes in the Social Structure</b>	<b>46-161</b>
<b>IV</b>	<b>Political development and Cultural Trends</b>	<b>162-252</b>



## MODULE I

### Debates in Contemporary India

#### Legacy of Colonialism-Political, social and economic legacy

The Indian subcontinent was under direct British administrative control from 1857 to 1947 – almost a century. This followed a period of more indirect political control from the British East India Company that was established gradually, starting in Bengal around 1757. During this time, the Indian subcontinent underwent a number of significant structural changes to its economic and political systems. Although many of these processes were officially brought to an end upon independence in August 1947, it is apparent that the extended period of foreign control had impacts that persist in modern-day India. Here, the impacts of the British raj are systematically identified and their legacies for India's growth and development today are briefly discussed.

The British raj saw the entire India subcontinent brought under the control of one central government, presided over by the British parliament in London. This was a significant change for the region, which had historically consisted of only a weak collection of distinctly separate districts with considerably separate economic systems. The use of eleven different primary languages, great differences in religious beliefs, social structure, living standards, and urbanisation rates, and the absence of a dominant central power have led some scholars to compare pre-colonial India to the culturally diverse region of Europe. Despite political separation of some major areas of the subcontinent (into Pakistan, Bangladesh, Ceylon and Myanmar) upon independence, the state of modern-day India retains an active central government – a necessary institution for proper representation in the modern world

system. Although the Indian government acts on behalf of the entire country it has been suggested that, partly due to its colonial history and a reinforcing of regional government after WWI, the central government has been weak in its role for promoting country-wide economic development.

In order to raise finance from their Indian colony, the British established a system of land tenure whereby property rights were assigned to a landlord, a village community, or the individual cultivators of the land. The allocation of property rights varied widely both across regions and throughout the period, often leading to a restructuring of historic class divisions. It has been argued, particularly by Banerjee and Iyer (2005), that this system led firstly to distinctly different institutional arrangements in each locality, and consequently to wide variation in levels of local development. Although the landlord system was abolished upon independence and land taxes now account for only one percent of total tax, the persistent effects of this may be seen in the established local institutions and their impact on asset distribution and political representation.

This persistent link from colonialism to institutions to development has received much attention in recent literature, with historical arrangements such as India's viewed as detrimental to the country's present-day development. The dominance of the British in India led to the advancement of European economic ideology and practice throughout the country. Although for some time there had already been a form of capitalism amongst, for example, the Indian merchant class, the widespread commercialization of industries such as agriculture led to a widespread belief that Britain had a vital role in "transplanting capitalism in India". New production techniques were adopted, as were new ways of undertaking business. The British treatment of labour, including the land tenure systems, and the increasing mobility of workers led to the

steady establishment of a labour market.

The spread of commercialism also necessitated the development of India's legal system, while the financial orthodoxy of the British stimulated a development of India's financial markets. The efforts to develop some form of central bank in India date as far back as 1773 – very early among developing economies – and a central bank was formally established, before independence, in 1935. Furthermore, persistently strong links with Britain meant that a large number of officials in the new Indian government were trained at British institutions and would certainly have been influenced by the economic ideology popular in Britain at the time. Although there may have been downsides to this influence, it is widely viewed as one of the more beneficial legacies of India's imperial relationship with Britain. All this was accompanied by large-scale investment by the British into Indian infrastructure. This investment was narrowly focussed, however, and certain types of infrastructure were prioritised. Railways, canals, ports and other facilities to assist the spread of commercial agricultural commodity production and the movement of the military developed quickly, along with urban centres of colonial administration such as Calcutta and Bombay. The infrastructure was seldom targeted at the development of the general population, and investment into primary education and healthcare facilities remained limited. Although one can argue that “modern industry was essentially a product of India's contact with Britain”, it has been suggested that the legacy of infrastructure left by the British has in fact been detrimental to the country's development. Rather than developing the economy, it may have reduced the protection of Indian industries and served primarily commercial, manufacturing and military objectives rather than general social objectives. Many writers in the 20th century referred to this specific infrastructural investment as part of the ‘underdevelopment’ of the Indian economy – development that has not led to widespread growth of the economy. Perhaps due to this,

productivity has remained low since independence.

A significant portion of this British investment into infrastructure was used to aid the drain of resources from India back to Britain. India was considered one of Britain's major assets, contributing large portions of its GDP each year. Although accurate data from early colonial India is inherently difficult to obtain, it has been estimated that even by 1882 more than four percent of India's GDP was transferred in net payments to Britain. This process changed over the period, beginning with trade and looting during the time of control by the East India Company and then becoming somewhat more official—in the form of taxes, remittances and interest payments – once Britain had taken direct administrative control of the country. British financial interests took precedence over Indian economic interests, and the economic policies that were pursued exploited India's abundant resource endowments under the popular notion of comparative advantage. For India, as for a number of western colonies in East Asia, this meant intensifying production based on abundant land and labour. The extraction of resources from India meant a shift in production methods and the pattern of trade. The British used their investments in infrastructure to encourage the production of land and labour-intensive goods, which led India to become a net exporter of agricultural commodities. This accompanied a decline in the relative production of industrial goods, reversing India's historic trade position as an importer of primary goods and exporter of manufactures. The British raj also reinforced a shift from the production of food to non-food export crops, which increased the susceptibility of many parts of the country to widespread famine. There was a widely noted decline in traditional Indian industries – particularly textile production – that has commonly been attributed to Britain's preferential treatment of its own domestic textiles. Colonialism

may not have been responsible for this, however, as improvements in production technology in the Lancashire cotton industry were already making British textiles a competitive threat. Regardless of what was responsible for the change, the transformation of India into an agricultural commodity-based economy, and the associated low per capita incomes, have to a large degree persisted beyond the cessation of British rule.

The British raj also led to an opening of the Indian subcontinent far beyond what it had previously experienced. Trade, which had been less than two percent of GDP in 1800, was as high as twenty percent of GDP by 1914. International capital flows, particularly between India and Britain, also increased significantly. It has been suggested that the development of a comparative advantage in agricultural production, coupled with an increased integration into the world economy, led to a deindustrialization of India as a response to the industrialization of the more technologically advanced economies and the entrance of India into the world market in a subservient position. Whether the effects of this increased openness persisted or not is unclear, as the newly independent government withdrew India from the world economy to a large degree, imposing restrictions on the movement of international capital<sup>56</sup> and adopting policies which hindered the implementation of foreign knowledge. This approach was reversed in the economic reforms of the early 1990s, partly in order to recover access to the potential benefits of international trade. A natural conclusion that one could make from the discussion above is that during the colonial period India did not experience widespread, centrally controlled economic development to the benefit of all Indians. The British pursued their own interests in India, which often led to developments that had specific benefits to the British but ignored the needs of the Indian population.

An alternative colonial approach was taken in countries like New Zealand, where the British developed the country in such a way that private property and democratic government did eventually lead to population-wide increases in living standards. In the view of Acemoglu et al. (2001) the disease environment, leading to relatively lower settler populations, may have been the explanation for why this form of development was not a feasible strategy for India. It has even been suggested that traditional Indian sources of economic growth were pushed aside to make way for imperial economic and social networks. This led to what has been termed “uneven development” or “underdevelopment” of the Indian economy, whereby the country has grown extensively but, in general, intensive (per capita) growth has not been realized. The majority of other European colonies in East Asia—such as Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong— have experienced far higher levels of intensive growth than India since its independence, when the newly established government inherited a widely diverse country with many economic and social problems.

Despite some improvements in living standards since 1947, India has never managed to implement a successful central development strategy such that these persistent issues could be resolved. In summary, British imperialism had a number of significant impacts on the Indian subcontinent, and many of these impacts have legacies that continue in modern day India. There is still a major debate amongst scholars as to whether the legacies of India’s colonial past have primarily been beneficial or harmful for India’s development, with some (including Imperialists, Orientalists and some Marxists) claiming that the British Empire brought modernity to India and others (particularly Nationalists) claiming that it removed or distorted the country’s developmental base. From a brief discussion of the specific impacts, it is apparent that the legacy of the British raj was both positive and negative. There were some beneficial consequences, such as the unifying of the country under

one central government; the influence of modern economic ideology, production techniques and technology; and the opening of the Indian economy to the benefits of increased trade and access to capital markets. However, these were not without their downsides: the unification of a diverse region left the central government weak in its role for centrally planned development, and comparative advantage and the opening of the economy may have led to India's subservient position in the modern world market. Combined with negative institutional arrangements from the land tenure system, an infrastructure skewed away from the needs of the majority, and mass resource extraction from the Indian economy, it seems that the overall impact of British colonialism in India may have done more harm than good. Regardless of whether this conclusion is correct, and despite the fact that colonialism was clearly not the exclusive driver of India's economic history, it is apparent that the impacts of India's colonial past had legacies that continued to persist well beyond 1947.

### Indian Secularism

Secularism is the corner stone of Indian Democracy. During the Period of independence and before there are two different lines of understanding are competing for Ideological domination. one side of understanding Put forward by Jawaharlal Nehru who had a vision of separating to religion and Politics Manifesting in the concept of 'Dhermanirapeksha', when Mahatma Gandhi rejected the idea of separation of religion and Politics, who believed in the principal of equal respect of all religious manifesting in the concept of 'Sarvadharmasambhava'

These different understanding of Secularism was an Issue of debate in the Constituent Assembly and later in academic Circles and Political life of young Democratic India. Questions raised from Various parts of India, is western concept of secularism is

appropriate in a religious society of India? And what is secularism in wall of Separation between state and religion, or treating all religions as equal? Is Secularism capable of warding off communalization of Indian Society and interreligious harmony or secularism is only relevant for western society that has undergone a Process of secularization?

There are numerous academicians participated in this debate, critically. One of the advocators of secularism debate was D.E.Smith who gave a theoretical outline of a secular state. Denold.

E. Smith's Work 'India as a secular state published in 1963 Provides detailed analysis on Indian secularism Smith focused on mainly three demands of a secular nation that free of religion, citizenship and right to equality and separation of state and religion This understanding on secularism incorporates 3 distinct interrelated set of Relationship concerning state, religion and Individual. In relationship between individual and state religion is excluded. Third is the relation between state and different religion and secularism entitled mutual exclusion of state and religion.

Ashish Nandy, the eminent historian, argues has exhausted Its that Ideology and Politics of secularism has exhausted its possibilities in India. He calls himself as "an anti- secularist". Ashish Nandy's rejection of secularism is rooted in a twofold. critique of modern culture and society and critique of secular state. Nandy states, Indian secular state has much to learn about Morality from Hinduism, Islam and Sikhism while Hinduism, Islam and Sikhism have nothing to learn from the secular state in this respect. Nandy's Critique of the ideology of secularism is against western state Cantered version which is adopted by India's westernized intellectuals. Through this version, Religion should be abolished from the scientific management of the public sphere. The non-

western religion centered understanding of secularism that supports equal respect for all religions and suits South Asian realities. criticize the idea of secularism though not dismiss it absolutely. He cautions against unproblematic adaptation of secularism in South Asian realities. Citing Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay Madan argues how translations are difficult because words can be translated but it is difficult to translate an idea that the word denotes if that idea does not exist among people whose language translation is required. The idea of secularism as transferred to countries of South Asia also pose many difficulties. South Asia is a multi-religious society and the majority of people living in this region are active adherents of some religious faith. While Secularism is impractical for State action because Buddhism and Islam have been declared as State religion, Policy of equidistance is also difficult to maintain since religious minorities do not share the majority's view of what this entails for the State.

Achin Vanaik's argued that the idea given by Nandy and Madan is based on traditional idea of embedded self and support a form of religious Communitarianism. Despite theoretical insightfulness the 'anti secularist' legitimizes politics of religious identity. According to Vanaik Nandy's idea of replacement of secular state and secular public morality with religion based public morality of tolerance is dangerous. Achin Vanaik viewed that Secularism means three things, right to freedom of worship, primacy of citizenship and non-affiliation of State to any religion. The secular State must separate state and religion, secularize state laws and policies. Recognizing due importance of Gandhian legacy Vanaik argues that though Gandhi did not separate religion and politics his role was remarkable in giving principle of equal respect to all religions. But many of Gandhi's perspectives were against modern conception of secularism.

Akkel bilgrami criticize Nehruvian form of secularism but reject Nandy's views on secularism also. Bilgrami argued that Nandy's prime objective is practicing both nostalgia and skewed historiography. While Nandy is right in arguing that different religious traditions have their specific source of the realization of a tolerant way of life his ideas of the rise of Hindu Nationalism is oversimplified. According to Bilgrami Nandy's anti secular proposal have flaws in it because the condition for different religious traditions and communities has changed in the modern India. In Bilgrami's opinion Nehruvian secularism stands in a conceptual and political space that lies outside the sphere of substantive political commitments. Secularism did not emerge as the product of a negotiation and dialogue between religious communities. It was adopted from above as an Archimedean point.

Partha Chatterjee observes, in post independent India the model of secularism adopted by India's westernized elites implied exclusion of Indian alternative to Western secular modernity. And introduced direct involvement of state in religious and social matters especially in Hindu religious matters. Partha Chatterjee critically evaluating about the implementation of secular principles in Indian realities. If secularism is interpreted as strict separation of religion and politics this can prove fairly compatible with the discrimination against minorities. If secularism is interpreted as equidistance from all religious groups then its practice in India raise some doubts because State has intervened selectively in personal laws of different communities making laws to reform Hindu personal laws but the same reformist agenda has been absent for other communities like Muslims, Christian and Parsis. Hindu right describe this as appeasement of minorities. Chatterjee refers to the exceptionality of India though he does not call for a new version of secularism. Chatterjee is in favour of idea of political tolerance that incorporates autonomy

and respect for persons and accommodates different reasons coming from different cultural and traditional institutions.

Amartya Sen argues that the principle of secularism does not require that the state has any association with any religious matter whatsoever. Rather what is required is to ensure that in so far as the State has to deal with different religions and member of different religious community there must be a basic symmetry of treatment. The merit of this kind of approach he emphasizes is that the requirement of symmetric treatment leaves opens the question as to what form that symmetry should take.

### State in post-colonial India

Different of scholars have interpreted the nature and the role of the postcolonial state in India in various ways. Some were explained the state in a liberal way, while others adopted the Marxist approach. The liberals consider the active intervention of the state as an agent for recovering from centuries of colonial exploitation and underdevelopment. After the Indian independence, the decolonization process has worked in almost every academic circles. state has a institution, it emerged as an important focus of study among political scientists and political economists. There are two major approaches, Liberal and Marxist, interpreted the nature of postcolonial state according to their respective position to the state.

Views From the liberal approach the state as an instrument of modernization - socio-economic, political and cultural. During 1950s and 1960s, Modernization theorists were treated the post-colonial state as the principal tool in transforming the backward and underdeveloped societies along progressive lines. The prime motive of the overall modernization process was to recover from the underdevelopment created by colonialism. The fulfilment of the objective of modernization is only work through an effective process of national reconstruction - reconstruction of

their ideologies, culture, administration, economy, social norms and education structure. The liberals considered that the state as an instrument for nation building. The different social, cultural and economic cleavages and the multiplicity of identities hindered the emergence of a nation. The postcolonial states initiated a huge task of building a national identity by assimilating the whole diverse.

The Marxist approach on the postcolonial State is in another way. For the Marxists the postcolonial state was the principal agent for the development of capitalism in the postcolonial era. The Marxists interpret the state as an instrument of class domination and an executive committee for managing the affairs of the bourgeoisie. Their attitude towards the postcolonial state was in tune with their basic stand on state. The most pertinent analysis of postcolonial states within the Marxist framework has been offered by the Pakistani scholar Hamza Alavi. He argued that in western societies, the nation-state was a creation of indigenous bourgeoisie; in the colonies the process was different. The state in postcolonial societies is not established by an ascendant native bourgeoisie, but rather by a foreign imperialist bourgeoisie. The reason for the inability of the native bourgeoisie to establish such a state was that the colonial state equipped with a powerful bureaucratic-military apparatus and with governmental mechanisms subordinated them.

Deviating from the traditional Marxist approach to study the postcolonial state in India, Rasheed Uddin Khan developed a new interpretation to the state. Describing the Indian State as "Total State", he identifies the interventionist role of the state in bringing about social change and economic development.

### The Political Economy of LPG

The long-term constraints that were building up over a few decades and debilitating the Indian economy combined with certain more recent and immediate factors led to a massive fiscal and balance of payments crisis that climaxed in 1991. The crisis pushed India into initiating a process of economic reforms and structural adjustment. The reforms, which in the Indian context were almost revolutionary in nature, were ironically started by a minority government led by Narasimha Rao, and guided by one of the most distinguished economists of post-independent India, Manmohan Singh, as finance minister. Reform of the dirigiste, controls-ridden and inward-looking Indian economy was long overdue. As early as the early 1960s, Manmohan Singh had argued that India's export pessimism at that time was unjustified. He advised more openness and a less controlled economy. Other eminent Indian economists such as Jagdish Bhagwati were among those who urged reform in the early stages. An attempt at reform was made in the mid-1960s but it got stymied for a variety of reasons discussed elsewhere leading to a further recoiling into restrictionist policies. The 1970s witnessed some, what has been described as, 'reform by stealth', with the rupee being allowed to depreciate in response to market conditions not by an outright devaluation, which was then politically unviable, but by pegging it to a depreciating sterling. Indira Gandhi, particularly after her return to power in 1980s, tried to bring in liberalization measures, mainly in the area of deregulation of industrial licensing and education of restrictions on large 'monopoly' enterprises. Though by the standards of the post-1991 reforms these efforts would appear puny, a glance at the newspapers of the 1980s would suggest that they were seen as quite path-breaking at that time. Rajiv Gandhi, when he took over in 1984, attempted reform at a relatively quicker pace towards industrial deregulation, exchange rate flexibility and partial lifting of import controls. The major issue of the emerging macroeconomic imbalance, calling for stabilization of the fiscal and balance of payments deficits, was,

however, left unattended, despite the express intentions to the contrary. Reforms of the financial and Labour markets and the public sector also essentially remained untouched. Even these piecemeal attempts at reforms made by Rajiv Gandhi got abandoned after some time mainly due to the political crisis centered on the Bofors allegations and the desertion of VP Singh and others.

Though the need for reform had been recognized early enough, its comprehensive implementation could not occur for various reasons. Governments, especially when in a vulnerable situation, were extremely wary of initiating or sustaining reforms which would involve introducing unpopular measures like attempts to regain fiscal discipline, change in Labour laws, steps which in the initial phase were bound to be painful. Also, there was persistent opposition to reform from vested interests such as the bureaucracy and even sections of business who benefited from the existing system of controls, using them to earn a sort of 'rent'. Last, and certainly not the least, the strong ideological opposition from the orthodox left, strangely oblivious to the changing global reality, continued to play a role in obstructing reform.

The crisis in 1991, with the country at the edge of default enabled the Narasimha Rao government to break through the traditional mindset and attempt an unprecedented, comprehensive change at a time when both the ideological opposition and the resistance of the vested interests was at a weak point. Thus, though late, nearly thirteen years after China changed course, a program of economic reform was initiated in 1991. One reason why the shift took so long and even when it took place, was not as sharp a turnaround as it was in China in 1978 or the Soviet Union after the mid-1980s was that in a democracy the change from one kind of societal consensus to a new consensus had to be a process and not an event, which had its own dynamic, very different from that operating in a non-democratic or

totalitarian society.

The process of reforms started in 1991, involved, inter alia, an immediate fiscal corrections: making the exchange rate more realistically linked to the market; liberalization of trade and industrial control like freer access to imports, a considerable dismantling of the industrial licensing system and the abolition of the MRTP act, reform of the public sector including gradual privatization, reform of the capital markets and the financial sector, removing a large number of the restrictions on multinational corporations and foreign investment and so on. In short, it was an attempt to free the economy from stifling internal controls as well as equip it to participate in the worldwide globalization process to its advantage.

The record of the first few years of reform was creditable by any standards, though a lot of problems and challenges still remained. India performed one of the fastest recoveries from a deep macroeconomic crisis. Moreover, the process of structural adjustment, particularly the fiscal reining in, was achieved with relatively minimal pain-without it setting off a prolonged recessionary cycle leading to massive unemployment and deterioration of the condition of the poor as was feared and as occurred in the case of several other economies in a similar situation attempting structural adjustment.

For example, the growth rate of India's GDP which had fallen to a paltry 0.8 per cent in the crisis year of 1991-92 recovered quickly to 5.3 per cent by 1992-93 and rose further to 6.2 per cent in 1993-94 despite the major disturbances in 1992-93 triggered by the Ayodhya crisis. More important, over the next three years, the Indian economy averaged a growth rate of nearly 7 per cent higher and on a more sustainable basis, than the seventh plan (1985-90) average of 6 per cent. Gross Domestic Savings averaged over 23 per

cent between 1991 and 1997, higher than the seventh plan average of 20.6 per cent. Gross Domestic Capital Formation and Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation between 1992 and 1997 also maintained a respectable average of 25.2 per cent and 22.3 per cent of GDP respectively 19.8 per cent.

Industrial production, which showed a dismal, less than 1 per cent, growth rate in 1991-92 picked up to 2.3 per cent in 1992-93 and 6 per cent in 1993-94 peaking at an unprecedented 12.8 per cent during 1995-96. The capital goods sector, which had demonstrated negative growth rates for a few years, bounced back to nearly 25 per cent growth in 1994-95, allaying early fears that import liberalization would hit the domestic capital goods industry adversely. The small-scale sector too grew faster than overall industrial growth, suggesting that abolition of the MRTP act did not have an adverse effect on it and perhaps encouraged its growth. Agriculture, too, after recording fall in 1991-92 picked up the following year and by and large maintained till 1996-97 the high rate of growth of over 3 per cent which it had been experiencing for some years.

The central government's fiscal deficit, which had reached 8.3 per cent of GDP in 1990-91, was reduced and averaged roughly 6 per cent between 1992-97. The important thing was that out of the total fiscal deficit of 5.2 per cent in 1996-97, 4.7 per cent was accounted for by interest payments which was a liability emanating from past fiscal laxity. The primary deficit, that is fiscal deficit, net of interest payments, which represents current fiscal pressures or overspending, was only 0.6 per cent in 1996-97; it was systematically brought down from 4.3 per cent of GDP in 1990-91 and 2.9 per cent in 1993-94.

To the extent, therefore, that the economic reforms were designed to put India on a higher-growth path, it would be expected that

poverty levels would decline as well. The key question remaining was what would be the impact on poverty in the transitional phase, especially when the necessary stabilization had to take place with the attempts to improve the balance of payments position and reduce the fiscal deficit, leading to a possible fall in government expenditure. India's initial stabilization programmed was said to be 'extraordinarily successful' causing 'remarkably little suffering' when compared with most other countries which were forced to effect a large and rapid reduction in their current external account deficits. Calculations based on several different indicators of poverty show that poverty, mainly rural poverty, marked a significant rise only in 1992-93 and its causation was linked mainly to a drought and fall in food grain output in 1991-92, leading to a rise in food prices, and very weakly to the stabilization programmed. Even this was perhaps avoidable to a great extent. The government's failure in not anticipating the situation and maintaining expenditure on rural employment programs, it is not refraining from making any cuts (in real terms, there being a nominal increase) in the anti-poverty Social Services and Rural Development (SSRD) expenditure in 1991-92 to achieve fiscal stabilization, was criticized even by the supporters of reform. However, all the poverty indicators showed that by 1993-94 there was much improvement in the poverty situation. The poverty both rural and urban, were significantly lower in 1993-94 in 1992, by nearly six percentage points, and were lower than pre-reform average of the five years 1986-87 to 1990 had a negative impact, if any, on poverty levels. Other aspects of the reform, it is generally agreed, do not threaten the per cent and in fact would improve their condition by releasing the improvement in the poverty situation was helped by the fact that the government increased the overall Social Services and Rural Development expenditure from 1993-94. It rose from 7.8 of total government expenditure in 1992-1993 to an average of nearly 10 per cent between 1993 and 1998. Real agricultural wages, which had decreased by 6.2 per cent in 1991

grew in the next two years at over 5 per cent per year and By 1993-94 surpassed the pre-reform level. After the low of 1991-92, additional employment generated in the total economy rose to 7.2 million in 1994-95, averaging about 6.3 million jobs every year between 1992-93 and 1994-95, considerably higher than the average annual increase of 4.8 million in the 1980s. moreover inflation, which hurts the poor the most, was kept under control. The annual rate of inflation, which touched a high of 17 per cent in August 1991, was brought down to below 5 per cent in February 1996.

But this does not complete the picture. Though on the whole the reform initiatives looked quite successful, there was still a long majority emerging in parliament of any political party, made it difficult for any government to move away from populist measures and take tough but necessary decisions.

That is why no serious efforts were made to increase public savings and reduce government expenditure and the problem of high fiscal deficits continued. The public savings investment gap remained at a very high average of 7.1 per cent of GDP between 1992 and 1996. The food grain subsidies contributed towards a tendency for real investment in agriculture to fall because of lack resources. C. H Hanumanth Rao, eminent agricultural economist, noted in 1992, 'the annual subsidy on fertilizer above amounts to nearly as much as the annual outlay on agriculture by the center and states put together'. A similar example was the government subsidy on diesel, kerosene and cooking gas amounting to Rs 93.6 billion in 1995-96.

Similarly, little was achieved with regard to reform of the public sector, particularly of state-owned utilities, transport corporations, etc. While the Punjab government went to the absurd limit of actually distributing electricity and water free to the farmers,

several other states were not much better as they charged rates which covered only a small fraction of the costs. State electricity boards and transport corporations turn at huge losses at a time when availability of power and proper transport infrastructure threatened to be critical bottlenecks, slowing down the projected rate of growth of the economy.

Also, there was no significant move towards reform the Labour market and creating possibilities of exit for loss-making enterprises. After the few years of initial success, the tempo of economic reform in India seemed to be waning. Moreover, the economy began witnessing a slowdown, from 1997. The GDP growth rate had accelerated significantly to 5 per cent in 1997-98 down from 7.8 per cent in 1996-97. Exports, which were growing at over 20 per cent, slowed down for the third year in succession since 1996 and were negative in 1998-99 (April-December). There was a slowdown in industry after 1995-96 and it was growing at less than half the rate achieved that year over the next three years. Very importantly, there was been a slowdown in the critical infrastructure sector, which was emerging as a major bottleneck. Flows of external capital, both FDI and portfolio investment, declined sharply, the latter turning negative in 1998-99 (April - December)

One of the most dangerous reversals was in the sphere of fiscal deficit, where the primary deficit which had been brought down to 0.6 per cent of GDP in 1996-97 more than doubled to 1.3 per cent in 1997-98 and for the center and state together it was estimated to be 2.4 per cent (revised estimate). The selective acceptance of the fifth pay commission recommendations by the united front (Gujral government in 1997).

The slowing down of the economy from 1996-97 was partly because of the East Asian crisis, with Japan in recession and south

Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and others showing negative growth.

## Module 2

### Issues in Contemporary India

The history of contemporary India began with the country became an independent nation within the British commonwealth. After they independence nation has faced different of insurgencies and disputes. A major issue that India has faced since 1947 has been of national unity or consolidation of the state or nation. Solution of such problem, like formation of linguistic states, and a Hindi agitation question of autonomy, regionalism and regional separatism has made the integration of Indian people as a political community.

#### Formation of Linguistic States

After the independence of India, the re organization of the states on the basis of language, a major aspect of national integration and consolidation, came to the forefront. The boundaries of provinces in the pre-1947 India had been drowning in a haphazard manner as the British conquest of India had proceeded for nearly a hundred years. In that period most of the provinces were multi lingual and multi-cultural. The case of linguistic States as administrative units was very strong language is merely connected with culture and customs of the people. Such a great explosion of education and the growth of mass literacy can only occur through the medium of the mother tongue. Language is one of the determining aspects of democracy that the democracy can become real to the common people only when politics and administration are conducted through the language they can understand. But the problem was the language, the mother tongue cannot be the medium of education or administration or judicial activity unless a state is formed on the basis of such a predominant language.

The presence of Gandhi in the national politics which helped the involvement of the masses in the national movement after 1919, the Indian national congress undertook political mobilization in the mother tongue and in 1921 amended its constitution and reorganization its regional branches on a linguistic basis. It is only a primary step, and then the Congress repeatedly committed itself to the restructuring of the provincial boundaries on the basis of language. Gandhiji argued to the people to 'discourage all fissiparous tendencies and feel and behave as Indians', and just five days before Gandhi was assassinated, he also argued that, ' the redistribution of provinces on a linguistic basis was necessary if provincial languages were to grow to their full height'. And this argument was universally assumed that free India would base its administrative and linguistic boundaries.

After the Indian independence India had face to many issues that mainly, the partition had created serious administrative, economic and political dislocation, and the second world war created that serious economic and low order problems. And also emerged the cashmere issue, that a war like situation village-a-villages Pakistan. When the nation leadership had felt that the most urgent task for the present was to consolidate national unity. In the period of 27, November 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru upon the linguistic question, clearly states that 'first India'. Therefore, while still committed to linguistic States, Nehru and other leaders accorded the fast-redrawing India's administrative map a low priority.

Under the objective of linguistic reorganization of India, the constituent assembly was appointed a linguistic provinces commission in 1948. And it headed by justice SK Dar who enquire into the desirability of linguistic provinces. The Dar commission was submit a report against the step at the time for it might threaten national unity, and also be administrative in convenient therefore the constituent assembly decided not to incorporate the linguistic

principle in the constitution. But this decision failed to accept the public, especially in the south part, the problem was not politically solved. Then Congress appointed a JVP committee in December 1948, consisting of Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Pattabhi Seetharamayya to examine the linguistic problem/question. After the JVP committee advised against the creation of linguistic states for the time being, emphasizing on unity, national security and economic development as the needs of the hour. The JVP report was followed by popular movements for state reorganization all over the country. The demand for a separate Andhra state for the Telegu speaking people was an example. This demand was popular for nearly half a century and had the support of all political parties.

Upon the demand for the separate Andhra state for the Telegu people in 19th October 1952, a popular freedom fighter, Potti Sriramulu undertook a fast unto death. And he died after 58 days. His death was followed by 3 days of rioting, demonstrations, hartals, and violence all over Andhra. Then the government took immediate action for the demand for separate state of Andhra, which came into existence in October 1953. The success of the Andhra struggle encouraged by other linguistic groups in India to agitate for their own state on the basis of language. Tamil Nadu was created as a Tamil speaking state. But in the case of Nehru who was not in favor at that time of continuing with the redrawing of India's internal administrative boundaries, but he was too much of a democrat to sternly and consistently oppose the demands. Bipin Chandra's text "India Since Independence" put a quote by S Gopal, who was the author of Nehru's biography that, 'he felt that it would be undemocratic to smother this sentiment which, on general grounds, he did not find objectionable. Indeed, a linguistic mosaic might provide a firmer base for national unity. What concerned him were the timing, the agitation and violence with which linguistic provinces were being demanded and the harsh antagonism between various sections of the Indian people which

underlay these demands.

In 1953, August, Jawaharlal Nehru was appointed a state reorganization commission (SRC) with justice Fazal Ali, KM Panikkar and Hridayanath Kunzru as members, to examine objectively and dispassionately the questions of the reorganization of the states of the Union. In this period of time, the SRC was faced demonstrations, agitations, hunger strikes and meetings etc. Different linguistic groups clashed with each other verbally and physically. SRC commission was submitted its report in October 1955, after the completion of two years. It recognized for the most part the linguistic principle and recommended redrawing of the state boundary on that basis. The commission opposed the splitting of Bombay and Punjab. Despite strong reactions to the report in many parts of the country, the SRC recommendations were accepted, though with certain modifications, these were quickly implemented.

The state reorganization act was passed by parliament in November 1956. It recommended, for fourteen states and six centrally administered territories. The Telangana area of Hyderabad state was transferred to Andhra, Kerala was created by merging the Malabar region in Madras presidency with Travancore and Cochin. Kannada speaking areas of the state of Bombay, Madras, Hyderabad and Coorg were added to the Mysore state.

The SRC's report and the states reorganization act was created such strongest reactions in the Maharashtra where wide spread rioting broke out and around 80 people were killed in Bombay city in Police firing in January 1956. When the students, farmers, workers, businessmen were organized a powerful protest movement. Finally, under the pressure, the government decided to divide the Bombay state into two linguistic states of Maharashtra and Gujarat with Bombay city forming a separate,

centrally administrated state in June 1956. This move was strongly opposed by the Maharashtrians and Gujarat people. The broad-based Sam Yuktha Maharashtra Samithi and Maha Gujarat-Janata Parishad led the movements in the two parts of the state. In Maharashtra, even a large section of Congress men joined the demand for a unilingual Maharashtra with Bombay as its capital. The Gujaratis felt that, they would be a minority in the new state. They would not agree to give up Bombay city to Maharashtra. Such violent activities aroused and spread to Ahmedabad and its parts. In view of the disagreement over Bombay city, the government stuck to its division and passed the state recognition act in November 1956, but the matter could not solve. In later time, 1960, the government would agree that to bifurcate the state of Bombay into Maharashtra and Gujarat, with Bombay city being included in Maharashtra and Ahmadabad being made the capital of Gujarat.

In 1956, the state of PEPSU had been merged with Punjab, which remained a trilingual state having three language speakers Punjabi, Hindi and Pahari, within its borders. In the Punjabi-speaking areas of the state make strong demand for carving out a separate Punjabi Sabha or Punjabi speaking state. And this particular issue assumed communal overtones. The Sikh communalists, led by Akali Dal and the Hindu communalists led by the Jana Sangh, used the linguistic issue to promote communal politics. The Hindu communalist were opposed the demand for a Punjabi Sabha by denying that Punjabi was their mother tongue, the Sikh communalist put forward the demand as a Sikh state, claiming Punjabi written in Gurmukhi as a Sikh language. The SRC had refused to accept the demand for a separate Punjabi speaking state. In 1966, Indira Gandhi agreed to the division of Punjab into two Punjabi and Hindi speaking states of Punjab and Haryana with the Pahari speaking district of Kangra and a part of the Shirpur district being merged with the Himachal Pradesh. Chandigarh, the newly built city and capital of Punjab and Haryana.

The state reorganization is the best regarded as clearing the ground for national integration. And also, the state's reorganization was to strengthened the unity of the country. The states reorganization did not resolve all the problems relating to linguistic conflicts. Dispute over boundaries between the state's linguistic minorities and economic issues, such as sharing of water, power and the Surplus food still persist. Gujarat, with Bombay city being included in Maharashtra and Ahmadabad being made the capital of Gujarat.

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### The Question of Language

India been a diverse country with different of cultures, dialects, languages, regions, religions etc. People's linguistic survey of India marks, there are 780 languages and 86 scriptures out of with 250 languages extinguished India. Language is the integral part of the nation. The Indian constitution recognize 16 major languages including English and Sanskrit. Same time , there are myriad languages spoken by the tribals and others with or without their own script.

each and every region or nation has its own language in which it was supreme. Language is closely related to the culture and customs of the people. Before the advent of English language Sanskrit was the most prevalent language in India. In the ancient period the Sanskrit language was introduced by the Aryans. Then the coming Islamic rulers, Persians became the language in the most of the regions of the country. In that parallel period, the language of Urdu was also developed as the combined language of Persian and Sanskrit.

After the colonial invasion, the English language made domination over the Persian language and all over the nation. The British used English as the language of administration. Most of the functions of the government switched over to the English language. The language has dual character, both a means of communication and a carrier of culture. In the case of English, it is spoken in Britain and in Sweden and Denmark. But for the non- British people especially Swedish and Danish people consider language as only a way of communication, to others, not as a carrier of their culture. But what is in the case of British, they used English as a tool of communication and a carrier of their culture. When we learn a new language, it's not only involves learning it's alphabets, the word arrangement and rules of grammar, but also learning about a specific society's culture,

customs, and behavior. English is the study of culture and not simply the study of language. The newborn India had faced numerous issues on the basis of language. The national consolidation by linguistic diversity has taken to major forms. One was the dispute over official language of the nation, the second one, the linguistic reorganization of the states.

### Anti-Hindi Agitation

India was one of the multilingual countries in the world. According to the senses of 2001, there are 1635 rationalized mother tongues and 122 languages with more than 10000 speakers. The controversy on the language issue became most virulent when it took the form of opposition of Hindi which create conflict between Hindi-speaking and non-Hindi speaking regions of the country. The Indian constitution makers who accepted all the major languages as 'languages of India'. But there was an issue on which language is more official? In a country's official work could not be carried on in so many languages. There had to be one common language in which the central government carry its administrative purposes. And maintain connection with the state governments. When emerged such questions on language that, what would be India's official language? there are two main options are there one was English and second was Hindi. Then the constituent assembly heatedly debated which one should be selected.

Actually, the answer of this particular question had already been made in the pre- independence period by the national leaders that English would not continue to be the all- India medium for communication in free India. Gandhi, during the twenties expressed that English is a 'language of international commerce, it is the language of diplomacy it contains many a rich literary treasure, and it gives us an introduction to western thought and culture'. Then he adds some further arguments that, but English occupied in India 'an

unnatural place due to our unequal relation with English men'. The second one Hindi or Hindustani had already played. Its role during the nationalist struggle. Hindi had become accepted by the non-Hindi speaking leaders and regions, because it was considered to be most widely spoken and understood language in India. The political and diplomatic sections of Indian national congress had substituted Hindi and the provincial languages in place of English. In 1925, congress amended its constitutions to read, 'the proceedings of the Congress shall be conducted as far as possible in Hindustani the English language or any provincial language may be used if the speaker is unable to speak Hindustani or whenever necessary. The real debate in the constituent assembly occurred over two questions, would Hindi or Hindustani replace English?

Gandhi and Nehru both are supported Hindustani, written in Devanagari or Urdu script. Many people were supported to the Gandhi-Nehru view point. But once the partition was announced, these champions of Hindi were emboldened, the protagonists or Pakistan had claimed Urdu as the language of Muslims. Then the votaries of Hindi now branded Urdu's as a symbol of secession. They demanded Hindi in Devanagari script be made the national language. Their arguments lead to a split in Congress, in the end of the Congress legislative party decided for Hindi against Hindustani by 78 to 77 votes, Nehru and Azad fought for Hindustani. The Hindi block was also forced to compromise, finally Hindi would be the official language of India, not as a national language.

Hindi's official recognition will divide the all part of the nation into two, that is Hindi speakers and non-Hindi speakers. Nehru considered Hindi as an official language and same time he also was in favor of English. Continuing as an additional language, making the transition to Hindi gradual, and activity, encouraging the knowledge of English because of its usefulness in the contemporary world. Hindi language was the language of the

largest number, it was understood in the urban areas especially most of northern India from Bengal to Punjab and in Maharashtra and Gujarat. What about the case of south India, south India were doubted that, Hindi's adaption as the official language would place non-Hindi areas, at a disadvantage in the educational and economic spheres, and in the competition for appointments in the government and the public sector. The fear of domination was also existed, that imposition of Hindi on non-Hindi areas would lead to their economic, political, social and cultural domination by Hindi.

The constitution provided that Hindi in Devanagari script with international numerals would be India's official language, English was to continue for using all official purposes till 1965, when it would be replaced by Hindi. The constitution makers had held that by 1965 the Hindi protagonists would overcome the weakness of Hindi, but in a wide, Hindi would gradually weaken and even disappear. A major weakness of Hindi protagonists was that, instead of developing a simple standard Language which would get wide acceptance or at least popularize the colloquial Hindi as spoken and written in Hindi areas as also in many parts of India. Hindi protagonists were tried to Sanskritize the language, replacing commonly understood words with newly manufactured, etc. These initiatives made more complexity among the non-Hindi speakers, to understand or learn the new version.

In 1955, constitution set up a commission in the name of official language commission, which was submitted its report in 1956, the commission recommended that Hindi should start progressively replacing English in various functions of the central government with effective changes taking place in 1965. It's two members from West Bengal and Tamil Nadu, professor Suniti Kumar Chatterjee and P. Subbaroyan, who argued that for the continuation of English. The commissions' report was reviewed by a special joint committee of the parliament. After the reviewing process, the president, issued an order in April 1960 stating that after 1965,

Hindi would be principle official language without any restriction being placed on its issue.

Hindi would also become an alternative medium for the Union Public Commission examinations. And setting up of the central Hindi directorate, publication of standard works in Hindi translation in various fields, etc.

These immediate changes would make anxiety and tensions among the non-Hindi areas. Especially in Tamil Nadu, creating a strong Anti-Hindi movement in 1965. On 17 January, the Dravida Munnetta Kazhakam(DMK) organized the Madras state anti-Hindi conference which gave a call for observing 26th January as the day of mourning. Students were joined with movement, they raised the slogan that ' Hindi Never, English Ever'. This particular movement demanded to amendment of the constitution. The students' agitations soon developed into state wide unrest. Wide spread rioting and violence followed in the early weeks of February leads to a large-scale distraction of railways and other union property. Several Tamil youths will stand in the anti-Hindi feeling and support this movement, the four students burned themselves to death in protest against the official language policy. Two Tamil ministers C Subrahmanyam and Alakeshan were resigned from the Union cabinet.

The massive agitation against Hindi, forced both state and central governments and the congress party to revise their stand. They decided to accept the public opinion and change their policy and major demands of the agitators. Indira Gandhi moved to bill to amend the 1963 official language act on 27 November. The Lok Sabha adopted the bill, and made, the use of English as an associate language in addition to Hindi. For the official work at the Centre and for the non-Hindi states wanted. And also presented a three-language formula, in the non-Hindi areas, the mother tongue, Hindi and English or some other national languages were to be taught. In

school while in the Hindi areas a non-Hindi language, preferably a southern language was to be taught as a compulsory subject.

Anti-Hindi movements created a political space to DMK, whose rise to power to the language issue played an important role, also helped by cooling down the political temper in Tamil Nadu.

### Question of Autonomy

The historical reality of diversity and uneven development in India, the most legitimate and democratic mode of shaping the new state should have been by seeking a voluntary accession of various regional, linguistic, tribal and other communities to the Indian Union. The lack of Democratic consensus, the legitimacy of the new born Indian states was questioned in certain parts of the country. The rulers of the new States needed a centralized administration to tackle the conflicts and to impose a unifying ideology of National integration. Under which it could homogenize the people. When the new born states were, demand for autonomy with sensitivity to regional and cultural aspirations, has been trying to contain these demands through coercive measures. The uneven distribution of powers between the Union and the units of the Federation has been evoked sharp reactions from states which has been clamouring for more autonomy.

### Regionalism and regional separatism

After the Indian Independence, regionalism emerged as a main threat to the Indian unity. Regionalism needs to be first understood for appreciating its role in Indian politics. Local patriotism and loyalty to a locality or region or state and its language and culture do not constitute regionalism. They are quite consistent with National Patriotism and loyalty to the nation. The pride of a particular region or state is also not regionalism. An individual can be conscious on her/his regional identity itself may be, being a Tamil, a Punjabi, a Bengali, or a Gujarati act without being any the less

proud of being an Indian.

What to be considered as a regionalist, defending the federal features of the constitution is also not to be seen as regionalism. The demand for a separate state within the Indian Union or for an autonomous region with in an existing state, or for devolution of power below the state level, may be objected to several practical grounds, but not as regionalist, unless it is put forward in a spirit of hostility to the rest of the population of a state. If the interests of one region or state are asserted against the county as a whole or against another region in a hostile manner and a conflict is promoted on the basis of such alleged interests it can be dubbed as regionalism.

Since 1947, India has faced very little inter regional conflicts, the major exception being the politics of DMK in Tamilnadu. Regionalism could have flourished in India if any region or state had felt that it was being culturally dominated or discriminated against. Selig Harrison, the US scholar who argued that, in the context of 1960 the most dangerous decades had seen a major threat to Indian unity because of conflict between the national government and the region, asserted their cultural identities. But Nehru's statement on cultural diversity proclaimed, the different areas of India have had full cultural autonomy and been enabled to fully satisfy their legitimate aspirations.

Economic inequality among different states and regions could be a potential source of regionalism in India. At independence, some regions were more backward than others. Such areas around Calcutta, Bombay and Madras had undergone modern industrial development. For example, in 1948 Bombay and West Bengal accounted for more than 59 % of the total industrial capital of the country and more than 64% of the national industrial output. The agricultural sector had stagnated under colonialism, but comparatively more in Eastern India than in Northern or Southern India. And the regional economic disparity was also reflected in per

capita income.

The central government adopted such policies to influence the rates of growth in poorer states and regions so as to reduce their economic distance from the richer states and regions. Central Government appoint a Commission to study the regional disparities and commission gave recommendations to government, to reduce interstate disparity by giving preferential treatment to the poorer states, by allocating large grants to them than their population would warrants and by transferring resources from the better of states to them.

Planning was considered as the powerful instrument to remove regional inequality. the second plan reflected this objective and third plan explicitly stated that balance the development of different parts of the country, extension of the benefits of economic progress to the less developed regions and widespread diffusion of industry are among the major aims of planned development. Under planning, the public sector enterprises balanced regional growth. Bihar and Madhya Pradesh have gained the most from search investment, Assam, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir and North Eastern states have also benefited a great deal from the development of infrastructures especially roads. From 1956 to 1991 government to grid location of industries in backward areas, and nationalization of private banks, the extension of network in backward areas. And also, the poverty eradication programs, such as food for work program and the Intensive rural development programs, extension of educational facilities, Health and Family planning, Public Distribution system have favored to the backward States.

In 1960, when the green revolution began, and investment in rural infrastructure and technological innovation was concentrated in Punjab, Haryana and western UP. It caused to increase the regional agricultural disparity. The spread of green revolution technology

during the 1970s to Andhra Pradesh, Tamilnadu, Karnataka, Eastern UP and Rajasthan and in 1980, to the Eastern states of Bihar, West Bengal, Orissa and Assam had redressed the regional imbalance to a certain extent. Economic mobility of population through Migration of unskilled Labour from the backward regions and of skilled Labour to them can also contribute to the lessening of regional disparity. There were happening a large scale of migration from one region to another. Such States, Himachal Pradesh, Orissa, Bihar and Kerala have benefited from out migration and just as Bengal, Gujarat and Maharashtra have benefited from in migration. And the states like Punjab, Karnataka have had the benefit of both out and in migration.

The backward States have a lower level of infrastructural facilities, like power, irrigation, roads, telephones and modern markets for agricultural produce, etc. Comparing with the other developing States, it creates the feeling of regional disparity. And the political and administrative failure also reasoned for the backwardness. For example, the Bihar and UP are classic cases of the states recorded as the high level of corruption, sheer bad administration, deteriorating law and order. And all these regional economic inequalities create threat against National unity and political stability. In 1950s, a form of regionalism has been emerged with a slogan of 'the sons of the soil' doctrine. It is the view that a state specifically belongs to the main linguistic group inhabiting it or that the state constitutes the exclusive 'Homeland' of its main language speakers who are 'the sons of the soil' or the 'local' residents. All others, who live there and whose mother tongue is not the state's main language, are considered to be 'outsiders'. In the struggle for the appropriation of economic resources and economic opportunities, the language loyalty and regionalism were used to systematically exclude the 'outsiders' from the economic life of the state.

The 'sons of the soil' movement demanded for the reservation in employment and education for the local persons in the state. The militant anti-migrant and 'Sons of the soil' movements were mainly cantered in the urban areas of Assam, Telangana, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Orissa. In Maharashtra, the movement was led by Shiv Sena under the leadership of Bal Thackeray, which appealed to Extreme regional chauvinism and assumed fascist proportions. The Shiv Sena demanded that preference in jobs and small business should be given to Maharashtrians who were defined as those whose mother tongue was Marathi. The militant organization rising the slogan of 'Maharashtra for the Maharashtrians'. This movement basically against the South Indian people especially the Tamil. and 'Sons of the soil' movement in Assam and Telangana which also assumed serious proportions and were quite complex had some additional and distinctive features.

The problem posed by the 'sons of the soil' doctrine is still somewhat a minor one and there is no ground of pessimism on that score. And this movement didn't threaten the unity of the country or the process of nation in the making. In the pre-independent times, the Indian National Congress was unable to establish political roots in the Jammu and Kashmir. There is a powerful political force in the state was the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim conference formed in 1932. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah was the strongest among the Muslims in the Kashmir Valley and allied with the Indian National Congress.

### Jammu and Kashmir

The Kashmir problem has occupied in the central position of Indian politics. Kashmir was one of the princely states of India, which, under British rule, Kashmir had enjoyed a semi-autonomous status. At the time of independence these semi-autonomous states all theoretically reverted to sovereignty, where real choices were continued to merger with either India or

Pakistan. Most of all princely states were merged by choice, coercive persuasion or Pakistan's population was predominantly Muslims and India's population was predominantly Hindu.

But in the particular case of Kashmir, the state's population was predominantly Muslims and its ruler was a Hindu. Pakistan and India were forced to Kashmir to join with their territory. But they didn't and demanded the option for full independence. When Pakistan forced the issue by allowing irregular and Pakistan army elements to advance towards the state capital of Srinagar, which precipitated the formal, though reluctant and originally limited and conditional Accession of the state into the Indian union, followed by the first Indo – Pakistan war Kashmir was informally dividing into two parts which the largest and the most populous remained with India.

Kashmir's importance in India politics arises from several interrelated features of its history and status in the Indian union. Later, Kashmir was integrated into the Indian union under which peculiar constitutional circumstances. Under article 370 of the constitution of India, the Indian parliament cannot legislate on items listed on either the union or concurrent list of powers without the approval of the Kashmir legislature. Assembly, along with the other special features, it gives to the state of Jammu and Kashmir a kind of region autonomy from the early times, the reluctant Hindu nationalist were viewed that to the special status of Kashmir as unwarranted and they demanded the abrogation of article 370 under full integration of the state into Indian union like every other states. And today the history of Kashmir has changed, the right-wing political government has withdrawn the special status of Kashmir, the article 370 in Indian Constitution.

Kashmir at Independence was a Muslim majority state, it divided into three distinct culture regions. The Kashmir Valley, Jammu and Ladakh. the population of Kashmir Valley mostly 95

percentage Muslim and predominantly Kashmiri speaking. Jammu population was comparatively less than that of the valley, who were the primarily speakers of Dogri, a Punjabi language. Ladakh is bigger than Jammu and Kashmir but its population was less than 150,000 people. And these three regions of Jammu and Kashmir have different political orientation and regional separatist movements. The Hindu people in Jammu have supported militant Hindu parties which have demanded the full integration of the entire state in the Indian Union and the abrogation of article 370.

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Kashmir had faced such internal conflict from Independence and until the outbreak of internal war in 1989. The main issues in Kashmir had based on its status, regional conflicts within the state, and the relationship between the states and the central government, all are inseparably interconnected. These interrelated issues have main three principal faces. First one is, beginning from 1947 and until 1953, is one of the close Alliance between the central government under Nehru's leadership and Sheikh Abdullah, who became the Prime Minister of state. Sheikh Abdullah was placed between two extreme forces in the politics of the states, one of them expressed pro Pakistan argument and others had demanded to full merger with India. In Jammu, Praja Parishad supported Militant Hindu nationalism, they demanded for the abrogation of article 370. Sheikh Abdullah, took distinct position on the status of Kashmir, which implied something beyond regional autonomy, which some central leaders read as covert support for independence for Kashmir

from both India and Pakistan. In 1953 sheikh Abdullah was dismissed by the central government and arrested.

The second phase was Kashmir's post-independence political history, it was more complex. In that period the alliance between the state and central governments was not able to contain completely alternative political forces or to resolve underlying political issues. The National conference and the Indian National Congress were ultimately merged formally, old political forces reemerged on opposites, a plebiscite front, supported by Sheikh Abdullah, along with other groups supporting a popular vote to determine the ultimate future of Kashmir, the other side, The JK Singh calling for abrogation of Article 370, and full merger with India and on the other. In 1974, Mrs. Gandhi released sheikh Abdullah from jail and reached an accord with him in 1975 under which he accepted a finality to Kashmir's accession to India, while the centre agreed to retain Article 370. And he re-established his national conference party, he was appointed as chief minister of the state.

A third explanation, the central government has been not "soft and permissive" but manipulative and interventionist and that it has not kept its promise to respect in practice the limited autonomy granted to Jammu and Kashmir under the terms of accession the Indian state has failed in Kashmir as elsewhere in India to provide an economic environment. Lacking satisfying life chances and the political opportunities to express their dissatisfactions and seeing the corrupt behaviour of the state's politicians and the violation by the Indian government of its promises the unemployment, under employment, newly educated youth of Kashmir here taken to arms under the belief that an Independent Kashmir. In Kashmir, the Issues have been complicated by the internationalization of the dispute, but in the contemporary times the NDA led central

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In Kashmir, the issues have been complicated by the internationalisation of the dispute, but in the contemporary times, the NDA led central government has been withdraw the article 370 in Indian constitution, it would have dismissed special states of Kashmir.

### Punjab and North Eastern States

The Religious difference and communal organizations on religious lines were more important than the language difference in Punjab in the nineteenth century and up to the partition of the country in 1947. In which Punjab and the Sikhs were at the central part of the crisis. The Gurdwara reform movement at the 1920s, brought a critical change in the institutional vitality and political organization of the Sikhs as a community, for it brought into being two organization which became the central religious and political organization of the Sikhs. These are the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabhandak committee [SGPC], and the Akali Dal, SGPC was a central managing committee for the Punjab gurdwara, the Akali Dal is the principal political organizations at Sikhs in the Punjab before and after Independence.

The partition of India, during the time of independence would create such crisis in the Sikh community. In the post –independent era, the Sikh community demanded a special status, that Akali Dal leaders arguing for the inclusion of the Sikhs in the general process of reorganization of status in the 1950s and early 1960s, but this argument was denied. After a change in the leadership of Akali Dal in 1966 and after the Indo-Pakistan war at 1965, in which Sikh soldiers and the Sikh population of Punjab played critical roles, was the demand for a Punjabi Suba finally conceded by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

In Punjab, there have been three outstanding Issues which have not been resolved in the two-and –a half decades since the reorganization. The status of the capital city of Chandigarh, which remain still the joint capital of Punjab and Haryana, the status of some mixed Hindi and Punjabi speaking territories in which Hindus are the predominant population and the division, for irrigation purposes, of river waters which run through the territories at south states.

The Marxist left in India, put forward the economic factors in seeking an explanation for the correct crisis as profits declined in agriculture and increasing numbers of young Sikhs sought non-agricultural employment in Punjab. In the Indian armed forces, and abroad in the Persian Gulf and the u k, such opportunities either declined or failed to keep face with the increased demand. Such factors have probably contributed to disaffection and discontent among Sikhs, the absence of economic opportunities which have led to its internal crisis. The Sikh community has maintained internal cohesion and orthodoxy and the separateness of the Sikh from Hindus, the development of a violent confrontation between militant orthodox Sikh group and a heterodox Hindu-Sikh sect. all of these conflicts created a figure of Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, an important Sikh preacher, who aimed the consolidation of the Sikh community.

The fundamental transformation in the context of central –state relation under Mr. Gandhi leadership and that consequent adoption by the central government of an entirely different role in Punjab politics. During the Punjab Suba movement in the 1960s, prime minister Nehru was secure in his power. In new Delhi and gave his full support in the Punjab to chief minister Pratap Singh Kairon, who was the one of the prominent figures in that state's politics for a decade until his assassination on 1964. A untied congress leadership then followed a strategy of dividing the Akalidal, through a variety of methods: designed to displace the more extremist Akali

leaders and aid more moderate leaders to come to power. In 1960s, the congress successfully exploited division in the Akali Dal to displace master Tara Singh and aid the rise to power of the more moderate Sant Fatch Singh, then in 1980s congress supported the extremist Sant Bhindranwale, to undermine the moderate leadership of the Akali Dal, the extremist groups under the leadership of Bhindranwale had begun to assassinate by Hindu opponents even innocent Hindus as well.

After a series of assassination of innocent Hindus in the Punjab and with a general election due by the end of the year in 1984, to launch an assault on the golden temple in Amritsar, in whose incants Sant Bhindrawale and his followers had taken sanctuary Mrs. Gandhi was herself assassinated by the Sikh bodyguards on October 31, 1984. And a massacre of thousands of innocent poor Sikhs was murdered in Delhi after Mrs Indira's death. Mr. Rajeev Gandhi, the new prime minister reached an account with the Akali Dal leadership in September 1985 to resolve all the outstanding issues. Under the terms, Chandigarh was to be transferred to Punjab within a year, the other substantive issues in dispute were to be submitted to commission and courts, for adjudication, Sikh army deserters of Sikhs in places outside Delhi were to be conducted.

In the elections held a after in 1985 in Punjab, Akali Dal won a majority of seats in the Punjab legislature and formed a government under Surjith Singh Baranala. Under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA), brought an end to terrorist actions and the killing of innocent Hindus in the Punjab. The central government again plead the Punjab under presidents' rule in May 1987. Rajiv Gandhi's policies seemed at first to involve a silent rejection of his mother's and a return on the pluralist policies of his grandfather, the failure to implement most at the provisions on accord with the Akali Dal in the way of a settlement of the conflict in the Punjab and the return of civil order.

In the 1989, Lok Sabha election, polling was allowed in Punjab in which a faction of the Akali Dal led by one of the released militants, Simranjit Singh Mann, won six of the thirteen Punjabi seats, after the election, the new prime minister V. P Singh visited Golden Temple to change the atmosphere before making a number of efforts to involve all parties and Akali leaders and groups into negotiations for a solution to be impasse.

Whatever, the present impasse was reached neither because the Sikhs are as intractable minority who must inevitably have a state of their own now because of falling farm prices or lack of employment opportunities for Sikh youth. It made the struggle for power at the centre of the Indian union simply, the Punjab crisis of federal system.

### Centre State Relations

The Constitution of India provides a dual polity with a clear division of powers between the Union and the States. Indian constitution contains such provisions to regulate the dimensions of the relations between the centre and the states. The word „Federal“ is nowhere used in the constitution of India. Article 1 merely states that “India, that is Bharat, shall be a union of states.” About the nature of Indian Federal system Dr. B.R. Ambedkar clarified that „it established a dual polity with the union at the centre and the state in the periphery, each endowed with sovereign powers to be exercised in the field, assigned to them by the constitution. The union is not a league of states, united in a loose relationship; nor are the states the agencies of the Union, deriving powers from it. Both the Union and the states are created by the constitution. The one is not subordinate to the other in its own field; the authority of one is not subordinate to the other in its own field; the authority of one is co-ordinate with that of the other.” Basically, the relationship between center and state are divided into three, Legislative relations, administrative relations and financial relations.

There are three Legislative lists, Union List, State list and Concurrent list. Union List consists of 97 subjects of all India importance. The most important subjects in the union list are – Defense of India, Naval, Military and Air forces, energy, foreign affairs, Railways etc. Concurrent list consists of 47 subjects. The subjects included in the concurrent list have varying degrees of local and national interest. State list consists of 66 subjects, which are primarily of regional interest. The state governments have full authority to make laws on any of the subjects mentioned in the state list, e.g., public order, police, prisons, local government, public health etc.

The Central Government does not possess power to legislate on subjects enumerated in the State List, but under certain special conditions the Union Parliament can make laws even on these subjects. In the national Interest Article 249, under Proclamation of National Emergency article 250, By Agreement between States Article 252, to Implement treaties Article 253, under Proclamation of President's Rule Article 356, The administrative jurisdiction of the Union and the State Governments extends to the subjects in the Union list and State list respectively. The Constitution thus defines the clauses that deal with the administrative relations between Centre and States.

## MODULE 3

### Changes in the Social Structure

#### Industrialization

Science is a significant development in human history that produces a systematic knowledge of nature. Technology plays a vital role in scientific studies and their applications. In this sense, technology has a utilitarian goal. It has developed mainly to decrease the complexities in labour for common people. This goal is visible in almost every sphere such as industry, agriculture, transport, communication etc. The quick changes that we are experiencing in our daily life are related to the growth of new techniques, new inventions, and new modes of production. The expansion of modern technology in the industry has influenced not only our economic life but also our social and cultural system.

Industrialisation is a development of technological advancement from domestic production with simple tools to large-scale factory-based production. However, sociologically, the term denotes a process of economic and social changes forming out of the change in the structure of the industry. Industrialisation contains a wide range of social factors that deeply affect the character of social life. For example, factories produce elaborate division of labour, new work culture, new social relations etc. Industrialization in India has a broad history ranging from pre-independence. There has been a wide network of domestic and cottage industries that existed from the period of British colonial rule. But modern large-scale industry came only after the 19th century as the result of the Industrial Revolution in Europe. In 1850, the first major industries have started and in 1914, India had established the world's largest jute manufacturing industry, the

fifth largest cotton textile industry and the third-largest railway network. In this manner, India had almost a century of industrial development near to independence. After independence, the growth of industrialisation has significantly accelerated during the periods of Five-Year Plans.

The development in the metal industry is the most significant matter in Indian industrial history. In 1951, there were only two major units producing iron and steel. The number of such major steel plants increased to six by the 1980s with an installed capacity of 80 lakh tones. The country has made considerable progress in the following years in various fields like agricultural tractors, electronics, fertilizer etc. The textile industry has changed to cotton and jute textiles than to a large number of units producing different types of synthetic fibers. Another important feature of industrial growth after independence has been the rapid expansion of the public sector enterprises. These produced diverse products such as steel, coal, heavy and light engineering goods, locomotives, aircraft, petroleum products and fertilizers. A brief sketch of industrial growth in India may give us an idea of the extent of industrialization that has taken place in the country since attaining independence.

Industrialization is not only a development in the scientific field but it also changed the social life of people. Our economic life has witnessed an incredible structural change in the period of industrialization. Production has been brought largely to the factories. Elaborate division of labour, specialization of tasks and the growth of class within industrial workers have taken place as the result of industrialization. Likewise, the nature of agricultural production has also changed because of the changes in agricultural practices. With the changes in agricultural practices, modifications have also occurred in farming relations and the life-styles of farm households. Besides, industrialization has changed the family mode of production and the number of

women increase in farming activities, factories to perform different tasks. The economic stability helped to change the social status given to women in the society and they got more voices in decision making in the family. These changes in roles have occurred due to occupational diversification that has been brought by industrialization. The breaking of joint families into nuclear families began to happen during this age. The traditional joint family was a multifunctional institution. It had numerous economic, educational, recreational, socializing and biological functions. Developments of transport and communication with the beginning of railways, automobiles and marine transports have resulted in increased spatial mobility and the rate of internal and external migration.

Changes were also visible in the system of social stratification. Significant changes are observed in the case of caste system, which is an important structural reality of Indian social system. The occupational diversification has made several occupations 'caste free'. The occupational divisions began to demolish during that age. Jobs divided to upper caste and lower castes were significant in India before that period. That situation had tremendous changes with the implementations done by industrialization. In factories, labours were forced to do particular works despite of their castes. So, one of the major contributions given by industrialization can be point on the change in social stratification based on caste.

### Urbanization

Urbanisation is process caused by industrialization in which people instead of living in villages start living in towns and cities. The main factor behind this mass migration is the transformation of agriculture-based habitat to non-agricultural habitat. The growth of urban centres is the result of growing industrial and service functions. The growth of urban population

accompanied by the rise in the size of towns and cities is an important aspect of urbanization. These centres are essentially non-agricultural in character. Urbanisation as a structural process of change is related to industrialisation but it is not always the result of industrialisation. Industrialisation is always connected with economic growth but we cannot say the same about urbanisation. 'Urbanism' is a kind of social life produced by Urban environment. This term was coined by Lois Wirth, an eminent member of the Chicago school. Social life in cities is more formal and impersonal. The relationship is based on a complex division of labour and is contractual in nature.

Urbanisation in India is a land of villages and will remain so for decades to come. However, it does not mean that cities have been absent from this vast sub-continent.

Existence of cities in India can be traced back to as early as third millennium B.C. Archaeological excavations reveal older traces of urbanization. Historians tell us that a truly urban civilization emerged in the Indus Valley with Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa as important urban centers. In addition to these two cities, several other urban settlements such as Kalibangan in northern Rajasthan, Lothal in Gujarat and Banwali in Haryana also emerged as the major centres. In the subsequent period, urbanization was not confined to a particular area. This phase of urbanization finds mention in the post- Vedic literature in the north and Sangam literature in the south. The Buddhist texts also mention the existence of the urban centers.

The British Indian administration promoted urbanization on a large scale. The major port towns of Kolkata, Mumbai and Chennai owe their beginning, growth and importance to the colonial efforts. Similarly, regional summer capitals were established in remote mountainous areas like Srinagar, Shillong and Shimla. The princely states did not develop as fast but even

they had capital towns. Some of the princely states like Hyderabad, Indore, Jaipur and Mysore had population exceeding one lakh. The urban scenario changed remarkably after independence. The proportion of urban population to the total population increased from 17.6% in 1951 to 25.7% in 1991. The number of cities with population of one million or more increased from 5 to 23 during the same period. Migrants are mainly employed in manufacturing and service occupations. Besides, the seasonal migration of unskilled labourers, too, has become common. We find labourers from Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Orissa working in agricultural farms of Punjab, Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh. Labourers begin with seasonal migration and later on start settling permanently in areas of their choice.

The urbanization has altered the structure of joint family as a result of occupational diversification. Consequently, the functions of family and kinship have declined significantly. The traditional family norms are relaxed and interpersonal relationships have become more formal. The nature of love and affection in interpersonal relationship has also changed. While children and their mothers receive considerable attention, sentiments and attachment towards other relatives have weakened. Similarly, the division of domestic duties between wife and husband is changing in the urban settings. They both share domestic duties, as there is no other adult member available to share the burden. Thus, social life in urban areas faces isolation due to diminishing kinship obligations. Another visible change is in the domain of caste identity. Urban inhabitants participate in networks that include persons of several castes. Individual achievement and modern status symbols have become more important than caste identity. Caste norms are not strictly maintained during that period. It is evident in commensal relations, marital alliances and in occupational relations. It is, thus, possible to suggest that urban way of life has made people think more as individuals than as members of a particular caste.

The importance of education began to improve in urban settings. The level of education, nature of occupation and the level of income are now major indicators of one's achievement in an urban setup. Therefore, people recognise education, occupation and income as fundamentals for higher social status.

The expansion of urban centres has also given rise to a variety of problems. The physical space is dingy, quality of life is poor and urban governance is unimaginative. Overcrowding and pollution, sub-standard housing and slums, crime and delinquency, alcoholism and drug abuse are a few of them. The impact of urban crowding is visible in declining services in the areas of housing, water supply, sanitation, transport, and power supply and employment opportunity. Increasing number of homeless people, high rate of rent and a scramble for the few available houses are commonly found in most of the cities and towns. Thus, urban areas have more people than they can support with the available infrastructure. The slum is an area of dingy neglected houses where people live in poverty without minimum civic amenities. The estimates of India's urban population living in slums vary widely. However, according to an estimate, not less than 45 million people were living in slums in 1995 and as the urban population is increasing fast, their number must have had increased by now. It is said that the Indian population living in slums is more than the total population of about 107 countries of the world.

### Major Trends and Processes of Urbanization in India

The Rapid growth of urban population in Asian countries in the second half of the 20th century has led to the speculation of urban explosion in the Region. There were created the concept of over-urbanization, pseudo-urbanization etc. in the academic arena. They argued that "the fulcrum of urban growth" has dramatically shifted from Africa and Latin America to the countries in Asia.

India has been considered to be a major contributor to the incremental urban population, both due to its large demographic weight as well as the dynamics of urbanization. The developmental analysts argue that these development in employment opportunities would further accelerate urban growth by linking the country with global economy, leading to rise in indigenous investment as also flood of capital from outside the country. Understandably, there will be significant increase in employment opportunities in the cities, strengthening the attractive features to the migrants. Even when the industrial units are located in neighbouring rural settlements, in a few years, the latter would acquire urban status.

The Eleventh Five Year Plan of India (2007-12) holding urbanization as the “key indicator” of economic and social development and that the cities “will be the locus and engine of economic growth over the next two decades” for the realization of “an ambitious goal of 9%–10% growth in GDP” is in line with this perspective. There is, however, an equally strong and vocal viewpoint that the process of urban development in India is not necessarily positive as it is associated with accentuation of regional and interpersonal inequality and, unfortunately, little reduction in poverty.

The birth and development of urban cities can be regarded as one of the major products of colonial rule. There were many spatial structures and urban settlements have formed to ease the colonial strategies here. The colonial economy, through the establishment of few port and administrative towns, generated strong centrifugal pulls manifested in commodity and population flows towards them. This had the inevitable consequence of weakening the centripetal forces exerted by the inter-settlement linkages. The four urban agglomerations (UAs), namely, Calcutta, Madras, Bombay and Karachi (presently in Pakistan) were the focal points of mechanism for generating economic surplus in India.

The pre-existing rural-urban interactions were gradually replaced by export-import oriented process. Movement of population became necessary to sustain the new urban centres and the new plantation fields. These cities, unlike their counterpart in the developed countries of the world, were not a product of economic development. The interactive system evolved through the centuries, between a large number of handicrafts, service and commerce-based towns and their hinterland of primary production as also between large cities and smaller towns in the hierarchy, were the major casualties of this process of urbanization. A few of these towns were developed into the major centres of export and collection of goods. The new urban centres, endowed primarily with instincts for trade, failed to disseminate growth impulses. Regarding India currently experiencing hyper urbanization and the trend would continue for the next few decades, are mostly based on the absolute population figures. Understandably, these work out to be high due to the impacts of the base year rural or urban population of India which accounts for 67 per cent of the total population of South-Central Asia and 29% that of Asia. Needless to mention that inferences regarding dynamics of urban development based on the share of India in the total or incremental urban population and its comparison with that of other countries or regions can easily be misleading. A study reveals that the growth of urban population of Latin America and Africa were incredibly high. The growth in urban population in India has at best been modest and fluctuated significantly over the past few decades. The rate was reasonably high in the fifties, fell sharply during sixties but reached its peak in the seventies.

There were significant ups and downs Indian urbanisation in later periods. The percentage of urban population in India has gone up slowly from about 11 in 1901 to 17 in 1951 and then to 28 in 2001. The growth rate of urban population during 1941-51 was fairly high, 3.5% per annum, which came down to 2.3% in the

following decade. The definition of urban centres was not standardised in the first senses after independence. Formalisation of the concept of urban centre in 1961 Census led to significant fall in the growth rate. Making adjustment for these anomalies, one would note that urban growth has been rising systematically during 1951-81, after which it has started going down. The highest urban growth of 3.8% was recorded during seventies but subsequently it has come down to 3.1% in the eighties and 2.7% in the nineties. The percentage of lifetime male migrants in urban areas declined from 33.6 to 32.4 and that of intercensal male migrants from 18.5 to 16.9 during 1971-81.

Migration of females into urban areas, too, declined but at a slower pace, as that is governed by socio-cultural factors that change sluggishly.

An analysis of the distribution of urban population across size categories of urban centres reveals that the process of urbanisation in India has been large city oriented. This is manifesting in an increasing concentration of urban population in class 1 cities over the past several decades. The spatial concentration can be seen in terms of a massive increase in the percentage share of class 1 cities - having population above one hundred thousand population. This has often been attributed to faster growth of large cities, without taking into consideration the fact that the number of these cities has gone up over the years. Indeed, the primary factor for the increasing dominance of these cities is graduation of lower order towns into class category. In 1901, there were only 24 class 1 cities that have gone up to 393 in 2001.

In addition to the factor of increase in the number of large cities, faster demographic growth in these has also contributed to the top-heaviness of urban structure.

The variation in the share of urban to total population across the

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states is high. The pattern, however, has undergone significant changes over the past few decades. A large proportion is currently concentrated in six most developed states, namely Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Punjab and West Bengal, accounting for about half of the country's urban population. This can largely be attributed to colonial inheritance, all these states reporting percentage of urban population much above the national average of 27.8 in 2001. Several studies have shown that the levels of urbanisation in the states with high per capita income are generally high, the opposite being the case of less urbanised states. Since Independence until 1991, most of the developed states have shown medium or low growth of urban population. In contrast, high urban growth was registered in economically backward states such as Assam, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, the states also having low percentages of urban population. The small north eastern states deserve special mention as they too have recorded rapid pace of urbanisation due to the process of their economic integration with the national economy. This, unfortunately, did not get reflected in their levels of economic development.

India has begun to enjoy a distinct advantage in its labour market compared to several developed and less developed countries due to the fast-changing age distribution of population. Its population growth which was maintained between 2.1 and 2.2% per annum during the first four decades since Independence has come down to below 2% during the nineties. As a consequence, the country has a high percentage of population in the age group 15-59 years which is likely to go up further in the next three to four decades. Further, worker population ratio in the adult age groups has been rising in recent years. Consequently, the country would enjoy significant demographic dividends during the next few decades; unavailable to most other countries. India's age pyramid has the typical shape of a country with young and fast -growing

population. Currently, it has about 63% of population in 15-64 age groups. A rapid decrease in the percentage of children (aged less than 15) will continue to occur during the next few decades, much more than in case other Asian countries. This is because the process of fertility decline in the former has begun only recently and this would affect and alter its age structure in the next two decades. The figure for people in this economically active age group has been predicted to be 68% in 2030 while that for China would go down from its current level to 67% only. India would thus be overtaking most of the developing countries (EIAS 2006).

The low share of children and aged in India would imply that it will have relatively low dependency burden. All these are being viewed as positive factors from developmental perspective of the country. The health expenditures for the aged (as a percentage to income) are growing exponentially in per capita terms in many developed countries due to increase in their aged population. This, however, may not shoot up in case of India (due to sluggish growth in life expectancy), enabling the country to make investment in water supply, sanitation and other infrastructure facilities where it is highly deficient. A large part of the female adult population in many of the states in India remains untapped and this would change in the next few decades. Stronger labour mobilization among women –in line with what has been recorded in most South-East Asian countries as also Bangladesh– is a distinct possibility. The nature of economic growth in the country, however, does not guarantee that the growth in job opportunities will equal the increase in working-age population or be higher than that, to wipe out the backlog of unemployment. There may be a surplus in labour supply on one hand and growing job expectations on the other.

The nature of industries began to change with the process of liberalisation. The employment in the organised manufacturing

(ASI data) and service (DGET data) sectors has shown negligible growth. Private industries within this sector have grown significantly during past one and a half decades. The public units, on the other hand, have registered a negative growth in their workforce. Importantly, there has been a steady decline in the proportion of regular/salaried male workers, as reported by the NSSO survey. It may be argued that the informal sector in recent years has experienced some amount of formalization leading to employ people on a regular basis. Entrepreneurs seeking to take advantage of the emerging global market have come to recognize that they would fail in competition unless they go in for standardization of their products, meeting the specifications of the customers, respecting the schedules of delivery and organizing production and marketing activities on a somewhat formal basis. In order to take advantage of this global market, they have resorted to a model of 'informal formalization' in the unorganized sector.

Many of the rapidly growing sectors of urban economy, in small scale manufacturing, trade, commerce and entertainment activities have tended to employ workers on a regular basis. Employment of domestic help and other supporting services too have followed a similar pattern, as the men and women working in global sectors must have a regular support system in the house, to meet the time requirements of these sectors. The increase in the rates of unemployment can at least partially be attributed to this process of informal formalisation. Many of the illiterate rural migrants like dispossessed farmers; rural artisans etc., not having the minimum level of conversation skills or market smartness are not able to put a foothold in the urban job market. So, this has resulted in an employment divide.

The urban centres in India are characterised by extreme heterogeneity in terms of their socio-economic features. Large cities exhibit distinctly lower poverty ratios, besides higher

demographic growth, when compared to the lower order towns. Poverty in million plus cities is around 14% in 1999-00 compared the figure of 18% in 1993-94. The medium category cities/towns, with population between 50,000 and 1 million, report poverty levels of 20% and 28% at the two time points. The corresponding percentage figures in small towns viz.

with 50,000 or less people, are as high as 33 and 24, slightly higher than that in even rural areas. There are reasons to be concerned about the poverty situation in lower categories of urban settlements, as much as in rural areas. Low poverty in larger cities is due to expanded economic opportunities and semi-skilled employment available in the former. These cities provide better social and physical infrastructure including educational facilities which results in higher factor productivity. Class 1 cities have been able to attract private investment from the national as also global capital market, particularly during the past couple of decades, resulting in significantly higher levels and quality of infrastructural facilities. Indeed, larger population coverage through primary, secondary and other schooling and technical training facilities is reflected in higher percentage of literate and educated persons in these cities. Also, these are able to attract educated migrants from all over the country seeking higher education or skilled employment in modern and capital-intensive activities that have grown significantly in recent years. A macro-overview of the mobility pattern reveals that economic deficiency is not the only motivation for migration decisions, even for the seasonal migrants. People migrate out of both poor and rich households although the reasons for migration and the nature of jobs sought by them are different. The migration of is determined by socio- cultural aspects as well.

Poverty among urban households classified by the number of members reporting mobility to urban spaces. The poorest households are those that have one or a few of their members as in-migrants. However, when the all the members are in-migrants, the households are observed to belong to economically better-off strata. These households are in fact wealthier than the non-migrant households as the incidence of poverty here is the lowest. For identifying the key determinants of poverty for individuals and households residing in different size class of urban centres, a logit regression model has been

employed to the NSS data for the year 1999-00, taking consumption expenditure, employment status, level of education, migration status etc. as explanatory factors. Educational attainment emerges as the single most significant factor, impacting on poverty for different types of migrants and non-migrants and all size class of urban centres. At the aggregative level, one would note that with increase in level of education, probability of being poor reduces by a factor 0.855. It shows that this probability declines monotonically with increase in level of education for all the categories of population.

A change in the perspective for urban development in the liberal system for governance and management of cities is clearly visible in India and in several other developing countries, since the mid-eighties. The problems of infrastructural deficiency and the incapacity of the state and local governments to make adequate investments to improve these has been responsible for this high-profile policy shift. Empowering the urban local bodies to take up some of the developmental responsibilities along with management of infrastructure and public amenities is perceived as the most crucial elements in the development. Decentralisation is to be carried out also within the cities up to the locality levels, by engaging the civil society and community groups in city management and decision making regarding its future growth for meeting the challenge of this crisis. An attempt has been made here to empirically examine the validity of the stipulations scaffolding this perspective and analyse its impact on the availability of infrastructure and basic amenities in urban centres across different size categories as also across wards within the cities. It was envisaged at the time of Independence that the government would assume the major responsibility of designing the settlement structure and morphology of the cities.

Under the new system of urban governance, the Central

government and Reserve Bank of India, have tried to impose some kind of "financial discipline" on the concerned state government departments and urban local bodies to ensure that their programmes and projects rely increasingly on internal resource mobilization, loans from development cum banking institutions and capital market at non-subsidised interest rates. They have also launched measures for reforming the land and capital market and specified conditionalities for resource mobilization for the state governments and local bodies. After failing to persuade the lower tiers of governance for compliance through policy declarations and administrative measures, programmes have been launched and new institutions set up to provide special grants and subsidized funds, liked with the adoption of the measures. Attempts are also being made to get greater engagement of private agencies in the management and future development of city infrastructure and civic amenities. It is however clear that private sector would not be able to bring about the changes in urban land and capital market and ensure the desired level of infrastructural investment without state becoming a partner. Public agencies are therefore being restructured and new institutions being created to help the cities take up the developmental responsibilities upon themselves, although the democratic structure and bureaucratic inertia have made the process somewhat slow.

The producers of the pattern of demographic and economic growth, particularly in large cities, were master plans created in the post-independent India, with the support of the para- statal agencies under the state government. This brought in physical planning controls on location of economic activities and urban land-use through Master Plans. This in effect tried to put ceiling on the absorptive capacity in different areas. It helped in diverting population growth, low valued activities, and squatters into marginalized areas within large cities or their peripheries, creating select high quality residential areas in a

great level. The system of control, nonetheless, resulted in contraction of land supply in the market, enormous corruption, and many court cases that ultimately constrained investments on infrastructure and housing. These have been deterministic and rigid, inhibiting the dynamics of city growth through land use controls. The Constitutional Amendment Act envisages assignment of the responsibility of preparing and implementing development plans to ULBs. A large majority of these are, however, not equipped to take up the responsibility of planning, especially of launching capital projects. Considerable expertise is required to identify the infrastructural and industrial projects appropriate for the growth of the city in the context of its resource base, assess environmental implications and mobilise corresponding resources. Given the difficult financial situation of the bodies, it is unlikely that they will be able to strengthen their planning departments by recruiting technical and professional personnel in immediate future. This assistance is unlikely to come from the state government departments since they too do not have adequate professional staff or the resources to employ them. The only choice for the local bodies has, therefore, been to resort to financial intermediaries, credit rating agencies and private consultants. A large number of such agencies have come up in recent years, a few with assistance from international organisations.

A summary of the urbanization process in India reveals that the system of settlements based on interactions between a large number of handicrafts, service and commerce-based towns and their hinterland of primary production as also between large cities and smaller towns was disrupted during the colonial period. The country was gradually drawn into the orbit of the capitalistic system during two centuries of colonial rule but the political economy of the regime became an impediment to technological advancement in different sectors of the economy and led to a top-heavy urban structure. An analysis of the

contemporary urban scenario shows that the growth in urban population in India has at best been modest and fluctuating over the past few decades. It casts serious doubts on this perspective that Asia will be the epicentre of future urbanisation in the world, India playing a key role due to its demographic weights. It questions the future urban scenario as projected by various expert committees of the government as also Statistical Divisions of international agencies. It is arguing that the high growth perspective on urbanization is largely due to the methodology adopted by the UNPD as also the negative or ambivalent attitude of the policy makers towards RU migration. The high growth perspective provides justification for imposing restrictions on population mobility as also strengthens the demand of the urban elites to demand for larger infrastructural investment.

### Caste and Community

“Caste was the system of social life, in which Hinduism was expressed. Hinduism was the ideological and emotional buttress of caste.... Caste and Hinduism succeeded in doing in India, what no state, no conqueror and no economy was able to do – the establishment of a single unified system of society throughout the whole of India (accommodating numerous semi-autonomous communities arising at many times and in many places), a system of society, which was able to comprise a greater range of local differences in a single system than any society has previously accomplished.”

Caste system has always been a centre of attention for Westerners, politicians, intellectuals, activists, or reformers from other faiths. It has been both defended and opposed vehemently in the political circles of modern India. Many assaults have been made on caste-system, especially because of the deformities and rigidity developed into the system during a very long period of

its evolution and its being under alien rule. However, after each assault, caste system has re-emerged with greater force. In the past, British Imperial rulers and missionaries had criticized caste system vehemently. In recent past, caste has become more of a politician crutch. It is often misinterpreted as an exploitative social system for retaining economic and social status of certain vested interests of ruling class. Indian caste system, which has evolved an answer the requirements of civilization at a later phase of development of culture, was integrated with Varna system as enunciated in the ancient scriptures and Dharmasastras.

In India, stratification begins with a social group, called caste. Caste-system is different from class on some points. It is not concerned with persons individually, but with persons belonging to different social groups. Caste-system separates wealth from status, power from authority and knowledge from temptations of worldly comforts. All individuals within a caste group irrespective of one's financial position – are equal having similar rank, rights and duties. Its constituent members are supposed to be independent, yet their roles complementary. 'Caste', an oldest social institution – Caste system is one of the oldest social institutions in the world. Caste-system gives Indian society a distinguished identity and a solid social structure with a system of thought, way of life, and sense of direction. It covers almost the entire social fabric of India. Not only in the past, but at present also, caste system commands respect and attention of a common man in India as a natural, valid, and inevitable unit of society. It is popular not only amongst Hindus, but amongst other sects as well living in India, whether foreign or indigenous. Muslims or Christians, Sikhs or Buddhist could not remain immune from its caste system for long. They also have been influenced and absorbed many of the systems and practices of caste-system. An individual is a natural member of a family, which is the unit of an extended family, extended family of Kula

(clan), Kula of a tribe (Vish) and a tribe of a Jana or Jati (Caste). Caste is second only to the family and is a natural, valid, useful and inevitable unit of Indian society. Family, extended family, Kula, and Caste are fundamental social institutions. Caste is nothing but a large extended family bonded by same language, customs, thinking and way of living and occupation. Rules of endogamy, ritual purity, interdependence, specialization and hierarchical order of social units were its important traits. Closer relations amongst caste-fellows – A person's relations with members of his caste are closer than with those, belonging to other castes. Caste values, beliefs, prejudices, injunctions as well as distortions of reality are the indivisible part of a person's psyche and conscience. Internalized caste norms define an individual role in the society. It makes one feel good and loved, when he lives up to these norms, and anxious and guilty, when he transgresses them. In a way, caste is still second only to the family in widening a person's social radius and in getting importance in his/her private and occupational life.

Varna system developed into caste-system gradually – How small and primitive tribal in India transformed into Varna system and finally into caste system has been as following – Start during ancient pastoral society – The beginning of the system can be traced from the times of pastoral tribal society, when people started forming small groups mostly living in hilly areas, not far from rivers. Tribal communities were nomadic or semi nomadic and egalitarian. They depended on nature for its subsistence. Developed during Agricultural society – Gradually pastoral tribal society transformed into a settled agricultural society, confining its activities and life within a small area or territory. Agricultural society leisurely evolved its structures and systems over about 2000 years (roughly between 2000 BC to about 600 BC) and kept on coping with the changes slowly, time had brought in. As reflected in 'Rigveda', when people ceased to be a wandering people, started the early stages of Vedic Age. Clans

and tribes settled permanently in different parts of the country. Possession of land, slaves and hired laborers started. People hardly possessed more than what was needed for their subsistence/survival. The practice of cultivation, rise of crafts and iron tools transformed the egalitarian society into fully agricultural and stratified society sometime during 6th century BC.

After entering India, first Aryans conquered India's original inhabitants of Northern part of India, colonized and established kingdoms. Most of original inhabitants moved to Deccan and then south. During the period, it was possible to have high ranks, but not high social classes. Initially a simple class division was seen in the social structure, i.e., nobility and the ordinary tribesmen. The units of social-political organizations were family, clan, village, tribe, and Jana. Family was the unit of society headed by father. Three or four generations lived together, and probably owned property in common. Several families living in one locality formed 'grama' (village). A number of such fighting units dwelling in a particular region constituted a 'vis' (canton), 'Jana' (a group of tribes) consisted of a number of such cantons, with a king as their ruler. Mixing up of their culture with native culture of the land – Starting with arrival of Aryans in waves and mixing up of their culture with native culture of the land evolved a social structure based on the principles of "Varna" (giving birth to caste system), "Dharma" and "Karma", which together distributed, organized performance of various functions and contributed to the growth of Indian society. In the beginning, Varna – meaning color – guided the division of the society. These principles gave Vedic society a distinct character, defined roles and organized interrelationship of various sections of society. Fair skinned Aryans, being the conquerors, kept themselves on the top. They spread their language and culture all over the North. Many changes started taking place in the life, manners, religion, language, and literature of people. Social

structure bases on 'Varna' – Principle of 'Varna' had stratified Vedic society into four groups – Brahmins (intellectuals), Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaishyas (Businessmen) and shudras (service providers) according to aptitudes, occupation, and location of people. Aryan's dependents of Brahmins and Kshatriyas were the subject class. Vaishyas followed the profession of agriculture or cattle raising and formed the armed forces of their princes. The three classes were not rigidly separated. People, who were conquered and admitted into the fold of Aryan society, were looked upon as the lowest of the four classes. Conquered Kols and Dravid tribes formed the fourth class of 'Dasas' or 'Shudras'. Aryan princes did not regard 'Dasa' princes as inferior, for they made alliances with them. Possession of land, slaves and hired laborers started. People started producing and possessing more than they needed. The kings collected their surplus yields. The power of kings gradually increased. For regular collection, administrative and religious methods were devised.

As more and more indigenous and foreign groups were merged into the Hindu-fold, Vedic Varna system gave rise to caste system. For making place for new groups, caste system provided a mechanism. Through it, the job of assimilation of different tribal, local and immigrant groups was done cordially, at different points of time. Each new group joining it was given a separate caste identity. It neither disturbed the existing internal social order nor any new group was prevented from joining it and still allowed new groups to preserve its specialties and indigenous culture. It gave each one opportunity to develop within its own parameters. Thousands of endogamous groups were included into it. Each group was allowed to maintain its own rules, regulations, customs, way of life and power to control conduct of its members. However, principles of Varna, Dharma, and Karma remained the foundation stones of caste system and contributed to its growth in a systematic way.

Natural response – As Basham has pointed out, Caste system may well be called a natural response of many small and primitive groups of people, who were forced to come to terms, with a more advanced economic and social system. It provided a mechanism, by which numerous discrete tribes, all sorts of groups and associations arising for political, sectarian, or other reasons could be internalized and preserved within the whole. Development of thousands of years – Caste is the development of thousands of years of the association of many racial and other groups in a single cultural system. The arrival of Aryans hereditary kinship and tribal groups in India in waves, from different parts of the world and their mixing up with the indigenous people (popularly known as Hindus) gave birth Varna-system of Vedic culture.

The origin of Caste-system cannot be found in one single authoritative text, nor can it be attributed to one single founder. It evolved in a natural way over thousands of years. The experiences and deep thinking of many learned sages and intellectuals belonging to different communities at different points of time have contributed to evolve this system. It is a very old and indigenous system, conceptualized, developed, and practiced exclusively in India. It suggests a shared membership in a homogenous social group as contrasted with the individual or with a selected class. Castes had its ethnic roots as denoted by 'Jati', and a ritualistic and symbolic significance in its 'Varna' aspect. Different castes found their place under a 'Varna' on the basis of their being ritually clean or unclean, nature of work and amount of self-discipline they exercised. Numerous castes and sub-castes emerged within each 'Varna'. Four 'Varnas' remained the same. These were never more or less than four. For over 2000 years, their order in precedence remained the same. As far as castes were concerned, they rose and fell in their social order, some died out and new ones were formed from time to time.

In fact, ancient history of India does lead considerable and credible information regarding primeval communities, or organization that had cropped up since the times of pre-Christian era. Since the ears of Indus valley civilization and Harappa, the concepts of organizing communities had been well assimilated within both uneducated and educated classes. Religious, economic, administrative, and even, societal classed communities had existed during ancient.

Indian involvement caste system and class consciousness were one such idealistic concepts that had driven these ancient India communities to behave the way they did. The gigantic awareness of belonging to a higher caste or higher religious order paved way for first ever establishment of Hindu religious community, divided into Brahmins, Kshatriyas vaishyas and shudras. These four cardinal Hindu caste systems were further sub-divided into their own specific community, a concept that is very much retained in present-day Indian society. Some of the Hindus communities are; Maratha community, Rajput community, Nayar community, bunt community, Ahir community Agrawal community, Maitil community etc.

Islamic invasion and subsequent extensive Muslim rule in India, wholly changed the concept of communities in India. The Khiljis, Tughlaqs, Lodies and finally the Mughals has entirely altered the graph of Islamic communities in India, with an overwhelming mass of the erstwhile populace joining in the various causes to form organizational communities Emperors, army generals and high-profile men had contributed wholeheartedly and honestly to each meticulous cause to make these Indian communities as well grounded as Mountainous rocks. Some of the Islamic communities are; Sindhi communities, Dawoodi communities, Bohra communities, Kashmir Muslim community etc.

Sikhism began around 1500 CE, when Guru Nanak began teaching a faith that was quite distinct from Hinduism and Islam. The Sikhs are the 4th largest religious community in India next to Hindus. Some of the Sikh communities are Khatri community, Jat Sikh community, Namdhari community, Pothohar community, and Ramgarhia community,

With the passage of time and advancement in Indian ruling and sovereign administration, arrived the concepts if Christian

communities in India that ushered in by the Dutch, Portuguese, French and British, accompanied by the former Jewish and Armenian settlers in the country. Till this period of time, Christianity and Christians was not a thing much heard of in India, with Hindus and Muslims dominating the entire topography. The historic and long- drawn British Empire and its western outlook paved way for establishing innovative communities based upon creed and caste that were divided upon religious basics. Some of the Christian communities are Armenian Community, Jewish community, Kannada Catholic community, Parsi community Anglo-Indian community etc.

The concept of Indian communities has become much more panoptic and international in conscience, almost lapping up everything coming to its way. Matrimonial alliance amongst the aboriginal Indian communities is another striking factor that is assisting in betterment of Indian citizens.

Community is another fundamental concept used in sociology. Because human civilization grows and develop in the lap of community. It is a well-known fact that an individual rarely exists alone. He always lives with his fellows in a group. It is also equally true that one can't be a member of all groups existing in the world. Hence an individual lives and establishes relations with those people who reside in a close proximity with him i.e., within definite territory. It is also obvious and natural that people residing in a definite area develop likeness, cooperation and fellow-feeling among themselves. As a result, they share common customs, traditions, culture and develop common social ideas among themselves. This fact of common social living within a limited or definite geographical area gives birth to community.

But the origin and growth of community goes back to the origin of human civilization. Man has been living in community of

some sort since his arrival. Community is the original and first abode of human civilization. The human civilization itself reared up in community. During pre- historic era man was leading a nomadic or barbarian life and was wandering here and there for food and could not settle anywhere. But when his mental horizon increased, he learns the skill to collect food and other needs from a particular place mainly on riverbanks or fertile areas and permanently settled there. When a group of people or families lived together in a particular area which led them to share each other's joys and sorrows, as a result a pattern of common living is created which marked the origin of community life. Gradually community life expands with the creation of different socio-economic, cultural, and political relations among the people of a particular area. This led to the emergence of different social, political, economic and cultural institutions. As a result, a full-fledged community was created.

However, the term community has been derived from two Latin words 'Com' and 'Munis' which means 'together' and 'servicing' respectively. It consists of a group of people with common and shared interests. But in common discourses the term community very often wrongly used such as racial community, caste community, religious community etc. Here the meaning of the term community differs from the one which is used in sociology. The term is also used both in a narrower and broader sense. In a narrow sense community refers to Hindu or Muslim community but in a broader sense community may refer to a nation or world community. It also refers to a village, a town or a tribal community.

When a group of individual or members of any group small or large live together and share a common life and have developed a strong sense of awe feeling among them they form a community. They enter definite social, economic and cultural relations and have developed a sense of community

consciousness which distinguishes them from others. A group of individuals or group of families living in Physical Proximity with each other in a definite geographical boundary constitutes a community. But to understand the meaning of the term community we must have to give a look towards the definitions given by sociologists. But sociologists differ among themselves in their approach to the meaning of community. Some puts emphasis on area or ecological aspects where as others puts emphasis on psychological aspects.

- (1) According to Maclver, “Community is an area of social living marked by some degree of social coherence”.
- (2) According to Kingsley Davis, “Community is the smallest territorial group that can embrace all aspects of social life”.
- (3) According to Ogburn and Nimkoff, “Community is the total organisation of social life within a limited area”.
- (4) According to Arnold Green, “A Community is cluster of people, living within a contiguous small area, who share a common way of life”.

Indian Communities refer to a group of people, belonging to a certain religion and believing in one single united cause. The term Indian communities perhaps cannot be credited to any single individual. An omnipresent and unseen demarcation line had existed amongst the various Indian communities.

In fact, ancient history in India does lend considerable and credible information regarding primeval communities, or organizations that had cropped up since the times of pre-Christian era. Since the eras of Indus valley and Harappa, the concept of organizing communities had been well assimilated within both uneducated and educated classes. Religious, economic, administrative, and even, societal classed

communities had existed during ancient Indian evolution. Caste system and class consciousness was one such idealistic concept that had driven.

## Dalit Oppressions in India

Social structure of this country is a complex one. The people are divided into various castes. This idea of social stratification was further developed in the Laws of Manu, written in Manu Smriti. No mention of the untouchable class can be found here as the Varna division system excluded the untouchables altogether. The caste system dates to The Vedic Period. The Four major groups are the Brahmins, the Kshatriyas, the Vaisyas, and the Sudras. Apart from the four basic varnas there also emerged a fifth group which was called “Panchama”. They are the Dalits. They were originally considered as Panchama or the fifth group beyond the four- fold division of Indian people. They were not allowed to let their shadows fall upon a non- Dalit caste member and they were required to sweep the ground where they walked to remove the 'contamination' of their footfalls. Dalits were forbidden to worship in temples or draw water from the same wells as caste Hindus, and they usually lived in segregated neighborhoods outside the main village.

## Roots of the Dalit movements

In the Indian countryside, the Dalit villages are usually a separate enclave a kilometre or so outside the main village where the other Hindu castes reside. The Status of Dalits during the pre-independent days. The word “Dalit” comes from the Sanskrit language and means, “ground”, “suppressed”, “crushed”, or ‘broken to pieces. Dalit is not the caste. It is a group of people exploited by social and economic traditions of the country. So, Dalit is a symbol of change and revolution. Dalit status has often been historically associated with occupations regarded as ritually impure, such as involving in butchering, removal of dead animals, removal of night soil (human faeces) and leatherwork. One million Dalits work as manual scavengers, cleaning latrines and sewers by hand, and clearing

away dead animals. Engaging in these activities was polluting to the individual, and this pollution was considered contagious. As a result, Dalits were commonly segregated, and banned from full participation in Hindu social life. For example, they could not enter a temple or a school, and were required to stay outside the village. Elaborate precautions were sometimes observed to prevent incidental contact between Dalits and other castes.

Discrimination against Dalits still exists in rural areas (where two-thirds of India's people live) in the private sphere, in everyday matters such as access to eating places, schools, temples and water sources. It has largely disappeared in urban areas and in the public sphere. Most Dalits are bonded workers, and many work in slave-like conditions to pay off debts incurred generations ago. Most Dalits live in segregation and experience violence, murder, rape, and other atrocities. "Dalits or the downtrodden have been referred to in history, as people, without history of their own, which certainly is untrue and illogical, notwithstanding the fact that they have been a marginalised lot in their own land and treated as mere objects. Even scholars and academics have treated them as subjects for their research in social sciences, anthropology and philanthropy. Hence there are very few objective studies or works of worth in this discipline.

Karnataka holds the record for the highest number of Dalit atrocity cases. Gulbarga, a city in the southern state, alone has 126 cases registered under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Prevention of Atrocities Act 1989, and the Protection of Civil Rights Act 1955. In Uttar Pradesh, many villages are populated by people from the Chamar caste, which is tantamount to the majority of the Dalit population. The situation is so tense there that the post of gram pradhan, which is reserved for the scheduled caste, has been lying vacant since long, as no Dalit person has the courage to contest the polls against the Thakurs.

At Dholaria Shashan village in Rajasthan, Dalit people are scrutinised before entering the village. They are not allowed to wear shoes and headgear while passing any upper-caste area. In another bizarre incident, Thakurs at Rajpur tehsil near Kanpur withdrew the names of their children from a school when the institute appointed a Dalit cook to prepare the midday meal. June 2012, Mohan Paswan, a Dalit resident in the Parhuti village, Bihar, was lynched when he disobeyed a local thug by using a hand pump during the heatwave. In August 2015, a Jat khap panchayat in Haryana ordered the rape of two Dalit sisters because their brother had love affair with a Jat girl.

The organization of the caste system and its entrenchment within Indian history has resulted in centuries of hostile interaction between classes. In rural areas, Dalits were excluded from temples, village wells and tea shops. In some areas of the country, the Dalits were not permitted to walk in daylight for their shadows were considered pollution. In addition to the cruel and humiliating circumstances the Dalits have been put in, their efforts to improve their situation have often been squashed by assault, rape and murder by upper castes threatened by the Dalits' search for equality. The cruel and unjust treatment imposed upon the Dalits has decreased in frequency as history has progressed, although it continues today. After the introduction of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled tribe Prevention of Atrocities Act of 1989, the practice of the caste system became illegal in India. Despite increased government intervention, the discrimination, and mistreatments of individuals of lower castes still occur. Today, the Dalit population represents 16% of the country's population and still struggles to achieve social equality. There remains geographic division within Indian cities and villages

which exemplify the role that the caste system plays today. Many Dalits have attempted to avoid the caste system by

converting from Hinduism to other religions, although this rarely allows these individuals to escape their social and economic hardships. The Dalits have experienced a bit of progress in establishing an equal position in Indian society. Under the Poona Pact, a reserved number of seats in the national legislature were reserved for Dalit candidates only who would be elected based solely on the votes of their Dalit constituents (Bob). Their movement has also been encouraged by slow societal shifts towards a greater acceptance of Dalit equality and a greater role played by local and international nongovernmental organizations. The Dalit population continues to struggle for equality, though the progress of the past few decades shows hope for an improved level of equality within Indian society.

Babasaheb Ambedkar has, undoubtedly, been the central figure in Indian dalit society. It is difficult to imagine anything serious or important in their collective life that is totally untouched by Ambedkar. For the dalit masses, he is everything together; a scholar par excellence in the realm of scholarship, a Moses or Messiah who led his people out of bondage and ignominy on to the path of pride and a Bodhisattva in the pantheon of Buddhism. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar was born on 14th April, 1891 in Mhow in Madhya Pradesh to Ramji Maloji Sakpal, a ranked army officer and Bhimabai Murbadkar Ambedkar Sakpal. Ambedkar had a rough childhood as he belonged to a family of poor Dalit caste. They were considered to be untouchables and were subjected to socio-economic discrimination. Even in school. Ambedkar and other untouchable children were victims of segregation and inferior treatment. After graduating from Elfinstone College, Bombay in 1912, he joined Columbia University, USA where he was awarded PhD. Later, he joined the London School of Economics and obtained a degree of Dsc (Economics) and was called to the Bar from Gray's Inn. Being an Indian jurist, economist, politician and a social reformer, he

influenced dalits in various different ways. With the slogan of 'Educate-Agitate-Organise', the social movement led by Dr Ambedkar aimed at annihilation of caste and the reconstruction of Indian society on the basis of equality amongst human beings. In 1927, he led the march at Mahad, Maharashtra to establish the rights of the untouchables to taste water from the Public Chowdar Lake, traditionally prohibited to them. This marked the beginning of anti-caste and anti-priest movement.

The temple entry movement launched by Dr Ambedkar in 1930 at the Kalaram Temple, Nashik, Maharashtra is another landmark in the struggle for human right and political and social justice. Dr Ambedkar held the view that "Only political power cannot be a panacea for the ills of the depressed classes. Their salvation lies in their social elevation.'" In 1932 British announced the formation of a separate electorate for 'Depressed classes' in the communal Award. Gandhi opposed a separate electorate for untouchables, as he feared that such an arrangement would divide the Hindu community and started fasting. Later an agreement known as 'Poona pact' between Ambedkar and Madan Mohan Malaviya was signed. The agreement allowed reserved seats for depressed classes in the provincial legislatures, within general electorate. As a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council from July 1942, he was instrumental in bringing about several legislative measures to protect the rights of labourers and workers. Dr Ambedkar was the Chairman of Drafting Committee fm• the Indian Constitution. He prepared a Draft Constitution for discussion. Under his leadership the members of the drafting committee completed the works in 114 days spread over three years.

One of the greatest contributions of Dr Ambedkar was in respect of Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined in the Constitution of India. The Fundamental Rights provide for freedom, equality and abolition of

untouchability and remedies to ensure the enforcement of rights. The Directive Principles enshrine the broad guiding principles for securing fair distribution of wealth and better living conditions. On 24th May, 1956 on the occasion of Buddha Jayanti, he declared in Bombay, that he would adopt Buddhism in October. On 14th October, 1956 he embraced Buddhism along with many of his followers. Ambedkar had been suffering from diabetes since 1948. From June to October in 1954, he was bed ridden owing to clinical depression and failing eyesight. He died in his sleep on 6th December, 1956 at his home in Delhi. His birth date is celebrated as a public holiday known as Ambedkar Jayanti. Many public institutions are named in his honour, such as the Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar Open University in Hyderabad, BR Ambedkar Bihar University, Muzaffarpur etc. He was honoured with the greatest civilian award 'Bharat Ratna' posthumously in April 1990. He was an Indian nationalist, jurist, political leader and a Buddhist revivalist. He was also the chief architect of the Indian Constitution. Ambedkar spent his whole life fighting against social discrimination and the Indian caste system.

There were movements which instead of seeking positional changes within the caste system, questioned the fundamentals of this social organisation, the most notable of them being the non-Brahman movements in western and southern India and some of the more radical movements among the Dalit groups. The non-Brahman movement started in Maharashtra under the leadership of an outstanding leader of the Mali (gardener) caste, Jotirao Phule, who started his Saryasodhak Samaj (Truth seekers' Society) in 1873. Phule argued that it was Brahman domination, and their monopoly over power and opportunities that lay at the root of the predicament of the Sudra and Atisudra castes. So he turned the Orientalist theory of Aryanisation of India upside down. The non-Brahman movement in Maharashtra was developed at the turn of the century two parallel tendencies:

One was conservative, led by richer Non –Brahmans. Who reposed their faith in British government for their salvation after the Montagu—Chelmsford reforms of 1919, organised separate and loyalist political party, the Non-Brahman Association, which hoped to prosper under the benevolent paternal rule of the British. But the movement also had a radical trend, represented by the Satyasodhak Samaj, which developed a "class content" by articulating the social dichotomy between the "bahujan samaj" or the majority community or the masses, and the "shetji-bhatji"-- the merchants and Brahmans. Although opposed initially to the Brahman-dominated Congress nationalism, by the 1930s the non-Brahman movement in Maharashtra was gradually drawn into the Gandhian Congress. Roots of the Dalit Movements. On the political front the movement followed a familiar trajectory that began with the publication of a Non-Brahman Manifesto'. The formation of the Justice Party in 1916, as a formal political party of the non-Brahmans. It opposed the Congress as a Brahman dominated organisation and claimed separate communal representation for the non-Brahmans as had been granted to the Muslims in the Morley-Minto reform. This demand, supported by the colonial bureaucracy, was granted in the Montagu Chelmsford reform of 1919, as it allocated twenty-eight reserved seats to the non-Brahmans in the Madras Legislative Council. Opposed to the Congress and to its programme of non-cooperation . The Justice Party had no qualm in contesting the election in 1920, Which the Congress had given a call for boycott. As a result, the council boycott movement had no chance of success in Madras. Where the Justice Party won 63 of the 98 elected seats, and eventually came to form a government under the new reforms. The formation of a ministry in 1920 was the high point in the career of the Justice Party, and also the beginning of its decline. It was a movement patronised mainly by richer landowning and urban middle class nonBrahmans, like the Vellalas in the Tamil districts, the Reddis or Kapus and

Kammas in the Telugu districts, the Nairs in Malabar and the trading Beri Chettis and Balija Naidus scattered all over south India. Soon after assumption of office, these elite members of the Justice Party became engrossed in using and abusing their newly gained power, gave up their reformist agenda and became less interested in the plight of the untouchables.

The latter as a result under the leadership of M.C. Rajah, left the party in disgust. The decline in popular base which thus began, ultimately culminated in their electoral defeat in 1926 at the hands of the swarajists. Many non-Brahmans thereafter left the party and joined the Congress, which regained its power. This was reflected adequately in the success of the Civil Disobedience campaign in 1929-30. The Quit India movement of 1942 finally took the wind out of its sails; in the election of 1946, the Justice Party did not even field a candidate. But if the justice Party gradually paled into political insignificance, another more radical and populist trend within the Non-Brahman movement emerged in south India around this time in the "Self-Respect" movement, under the leadership of E.V. Ramaswamy Naicker, "Periyar". Once an enthusiastic campaigner for the non-cooperation programme. He left the Congress in 1925, believing that it was neither able nor willing to offer "substantive" citizenship to the non-Brahmans. He was incensed by Gandhi's pro-Brahman and provarnashram dharma utterances during his tour of Madras in 1927 and constructed a trenchant critique of Aryanism, Brahmanism and Hinduism, which he thought created multiple structures of subjection for Sudras, Adi-Dravidas (untouchables) and women. So before self-rule what was needed was self-respect, and its ideology was predicated upon a sense of pride in-though not an uncritical valorisation of-the Dravidian antiquity and Tamil culture and language. Indeed, Ramaswamy had reservations about privileging Tamil, as this could alienate the other non- Tamil speaking Dravidians of south India.

## Question of Reservation in India

In India to the freedom fight led by M.K.Gandhi projected equality as one of the major themes for Indian freedom fighting. But after 69 years of Indian Independence how far equality is being practiced in society is a matter of major concern. Reservation as a practice existed in the society for more than 2000 years and transformed to the new contrary stature in the post- independence period due to the tenacious efforts of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, MK Gandhi and other great leaders. The Constitution of India, adopted in 1950, defines the nation as a „Democratic Republic“ which ensures that All citizens are equal before law, free from discrimination on grounds of caste, creed, religion, sex, place of birth, and equality of opportunity in education and public appointments. The Constitution also specifically abolishes untouchability. The Constitution lay down „special provisions“ for the reservation of seats in educational institutions, government service, PSU service, Parliament and state legislature for Scheduled castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). The same section also defines „backward classes“ but neither gives a satisfactory definition of them nor lays any specific provisions on their behalf. The explicit purpose of the reservation policy was and is to promote social, economic, and political equality for Scheduled caste, tribal peoples, and other lower castes peoples, (i.e. OBCs (Other Backward Communities) through positive or compensatory discrimination. By this policy, the leaders of independent India declared their determination to eradicate inequalities. The constitutional delegitimizing of caste has had a significant impact at all levels of society. Nevertheless, the policy has also contributed to the progressive strengthening of caste as a major political factor, so that sixty-nine years after independence it still plays a key role in the working of Indian democracy. Reservation in India is the process of setting aside a certain percentage of seats (vacancies) in government institutions for

members of backward and under-represented communities (defined primarily by caste and tribe). Reservation is a form of quota based affirmative action. Reservation is governed by constitutional laws, statutory laws, and local rules and regulations. Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST) and Other Backward Classes (OBC) (and in some states Backward Classes among Muslims under a category called BC(M)) are the primary beneficiaries of the reservation policies under the Constitution.

History of the reservations system is important in analysing its various sides. In August 1933, the then Prime Minister of Britain, Ramsay Macdonald gave his 'award' known as the Communal Award. According to it, separate representation was to be provided for the Muslims, Sikhs, Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians, Europeans, Scheduled caste. The depressed classes were assigned a number of seats to be filled by election from special constituencies in which voters belonging to the depressed classes only could vote. The Award was highly controversial and opposed by Mahatma Gandhi, who fasted in protest it. Communal Award was supported by many among the minority communities, most notably revolutionary Dr. B. R. Ambedkar. After lengthy negotiations, Gandhi reached an agreement with Dr. Ambedkar (Initially opposed it) to have a single Hindu electorate, with Scheduled caste having seats reserved within it. This is called the Poona Pact. Electorates for other religions like Muslim and Sikh remained separate. Present reservation system has a long history and has been debated before and after Indian independence from the British in 1947. Reservations in favour of Backward Classes (BCs) were introduced long before independence in a large area, comprising the Presidency areas and the Princely states south of the Vindhyas. In 1882, Hunter Commission was appointed. Mahatma Jyotirao Phule made a demand of free and compulsory education for Smrti along with proportionate representation in

government jobs. In 1891, there was a demand for reservation of government jobs with an agitation (in the princely State of Travancore) against the recruitment of non-natives into public service overlooking qualified native people. In 1901, reservations were introduced in Maharashtra (in the Princely State of Kolhapur) by Shahu Maharaj. Chatrapati Sahuji Maharaj, Maharaja of Kolhapur in Maharashtra introduced reservation in favour of non-Brahmin and backward classes as early as 1902. He provided free education to everyone and opened several hostels in Kolhapur to make it easier for everyone to receive the education. He also made sure everyone got suitable employment no matter what social class they belonged. He also appealed for a class-free India and the abolition of untouchability. The notification of 1902 created 50% reservation in services for backward classes/communities in the State of Kolhapur. This is the first official instance (Government Order) providing for reservation for depressed classes in India. In 1908, reservations were introduced in favour of several castes and communities that had little share in the administration by the British. There were many other reforms in favour of and against reservations before the Indian Independence itself. Even after the Indian Independence there were some major changes in favour of the STs, SCs and OBCs. One of the most important occurred in 1979 when the Mandal Commission was established to assess the situation of the socially and educationally backward classes. The commission did not have exact figures for a subcaste, known as the Other Backward Class (OBC), and used the 1930.

A common form of past discrimination in India was the practice of untouchability. Scheduled Castes (SCs) are the primary targets of the practice, which is outlawed by the Constitution of India. The primary stated objective of the Indian reservation system is to increase the opportunities for enhanced social and educational status of the underprivileged communities and thus

uplift their lifestyle to have their place in the mainstream of Indian society. The reservation system exists to provide opportunities for the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes to increase their political representation in the State Legislatures, the Executive Organ of the Union (Centre) and States, the labour force, schools, colleges, and other public institutions. The Constitution of India states in article 16(4): "Nothing in [article 16] or in clause (2) of article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes." Article 46 of the Constitution states that "The State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation." Today, out of 543 seats in India's parliament, 84 (15.47%) are reserved for SC/Dalits and 47 (8.66%) for ST/Tribes. Allocation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Tribes in the Lok Sabha are made on the basis of proportion of Scheduled Castes and Tribes in the State concerned to that of the total population, vide provision contained in Article 330 of the Constitution of India read with Section 3 of the R. P. Act, 1950.

The spirit behind the term 'backward classes' is that the middle strata of the people have suffered and remained ignored. The Janata Party, in its election manifesto in 1977, called for an end to caste inequalities. It promised a "policy of special treatment" in favour of the weaker sections of Indian society. The party promised to reserve between 25 and 33 per cent of all appointments to government services and educational opportunities for the backward classes. The Government of India, headed by the Janata Party, appointed a Backward Classes Commission under the chair-manship of B.P. Mandal,

Member of Parliament, with a view to get definite recommendations by which it could implement its election promises.

Terms and references of Mandal commission are,

1. To determine the criteria for defining the socially and educationally backward classes.
2. To recommend steps to be taken for the advancement of the socially and educationally backward classes of citizens so identified.
3. To examine the desirability or otherwise of making provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of such backward classes of citizens which are not adequately represented in the services of both the central and the state governments/union territory administrations; and
4. To present a report setting out the facts as found by them and making such recommendations as they think proper. The Commission observed that backwardness was both social and educational. Caste was also a class of people.

The Commission recommended a reservation of 27 per cent of jobs and educational facilities for this 52 per cent population. It may be stated here that no caste-based census has been conducted after 1931 census. Therefore, no definite data is available about the OBCs.

The controversy surrounding this policy came to a fore when upper castes resisted the implementation of the Mandal Commission Report in 1990. While reservation policies played a role in the crystallization of the low caste movements in South and West India, their momentum was sustained by the ideology of "pre-Aryanism" or Buddhism in these regions. In the North,

however, the state policies were more or less the starting point of the whole process. This article will discuss the crystallization of lower caste movements in India, arguing that the mobilization of the lower castes was delayed and did not imply any significant change in caste identities: the emancipatory and empowerment agenda in India materialized without any prior ethnicization. The North-South divide is a locus classicus of Indian studies, partly based on cultural-and more especially linguistic-differences. It also derives from economic and social contrasts. First, the kind of land settlement that the British introduced in India was not the same in these two areas. While the zamindari (intermediary) system prevailed in North India, the raiyatwari (cultivator) system was more systematically implemented in the South.<sup>1</sup> Second, these two regions always had a different caste profile. In the Hindi belt, the caste system is traditionally the closest to the varna model with its four orders (Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Shudras) and its Untouchables. In the South, the twice born are seldom "complete" because the warrior and merchant castes are often absent or poorly represented, as in Maharashtra and Bengal. Correlatively, the upper varnas are in larger numbers than in the North.

However, the factor of caste does not explain the North/South divide only for arithmetic reasons. In fact, the caste system underwent a more significant and early change out of the Hindi belt. The caste system has been analysed by anthropologists as a sacralised social order based on the notion of ritual purity. In this view, its holistic character-to use the terminology of Louis Dumont implies that the dominant, Brahminical values are regarded by the whole society as providing universal references. Hence, the central role played by Sanskritization, a practice that M. N. Srinivas has defined as "the process in which a 'low' Hindu caste, or tribal or other group, changes its customs, ritual, ideology and way of life in the direction of a high, and frequently 'twice-born caste,' that is the Brahmins, but also the

Kshatriyas or even the Vaishyas." Low castes may for instance adopt the most prestigious features of the Brahmins' diet and therefore emulate vegetarianism. The caste system underwent transformations because of the policies of the British Raj. Among them, the introduction of the census made the most direct impact because it listed castes with detail. As a result, castes immediately organized themselves and even formed associations to take steps to see that their status was recorded in the way they thought was honourable to them. Caste associations were therefore created to pressure the colonial administration to improve their rank in the census. This process was especially prominent among the lower castes.

In turn, caste associations were secularized when the British started to classify castes for usage in colonial administration. These associations claimed new advantages from the state, principally in terms of reservations (quotas) in educational institutions and in the civil service. Caste associations—even though they often lack a resilient structure—therefore not only played the role of pressure groups, but also that of interest groups. Subsequently, they also became mutual aid structures. They also founded schools as well as hostels for the caste's children and created co-operative movements for instance. In addition to the concessions, they could get from the British, the most important social change that these associations have achieved concerns the unity of the caste groups. They have successfully incited the sub-castes to adopt the same name in the Census and to break the barriers of endogamy. It seems to me, however, that intermarriages are only one aspect of the ethnicization of caste. The subjective representation of the collective self plays a crucial role in this transformation. Caste is largely a mind-set and a belief system. Those who live in such a society have internalized a hierarchical pattern relying on the degree of ritual purity. Therefore the primary implication of ethnicization of caste consists in providing alternative non-

hierarchical social imaginaires.

The ethnicization process that took place in West and South India was largely due to the impact of the European ideas, as propagated by the missionaries and the schools. Certainly, castes have always been perceived by the historian Susan Bayly as being "kingroups or descent units."<sup>5</sup> British orientalism gave purely racial connotations to caste and linguistic groups in the 19th century. Colonial ethnography equated the "Aryans" with the upper castes and the Dravidians with the lowest orders of the Indian society. This perception prepared the ground for the interpretation of castes in ethnic terms in West and South India. Caste leadership played an important part in this process. Jotirao Phule and B. R. Ambedkar are two of the most prominent lower caste leaders of their time. Jotirao Phule (1827-90) was probably the first of the low caste ideologues in the late 19th century. Phule's endeavor had a pioneering dimension since he was the first low caste leader who avoided the traps of Sanskritization by endowing the lower castes with an alternative value system. As early as 1853, he opened schools for Untouchables.

In North India, while caste associations took shape at an early date, they did not prepare the ground for a resilient ethnicization process but operated within the logic of Sanskritization. These shortcomings are well illustrated by three cases chosen among the Shudras and the Untouchables, respectively the Yadavs and the Chamars. The "Yadav" label covers a great number of castes. The common function of all these castes was to take care of cattle as herdsmen, cowherds, and milk sellers. In practice, however, the Yadavs have been spending most of their time tilling the land. The Yadavs reportedly descend from immigrants from Central Asia, the Abhiras, who established kingdoms in North India. From the 1930s onward, intermarriage-based fusion was made easier when North Indian Yadavs started to migrate from their villages to towns. But this

ethnicization process remained largely unachieved because the Yadav movement remained imbued with the ethos of Sanskritization. The Yadavs lent themselves to such Sanskritization because they had a special relation to the Hindu religion, owing to their association with the Arya Samaj. The Arya Samaj is an association too often regarded as purely Punjabi and confined to the urban middle class. The Arya Samaj did not hesitate to mobilize lower caste people against the Brahmins, but not against the caste system. In fact, they followed the path of Sanskritization. Their campaigns were especially successful in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.

The rise of egalitarian movements, stemming from the ethnicization of caste was more prevalent in the South and in the West. In these two mega- regions the ethnicization of caste did not rely only on caste fusion. This process, fostered by caste associations, prepared the ground for a more radical transformation based on new imaginaires. In Maharashtra, Phule invented a pre-Aryan pedigree for the Shudras while Ambedkar endowed the Untouchables with a Buddhist identity. In Tamil Nadu, the Dravidian identity of the non-Brahmin movement borrowed from both sources of inspiration. This ethnicization process provided the lower castes with an alternative, egalitarian sub-culture. In contrast, in pre-independence India, the Yadav movement can be classified in the first group of the typology presented here and the Adi Hindu movement in the second one. None of them really challenged the caste system. In contrast to the situation prevailing in the South and West India, the mobilization of the lower castes stopped with caste associations. They could not establish their claim on ethnic grounds, which prevented them from shaping large coalitions like the Dravidian non-Brahmin groupings. In fact, they started to move toward the formation of larger fronts only when the state extended its compensatory discrimination policy to what became known as the "Other Backward Classes."

The OBCs then, became, a relevant unit and low castes started to rally around this administrative category to defend their quotas in the bureaucracy from the state

Reservations are intended to increase the social diversity in campuses by lowering the entry criteria for certain identifiable groups that are grossly under-represented in proportion to their numbers in the general population. Caste is the most used criteria to identify underrepresented groups. However, there are other identifiable criteria for under-representation: gender (women), state of domicile (Northeastern States, as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh), rural people, etc. are under-represented, as revealed by the Government of India sponsored National Family Health and National Sample surveys. The underlying theory is that the underrepresentation of the identifiable groups is a legacy of the Indian caste systems. After India gained independence, the Constitution of India listed some erstwhile groups as Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST). The framers of the Constitution believed that, due to the caste system, SCs and the STs were historically oppressed and denied respect and they introduced a policy to ensure social equality.

### Communalism in Society and Politics

Communalism and communal organization have been becoming an important part of our political environment. The communal appeal is used on a large scale for electoral mobilization. For the last two decades the country has been regularly racked by a flood of communal riots. Communalism is one of the most serious dangers facing Indian society and polity. It is undermining secularism, has become a risk to the hard-won unity of the Indian people and threatens to unleash the forces of barbarism. To discuss the problem of communalism in independent India, the terms secularism and communalism first need to be defined. Secularism, basically, means separation of

religion from the state and politics and its being treated as a private, personal affair. It also requires that the state should not discriminate against a citizen on grounds of his or her religion or caste. Communalism is an ideology based on the belief that the Indian society is divided into religious communities, who's economic, political, social and cultural interests diverge and are even welcome to each other because of their religious differences. Communalism is, above all, a belief system through which a society, economy and polity are viewed and explained and around which effort is made to organize politics. As an ideology it is similar to racialism, anti-Semitism and fascism. It can be considered as the Indian form of fascism.

The basic thrust of communalism as an ideology is the spread of communal ideas and modes of thought. Though communal violence draws our attention to the communal situation in a dramatic manner; it is not the crux of the problem. The underlying and long-term cause foreign communal violence is the spread of communal ideology or belief-system. Communal violence usually occurs when communal thinking that precedes it reaches a certain level of intensity and the atmosphere is vitiated by the building up of communal fear, suspicion and hatred. Communal ideology can thus prevail without violence but communal violence cannot exist without communal ideology. In other words, communal ideology and politics are act as the disease, communal violence is the external symptom. Unfortunately, the presence of communal ideology as an introduction to communal violence is generally ignored; awareness of communalism registers only when violence breaks out. The communalists are also, therefore, primarily interested in spreading the communal belief-system and not necessarily communal violence. In fact, the major purpose of those who inspire and organize communal violence is not genocide but to create a situation which communalizes the masses.

Secularism was one of the great triumphs of the Indian national movement that despite the Partition of India and the barbaric riots that accompanied it, the Indian people accepted secularism as a basic value, preserved it in the Constitution, and set out to build a secular state and society. The legacy of the freedom struggle, Gandhiji's martyrdom, Nehru's total commitment to secularism and the active support extended to Nehru by Sardar Patel, Maulana Azad, C. Rajagopalachari and other leaders in the struggle against communalism, led to the development of Indian culture. Communal parties made a poor showing in the elections of 1952, 1957 and 1962 and for years remained a marginal force in Indian politics. Consequently, people became satisfied and came to believe that economic development and spread of education, science and technology would automatically weaken and extinguish communal thinking. Communalism, they believed, would gradually disappear from the Indian environment. It was not realized by the people or their leaders that communalism can have passive and active phases, depending on circumstances, but that it would not disappear without an active struggle. Moreover, even while communal politics lay dormant, communal ideologues continued their work and communal organizations such as RSS, Jan Sangh, Jamaat- e-Islami, Muslim League, Akali Dal and various Christian communal groups in Kerala continued to function.

Communalism became active in the sixties, gaining in strength as seen in the rising communalization of Indian society. In the late fifties itself, there was a serious outbreak of communal riots. The number of persons killed in riots increased from 7 in 1958 to 41 in 1959 and 108 in 1961. In particular, the riot in Jabalpur in 1961 shook the whole nation. Nehru reacted by immediately forming the National Integration Council. The Chinese aggression in 1962 aroused feelings of national unity among all sections of the people and communal sentiments had to retreat.

But this pause proved to be short-lived. Once again, in the mid-sixties, the disruptive forces of communalism were on the upswing in Indian politics and large sections of the common people became vulnerable to communalism and casteism. The Jan Sangh increased its strength in parliament from 14 in 1962 to 35 in the general elections of 1967. It participated in coalition ministries in several North Indian states and began to attract considerable support in the rural areas of U.P., M.P and Rajasthan. The incidence and severity of communal riots also increased, the number of riots being 1,070 in 1964, 520 in 1969 and 521 in 1970; the number of those killed being 1919, 673 and 298 respectively. There was some respite from communalism and communal riots from 1971 to 1977. The number of communal riots did not exceed 250 in any of those years and the number of killed did not exceed 1,000, as Indira Gandhi consolidated her power in the parliamentary election of 1971. In elections, Jan Sangh's strength in the parliament was reduced from 35 in 1967 to 22. The Bangladesh war at the end of 1971 also gave a major blow to both Hindu and Muslim communalisms. However, communalism and communal violence began to once again increase from 1978 and have become endemic since then, assuming alarming proportions.

Communalism is equal to any other ideology we know. It has a concrete social base. It is the product of and reflects the overall socio-economic and political conditions. But this happens in a distorted manner, without trying to understand the real causes and results.

Thus, communalism does not reflect any social truth. The truth revealed by communalism is not the real truth. What it declares to be the causes of social discontent are not the causes; and what it declares to be the solutions of the social malady are not the solutions – in fact it is itself a social malady. Communalism is, thus, no answer to any of the problems leading to its generation

and growth. Instead, it undermines the real struggle for changing social conditions. While the society and polity of India after independence have been secular, the logic of the socio-economic system has continued to provide favourable soil for the spread of communalism. Especially important in this respect have been the social strains which have arisen out of the pattern of economic development. Indian economic development after 1947 has been impressive but the problems of poverty, unemployment, and inequality arising out of colonial underdevelopment have been only partially tackled, especially in the context of the population explosion. These problems breed frustration and personal and social anxiety among the people and generate unhealthy competition for the inadequate economic and social opportunities. In fact, capitalist development has generated sharp and visible economic inequality and the position in this regard has been worsening over the years. Though, overall, there are greater economic opportunities available for the people, there is far greater inequality than before in regard to access to them. Also, the aspirations of the people are rising faster than their possible fulfilment. The soil for the growth of communalism and casteism is thus always ready.

Communalism has stricken mainly the middle-class section of people. In recent years, the petty bourgeoisie or the working middle class has been faced with the constant threat of unemployment and adverse socio-economic conditions. Moreover, its growth has constantly outpaced economic development. The situation is further intensified by the fact that after independence the spread of education, the pattern of social change and rapid population growth have led millions of peasants and working-class youth to look for jobs in the cities and in administration and to joining the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie. This analysis also explains why communalism remained relatively dormant till the early sixties. Independence and the three Five Year Plans did open up a wide range of

opportunities for the middle classes because of the Indianization and expansion of the officer positions of the armed forces and private firms, immense expansion of the administrative apparatus, the rapid development of banking, trading and industrial companies, the growth of school and college education and other social services, and the phenomenal expansion in the training and recruitment of engineers, doctors and scientists. But this initial push to middle-class employment was exhausted by the mid- sixties. Besides, the pattern and rate of economic development were such that they failed to generate large-scale employment in the industrial and commercial sectors and also placed limits on the expansion of social services.

Communalism was not an answer to the economic problems of the petty bourgeoisie; it did not serve the interests of this social stratum in case. Unable to understand the reasons for their economic or social distress, growing social and economic insecurity, their anxiety tended to take a communal or casteist form. The other religious or caste groups were seen as the cause of their problems. The communal problem did not, however, lie merely in the economic realm. For several generations Indians have been undergoing a social transition; they have been losing their old world without gaining the new. The process accelerated after independence. Old, traditional social institutions, solidarities and support systems – of caste, joint family, village and urban neighbourhood – have been rapidly transforming. The new institutions and solidarities of class, trade unions, Kisan Sabhas, youth organizations, social clubs, political parties and other voluntary associations have, on the other hand, made delayed progress and have not been able to take their place to a significant extent. In this situation, many turns to communal organizations as an alternative focus of unity and solidarity.

Another aspect of the communal problem has been the inevitable exhaustion of the political idealism generated by the

national movement which inspired the people, particularly the youth, and gave motivation to secular ideas. After 1947, people needed a new unifying, anti-divisive goal or vision which could generate hope for the future, kindle healthy national feelings, inspire and unite them in a common nation-wide endeavour, and strengthen the secular content of society. Unfortunately, such a vision has been lacking, especially after the seventies. There is, thus, every danger that without radical social change and the sway of an inspiring developmental and democratic ideal, communalism and communal-type movements may succeed in destroying India's unity and hindering all efforts at social and economic development. It is, therefore, necessary to eliminate the social conditions which favour the growth of communalism. A warning may, however, be sounded in this context. Great care has to be exercised in making a social analysis of communalism, which should be based on serious empirical and theoretical research.

In order to learn communalism as an ideology and communal violence, we have to distinguish between the long-term causes of communalism and the immediate and short-term causes of communal riots and other forms of communal violence. The causes of communal violence have often been conjunctural; they have been local, specific and accidental, such as some minor religious issue or dispute, or teasing of a girl, or even a violent quarrel between two persons belonging to different religious groups. These causes have invariably become operative only when there has been prior communalization of the area concerned. These conjunctural causes at the most act as sparks who light the communal fire for which ground had already been prepared by the communal groups, parties and ideologues. Communal violence has often actively involved the urban poor and lumpen elements whose number has grown rapidly as a result of uneven economic development and large-scale migration into towns and cities from rural areas. Rootless,

impoverished and often unemployed, millions live in overcrowded areas without any public facilities in terms of health, education, sanitation, and drinking water. Their social anger and frustration, fed by horrid living conditions, makes them easy victims of the purveyors of communal hatred and finds expression in spontaneous violence and loot and plunder whenever a communal riot provides the opportunity. In more recent years, criminal gangs engaged in lucrative illegal activities, such as smuggling, illicit distillation and sale of liquor, gambling, drug pushing and kidnapping have used communal riots to settle scores with their rivals.

One of the important features of Indian politics and administration in the last few decades has been the growing carelessness of the state apparatuses, especially the police, in their treatment of communal violence. After all the state alone possesses the instruments to successfully counter communal violence, and immediate and effective state action is the only viable way of dealing with it. However, in recent years, the administration has seldom acted firmly and decisively and in time and with the full force of the law-and-order machinery. Communal violence is, Moreover, invariably preceded by the intensive spread of different forms of inflammatory propaganda.

Another major factor in the growth of communalism since the sixties has been the political opportunism towards communalism practiced by secular parties, groups and individuals. They have often permitted the interruption of religion into politics and have tended to vacillate and retreat in the face of the communal attack. They have compromised with and accommodated communal forces for short-term personal gains or as a part of the policy of anti-Congressism. And, far worse, they have sometimes associated and entered into alliance with communal parties. Congress was the first to do so by allying with Muslim League in Kerala in the early sixties. In turn,

Communist parties allied with Muslim League in Kerala and Akali Dal in Punjab in the late sixties, justifying their action by declaring that minority communalism was understandable, democratic, and even justifiable. In 1967, the Socialists and other secular parties and groups did not hesitate to join the communal Jan Sangh first in seat adjustment in elections and then in forming non-Congress governments in several states in North India. In 1974-75, Jayaprakash Narayan permitted RSS, Jan Sangh and Jamaat-e- Islami to become the backbone of his movement of 'Total Revolution' against Congress and Indira Gandhi. In 1977, Jan Sangh became a part of Janata party. In November 1989 elections, Janata Dal, under the leadership of V.P. Singh, formed an indirect electoral alliance with BJP and then formed a government at the Centre with its support. The Communist parties sanctioned both steps silently.

The mediatory sentiments towards communal parties and groups have had the extremely negative consequence of making them respectable and legitimizing communalism. This policy has tended to whittle down one of the major contributions of the national movement and the Nehru era, of making communalism a dirty word even when failing to root it out. The secularists have also in recent years tended to pander to communal sentiments through all types of concerns. It is, however, significant that, despite their insensitive opportunism, most of the Indian political parties and intellectuals – whether of the right, left or Centre – have themselves not been communal. This has so far prevented the rapid growth of communalism and has kept India basically secular. The Indian state has also been basically secular and opposed to communalism so far. However, the quality of the secularism of the Indian state and most of the political parties has had many weaknesses and has, in fact, seldom been very strong. Still, a major saving feature of the Indian social and political situation has been the absence of active state support to communal ideology and communal

forces. Though, during recent years, the state had been lacking in political will to deal firmly with communalism and communal violence, it has not through its myriad channels from text books and mass media to administrative measures, promoted communal ideology.

### Hindu Muslim communalism

The communalists in India have been taking recourse to religious issues to impart passion and intensity to their politics from the sixties. Muslim communalism flourished in the forties in colonial India on the basis of the cry of Islam in danger, but Hindu communalism remained weak in India and a marginal force in Indian politics as it had not been able to appeal to religion or arouse religious passion. Hindu communalists raised the cries of Hindus or their culture being in danger but were not able to arouse Hindus emotionally as effectively as Muslim communalists. This was because of several reasons: Hinduism is not an organized religion – it is not based on the sanctity and authority of a single sacred book or a hierarchical priestly class. Hindus do not have one God or one set of beliefs – consequently there is immense religious diversity among them – in fact, there are no strict rules determining who is a Hindu. Hindus also have a long tradition of religious tolerance and broad mindedness. It was also not easy to convince Hindus, who constituted the large religious majority in India, that their religion was in any danger. Hindu communalists found that without the strong emotional appeal to religion or a religious issue the progress of communal politics was late. When analysing the pre-1947 Muslim League politics, they began from the late seventies to feel for a religious issue around which to develop their politics. Such an opportunity was presented to them in the early eighties in the Babri Masjid (mosque) – Ram Janmabhoomi (birth place of Ram) issue, which could inflame Hindus, for Ram occupies a unique place in India. He is the

incarnation of the values that a Hindu, in fact an Indian, values. His name touches the hearts and minds of millions. Over the years, the BJP and its branch organizations, Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Bajrang Dal, all carefully nursed by RSS, succeeded in using this issue and its religious appeal to gain influence with a large number of Hindus all over the country and to weaken their resistance to communalism. A brief history of the controversy follows.

Governor of Babur has built a mosque at Ayodhya in UP in the early sixteenth century. Some Hindus claimed in the 19th century that it was built over a site which was the place where Ram was born and where a Ram temple had existed before. But the issue did not take a serious turn till December 1949 when a communal-minded district magistrate permitted a few Hindus to enter the mosque and instal idols of Sita and Ram there. Sardar Patel, as the home minister, and Jawaharlal Nehru condemned the district magistrate's action, but the U.P. government felt that it could not reverse the decision. However, it locked the mosque and barred it to both Hindus and Muslims. The resulting quiet lasted till 1983 when the Vishwa Hindu Parishad started a whirlwind campaign demanding the 'liberation' of the Ram Janmabhoomi, which would entail the demolition of the mosque and the erection of a Ram temple in its place. The secular parties and groups did not do anything to counter the campaign; they just ignored it. Suddenly, on 1st February 1986, the district judge, probably at the encouragement of the Congress chief minister of U.P., reopened the mosque, gave Hindu priests as possession, and permitted Hindus to worship there. As a result, religious and communal passions were aroused leading to communal riots all over the country; sixty-five persons were killed in U.P. towns alone. Soon, powerful Hindu and Muslim communal groups led by the VHP and the Babri Masjid Action Committee were ranged against each other. The Hindu communalists demanded the demolition of the mosque and the

construction of a Ram temple on its site; the Muslim communalists demanded the restoration of the mosque to Muslims. The secular and nationalist-minded persons, parties and groups now suddenly woke up to the enormity of the problem.

In 1989, VHP, keeping in view the impending Lok Sabha elections, organized a massive movement to start the construction of a Ram temple at the site where the Babri mosque stood. As a part of that objective, it gave a call for the collection of bricks, sanctified by water from the river Ganges, from all over the villages, towns and cities to be taken to Ayodhya. The Lok Sabha elections took place in a heightened communal atmosphere. There was also an indirect alliance of Janata Dal and its left allies with BJP, which increased its strength from two in 1984 to 86. Moreover, the new government at the Centre formed by V.P. Singh relied on the outside support, of the CPI and CPM as well as the BJP. BJP now officially adopted as its objective the construction of the Ram Temple at Ayodhya. To popularize the objective, it organized in 1990 an all-India rath yatra headed by its president, L.K. Advani. The yatra aroused fierce communal passions and was followed by communal riots in large numbers of places. Thousands of BJP-VHP volunteers gathered at Ayodhya at the end of October 1990, despite the U.P. government, headed by Mulayam Singh Yadav, banning the rally. To disperse the volunteers and to prevent them from harming the mosque, the police opened fire on them, killing and injuring over a hundred persons.

As a result, BJP had withdrawn its support to the V.P. Singh government, resulted in its down fall. Elections to a new Lok Sabha was held in 1991. BJP with 119 MPs emerged as the main opposition to Congress. It also formed governments in four states – U.P., M.P., Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh. To

consolidate and further enhance its political gains, BJP- VHP organized a huge rally of over 200,000 volunteers at the site of the mosque on 6th December 1992, with the major leaders of the two organizations being present. To allay the fears of injury to the mosque, the BJP Chief Minister of U.P., Kalyan Singh, had given an assurance to the Supreme Court that the mosque would be protected. The assurances had been repeated by the BJP leaders in the parliament. In spite of these assurances the BJP-VHP volunteers set out to demolish the mosque with hammer blows, while BJP leaders looked on. The central government also lay paralyzed. The entire country was shocked by this event which had other disastrous consequences. Communal riots, the worst and the most widespread since 1947, broke out in many parts of the country, the worst hit being Bombay, Calcutta and Bhopal. The riots in Bombay lasted for nearly a month. In all more than three thousand people were killed in the riots all over India.

It may be concluded by pointing out that though on the surface the Babri Masjid Ram Janmabhoomi issue appears to be a religious one, in reality this is not so. In fact, the communalists are not interested in religion; they are interested only in the manipulation and exploitation of religion and religious identity for the communalization of the people for political ends. Religious differences as such are not responsible for communalism or are its root cause. Communalism is not the same as religious-mindedness. In fact, the moral and spiritual values of all religions go against communal values. It is the intrusion of religion into politics and affairs of the state which is undesirable. As Gandhiji put it in 1942: 'Religion is a personal matter which should have no place in politics'.

Besides the growth of communalism and communal parties and groups in recent years, India still has a basically healthy secular society. Even though communalism is perhaps

the most serious challenge facing Indian society and polity, it is not yet the dominant mode of thought of the Indian people. Even when the communalists have succeeded in utilizing communalism as the quick and easy route to political power and have won elections, the people who have voted for them have done so to express their discontent with the existing state of political and economic affairs. They have not yet imbibed communal ideology significantly. The Indian people are still basically secular, and the believers in communal ideology constitute a peripheral. Even in areas where communal riots have occurred, there does not exist a permanent divide between Hindus and Muslims or Hindus and other minorities. In no part of the country is 'an aggressive majority arranged against a beleaguered minority'. In fact, popular consciousness has posed a major barrier to the spread of communalism to a significant extent in the rural areas and to large parts of urban India. This also explains why communalism, making a beginning in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, has still failed to strike deep roots in large parts of the country and has taken such a long time to acquire even its present strength.

### Adivasi Questions

India has a rich history of flourishing civilizations, empires, and rulers. The sub-continent of India has witnessed wonderful eras under different empires. This resulted in cross-cultural exchange among people. Through all of this, there are groups of people that are living in this country who migrated here during the time of early inhabitation. They are called Adivasis. Adivasis have been living in India from as early as 2000 BCE. The word 'Adivasi' is derived from Sanskrit and means 'the earliest inhabitants. Adivasi is the word coined to represent indigenous people of India is widely used in India and Bangladesh. Experts say that Adivasis arrived in Indian sub-continent region during the great human migration from Africa. At present, they are

spread over the Indian sub-continent: India, Nepal, Bangladesh and in the Andaman Islands. Nearly 90% of Adivasi people in this region live in rural areas.

Majority of them live close to nature – in mountains, forests and hilly areas. The occupation of Adivasis varies from working in farms, fishing, and collection of forest produce. Most of them depend on forests for their livelihood and less than 10% of them depend on hunting and gathering for the necessities. In rural areas, Adivasis work as daily wage labour and few of them involve in jobs and services. Adivasis are often called as the guardians of the forest. The government of India has coined a constitutional term for Adivasis – Scheduled Tribes (ST).

According to Article 342 of the Constitution of India, there are over 700 schedules tribes in India and as per the 2011 census report of India, there are around 104 million indigenous people in India. Adivasis comprise 8.6% of the total population of the country.

Odisha has the highest number of Adivasi communities in India, with 62 tribes living there. There are about 75 small Adivasi communities in India called the Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups (PVTG); these include communities like the Jarawa, Chenchu, Korwa, Lodha and Approximately 480 languages are spoken by indigenous and nomadic people in India. According to a UNESCO report, 42 of these languages are critically endangered and are on the verge of extinction. Adivasis in India have consistently contributed to the diverse culture of the country. They are experts in wildlife and nature conservation, have knowledge of various sustainable agriculture and living practices, ethno-medicine and have a rich culture of stories, literature, art, and dance forms.

In Tamilnadu, there are many tribal clans. Majority of them includes Todas, Kadars, Irulas, Kotas, Kattunaikas, Kurumans,

Muthuvans, Paniyans, Pulayans, Malayalees, Kurumbas, Eravallans, Kanikkars, Mannans and Paliyans. Share of Adivasis population in the state is 1.03%. According to the Census Report, the total ST Population in Tamilnadu is 6,51,321 (1.04%) among this Male is 328917 and Female is 322404. There are six primitive tribal groups in Tamilnadu such as Irular, Kattunaikan, Kotar, Kurumbar, Paniyan and Todas are the PTGs. There are 35 Adivasi communities are listed in Kerala. Majority of them includes Malakuravans, Malayarayans, Malavetans, Malayans, Mannans, Ullatans, Uralis, Vishawans, Arandans, Kattunaykans, Koragas, Kotas, Kurichiyans, Kurumans, Paniyas, Pulayans, Malsars and Kurumbas. Share of adivasi population in the state is 0.49. There are 49 Adivasis communities are listed in Karnataka state. Majority of them includes Gaudalus, Hakkipikkis, Irruligas, Jenu Kurubas, Malaikuds, Malikudis, Bhils, Gonds, Chenchus, Koyas, Yeravas, Haleyas and Koramas. Share of Adivasi population in the state is 2.95%. Adivasi literacy rate in Karnataka is 36.01% among them men 47.95% and the women 23.57%. About 85% of the Adivasis are living under the poverty. 52% of the Adivasis are not finding any employment opportunities in this state. 2 MLA seats reserved for Adivasis in this state. In Andhra Pradesh there are 33 Adivasis communities are listed in this state. Majority of them includes Chenchus, Koyas, Gadabas, Konda, Doras, Konda Kapur, Konda Reddis, Sugalis/Lambadis, Yenadis, Yerukulas, Bhils, Gonds, Kolams, Pradhans & Valmiki. As per the census report, share of STs in the state is 6.47

For the colonial administrators the 'wild' and 'barbaric' tribesmen of the hills and forests only meant trouble in the form of rebellions, which continued to occur with alarming regularity throughout the colonial rule. However, the negative traits associated with the term 'tribe', was not only a colonial creation, but had existed in the pre-colonial brahminical texts as well. The colonial ethnological exercise, he elaborates, drew from the

traditional sanskritic texts which largely depicted the aborigines as beastly and demonic in terms like ‘dasyus’ and ‘daityas’. The term ‘tribe’ was also given a new dimension, of seeing it as a lower stage of human progress. The nature of interaction between the tribal and peasant societies seems to have been far more complex than that delineated by the so-called processes of absorption and Sanskritization as suggested by N. K. Bose and M. N. Srinivas. Although many of them came within the social and economic orbit of Hindu society, which resulted in them emulating the lifestyles and religious practices of the upper castes, there is ample evidence to suggest that there was indeed a great deal of give-and-take and mutual interaction between the societies.

In later periods several processes appear to have been at work affecting the organisation of tribal communities. Many of them, as Ratnagar points out, co- existed with stratified societies under the rule of monarchies, many peasant groups pushed into ‘inhospitable fringe’ would have adopted tribal ways of life, and some tribal groups were also absorbed into the larger society as jatis or castes. But, while tribes may have shared many features with the peasants societies, what distinguished them, Ratnagar argues’ ... by definition tribesmen are not surplus-producing peasants ... the affairs of tribal people do not depend on the markets or the law-and-order institutions of a larger society Tribal households have a degree of self- sufficiency not evident among peasants tribal society thus has a structure that is simpler than class or state society ... (which) need not be a pejorative understanding at all. ‘(Ratnagar 2010: 2-3). One may add that, by definition, these communities did not have a notion of private property, and had a distinct culture. Even in present times, when adivasi societies are stratified, exposed to the markets, their social organisation totally disrupted by the outside forces, one can still find in adivasi communities the remnants, more or less, of the principals of equal access to water resources, forests, pastures, land; a sense of community defined by the recognition

of a common ancestor within the larger kinship, shared rituals and religion dominated by nature and spirit, language, cultural practices, and politico-social organisations to manage the affairs of the community, which give them their distinctiveness.

Even when some members of a community adopt Hindu or Christian values and practices, they do not give up their specific identity of being a Warli, Gond, or Bhil. Our own experience with the Warlis in Maharashtra shows that often elements of the old and new are combined in very interesting and practical ways. Adivasi language, way of life, social organisation, cultural practices, rituals related, for example, to marriage, birth, and death, are not given up totally, but most often elements of the new religion are incorporated within the framework of the adivasi religion and culture. A simple but good example is the inclusion of the sign of the cross in the ritual paintings made on the walls of the houses at the time of weddings. Their social organisation remains basically unaltered. Adivasi identity, and an acute awareness of its distinctiveness, continues to be asserted by adivasis all over the country through their demands for autonomy, forest and land rights and a better quality of life. That this distinctiveness is getting eroded in the process of marginalisation, and over all change, of course, is a sad fact. Despite the state's commitment to help the adivasis grow 'according to their own genius and tradition', development has devalued and undermined much of what was positive in their culture, knowledge system, skills, institutions of governance, practices of resource management and use, language, and other cultural traditions. For example, it is reported that of the large number of spoken languages that are lost, most are tribal languages.

That even a Hinduised group essentially retains its adivasi character, and does not become a caste, as some sociologists have suggested, is the focus of Xaxa's argument. He points out that the

process of Hinduisation does not necessarily lead to the integration of the adivasi groups into the caste society. 'To be integrated, tribes must be drawn into the social organisation of the caste. That, by and large, is not an empirical reality.' Hinduisation cannot take away the social attributes of adivasi groups as communities with their special modes of living and believing. To be Hindus, he argues, they must become a part of the structure of Hindu society, 'which is possible only if they get drawn into the structure of the regional linguistic community'. In very rare cases has an entire adivasi group joined a caste/jati and taken on a new identity. Nor do they cease to be adivasis when they become a part of the process of peasantisation. Few adivasi groups practise hunting and food-gathering as their sole occupation. Most of them, nearly 51 per cent, are cultivators, followed by agricultural labourers, nearly 28 per cent. The rest are engaged in household industry, construction work, plantation, mining and quarrying and in other services. A very small section has benefited from the protective measures of the government, the system of reservation in educational institutions, employment, and political reservation, but the majority have been marginalised by the process of so-called development of the last six decades since Independence. It is they who have borne the cost of industrialisation, urbanisation, construction of big dams, infrastructure, mining and quarrying and other development activities. However, the socially and economically most marginalised among them are those groups who were formerly branded as 'criminal tribes' by the colonial government through a series of Criminal Tribes Acts.

The eagerness of various landed classes and castes, and later industrial employers, to have nomadic tribes declared notified under the act, to meet the demand for it. Although the laws were repealed in 1952, and they were listed as De-notified and Nomadic Tribes, these groups continue to be stigmatised as 'born criminals' and harassed and humiliated by the general society and

by the agencies of the state. Estimates suggest that there are about 400 nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes in the country, numbering some 150 million, most of whom do not possess land rights or house titles, and are, therefore, denied even voting rights. Many of these groups have lost their traditional- livelihoods over time, are now confined to the urban fringes, living in abysmal conditions and are dependent on informal means of. They constitute the 'poorest of the poor' in Punjab, an otherwise prosperous state. But, as Singh points out, they have already started agitating for their long pending demand for ST status, which will go the Gujjar way if it is not suitably addressed.

Most of the adivasi groups derive their livelihood from agriculture and forest, and as different from the non-tribal agricultural communities, their dependence on the forests, for a variety of purposes, is substantial. Agriculture, both shifting and settled, is closely interlinked with the forest. While the former takes place in the forest and cannot be imagined outside of it, settled agriculture, too, depends on the inputs from the forest. Out of the total geographical area, the actual area under shifting cultivation is estimated to be about 22.78 lakh hectares, and the number of families dependent on it for livelihood is said to be nearly 6.07 lakhs. About 83.7 per cent of this area lies in the north-east of the country. Rough estimates suggest that the per cent of population dependent on shifting cultivation, or jhum as it is popularly known, is as high as 57.69 in Arunachal Pradesh and 80.74 in Mizoram. An overwhelming majority today is, however, engaged in settled agriculture.

The forest has been, and continues to be, a major source of food, timber for house construction and agricultural implements, fuelwood, medicines, and other necessities of everyday life. Leaves, fruits, flowers, roots, tubers from the forest constitute an important supplement to the otherwise meagre diet of the adivasis, especially during the lean season and periods of

drought. Wild fruits, berries and honey are collected and eaten by children when they are hungry, fish and small game are a source of protein, bamboo and timber are necessary for making agricultural, hunting, and fishing tools, and herbs serve not only as potherbs but as medicines for several ailments; oil, liquor, soap come from the forest. Scholars have suggested that 50 to even 80 per cent of the food requirement of the adivasis may, in fact, be provided by the forest. Sale of non-timber forest produce like bamboo, kath, fuelwood, tendu leaves, sal leaves, a variety of nuts are an important source of income. Gods and spirits reside in the forest, so do trees and animals, which are objects of devotion, and it is the ideal getaway space for leisure time activities. In spite of the fact that a major disruption in the relationship between the two has been caused by forces unleashed in the last two centuries or so, for a large number of the adivasis, the forest is the leitmotiv of their material and spiritual existence.

Although the governments that preceded the British had appropriated certain parts of the forest for imperial purposes, regulated cutting of certain trees and plants, taxed certain products of the forest, but, by and large, the forest communities enjoyed free access to the forest. They could take all the produce they required for domestic and agricultural purposes from the public forests without hindrance. From the scanty evidence available, it appears that the forest communities enjoyed a degree of freedom in the use and management of the forests they inhabited, and they developed their own mechanisms, cultural and religious, to regulate the use of forest. One still finds among adivasi communities' norms and rules governing the use of forests, although in the face of rampant exploitation and destruction of forests all over the country, these norms are inevitably breaking down.

Several regulations were passed in mid-nineteenth century with the object of protecting and regenerating forests for ecological

reasons, as well as of facilitating production of timber on a sustainable basis, for both revenue and imperial purposes. It was found expedient to pass a law in 1865, later revised in 1878, to curtail the rights of the people and make 'government the only master'. Laws relating to the management of forest and forest produce were subsequently consolidated in the Indian Forest Act of 1927. This resulted in the large-scale restriction on the removal of fuelwood and bamboos, the prohibition against cutting wood for building huts and cattle-sheds, and for agricultural implements, the reservation of mahua flowers and fruits, leaves of many kinds, and prohibition of shifting cultivation. In many instances, grazing lands were included into 'reserved' and 'protected' forests, thereby seriously affecting the existing grazing arrangements. Overall, notwithstanding the regional differences, one could suggest that the creation of a large area of 'reserved' forests in India under control of the state, supervised and managed by the forest department resulted in the restriction of the customary rights of the forest communities endangering their very survival. These communities suffered great hardships at the hands of forest officials who enforced the restrictions with great severity, so that even a minor breach of regulation was treated as a 'crime'.

The scientific management of forests introduced by the British also resulted in the enhanced commercial value of the forests, and opened up an important source of revenue for the government. The forest department showed a consistent rise in surplus. The ever expanding demand from the urban centres, military cantonments and hill stations, from the railways, and the rising commercial value of teak, and other so-called Minor Forest Produce like resin, tanning materials like kuth, myrabolans, and essential oil as items of export, all added to the economic value of the forests. Efforts were made to promote the growth of trees like teak, deodar, sal, pine, sissou which commanded a ready market (Guha 1983: 1886-87; Guha 1999:

60; Munshi 1996: 1268). The increased policing by the forest department inevitably resulted in more and more forest 'crimes' and 'offences' being committed by those dependent on the forest. The forest department, by and large, treated, and continue to treat, the adivasis as the enemy of the forest, holding them responsible for its destruction. There was, and is, no place in this model of forestry, for the involvement of local forest communities in matters pertaining to the management and use of forest. Scientific arrogance, economic compulsion and sheer callousness towards the basic needs of the poor have largely guided the working of the forest department.

Two important processes through which, according to Xaxa, land and forest under tribal control were brought under state control and management were the following. One of them was that under the system of administration introduced during the colonial rule and which continued after Independence, lineage/village ownership of land was not recognised. Hence, adivasi land under such arrangement was not recorded in the survey and settlement reports. The other was the non- recognition of shifting agriculture as a legitimate agricultural practice, except in the north-east. As a result, the rights of adivasis practising shifting cultivation in states like Odisha, Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, remain unrecognised. In concrete terms it implies that the forest on which the adivasi community was dependent for shifting cultivation was not recognised as forest under the control of the community or the village.

The traditional rights of the adivasis were neither recognised nor recorded. The creation of national parks and sanctuaries on forest lands further excluded these communities from their survival base. While conservation of the flora and fauna was recognised as an urgent need, the settlement of adivasi rights to forest and its produce was not undertaken with the sincerity and seriousness that it deserved. And those who continued to use forest land were

deemed ‘encroachers’, stripped of any security or rights. The debate between the supporters of wildlife and forest protection and that of adivasi rights continues, and while the concerns of both are legitimate, it is being increasingly recognised that the two are not necessarily irreconcilable.

Despite state control, depletion, and destruction of forest as a result of the combined activities of the forest department and private interests has gone unchecked. In some cases, adivasis, too, have become instrumental in illegal harvesting of timber for business groups. While a few have joined the loot, and begun to trade in timber, most of them do so for a meagre sum. A constant increase in the number of people, who still depend on the forest for their livelihood, in the absence of an alternative source of employment, is certainly taking a toll on the already depleted forests. But over-exploitation of forests by the forest department as also by commercial interests for profits and use of forest land for non-forest purposes in the so-called national interest has resulted in massive destruction and depletion of forests. Between 1980 and 2004, 9.81 lakh hectares of forest land involving 11,282 development projects were diverted from forest to non-forest purposes. By some estimates, the present rate of deforestation is around one million hectares a year. Ignorance, greed and callousness of which the adivasis are often accused, has been no match for the ignorance, greed and callousness of the forest department and the state.

The problems faced by tribal communities in India are,

1) Resource exploitation

The policy of liberalization and the new state perceptions of utilization of resources are diametrically opposed to the adivasi worldview of resource exploitation and this divide has only widened further with the intrusion of globalization’s market oriented philosophy of development. The recent rapid

technological advancement and unrivalled economic and political strength of world capitalism have created favourable conditions for the evasion and extraction of natural resources from the ecologically fragile territories of tribal people.

All available laws those relating to lands, forests, minor forest produce, water resources, etc. restrain people from using forests. Primary resources such as fuel, fodder and minor forest produce which were available free to villagers are today either non-existent or have to be brought commercially. For the Tribals, globalization is associated with rising prices, loss of job security and lack of health care.

## 2) Displacement

Since the emergence of liberalization, privatization and globalization (LPG), the areas inhabited by tribal population have been subject to various protests due to involuntary displacement. Thus, forced evictions of tribals make way for mammoth capital-intensive development projects have become a distressing routine and ever-increasing phenomenon.

## 3) Gaps in Rehabilitation

There are gaps in the rehabilitation of the tribal community members displaced by development projects. Only 21 lakh tribal community members have been rehabilitated so far of the estimated 85 lakh persons displaced due to development projects and natural calamities.

## 3) Health

Recently Seven adults of the KhariaSavar community died within a span of just two weeks. Their lifespan is approximately 26 years less than the average Indian's life expectancy. Nearly 10% in West Godavari District are affected by Sickle Cell

Anaemia.

#### 4) Alienation

The problems in Red Corridor areas (especially Jharkhand, Odisha, Madhya Pradesh) is governance deficit and unfinished land reforms that has deprived the well being of tribes. There is widespread infighting amongst tribes of North-East for natural resources and also of territorial supremacy.

#### 5) Vested interests:

In the name of upgradation of lifestyle of poor indigenous tribal people, the market forces have created wealth for their interests at the cost of livelihood and security of these tribes in the areas.

#### 6) Unemployment:

There is a heavy concentration of industrial and mining activities in the central belt. Despite intense industrial activity in the central Indian tribal belt, the tribal employment in modern enterprises is negligible. Apart from the provisions of Apprenticeship Act, there is no stipulation for private or joint sector enterprises to recruit certain percentage of dispossessed tribal workforce. They are forced onto the ever-expanding low paid, insecure, transient and destitute labour market. About 40 per cent of the tribals of central India supplement their income by participating in this distorted and over exploitative capitalist sector.

#### 7) Affecting social life:

Many more are slowly crushed into oblivion in their homeland or in urban slums. Their economic and cultural survival is at stake. The globalization behemoth has added new dimensions to the vulnerability of India's downtrodden by exacerbating their social exclusion, and making large segments of tribal groups also

vulnerable and excluded.

8) Leading to subnational movements:

Inadequate social and economic infrastructure in areas that have insufficient resources for participation in mainstream development also has been at the root of various “sub-national movements” such as the Jharkhand, Uttarakhand and Bodoland.

9) Tribal women:

Tribal forest economy is primarily a women’s economy, and it is women who are most directly affected by the corporate exploitation of their traditional lands. In poverty stricken tribal areas large scale migration has revealed the increasing movement of young women towards urban centres in search of work. Their living conditions are unhygienic, the salary is poor and tribal women are vulnerable to exploitation by unscrupulous agents. There is a large number of anemic women amongst the tribes. There is a shortfall of 6,796 sub-centres, 1,267 primary health centres (PHCs) and 309 community health centres (CHCs) in the tribal areas at an all-India level as on March 31, 2015. They have become the prime targets of sexual violation by managers, supervisors and even fellow male workers in the plantation industrial sectors.

10) Informal jobs:

Construction sites, such as mines and quarries, and industrial complexes spelt doom for the local adivasi communities with the influx of immigrant labourers.

11) Cultural Defacement:

Tribals are being forcefully integrated in to the society leading to them losing their unique cultural features and their habitat threatened. Isolated Tribes such as Sentinelese as still hostile to

outsiders. The government must enforce “eyes on hands off” policy in these cases. The Jarawa community is facing acute population decline due to entry of outsiders into the area (The Andaman Trunk Road, among other projects, has cut into the heart of the Jarawa reserve).

### Genesis of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand

Jharkhand, the tribal area of Bihar consisting of the Chota Nagpur and the Santhal Parganas, has for decades spawned movements for state autonomy. In this area are concentrated several major tribes of India, namely Santhal, Ho, Oraon and Munda. Unlike traditional tribes, nearly all of this practice settled plough agriculture on the basis of family farms. Economic differentiation has set in; there are a significant number of agricultural labourers and a growing number of mining and industrial workers. The land-holding pattern among tribals is as unequal and skewed as among non-tribals. A large class of moneylenders has also developed among them. The tribal society in Jharkhand has increasingly become a class-divided society. Most of tribals practice two formal religions – Hinduism and Christianity. The Jharkhand tribes, however, share some features with other Indian tribes. They have lost most of their land, generally to outsiders, and suffer from indebtedness, loss of employment and low agricultural productivity. They organized several major rebellions during the 19th century; and many of them actively participated in the national movement after 1919.

In 1951, the Scheduled Tribes constituted 31.15% of the population in Chota Nagpur (30.94 in 1971) and 44.67% of the population in the Santhal Parganas (36.22 in 1971). Thus, nearly two-thirds of Jharkhand’s population in 1971 was non-tribal. The overwhelming majority of both tribals and non-tribals were equally exploited poor peasants, agricultural labourers and

mining and industrial workers. Inequality in landholding and the moneylender menace were equally prevalent among the two as was the commercialization of agriculture and commercial activity. With the spread of education and modern activity in the tribal areas, a movement for the formation of a separate tribal state of Jharkhand, incorporating Chota Nagpur and the Santhal Parganas of South Bihar and the contiguous tribal areas of M.P, Orissa, and West Bengal, started during the late thirties and forties. Realizing that the interests of the tribal people could be best promoted and their domination by non-tribals ended if they had a state of their own within the Union of India, the Jharkhand party was founded in 1950 under the leadership of the Oxford-educated Jaipal Singh. The party achieved a remarkable success in 1952 elections when it won 32 seats in Chota Nagpur and emerged as the main opposition party in the Bihar Assembly. It won 25 seats in 1957.

But the Jharkhand party faced a major dilemma. While it demanded a state where the tribal people would predominate, the population composition of Jharkhand was such that they would still constitute a minority in it. To overcome this problem the party tried to give its demand a regional character by opening its membership to the non-tribals of the area and underplaying its anti-non-tribal rhetoric, even while talking of the empowerment of tribals and their dominance of the new state. The States Reorganization Commission of 1955, however, rejected the demand for a separate Jharkhand state on the ground that the region did not have a common language. The central government also held that tribals being a minority in Jharkhand could not claim a state of their own. By the early sixties the rank and file of the party began to get disheartened and frustrated. The Jharkhand party could win only 30 seats to the Bihar Assembly in 1962. In 1963, a major part of the leadership of the party, including Jaipal Singh, joined Congress, claiming that by 'working from within Congress' it stood a better chance of getting

its demand for a separate state accepted by the government. Several tribal parties and movements developed in Jharkhand after 1967, the most prominent being the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM), which was formed in late 1972. The JMM revived the demand for the Jharkhand state, but it made two innovations. It recognized the hard reality that nearly two-thirds of the population of Jharkhand was non-tribal and that, therefore, a movement which appealed only to the tribal people could not acquire the requisite political strength.

The JMM, therefore began to assert that all the older residents of the Jharkhand region, whether tribal or non-tribal, were exploited, discriminated against, and dominated by North Bihar and the recent migrants. It, therefore, put forward the demand for a separate state as a regional one on behalf of the peasants and workers of the region. Concentrating on economic issues, it also acquired the support of the non-tribal poor; several non-tribal leaders and political activists joined it, though the bulk of its following was still that of tribals. The tribal leaders felt that despite the minority character of tribals in the projected Jharkhand state, they would have a far greater representation and weight in the new state than they had in Bihar. Several tribal parties and movements developed in Jharkhand after 1967, the most prominent being the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM), which was formed in late 1972. The JMM revived the demand for the Jharkhand state, but it made two innovations. It recognized the hard reality that nearly two-thirds of the population of Jharkhand was non-tribal and that, therefore, a movement which appealed only to the tribal people could not acquire the requisite political strength.

The JMM, therefore began to assert that all the older residents of the Jharkhand region, whether tribal or non-tribal, were exploited, discriminated against and dominated by North Bihar and the recent migrants. It, therefore, put forward the demand

for a separate state as a regional one on behalf of the peasants and workers of the region. Concentrating on economic issues, it also acquired the support of the non-tribal poor; several non-tribal leaders and political activists joined it, though the bulk of its following was still that of tribals. The tribal leaders felt that despite the minority character of tribals in the projected Jharkhand state, they would have a far greater representation and weight in the new state than they had in Bihar as a whole. The JMM turned to a radical programme and ideology. Joined by other groups, especially leftist groups such as the Marxist Coordination Centre, it organized several militant agitations on issues such as recovery of alienated land, moneylenders' exploitation, employment of tribals in mines and industries and improved working conditions and higher wages in the latter, police excesses, high-handedness of forest officials and increasing liquor consumption. Shibu Soren emerged as the charismatic leader of the JMM during the early seventies. Cooperation with the leftists did not, however, last long; nor did the tribal-non-tribal alliance. The movement for the Jharkhand state underwent constant ups and downs and splits over the years with new groups coming up every so often.

In the fifties, many saw regionalism as a major threat to Indian unity. But, in fact, regionalism, at no state was a major factor in Indian politics and administration; over time, it tended to become less and less important. What precisely is regionalism needs to be first understood for appreciating its role in Indian politics. Local patriotism and loyalty to a locality or region or state and its language and culture do not constitute regionalism, nor are they disruptive of the nation. They are quite consistent with national patriotism and loyalty to the nation. To have pride in one's region or state is also not regionalism. A person can be conscious of his or her distinct regional identity – of being a Tamil or a Punjabi, a Bengali, or a Gujarati – without being any the less proud of being an Indian or being hostile to people from

other regions. This was put very well by Gandhiji in 1909: ‘As the basis of my pride as an Indian, I must have pride in myself as a Gujarati. Otherwise, we shall be left without any moorings.

Economic inequality among different states and regions could be a potential source of trouble. However, despite breeding discontent and putting pressure on the political system, this problem has not so far gives rise to regionalism or feeling of a region being discriminated against. At independence, the leadership recognized that some regions were more backward than others. Only a few enclaves or areas around Calcutta, Bombay and Madras had undergone modern industrial development. For example, in 1948, Bombay and West Bengal accounted for more than 59% of the total industrial capital of the country and more than 64% of the national industrial output. Under colonialism, agriculture had also stagnated, but more in eastern India than in northern or southern India. Regional economic disparity was also reflected in per capita income. In 1949, while West Bengal, Punjab and Bombay had per capita incomes of Rs. 353, 331 and 272 respectively, the per capita incomes of Bihar, Orissa and Rajasthan were Rs. 200, 188 and 173 respectively.

From the beginning, the national government felt a responsibility to counter this imbalance in regional development. Thus, for example, the 1956 Industrial Policy Resolution of the Government of India asserted that ‘only by securing a balanced and coordinated development of the industrial and agricultural economy in each region can the entire country attain higher standards of living’. Similarly, recognizing ‘the importance of regional balance in economic development as a positive factor in promoting national integration’, the National Integration Council of 1961 urged that ‘a rapid development of the economically backward regions in any State should be given priority in national and State plans, at least to the extent that the

minimum level of development is reached for all states within a stated period’.

Since the fifties, an ugly form of regionalism has been widely prevalent in the form of ‘the sons of the soil’ doctrine. Underlying it is the view that a state specifically belongs to the main linguistic group inhabiting it or that the state constitutes the exclusive ‘homeland’ of its main language speakers who are the ‘sons of the soil’ or the ‘local’ residents. All others, who live there, or are settled there and whose mother tongue is not the state’s main language, are declared to be ‘outsiders’. These ‘outsiders’ might have lived in the state for a long time, or have migrated there more recently, but they are not to be regarded as ‘the sons of the soil’. This doctrine is particularly popular in cities, especially in some of them. Unequal development of economic opportunities in different parts of the country, especially the cities, occurred in the surge of economic progress after 1952. Demand or preference for the ‘local’ people or ‘sons of the soil’ over the ‘outsiders’ in the newly-created employment and educational opportunities was the outcome. In the struggle for the appropriation of economic resources and economic opportunities, often recourse was taken to communalism, casteism and nepotism. Likewise, language loyalty and regionalism were used to systematically exclude the ‘outsiders’ from the economic life of a state or city.

The first ever agitation for the hill state was organized in 1957 under the leadership of erstwhile ruler of Tehri Manvendra Shah but it took almost 14 years to assume shape of a common cause of the people of the region. Uttarakhand Rajya Parishad, formed in 1973 took up the cause and became a platform for struggle. The movement produced a political party, namely Uttarakhand Kranti Dal in July 1979 under the chairmanship of former vice-chancellor of Kumauni University. Its first-ever MLA (Jaswant Singh Bisht) was elected in the assembly election held in 1980. Kashi Singh Ere wining in 1985 became its second representative to the state assembly. But this was the only main

road, Uttarakhand Kranti Dal could make Bhartiya Janata Party came up with a major force (and ultimately became a dominant party) in the hills after it started justifying the demand for new state.

The amendments suggested by the state assembly include among other things, full property rights to Uttar Pradesh as far as power projects and water resources are concerned. All irrigation and power projects, already in existence and also those under construction, will belong to Uttar Pradesh, said the resolution. It also provides for a 60-member Assembly of the new state and till this house is constituted through all legal formalities, an interim Assembly will function on its behalf. There was a furor when Home Minister L.K. Advani stood up for tabling the bill, in yet another attempt to fulfill party's long-standing promise on 17th May 2000 in the Lok Sabha. The Uttar Pradesh reformation bill was passed in the Lok Sabha on 1st August 2000 and in the Rajya Sabha on 10 August 2000. The President gave his approval to the bill on 28th August 2000. Later it was notified to the official gazetteer.

Political analysts conclude that as against long-drawn and bitter struggle for creation of most of new states, people of Uttaranchal are getting it rather comfortably – reason being that both the major political parties, which matter in the hills have a common cause as far as creation of the new state is concerned. Uttaranchal, like all other new states has a history but dotted mostly with strikes, bundhs, meetings, conferences and the like, barring a major incident of police and administrative excesses mostly on women who were proceeding to Delhi to participate in a rally organized in support of Uttaranchal on second October 1994 in Muzaffarnagar in western U.P.

As far the state assembly was concerned, it passed a government-sponsored motion demanding Uttarakhand state, on 12th August 1991 Samajwadi Party chief Mulayam Singh

Yadav government came up with a resolution to the same effect and done the state assembly adopt it on 24th August 1994. Three years later, on 24th April 1997, the state assembly passed yet another government motion urging the center to do the needful for creating a hill state. The central government headed by the BJP, came up with a constitutional amendment bill, the first exercise of the kind, in 1994 and through the President of India, urged the state assembly to give its opinion on various provisions of the bill. The state assembly, in turn, passed a resolution offering as many as 26 amendments to the central draft bill including the one to bar Haridwar becoming part of the new state and almost usurping a number of proprietary rights over the irrigation and power projects and major natural resources. The proposed Uttarakhand State would be marked by very considerable diversity in several contexts, viz., geographic, topographic and demographic. First, we have the foothill plains of the tarai, which are generally fertile as well as endowed with warm climate and substantial water resources. In Kumauni the terai has become a veritable granary of cereal crops and quality seeds.

### Gender and the Rise of the Women's Movements

The women's movement in India has been initiating from the 1920s as a continuation of the 19th century social reform movement. The women's movement progressed during the period of high nationalism and the freedom struggle, both of which shaped its outlines. The most significant achievement of this movement is the constitutional guarantees of equal rights for women and universal adult right to vote in independent India. However, these guarantees did little to bring about social and material change in the lives of most Indian women. A New women's movement, articulated to mass and popular politics, emerged in the 1970s. Despite the longstanding and vigorous women's movement, patriarchy remains deeply entrenched in

India, influencing the structure of its political and social institutions and determining the opportunities open to women and men. The negotiation and conflict between patriarchy and the women's movement are central to the constitution of the nation- state.

The term Indian women's movement has been a reason for many debates in the earlier period. The designation of "Indian," when used for the women's movement implies a political and cultural singularity that obscures the movement's diversity, differences, and conflicts. The problem is not simply one of disunities but rather has to do with intractable conflicts involving the word "women" that derive from the central position of gender in postcolonial Indian culture and politics. Indeed, processes of gender the construction of identities, roles, and relations based on sexual differences played a key role in the historical formation of the Indian nation state. But gender cannot be separated from other, conflicting political identities, all of which play a crucial role in the life of the nation.

The gender conflicts have a long period of history globally. In India, gender has been an issue from the colonial implementation of power. An overwhelming preoccupation with the "woman's question" arose from the 19th century social reform movement, crucially informed anti-colonial nationalism, and remains a point of crisis in India's cultural, social, and political space. The recognition of gender as an issue forms the basis for India's women's movement. One prominent gender concern was the rewards and benefits that accumulated to women on India's journey to self-determination, statehood, democracy, progress, modernity, and development. In 1974 the Indian government published a report, Towards Equality, that put status of women forcefully on the national agenda by arguing that the position of Indian women had declined, not improved, since 1911(Committee on the Status of Women

1974). As a result, development and progress became gender issues. Data on gender discrimination in employment, education, land distribution, inheritance, nutrition, and health became impossible to overlook. Violence against women was on the rise and widely reported in the media during the period. There were cases of rape in police custody, wife murder due to bride-burning or dowry deaths on a large scale, and sexual harassment in the workplace and on the street. Women's issues entered the fields of culture, religion, and law; of family and community structures; of the problems of and official responses to Population, poverty, illiteracy, and labour; and of the new social movements of Dalits, environmentalists, tribal's, anti-dam activists, peasants, and trade unions. Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, taking stock of the 50th independence celebrations, comments that in "all these discourses, disciplines and sites of action, gender began to figure as an 'issue' as well as a category of analysis".

The recognition of gender as an issue fuelled the post-colonial women's movement, supported by feminist critiques and women's studies in academia. Women mobilized to protest violence, legal discrimination, and rising prices and agitated for better living conditions through higher wages, the prohibition of liquor, and the provision of drinking water. These women represented a wide range of castes, classes, and communities, rural and urban. But differences among these women grew, fracturing not only the category of women but also solidarities among them. In 1986 the developing tensions were exposed and fuelled by the Shah Bano case. Discrimination against women in personal law had been on the women's movement's agenda since the 1920s, but the Shah Bano case projected the issue into a crisis of national proportions. The case intensified a process in which nationalist ideology, religious fundamentalism, communalism, and caste tensions were pitted on the site of gender. Thus embattled, women and their movement lost the fragile unity and broad identity in which their differences and

diversities were contained in the first phase of their active political engagement. Today the women's movement in India is deeply cleaved. There is, nevertheless, a vigorous search for a viable feminist politics. To succeed, feminists must develop transformative politics, managing and transcending class, caste, and community differences.

Today there is not one women's movement in India, an overarching collective in which gender politics is articulated. Yet the multiplicity of sites, disciplines, and discourses make for vibrant gender politics. Although women often define and identify themselves through difference and conflict rather than through similarity or common belonging. This approach is justified because analytical categories often must indulge in abstraction from the perceptions and definitions of social actors, so the term can be used to indicate a variety of campaigns around issues important to women. Moreover, the women's movement has an ambiguous relationship with the state. From its beginning the movement has placed a disproportionate emphasis on seeking solutions from the state, usually in the form of progressive legislation. In the colonial period such demands were constrained by the women's movement's alliance with the nationalist movement, which challenged the colonial state's intervention in Indian social relations. For a few decades after independence, female leaders, drawn mostly from the urban elite, believed in the fiction of the state's neutrality and assumed the goodwill of the male nationalist leadership. The critique of the state came from leftist women intellectuals and participants in mass movements who placed an equally disproportionate emphasis on solutions emanating from the state and its agents as perpetrators of violence. The colonial period has been viewed by historians as one in which a New Patriarchy was fashioned to meet the demands of colonial rule and the desire for modern progress. But soon "New Women" began to speak on their own behalf for a future different from that charted for them, and

often against both the new and old patriarchy. These women are the focus of the second section, which examines the development of the women's movement in the colonial period. It also traces the shifts in the movement through independence and the disenchantment with nationalism.

The social reform movement was the mirror in which Indian men were invited to see themselves when colonial education began. The new urban elite, drawn mostly from the upper castes, imbibed the enlightenment philosophy of individualism and humanism. They perceived barbaric traditional practices against women as a civilizational lapse and as recognizable social evils. Thus emerged the social reform movement, an attempt on the part of the new elite to redress, sometimes with and sometimes without British help, the worst features of the old patriarchal order. Women were in the forefront of all the main items on the agenda of the social reform movement. For reformers, women's emancipation was a prerequisite to national regeneration and an index of national achievement in the connected discourse of civilization, progress, modernity, and nationalism. One strand in the movement concentrated on legislative remedy. A series of campaigns resulted in the abolition of sati in 1829 and the enabling of widow remarriage in 1856. Another strand was concerned with creating the female counterpart of the new male elite, "New Women", who would share the sensibilities of the men in the family and be able to sustain their new class roles. The chief instrument was formal education, but the issue became inextricably linked with the gender segregation and seclusion (purdah) practiced by the upper castes and classes and, by extension, with a reworking of public-private gender roles. Between the 1820s and 1850s reformers, who favored both legislative interventions by the colonial state and a wider program of female emancipation, set up organizations like the Brahma Samaj in eastern India, the Prarthana Samaj in western India, the Arya Samaj in northern

India, and the Theosophical Society in southern India. Elite urban men led these movements and challenged many of the ritual and social restrictions to which upper-caste women were subjected. As fathers and husbands, the men were able to extend many benefits of modernity to a small but significant group of women. These women were drawn into the public spheres of formal education and eventually into employment, political participation, and leadership. These achievements are sometimes underestimated: “elite” has often been used to categorize—and dismiss—women who struggled to gain an education and a place in India’s public life, neither of which flowed automatically or easily from their class or caste status. Women often earned “freedom” at the price of social ridicule, ostracism, and harassment. And while some women were aided by well-intentioned male relatives, others faced severe familial resistance. Still, the achievements were remarkable

From Rassundari Devi’s careful efforts to trace her son’s lessons in the seclusion of her bedchamber at night, Bengali women progressed rapidly. In 1883 Kadambini Basu and Chandramukhi Basu received B.A.s from Calcutta University, becoming the first female graduates of the British empire. Kadambini went on to train in medicine and practiced as a doctor in Calcutta in the 1880s. Other women became doctors, teachers, and educators. Women’s education also proceeded apace in urban centers like Bombay, Poona, and Madras. Remarkable women like Pandita Ramabai, Anandibai Joshi, Tarabai Shinde, Haimavati Sen and Saraladevi, some privileged and some not, challenged patriarchal constraints, at least in their own lives, and some went on to participate in the emerging nationalist movement. While the liberal section of the new elite demanded legal and administrative initiative from the colonial state in their reform project, more conservative Indian opinion resisted colonial intervention into traditional social relations. The debates between these two groups have often been seen as a battle

between modernists and traditionalists. Lata Mani, however, argues that both groups were redefining tradition and, therefore, “Indianness.” Women were “neither the subjects nor the objects” of this discourse, but merely the “site” on which the debates were conducted.

Tradition severed from social reality finds fulfilment in an emotional and aesthetic imaging of a heroic mother-goddess. Second, the idealized opposition between domestic and public has located women firmly in the domestic realm, with housework and childcare at their only legitimate concerns. The moral health of the community is felt to depend on the “different but equal” roles of men and women, and thus on established values of a gender-based division of labour. Third, the aesthetic, cultural, and emotional investment in the imaging of women has become the cornerstone of an ethicized and oppositional entity. “Woman” has become the arena in which community, caste, and class battles are fought. In such a discursive space, the unity of nation, caste, class, or community requires the subordination of women. Hence women’s aspirations for gender justice or gender equality sit uneasily with claims of justice or equality flowing from their other identities (such as being low caste or poor or a member of a minority community). The ideological and symbolic location of women was buttressed by legal and administrative measures that laid the foundations for a new patriarchy. This too colonialism bequeathed to the “daughters of independence,” and it is a legacy the ruling powers of the post-colonial nation-state have not discarded. The persistence of the new patriarchy was foreshadowed in the manner it was fashioned— with the complicity of the male Indian elite. Few women of the time voiced an understanding of these processes. Pandita Ramabai was perhaps the era’s most scathing critic of Hindu patriarchy and casteism. When Rukhmabai, married as a child, was tried and sentenced to prison for refusing to live with her husband, Ramabai wrote: Our only wonder is that a defenseless woman

like Rukhmabai dared to raise her voice in the face of the powerful Hindu law, the mighty British Government, the 129,000,000 men, the 330,000,000 gods of the Hindus; all these have conspired together to crush her into nothingness. We cannot blame the English Government for not defending a helpless woman; it is only fulfilling its agreement made with the male population of India. Ironically, while the “liberal “and “civilizing” arm of the colonial state was disabled by indigenous opposition, the enhancement of male control over women happened relatively quietly, often at the initiative of the colonial state and without nationalist opposition. The colonial state inherited a highly coercive labour arrangement, based on the household, organized by gender and age and maintained through family roles.

It was in the state’s interest to maintain this arrangement to prop up the increasingly unviable small peasant economy that was the basis of the state’s revenue calculations. Segments of the male Indian elite were demanding greater cohesion of the family and consolidation of patriarchal control over women (and children) against the incursions of capitalism and modern institutions. Especially in urban India, women’s exclusive domesticity became the most effective marker of middle-class status (as in Victorian Britain). Besides, the increasing control over women their sexuality and their power underwrote indigenous elite men’s claim to autonomy in the domestic domain. The question of women’s labour was enmeshed in elite ideologies of domesticity, while control of sexuality (and labour) was increasingly affected through the legal and ideological manipulation of marriage systems. The marriage system was the key to men’s control over women.

The brahminization of marriage had a disastrous effect on the habitual rights and marriage practices of low-caste women. The law of divorce is a telling example. Colonial officialdom, based

on scriptural prescription and upper-caste custom, understood the absence of divorce to be the most significant feature of the Hindu marriage system (as opposed to the Muslim system). They ignored, despite overwhelming evidence furnished by their own officials to the contrary, the fact that all but the very high castes routinely allowed divorce. In the 1860s a series of High Court judgments ruled that there was no divorce in Hindu law and that Hindu woman, because they were not allowed polygamous marriages, could not marry a second time. As a result, many poor and low-caste women became criminally liable under the penal law against bigamy. Hindu men were allowed polygamous marriages and had no liability to maintain discarded wives; thus, the outlawing of divorce had no material effect on them. Hindu women were legally empowered to remarry only after their husband's death, as dictated by the Hindu Widow Remarriage Act (1856). Yet this apparently enabling act became the means through which orthodoxy was reinforced, because the act stipulated that a Hindu woman who remarried forfeited all claims to the property of her first (dead) husband. Criminal laws, migration regulations, and other legal and administrative innovations enhanced such restrictions. Thus a small group of elite women became the crucial beneficiaries of colonial modernity and were able to negotiate patriarchal (and class) spaces to access education and employment and to aspire to political leadership. Yet the recasting of patriarchy in the image of high-caste and upper-class norms meant that most women were left out of the benefits of modernity and deprived of their traditional rights and freedoms.

The "New Women" began to speak in the 1880s, questioning elements of their subordination. They found a voice in writing about their lives and the condition of women. In 1881 Vijayalakshmi, a young Brahmin child-widow was sentenced to death for killing her illegitimate child. Tarabai Shinde, a young woman, responded with a harsh critique of Brahminical

patriarchy, Stri-purush tulana (A Comparison between Men and Women. In the 1920s the second generation of “New Women” became more active. They articulated the needs of women, critiqued their society and foreign rulers, started associations, developed institutions, and sought to consolidate women’s interests.

The history of feminist organization was highly important when analysing the gender reformation in India. During 1920–70 Indian feminists focused on gaining equality through two main channels: by forming associations and becoming active in politics. Saraladevi Chaudhurani, perhaps the most remarkable of the “New Women”, was both a feminist and a nationalist, an active participant in both the social reform and nationalist movements. She was one of the first women to see the need for and start an association for women. Saraladevi founded the Bharat Stree Mahamandal (Great Group of Indian Women) in Allahabad in 1910. Saraladevi’s efforts came on the heels of several women’s clubs, groups, and associations initiated by men. These included the Bharat Ashram (Indian Hermitage) in Bengal, formed by Keshab Chunder Sen (of Brahma Samaj) in the 1870s; Arya Mahila Samaj (The Aryan Women’s Association) in Bombay, formed by Pandita Ramabai and Justice Ranade in the 1880s; Bharat Mahila Parishad (Ladies’ Social Conference), formed as part of the National Social Conference in 1905; and Anjumane-Khawatin-e- Islam (The Muslim Women’s Association) in Punjab, formed by Amir-un-Nisa of the Mian family. These associations, initiated or inspired by men, were critical training grounds for women, allowing them access to education and their first experience with public work. But they also tried to impose traditional gender roles and values. Their limits became evident when women attempted to define the “woman’s question” in their own ways. As a result, women followed in Saraladevi’s footsteps to organize women-only associations (mostly called Mahila Samitis) in the early decades

of the 20th century. These were mostly city-based, sometimes neighbourhood-based, small, limited, and dispersed. Some taught basic subjects like mathematics and geography. Some focused-on classes on health, hygiene, nutrition, and childcare. Some were class-oriented and taught new social skills such as polite conversation in English, tea serving, or public speaking. And many concentrated-on livelihood solutions such as skill training (sewing and embroidery) or handicrafts (weaving and pottery). These local associations laid the ground for national associations of women. During the early spurt of nationalist agitation, the Women's Indian Association was launched (1917), followed by the National Council of Indian Women (1925) and the All-India Women's Conference (1927). The Women's Indian Association defined itself as including and representing women of all races, cultures, and religions. It opened branches in different parts of southern India but remained connected to the Madras Theosophical Society. Its political debut was immediate.

In 1917 a delegation met Secretary of State Sir Edward Montagu to argue for female franchise. But the Women's Indian Association remained highly limited in class and caste composition and failed to spread outside the Madras presidency. The National Council of Indian Women was even more elitist. It was set up as a national branch of the International Council of Women and was influenced by Lady Tata and other women from wealthy industrialist families of Bombay. Many of these women saw charity as the council's main purpose, providing a scope for "enlightened" activity based on the model offered by British middle-class women. Still, the council had committees on labor, legislation, and the press. The legislation committee, under the guidance of Mithan Tata Lam, was the most active. Both the Women's Indian Association and the National Council of Indian Women claimed to represent all Indian women, but they were far removed from the masses of women whom they confidently sought to benefit. They targeted the government for

solutions and advice on what they considered problems. They concentrated on “petition politics” because such activity best suited their stations and purposes.

The All-India Women’s Conference, the third of these organizations, was much more successful in offering a national representation of women and in its alliance with the Indian National Congress. Within 10 years the conference included subcommittees on labour, rural reconstruction, industry, textbooks, opium and child marriage legislation. It was through the campaign for the Hindu Child Marriage Bill (1927; introduced by Harbilas Sarada and known as the Sarada Bill) that the All-India Women’s Conference (and other national women’s organizations) came of age. Child marriage and the age of consent (for sexual intercourse) had been controversial issues since 1891. Women’s organizations actively organized in support of the Sarada Bill because from the beginning they had identified child marriage as a major impediment to women’s progress. The government argued, based on a petition demanding that Muslims not be subject to the bill that the Muslim community was against the measure (AIWC 1931). Muslim women tried to combat this move. Sharifah Hamid Ali said that two of her daughters had been “victims of this custom” and favored 18 as the minimum age for marriage. Muslim members of the Women’s Indian Association submitted a special

petition: We speak also on behalf of the Muslim women of India, assert that it is only a small section of Mussalman men who have been approaching your Excellency and demanding exemption from the Act. This Act affects girls and women far more than it affects men and we deny their right to speak on our behalf. (WIA, Appendix, Report 1930-31, “Muslim Ladies Defend Sarada Act”) In the end the Child Marriage Restraint Act that was passed included Muslims but compromised on everything else. The minimum age of marriage for women was

set at 14 and for men at 18. The age of consent was not mentioned. The Child Marriage Bill was a consensus issue for the women's movement— perhaps the last. During the campaign women's organizations acquired a national profile and gained legitimacy and credibility in representing Indian women.

By the early 1930s women's organizations emerged as a consolidated force and were able to respond to national and international issues. They participated in every committee and planning group set up to discuss India's future. Women, it almost seemed, had been accepted as an equal partner in the nation-to-be. But their hegemony was short-lived. As the momentum of the movement for freedom gathered, priorities changed and overtook the fragile alliances and narrow base on which the women's movement was founded.

From the 1920s the Indian National Congress began to forge linkages with peasant, worker, and women's organizations to demonstrate mass support. Women's political participation was socially legitimized, completely altering equations within the women's movement. Some women were already engaged in a variety of political activity. From 1889 every meeting of the Indian National Congress included some women, a few delegates, and many observers. Their participation was often token and symbolic, but the women were educated and politically knowledgeable and were seeking (or being given) new public roles. The Partition of Bengal (1905) and the Swadeshi movement attracted much larger numbers, including uneducated rural women.

Geraldine Forbes argues that a new kind of feminine political role was fashioned during this movement: Where private and public roles were sharply divided by both ideology and physical arrangements, women's political acts were hidden from British authorities. Women hid weapons, sheltered fugitives, and

encouraged the men, their domestic roles providing the cover for these subversive and revolutionary acts were quite different from their representative roles in the Indian National Congress. There the delegates appeared as equals of men, but their true significance was symbolic. They sang in praise of Mother India and posed as regenerated Indian womanhood. In the Swadeshi movement women did not do the same things as men. Instead, they used their traditional roles to mask a range of political activities. While the public and the private continued to exist as distinct categories, usual definitions of appropriate behaviour in each sphere were redefined and given political meaning. This distinction between two kinds of political activity undertaken by different groups of women continued within the nationalist movement through independence and beyond and existed in many other political formations (such as the left-led peasant and worker movements). As a result, while a small group of women were able to aspire to public and leadership roles on equal terms as men, most were restricted to “feminine” modes of participation. The latter were functionally significant and amenable to valorisation in terms of “feminine” virtue. But for these very reasons, such activities were easily subsumed within traditional gender structures.

Mahatma Gandhi extended the logic of “feminine” modes of protest to the whole of the Nationalist Movement. It is argued, credibly, that Gandhi “feminized” nationalist politics by emphasizing Satyagraha and passive resistance and creating a special space for women. He drew to the nationalist movement groups and numbers of women as never before. The Bengal women showed the way during the non-cooperation protests of 1921. Basanti Debi, Urmila Debi, and Suniti Debi (members of C.R. Das’s family) joined picketing lines, courted arrest, and precipitated a broadening of the movement. They were joined by numerous ladyvolunteers, especially Sikh ladies. Calcutta students came out in hundreds, joined the prohibited volunteer

corps and marched out with khaddar [handloom cloth] on, seeking imprisonment. Gandhi appreciated the value of female picketers and continually sought to draw more women into such activities. These efforts bore fruit in the civil disobedience movements of the 1930s. In various parts of the country, masses of women took to the streets and joined picketing lines. Women's participation legitimized the Indian National Congress and Gandhian politics. It bolstered claims of Indian unity against foreign rule. It also undermined the "civilizing" mission of the British and the government's claim to be a protector of women. Police violence toward and sexual abuse of female political activists helped prove the illegitimacy of colonial rule. The movement for women's rights was furthered as well. The leadership of the Indian National Congress, for instance, became committed to the civil rights program of women's associations. Middle-class women in particular gained many social benefits. By breaching the public domain, female activists facilitated their daughters' entry into the world of formal education, professions, employment, and politics. Within the moral framework of the nationalist movement, they were able to redefine gender roles. Female demonstrators and nationalist leaders claimed the participation of all Indian women, but upper- and middle-class Hindus dominated the movement. This limitation was implicit in Gandhi's political idiom. He invoked India's sacred legends— all Hindu— to appeal to women. Icons like Sita, Savitri, and Damayanti resonated with Hindu women, even the most poor, low caste, and uneducated, because for them these were living legends. But they excluded Muslim women, who were uncomfortable with such invocations. But Gandhi's idiom was successful because it drew on traditional gender ideology, which not only appealed to women but also reassured men. Some women who joined the revolutionary movement transgressed stereotypical gender roles, but they were few and exceptional. Their political achievements were valorized, but society did not consider them

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respectable or representative. Pritilata Waddedar, the most celebrated female martyr of the freedom movement, asked an impassioned question that could not be answered within the dominant gender ideology of nationalism. Many of these women questioned social restrictions on women's mobility, the values of segregation, and the discriminatory sexual morality imposed on women. From their ranks came bold social statements like intercaste and intercommunal marriages, and some questioned the institution of marriage. But like the revolutionaries, they were a small group and outside the mainstream. Only these small groups asked radical gender questions. Congress-led nationalism, which had already cast itself in the image of a reinvented patriarchal tradition, found it easier to jettison even the little commitment it had to social reform. Most nationalist women accepted the social and cultural idiom of "Indianness"— values of segregation and male guardianship— in which their participation was sought. Nationalist activism did not lay any straight road to feminist consciousness. Not all women accepted male inscriptions on nationalism, however. Saraladevi, Muthulakshmi Reddy, Amrit Kaur, and others were committed to Gandhi and his non-cooperation and civil disobedience, but they did not abandon the struggle for civil rights.

The contradictions within the women's movement became increasingly apparent. On the one hand, by the 1940s the All-India Women's Conference was establishing itself as the premier organization representing women. Indeed, it could rightfully claim that after the Indian National Congress it was the second most representative body in India. On the other hand, differences were emerging within its ranks. By 1942 activist women were so caught up in the struggle for independence that they ignored gender issues or, like Sucheta Kripalani, deliberately put them aside. The franchise movement demonstrated the dilemma of the women's movement— there

was danger in both British collaboration and nationalist alliance. Gandhi had set the script in his first article on women in Young India, where he said that women should take their proper place beside men, but not with a “votes for women” campaign that would only detract from the fight for freedom. Women, he argued, should use their energy “helping their men against the common foe” (Gandhi 1920). During the 1930 Round Table Conference, organized women rejected Begum Shah Nawaz’s recommendation to accept special reservation as an interim measure. They remained loyal to the nationalist position to not cooperate without a firm commitment to the end of British rule. Similarly, when the Rau Committee (1941) was examining the possibilities of reforming Hindu law, women leaders who had worked hard and long to secure legal reform were hesitant to join Congress’s boycott. Gandhi dismissed the Rau Committee as a government ploy to divert attention, and Mridula Sarabhai insisted that women put nationalist issues first. In this complicated and compelling situation, few women leaders were able to balance their commitments to nationalism and feminism. By the mid-1940s the hegemony of all-India women’s organizations had eroded. For two decades they had spoken for all Indian women, placing their demands within the framework of social feminism, which constructed women as socially and psychologically different from men. But their ideology was too Hindu, too middle- class, and too urban to appeal to or adequately represent all Indian women. The 1940s were a tumultuous decade for India. Growing communalism led to partition and one of the largest known population displacements in human history. There was war and famine. And the Quit India movement ran parallel with more radical movements for socioeconomic justice. Women were a significant part of all the major events of this time, and their involvement helped shatter the constructions of “Indian woman” from which, in different ways, the women’s and nationalist movements drew. Already, organized women’s commitment to a comprehensive legal bill had alienated

some Muslim members— foreshadowing a deep cleavage to be unleashed in the elections of 1937. Women’s organizations’ attempts to attract lower-class rural and urban women failed for want of programs with mass appeal. There was significant participation of peasant and working-class women in class-based action and nationalist movements under the leadership of a variety of leftist (primarily communist) leadership. Examples include the Tebhaga movement in North Bengal, the Telengana movement in Andhra Pradesh, and the cotton textile workers’ movements in western India.

But the women’s movement— autonomous women’s organizations— was not able to articulate its campaigns on women’s issues with this mass upsurge of women. The left created women’s organizations of its own like the Mahila Atmaraksha Samiti (Women’s Self defence League) in Bengal— that did significant relief work in times of famine, war, and later partition. But these movements did not merge into any significant mass mobilization of women on gender issues.

The 1920s and 1930s witnessed the peak of the so-called first feminist movement. This was the period when women began to organize and mobilize on issues of social reform and civil and political rights. It was a phase of remarkable unity, albeit one achieved at the cost of major social and ideological exclusions. The focus of the movement dissipated in the 1940s: the urgency of the nationalist struggle overrode the priorities of the feminist agenda, and the variety and range of activities in which women began to participate shattered unity. As with many other political forces in India, widening and inclusion inevitably undermined the claim of a few to represent the many. The second feminist movement inherited many of the legacies of these developments. Issues of family law “nationalized” both the first and second feminist movements. But while child marriage legislation unified the women’s movement in the 1930s, the

second feminist movement's unity founded on marriage law reform in the 1980s. The Uniform Civil Code controversy had begun to expose fault lines in the women's movement in the 1940s; in the 1980s these developed into deep and unbridgeable fissures. At first one question seemed to have been laid to rest. The franchise movement and campaigns for civil and political rights seemed to have been won when the constitution of the new nation-state assured fundamental rights of equality and universal adult franchise. Twenty years later, however, women realized how hollow these provisions were and how little representation they had gained in political establishments and higher reaches of power. Political and social disenfranchisement powered the rise of the second feminist movement, but when in the 1990s the government proposed a bill reserving for women seats in legislative bodies, the women's movement was too fractured to unite in its support. The next section discusses the rise of the second feminist movement and two issues of contention within it: the Uniform Civil Code controversy and the debate over reserving for women seats in legislative bodies.

The contemporary women's movements were inevitable. Among the early all-India women's organizations, the All-India Women's Conference had the closest links with the Indian National Congress. But all the organizations were to some extent committed to a "harmonious alliance" with the male nationalist leadership. As a result (and because the Congress espoused many women's causes), these organizations accepted the independent Indian state as an ally. In their critique of patriarchy, identification of oppressive male agency was muted. The enemy was the system, not men. This political position meshed well with the organizations' welfare orientation and charitable work. The position was also consistent with the broad framework of the social feminism— in which claims to equality were based on the importance and value of women's traditional

roles— that continued to dominate women’s organizations until the 1960s. From the 1940s, however, women began broadening their scope far beyond women’s organizations to the freedom struggle and peasant, worker, and trade union movements. Women’s organizations lost their hegemonic claims to represent all Indian women, female activists lost their privileged position when their numbers in political parties and movements increased. As a result, the “harmonious alliance” with Congress faced new stresses and strains. Women began to articulate a more diverse, radical, and nuanced critique of patriarchy, reaching toward a new and more politicized gender identity.

The turning point came in 1970s, when several events— some within and some outside India— gave a radical turn to the women’s movement. The “new feminism” in developed Western countries led in 1971 to the international year and then decade of women. The focus was on development. In the 1950s the India state had bypassed Gandhi’s vision of an alternative path to progress, opting instead for conventional models of development: industrialization, central planning, expansion of science and technology. Congress, under Indira Gandhi, inaugurated a new era of populist politics, and there was a gradual broadening of the democratic base of mainstream political institutions. At the same time, the Indian left fractured, giving rise to a new body of leftist thought. A series of locally organized and intense popular struggles broke out. This was the beginning of new social movements, within which popular women’s voices found their first platform. The first of these was the Shahada movement in the Dhulia district of Maharashtra, initiated by Bhil (tribal) landless laborers. In 1972, with help from activists of the new left, the laborers formed Shramik Sangathana, which initiated a vigorous campaign against domestic violence. In the same year Gandhian socialists broke away from the Textile Labour Association to form the Self-Employed Women’s Association under the leadership of Ela

Bhatt. In 1973 Mrinal Gore from the Socialist Party joined women from the Communist Party of India (Marxist) to form the United Women's Anti- Price Rise Front, which turned into a mass movement of women seeking consumer protection. A student movement against price rises in Gujarat developed along the same lines to form Nav Nirman (1974), led by middle-class women. A start was made in this period toward the formation of women's organizations along lines completely different from pre-independence ones. There was no effort to form all-India organizations.

Thus, the second feminist movement developed, national in scope and with mass connections. This was a phase of self-conscious commitment to feminist politics. The national character of this movement is usually ascribed to the countrywide protests (led by women) on a case of custodial rape (rape perpetrated by agents of the state on women in official custody, such as police lock-up), the Mathura rape case. Also of considerable importance in the early days were dowry deaths, cases where wives were murdered by their husbands or his relatives for not meeting demands to transfer more cash, goods, or assets from their natal to their conjugal family. In the first case the demand was for the state to take responsibility for crimes committed by its agents and led to a wider movement for the amendment of the rape law. In the second case the agitation focused on legislative and administrative remedies, resulting in a provision in the penal code giving the police wide powers in arresting perpetrators of domestic violence. The government's prompt response with radical legislation on both counts led some women's groups to question the efficacy of public campaigns for changes in law— because the more the law changed, the more things remained the same. Without political will or an enhancement in women's ability to claim and assert legal rights, laws existed only on paper; they were rarely enforced. From the mid- to late 1980s women's groups concentrated on providing

services to individual women to enable them to gain advantages already given in law. This case work was significantly different from the welfare dispensed by earlier women's groups. The earlier groups sought amelioration; the new groups sought recognition and realization of rights. In the mid-1980s the movement encountered severe challenges. The Shah Bano case catapulted the demand for a Uniform Civil Code into the cauldron of communal politics. The Deorala sati incident (1987) initiated a critique of feminism, highly sophisticated but bearing a striking resemblance to earlier dismissals on grounds of elitism, modernism, and Westernism.

The uniform civil code became a prominent matter of discussion in India in the following years. In India family laws are called personal laws. The laws are personal in that they relate to the sphere of personal relations but also in that they are person specific. The specificity flows primarily from religious affiliation, though local custom is also important. As a result, family laws are hived off from the main body of civil law, codified separately for four communities—Hindus, Muslims, Christians, and Parsis—based on their religious prescriptions. The four codes are a mix of scriptural sanctions, heterogeneous customs, and practices, and, most important, precepts forwarded and established through the political manoeuvrings of powerful spokespersons from these communities. Thus, the laws necessarily reflect patterns of social and political dominance based on region, caste, class, and gender. Personal laws define the relationship between men and women within the family and control and direct marriage, divorce, maintenance, guardianship of children, adoption, succession, and inheritance. All four codes concern women intimately, and all treat women as subordinate to and dependent on male kin. The male is considered the head of the family, and women do not have equivalent rights, especially to property. Personal laws are codified separately for the four religious' communities— that is,

they are not just customary (or common) law, but also statutory law based on religion. As a secular nation-state, India maintains these religious laws alongside secular laws, civil and criminal, all of which are administered by the same legal-judicial apparatus. Since the 1930s these contradictions have given rise to demands for a Uniform Civil Code based on secular and egalitarian principles to replace personal laws. But there has also been Considerable public opinion in favour of retaining the different personal laws, with great resistance to state interference in the religious communities the laws affect. This debate has plagued the Indian state and fuelled communal politics and, in recent years, evoked bitter conflicts within the women's movement.

The history of personal laws helps explain the politically charged nature of the debate. The duality of law was a product of colonial imperatives in 18th century Bengal, and part of the process of private public delineation discussed above. A profound misunderstanding of the pre-colonial system led the British to believe that religious and scriptural tradition was the basis of all custom, morality, and jurisprudence. Accordingly, from the 1770s the British concentrated on codifying Hindu and Islamic laws (drawing on scriptures) and administering these in court with the aid of pundits and maulavis (Hindu and Muslim scholars and priests). The codification constituted a herculean feat of selection, appropriation, and reinvention of scriptural texts that were many, varied, and contradictory. Moreover, the pundits and maulavis imprinted on the implementation of these laws their own class and caste interests. British Indian government officials disregarded evidence that many of these precepts and practices were specific to upper classes and castes. This codified and ossified family law was designated in 1860-61 as the domain of personal law, to be drawn and developed from religious principles and kept separate from the secular civil and criminal legal system, based on English law, being developed in

## British India.

While the 1891 Age of Consent Bill witnessed the first major nationalist mobilization around the question of family law, the Sarada Bill controversy (1927-30) witnessed the first major communal mobilization. As noted, women's organizations—under the leadership of the Women's Indian Association, All-India Women's Conference, and National Council of Indian Women—united Hindu and Muslim women in favour of the Sarada Bill and against communal leaders. But this was a fragile moment of unity. Throughout the 1930s bills were introduced to remove women's legal disabilities. As these bills were discussed (and defeated), it became apparent to women that their male political allies were opposed to even the most moderate reform of family and property arrangements. Blocked in their efforts at piecemeal reform, women's organizations sought a more comprehensive secular legal code, alienating Muslim women supporters. In the absence of sensitive consideration for the communally charged atmosphere of the period, the move for a secular code was doomed before it got off the ground. In the end the National Planning Committee's women's subcommittee endorsed a common code but deemed it more feasible to have an optional code that would gradually replace the personal laws. In the meanwhile, the subcommittee recommended reforms within each personal law. The All-India Women's Conference continued its campaign, but in its charter of demands just before independence, it abandoned the demand for a common code in favour of reform of personal laws. The question of personal law reform came to the fore during the Rau committee (1941-46), which was formulating a code of Hindu law. All women's organizations helped collect evidence for the committee, which recommended a rationalization of Hindu law for the consideration of the Constituent Assembly, established in 1945. In the debates and discussions on legal reform, the meaning of the common code had become increasingly identified with

citizenship in a united nation-state. In the Constituent Assembly the common code became more firmly thus inscribed. These meanings then became imprinted on the term itself.

The Uniform Civil Code became especially contentious as an instrument of national unity (rather than for securing women's rights). One group in the Constituent Assembly favoured including a provision for the Uniform Civil Code as a fundamental right for breaking down barriers of community. Another group opposed it. The compromise was to include it among the non-contestable directive principles. But several questions remained. First, the right to religion, especially of minorities, was protected as a fundamental right against state intervention, but it was not clear whether personal laws were included in "religion." Second, protection against sexual discrimination was included as a fundamental right, but it was not clear how gender equality could be squared against discrimination in personal laws. Third, an anomalous relationship among women's status, personal laws, minority rights, and citizenship rights was set up. In the first Congress government of independent India, Prime Minister J.L. Nehru, and Law Minister B.R. Ambedkar favoured the Uniform Civil Code as an instrument of modernization, secularization, and national unity. But given the immediate political context, they concentrated on reforming Hindu personal law first and proposed a comprehensive Hindu Civil Code. During debate in the 1950s, both sides invoked the Uniform Civil Code. Opponents of the Hindu Civil Code argued that it was unfair to target one community for reform and that a Uniform Civil Code was the only legitimate instrument of reform. The aim was to derail the Hindu Civil Code, but in the process personal laws (especially for Muslims) became marked as an area of minority privilege. "Minority privilege" necessarily implied minority male privilege. As in British India, men were the spokespersons of the community and the interests of the

community were identified with male interests.

In 1985 Chief Justice C.J. Chandrachud (of the Supreme Court) delivered a favorable judgment in the case of a divorced Muslim woman, Shah Bano, who had sued her husband for financial support. Her husband claimed that he had done all that was required under Muslim law, but the court granted Bano support under a provision in secular criminal law (section 125). This judgment provoked furious Muslim opposition and precipitated a national crisis. Chandrachud had been careful to quote the Shariat to prove that the right he was granting was in keeping with Muslim personal law. But he emphasized the need for a Uniform Civil Code: It is... a matter of deep regret that Article 44 of our Constitution [about the Uniform Civil Code] has remained a dead letter... A belief seems to have gained ground that it is for the Muslim community to take the lead in the matter of reforms in their personal law. A common civil code will help the cause of national integration by removing the disparate loyalties to law which have conflicting ideologies. Justice to all is far more satisfactory way of dispensing justice than justice from case to case. (Judgment dated 23 April 1985). The judgment in favour of Shah Bano was also a judgment against Muslim personal law. Thus, a woman's issue became a communal issue. Muslims challenged the right of courts to interfere in their law and constructed the judgment as an attack on their identity as a religious minority. The violation of personal law became a rallying point for Muslim political identity. Feminists, liberals, and orthodox Hindus denounced the Muslim reaction and argued, by implication, that Muslim law was especially harsh to women. The judgment had indicated that it was Muslim personal law from which the courts (or the state) would have to protect oppressed Muslim women. Meanwhile, Rajiv Gandhi's Congress government, already troubled by a loss of Muslim support, rushed through the Muslim Women (Protection of Right in Divorce) Act in 1986 along the lines demanded by Muslim

leaders, ignoring other voices in the community.

Isolation in areas such as marriage, inheritance, and social security. Some have argued for a gender-just code to cover not only family but also economic, workplace, and livelihood rights—the whole gamut of law (Nari Nirjatana Protirodha Mancha, UCC and Personal Laws, 1996). The Delhi-based Working Group of Women’s Rights (supported by the Human Rights Law Network) has proposed a new national secular civil code that would be optional. It has also suggested a “reverse optionality”—that is, all citizens would be born under the national code but could later opt into personal laws. These positions favour one-time legislation. A national conference met in Mumbai in May 1996 to deliberate the possibility of such legislation. Madhu Kishwar, editor of *Manushi* (once a leading feminist journal), denounced the Shah Bano judgment as anti-Muslim rather than pro-women. With the Bharatiya Janata Party’s appropriation of the Uniform Civil Code, many feminists felt that Muslim women’s identity as citizens was compromised by the Hindu strategy of marking Muslim law as retrograde and Muslim women as needing special state protection against their community. While some activists continue to support a Uniform Civil Code (or a gender-just code) as an issue of women’s rights, others believe that the argument has been dissipated in a “vortex of patriarchal and communal formulations of the issue”. Thus many women’s groups strongly oppose the Uniform Civil Code, arguing that the women’s movement cannot ignore the current political conflict without becoming complicit with or endorsing class, caste, and communal hierarchies. Majlis, a woman’s legal aid and cultural center in Mumbai, favors community initiatives for reform of personal laws.

### The Land Question and Peasant Rebellion

Many British, American and even Indian scholars have under stressed the scope and significance of peasant uprisings in India. Barrington Moore, jr., for example, acknowledges documented instances of peasant revolts, but nevertheless concludes that China forms most instructive contrast with India, where peasant rebellions in the pre-modern period were relatively rare and completely ineffective, and where modernization impoverished the peasants at least as much as in China and over as long a period of time.,<sup>6</sup> Moore attributes the alleged weakness of Indian peasant movements to the caste system with its hierarchical divisions among villagers and to the strength of bourgeois leadership against the landlords and the British and the pacifying influence of Gandhi on the peasantry." I would argue that peasant revolts have in fact been common both during and since the British period, every state of present-day India having experienced several over the past two hundred years. Thus, in a recent brief survey I discovered 77 revolts, the smallest of which probably engaged several thousand peasants in active support or in combat. About 30 revolts must have affected several tens of thousands, and about 12, several hundreds of thousands.

One of these revolts was the famous "Indian Mutiny" of 1857-58, in which vast numbers of peasants fought or otherwise struggled to destroy British rule over an area of more than 500,000 square miles' The frequency of these revolts, and the fact that at least 34 of those I considered were solely or mainly carried out by Hindus, cause me to doubt that the caste system has seriously impeded peasant rebellion in times of trouble. There does seem no doubt that, apart from the Mutiny, peasant uprisings in China usually had a wider geographical scope than those in India. At least since late Moghul times, the reasons for this may have included the political fragmentation as well as the diversity of language and culture among India's people. During the later decades of Moghul rule the country had already

disintegrated into several virtually autonomous, warring kingdoms and principalities. This facilitated the piecemeal conquest of India by Britain over a hundred-year period (mid-18th to mid-19th centuries). As a result, early anti-British revolts tended to be uncoordinated and localized, occurring at different times in different regions, although there were some cases of inter-regional coordination." Even the huge "Indian Mutiny," which swept across northern and central India shortly after the British had conquered most of India, tended to be strongest in the more recently acquired areas. 10 After the British repressed the Mutiny, political disunity was perpetuated by the division of India into British provinces interspersed with Native States having separate judicial systems, making it difficult to organize popular resistance. Ethnic and linguistic divisions compounded the problem of coordinated action. Between the Mutiny and Independence the British government and army were also better coordinated than those of China, and India was not disturbed by invasions. In these circumstances, from 1858 to 1930 peasants engaged only in local uprisings led by religious figures and by peasant committees. Beginning in the mid-1930s, however, peasant resistance again began to be organized on a larger scale, this time by Marxists and other radicals within the Indian National Congress Party, or else by nationalist and separatist parties of the formerly primitive tribes. In brief, I would argue that the limitations of Indian peasant revolts have sprung more from broader political forces at the level of the province and the colonial and post-colonial state than from the caste system or from peculiarities of village structure. At least two Indian authors have, indeed, argued that the caste system provided a framework for the organization of peasant rebellions, since in many cases peasants were able to assemble quickly through the medium of their caste assemblies. 11 When peasant uprisings figure in the British literature, they are often obscured under such headings as "communal riots" between major religions, fanatical religious cults, or the

activities of "criminal" castes and tribes. While the armed struggles of peasants have often had these characteristics, a large proportion of such movements has also, and primarily, been concerned with the struggles of tenants, agricultural labourers, plantation workers, or tribal cultivators, against the exactions of landlords, bureaucrats of the state, merchants, money-lenders, or their agents, the police and the military.

As a result of the land becoming the private property the peasants were the worst sufferers. The peasants could be evicted from the land any time by the zamindars who the owners of the land were. Fragmentation of land because of the creation of private property in land also led to the misery of the peasants. Under the new land settlements introduced by the British, it was the peasants who were the worst sufferers. One important cause of the peasants' suffering was that they came under the grip of the mahajans, money lenders, etc. who were oppressors. Second important cause of the peasants' suffering was since under the new land settlement their rights on land was not, recognized.

Ijaradars were basically land-speculators. They used to obtain the ijara of land on payment of an amount of money to the British government. Thus, the ijaradars squeezed out as much money as possible in the form of revenue from the peasants during the period of the ijara. The Fakirs and Sannyasis burst out in rebellion as they had number of complaints against the British. The British had restricted their movement from place to place. Also the imposition of the pilgrim tax by the British government forced them to rebel against the British. Haji Sariatulla was the leader of the Ferazis. Initially it began as a religious movement. But in course of time the agents of the British like the zamindars, indigo planters and others became the target of the Ferazis because of their oppressions. Under Sariatulla, the founder of the Ferazi brotherhood, the Ferazi movement was a religious movement in nature. But under his

son, Dudumiyan the Ferazi movement assumed the character of a peasants' rebellion. The zamindars, indigo planters, etc. who were the agents of the British became the main target of the Ferazis. Faridpur, in present Bangladesh, was the primary centre of the Ferazi activities.

The main limitation of the Ferazi movement was that the movement was not participated by all because of religious fanaticism of the Ferazis the Hindus remained aloof from the movement.

**Easy Control of New Areas of Conflict:** In the Revolt of 1857, a major driving force had been popular resistance to the system of rule imposed on India by the British. Once British power had been destroyed in northern India by the army revolt, many popular grievances coalesced with explosive power. The defeat of the revolt left most of these grievances unresolved. As the imperial power consolidated its hold during the next half a century, new areas of conflict emerged. These conflicts were, however, more easily contained by the state. Improvements in communications, the development of the machine gun and the expansion of the police and military, all these made it easier to crush popular insurgency before it could spread beyond a local area. Conflicts therefore tended to remain localized and confined to grievances.

Some scholars have attempted to divide popular resistance into five types: (1) restorative rebellions to drive out the British and restore earlier rulers and social relations; (2) religious movements for the liberation of a region or an ethnic group to establish a new form of government; (3) social banditry; (4) terrorist vengeance, with ideas of meting out collective justice; (5) mass insurrections for the redress of particular grievances. Others see the chief areas of resistance as follows: (1) anti-European planter; (2) anti-landlord; (3) anti-money lender; (4)

anti-land tax bureaucracy; and (5) anti-forest officials.

Indigo Agitation of Bengal (1859-60) was the result of the oppression and exploitation of the peasants of Bengal by the European monopolistic indigo planters. This was vividly portrayed by Dina Bandhu Mitra in his play Nil Darpan, enacted in 1869. Following this oppression, the peasants refused to cultivate indigo and took to armed resistance against the planters.

Bishnucharan Biswas and Digambar Biswas played a prominent role in this resistance. Further, the intelligentsia of Bengal organised a powerful campaign in support of the rebellious peasants. This led to the appointment of the Indigo Commission of 1869 by the government and removal of some of the abuses of indigo cultivation. This led to the appointment of the Indigo Commission of 1869 by the government and removal of some of the abuses of indigo cultivation.

Pabna Movement or Peasant Unrest in East Bengal (1872-76). In east Bengal the peasantry was oppressed by zamindars through frequent recourse to ejection, harassment, illegal seizure of property, arbitrary enhancement of rent and use of force. Consequently, the peasants organised no rent unions and launched armed attacks on the zamindars and their agents. Pabna district was the storm-centre of this movement, and hence the movement is known as the Pabna movement. The movement was suppressed only after armed intervention by the government. Later an enquiry committee was appointed to look into the complaints of the peasantry which led to the enactment of an act, known as the Bengal Tenancy Act (1885).

Deccan Riots (1875) is caused by the excessive land revenue demand of the British facilitating exploitation of peasants by moneylenders was responsible for the uprising in the Deccan. Social boycott of moneylenders by the peasants was later

transformed into armed peasant revolt in the Poona and Ahmadnagar districts of Maharashtra. The peasants forcibly seized from the moneylender's debt bonds, decrees and other documents, and set them on fire. When the police failed to suppress the riots army help was sought to put down the riots. It led to the appointment of a commission and the enactment of the Deccan Agriculturists' Relief Act of 1879 which prohibited the imprisonment of the peasants of the Maharashtra Deccan for failure to repay debts to the moneylenders.

The main reason behind Champaran Satyagraha (1917) movement was the oppression of the peasants of Champaran (a district in Bihar) by the European indigo planters through the system of tinkathia. In this system the European planters holding thikadari leases from the big local zamindars made peasants cultivate indigo on part of their land at unremunerative prices and also charged sharahbeshi (rent-enhancement) or tawan (lump sum compensation) if the peasants wanted to be exempted from the obligation to grow indigo. This led to refusal of the peasants either to grow indigo or to pay the illegal taxes; arrival of Gandhi along with Rajendra Prasad, J. B. Kripalani, A. N. Sinha, Mazhar-ul-Haq, Mahadev Desai etc., in order to conduct a detailed enquiry into the condition of the peasantry and to get their grievances redressed. Initially the government attempted to suppress the movement, but Gandhi succeeded in forcing the government to appoint an enquiry committee with himself as one of its members; acceptance of the recommendations of the committee by the Government and the abolition of the tinkathia system.

Khaira Satyagraha (1918) was proceeded due to the failure of crops due to drought in the Khaira district of Gujarat; Refusal of the government to exempt the peasants from the payment of land-revenue; Launching of a no-revenue campaign by the Khaira peasants under the leadership of Gandhi and Vallabhbhai

Patel; Suspension of the land-revenue collection for the time being by the government.

Moplah Rebellion (1921) is conducted against the oppression and exploitation of the Muslim Moplah peasants of Malabar (Kerala) by the Hindu zamindars (Jenmis) and British government was the main cause of this revolt. Outbreak of the rebellion in August 1921 (after a police raid on Tirurangadi masque in search of arms) and widespread attacks on police stations, public offices, communications, and houses of oppressive landlords and moneylenders. Total loss of control by the British over Ernad and Walluvanad taluks for several months; establishment of 'Republics' at several places by the Moplahs under leaders like Kunhammad Haji, Kalathingal Mammad, Ali Musaliar, Sithi Koya Thangal, etc. Bloody suppression of the rebellion by the British, leaving 2337 rebels killed, 1650 wounded, and more than 45,000 as prisoners. At Podnur 66 Moplah prisoners were shut in a railway wagon and died of suffocation on 20th November 1921. It was anti-British as well as anti-zamindar, and to some extent anti-Hindu also because most of the local zamindars were Hindus.

Bardoli Satyagraha (1928) is done for the enhancement of land revenue (by 22%) in the Bardoli district of Gujarat by the British government (1927) led to the organisation of a 'No Revenue campaign' by the Bardoli peasants under the leadership of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, and their refusal to pay the land revenue at the newly enhanced rates. Unsuccessful attempts of the British to suppress the movement by large scale attachment of cattle and land resulted in the appointment of an enquiry committee to investigate the land-revenue assessment, and reduction of the land revenue on the basis of the committee's recommendations.

### Environmental Movements in India

With the growing concerns for environmental degradation

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worldwide, we can feel the utmost need for a better environmental balance. Unfortunately, there are hundreds of instances of abuse, and only a little paid attention, and that too only when the local community protests. Usually, the conflict is seen as Environment v/s Development. We find that India is ranked 177 among 180 nations on the Environmental Performance Index 2018. In the contemporary world, numerous environmental movements launched against the developmental activities that have endangered our standard of living. Of course, more than the leaders we need a common crowd to be engaged. It is always argued that sustainable development is the promoter of a stable environment. We cannot do without the development goals. The era of the devastation of resources and causing an imbalance in ecology was stated explicitly by the Britishers in our country. Exploitation by them was validated by proving ‘our’ Indian traditional values as vague and ‘their’ scientific values as logical. They argued to manage the forests scientifically and it went into a conflict between them and local masses. Major reasons for the emergence of environmental movements can include Control over natural resources, false developmental policies of the government, socioeconomic reasons and Environmental degradation/ destruction. Moreover, we can include the spread of awareness as one another and a big factor. In the Indian context, many movements have emerged after the 1970s and 1980s.

Chipko movement – It was a representative of a wide spectrum of conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s include conflicts over forests; conflicts about the large dams; conflicts about the social and environmental impacts of unregulated mining. The movement got this name as in Hindi “Chipko” means “to hug”. People started hugging trees to protect them. Chipko movement is a drive that practised the Gandhian approaches of ahimsa that is nonviolence and Satyagraha. It was started in 1973 in Chamoli district of Uttrakhand and later Tehri Garhwal. Sunderlal

Bahuguna, Gaura Devi and Chandi Prasad Bhatt were important leaders. Majorly it was against deforestation. Villagers especially women started the revolt. Then another major protest occurred in 1974 near Reni village where more than 200 trees were scheduled to be felled. Till 1980 we can witness the inclusion of more than 150 village demonstrations. Sunderlal Bahuguna took a 5000-kilometre Himalayan foot rally in 1981-83, spreading Chipko message to far. With time it has become “Save Himalaya” movement. Also, Chandi Prasad Bhatt has bestowed the Ramon Magsaysay Award in 1982 and Sundarlal Bahuguna with Padma Vibhushan in 2009.

Narmada Bachao Andolan – It is the movement against the multipurpose dam project over Narmada River that would result in the displacement of local people and floods. The key reason is not providing proper rehabilitation and resettlement for the folks. The movement is led by Medha Patekar, Baba Ampte and Arundhati Roy. It is the most influential movement started in 1985. It supports two basic features of the Indian Constitution: the rights to life and livelihood. The dams force also destroys the inundation of forests. The long fight has resulted in the postponement of the work of the Sardar Sarovar dam project.

Silent Valley Movement – It was a drive against a hydro-electric project on the river Kunthipuzha that is tributary of Periyar River in Kerala state. When the Kerala Electricity Board announced plans to construct 240-Megawatt hydroelectric project it triggered a wave of protests. The significance of movement is that the same site is enclosed with many evergreen forests that are a home of numerous rare species of flora and fauna. There are many endemic species to the region. It is the first milestone in the Indian environmental history that brought national and international attention to the forests. In 1980, the M.G.K. Menon Committee set up also reviewed the plan. It urged to involve the Kerala Shashtra Sahitya Parishad (KSSP) that was popular in

Kerala during the 1970s and 80s for this as they scientific arguments and connection with a large number of people. After that we could also see the role of Prime Minister in any movement as the decision to deny permission to the project is credited to Indira Gandhi.

Tehri Dam Protest – On the account of hydroelectric project protest we can also include Tehri dam project. This is the key power-producing the project for Tehri near Utrakhnad. But instead of benefitting it is dangerous for the social life of people as it would destroy the delicate ecological system nearby. The Tehri Dam is the highest in India. One of the menaces is that it is situated on the Central Himalayan Seismic Gap. With an earthquake of high intensity, it would be destructed.

Bishnoi Movement – We can relate many instances where the sects of religion are used as tools to save humanity. Even these days religion plays a good role in promoting policies and programmes of the government in the various sector, for example, Namami Gange project to see river Ganga as our Goddess and save it. Bishnoi is a religious group which is based on 29 principles of Hinduism which is committed towards environment conservation. Jambaji Maharaj founded it in 1485. When in 1730 the maharaja of Jodhpur sent his soldiers to gather wood from Khejarli village the Bishnois protested in anguish and nearly 363 Bishnoi villagers were killed including Amrita Devi. It is due to sacred and piousness of Khejrli forest they hugged trees and lost their lives and Tree-Hugging has roots in this movement.

Jungle Bachao Andolan – We can find the roots of this movement from Bihar which later spread to Jharkhand and Odisha. Tribals have a great role in this. The government decided to substitute Sal forests with highly-priced Teak. Popularly this

move was quoted as “Greed Game Political Populism” by many. Navdanya Movement, 1982, Appiko Movement, Baliyayal movement and so on are other episodes that held authorities into controversies.

Delhi Protest against Deforestation – In June 2018 when the sun was scorching badly in the capital city of Delhi, people started their kind of Chipko movement. The order of felling nearly 14000 trees for the ‘redevelopment’ of South Delhi filled outrage in mobs. Nearly 1500 people gathered and hug trees while shouting out anti-government slogans in Sarojini Nagar. Deforestation in such a huge number is organizing a suicidal trap for the local people and market areas. People were shocked because we cannot even imagine cutting trees in a place where the Air Quality Index remains poor even in normal conditions. Further, in July, HC decided that no tree will be cut.

Aarey Forest Protests – Within the political and social dramas, we could see the other clash between common people and police. In October 2019, nearly 29 people were arrested with their crime being “protecting trees”. Aarey is located adjacent to Sanjay Gandhi National Park, Mumbai. The site is important for Mumbai Metro Rail Corporation and the same 2500 trees were permitted to cut for construction. IPC’s section 144 was also imposed in the area. Finally, SC interfered stating no more trees to be cut along with the release of activists.

In every movement, the question is raised for the autocratic capitalist class who ignores people’s social welfare. Right from the colonial period until now people have to fight for their social justice and sustainability. Even wrong decisions get approved in the name of development. We are not saying these protests have stopped every evil practice from the ground but these have made people conscious towards nature. After independence, when we

became unaware of natural heritage protection these movements helped us to promote various acts related to the same.

Environmental movements are very prominent in defining the true meaning of democratic values. The forgotten principles by the authority are restored. The quality of governance has also improved with more decentralized decisions. The capability of these movements can be seen also in more tolerable and endurable development projects instead of resource-oriented only. The welfare of people is increased and their importance as a human resource took place after the outbreak of such movements. This is the best achievement that now local tribal and poor people get respect and value as human beings. However, due to other factors like poverty, unemployment, lack of education, corruption and peer pressure we can see the failing of realizations in people. More is the materialistic society, more is the greed. We should not say that vigorous attempts are failed but not accomplished. Due to dam projects masses still face dislodgement. The pollution in rivers is worse today than 2 decades ago. We catch every step of development but do not have solutions if anything is unsuccessful in; for example The Bhopal Gas Tragedy.

The wealth and prosperous life that today's generation is leading have made them strangely selfish and self-centred. The major existential threat worldwide is the climate change due to negative impacts on both natural and social systems as stated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The alarming situation is a cause of human behaviours. The problem begins when the issues of the environment are only seen as school textbooks topics. The conflicts between political and social arenas often result in worsening the situation. Regarding the concepts more scientifically, the sociological perspective gets disappeared and social scientists hold a great responsibility in promoting the social side of the issues. The social appraisal and

critique of the policies are necessary at every time. The decrease in the emission of Greenhouse Gases, concerns for the rising global temperature and pollution often demands public sociology. To state the critical aspects of climate change is a very prominent contribution of this discipline that will lead the coordination between economic and political systems.

During the 1990s the focus of movements has shifted to the global issues that could only be resolved by international cooperation. Today world is facing climate change, global warming, ozone layer depletion, acid rain, etc. at a risky pace. Many summits have been called worldwide and it is the issue of great concern. These problems can never be dealt with national movements and protests. The basic rights of people including food, water and shelter are taken away either natural or anthropological. Amazon forest fires then ongoing Australia Bushfire are alarms to wake us up for this cause. But unfortunately, the politics game gets a higher position at any cost.

It is obvious that our leaders are serious about the planet they will inherit. According to Environmental Justice Atlas, an international database, India is one of the worst countries in case of environmental conflicts. Human concerns about the environment have a long history. There are a small but growing number of people becoming aware and responsible. While going through all movements it is clear that an era of socialization towards nature has begun but folks are becoming fancier. They are forgetting the gravity of the situation and behaving irresponsibly.

## MODULE IV

### Political development and Cultural Trends

#### Panchayati Raj

Mahatma Gandhi, the father of the nation, often emphasized that India lives in villages (at the time of independence, about 82.7 per cent population of India lived in villages) and unless the village life is revitalized, the nation as a whole cannot make progress. These ideas and the Article 40 of the Constitution of India, which declared that ‘the state shall take steps to organize Village Panchayats and to endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as the units of self-government,’ paved the way for the introduction of Panchayati Raj—a scheme of ‘democratic decentralization’ in India. In India, the system of panchayats has a long history. Its structure however varied from time to time. In village India, the concept of ‘Panch Parmeswar’ is very old and very prominent. We also find references of Gram Panchayat in ancient and medieval literatures. As we know, India is a caste-ridden society. Along with Gram Panchayats we also find Caste Panchayats in every caste to solve their social problems like marital discord and disputes. During the British period, an effort was made to revive the Village Panchayats but it could not make any success.

The present Panchayati Raj system is the result of the failure of the Community Development Projects (CDPs)—a kernel programme of rural development launched in 1952 as an arm of five-year plans. The two successive plans had failed to not only produce desired results but also generate real enthusiasm among the people. It was felt that the scheme of CDP failed because of the lack of proper governance. In the context of this crisis of

governance (inefficiency, corruption, lack of accountability, mounting disillusionment of the citizens towards government institutions and officials), decentralization was widely accepted as a powerful means to instill confidence and revive trust of people in government programmes. Democratic renewal through reorganizing the power structure would bring the government closer to people. It was seen as a means to deepen democracy, make governance accountable and responsive. Not only would it enhance the effectiveness of public policies and service delivery, but also give greater voice to citizens. It is against this backdrop, the idea of 'demo-cra-tic decentralization' emerged which was based on the Gandhi's cherished vision of 'self-governing' villages.

#### Development of villages.

The then government constituted a committee headed by Balwant Rai Mehta to review the CDP and suggest changes. Thus, the Panchayati Raj came into being.

Indeed, the prosperity of entire country depends on the prosperity and self-sufficiency of the villages. The Panchayati Raj system fulfils the long felt need of making the village administration truly independent and genuinely representative of the popular will, and putting village people in direct charge of their affairs. It mainly aimed to foster democratic participation, involve villagers in the development efforts and ease the administrative burden on the states. This system was also considered necessary for the growth of a sturdy democracy in India. This could be possible only when the villagers are able to organize themselves to think, plan, work and pay for the necessities and amenities for their welfare. To those, who have considered the villages the real India, the innovation is rational, overdue and beyond criticism. It was hoped that the experiment of the Panchayati Raj will be able to harness and develop the better characteristics of the average

villagers in spite of their illiteracy and restricted range of experience. It was also expected that this system will bring new aspiration and fresh stimulus to national self-respect.

In the present scheme of Panchayati Raj, the villagers have been held responsible for all-round improvement in the village life, including education, sanitation, medical relief—curative and preventive, lighting, housing, maternity and child welfare along with the administration of civil, criminal and revenue justice. It was thought that this system would be powerful means for self-preservation in the arena of social life. The main objective behind the Panchayati Raj is that the people in the village should undertake the responsibilities of governing themselves. Pioneer rural sociologist A.R. Desai spelled the objectives of PR system as follows: ‘Panchayati Raj is claimed as a real democratic political apparatus which would bring the masses into active political control from below, from the vast majority of the weaker, poor sections of rural India.’ People in the villages should actively participate in the development activities regarding agriculture, irrigation, animal husbandry, public health, education, etc. In a nutshell, the whole idea of this scheme is based on the dictum that ‘rural development is for the rural people, of the rural people, and by the rural people themselves’. It is based on self-help, as an old adage says, ‘God help those who help themselves’. This scheme of rural development confers on the rural people the power of decision-making regarding developmental activities. This is democracy at the grassroots. It will ‘decentralize’ democracy. This system has got a very important role to play in the social, economic and cultural life of the village community of India.

### Objectives of Panchayati Raj

1. Panchayats can best carry out the uplift programmes, such as mending roads, terrace, and embank the fields, building

bunds, digging drains, provide fresh drinking water, etc.

2. They are best constituted to organize voluntary labour for social uplift and economic amelioration.
3. Panchayats are the best agencies which can supply the political talent. They are the potential schools of political training for the rural masses.
4. They can also serve as the schools of social service, health care, popular education and social progress.
5. Panchayats can impart cheap litigation, speedy and substantial justice to the villagers.
6. Panchayats are best fitted to be

There are 4 phases in the formation of Panchayati Raj.

1. The phase of ascendancy (1959-1964)
2. The phase of stagnation (1965-1969)
3. The phase of decline (1969-1983)
4. The phase of revival (1983 onwards)

Revival and renovation of Panchayati Raj is associated with the government of Rajiv Gandhi (1985), the then Prime Minister. He infused a new blood in this institution by removing certain hurdles and handicaps. He constituted a committee under the chairmanship of L.M. Singhvi to write a concept paper on Panchayati Raj. About its revival there were two main schools of thought. One believed that Panchayati Raj is a God that had failed.

The other suggested that Panchayati Raj, in fact, had not been tried in its true spirit and as such the question of a final verdict

on its success or failure did not arise. The Singhvi Committee found that the PR system was not functioning owing to the lack of political will, lack of proper evaluation and feedback, and indifference to corrective measures. The indifferent attitudes of the bureaucracy and the elected representatives have crushed the spirit of the PR system. The official hierarchy failed to inspire confidence among the village people. Bureaucrats were unwilling to transfer power to elected representatives. They did not release funds in time. The Janata Party government (1990) appointed Ashok Mehta Committee to enquire into the causes of decline of the PR system and suggest changes in the pattern of the PR system recommended by B.R. Mehta Committee. This committee has offered a balanced appraisal of PRIs in the context of two schools of thought referred to above. It opined, 'Panchayati Raj should not be viewed as a God that has failed. It has many achievements to its credit, the more important of which may be identified here. Politically speaking, it became a process of democratic seed-drilling in the Indian soil, making an average citizen more conscious of his rights than before. Administratively speaking, it bridged the gulf between the bureaucratic elite and the people. Socio-culturally speaking, it generated a new leadership which was not merely relatively young in age but also modernistic and pro-social change in outlook. Finally, looked at from the developmental angle, it helped a rural people cultivate a developmental psyche' (Report of the Committee on Panchayati Raj Institutions, Government of India, 1978).

However, it was felt that there were some shortcomings in the structure and functions of the PR system. The performance of PRIs had been vitiated by political factionalism, corruption, inefficiency, political interference, parochial loyalties, motivated actions, power concentration, arrogant attitude of bureaucratic officials, lack of feeling of service, etc. All these had made the common villagers averse towards the PR system. To revitalize the PR system, the Rajiv Gandhi's government (1989), V.P.

Singh's government (1990) and Narasimha Rao's government (1991) proposed some amendments in it. As a result, the 73rd Constitution Amendment Act, 1993 was passed. After this, PRIs have got the constitutional legitimacy. It was, therefore, adopted by all the states. The present Panchayati Raj differs from the B.R. Committee's pattern mainly in two respects. First, the earlier PR system was not a political institution but only an implementing body. In the previous system of Panchayati Raj there was no role of political parties. People used to contest election on individual basis. The new Act allows political parties to enter into election fray. Second, the present system is not an implementing body of the development programmes. It is a decision-making body that rules over the governance of the village. One very conspicuous aspect of this Act is that the present system empowers the women and the weaker sections (SC and ST people) of village by giving them representation by a fixed quota at all three levels.

#### Changes brought by Panchayati Raj

1. Establishment of panchayats at two or three levels and a Gram Sabha is made mandatory in each village.
2. Tenure of PRIs is fixed as five years. Direct elections of all members in all the three tiers are made mandatory. The elections have to be conducted regularly.
3. Elections of chairperson at intermediate and district levels are to be indirect.
4. At least one-third of the total seats at all levels are reserved for SCs, STs and for women separately.
5. PRIs are given powers to impose taxes, duties, and fees and were given share in taxes collected by the state government.

6. The reservation of OBCs and association of MPs and MLAs in panchayats is made discretionary.

7. The Act also provides for the constitution of District Planning Committee.

8. It is obligatory on the part of Centre as well as the states to provide adequate funds for the PRIs to enable them to function properly.

9. Some states like Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana and Karnataka have also made provision for Nyaya Panchayats to settle the disputes at all the three levels. But this is not obligatory as per the provisions of this Act.

10. States like Haryana, Orissa and Rajasthan have debarred the candidates, having more than two children, from contesting elections, with a view to contain population.

11. A list of 29 functions was prepared to be carried out by PRIs. Some of the important functions are:

- (a) agricultural development and irrigation facilities,
- (b) land reforms,
- (c) eradication of poverty,
- (d) dairy farming, poultry, piggery and fish rearing,
- (e) rural housing,
- (f) safe drinking water,
- (g) social forestry and fuel,
- (h) primary education, adult education and informal training,

- (i) roads and buildings,
- (j) markets and fairs,
- (k) child and women development, and
- (l) welfare of weaker sections—SCs and STs.

Looking at the above functions and some special provisions made in the Act, it is amply clear that the new PR system has undoubtedly empowered the villages to take steps for their all-round development.

### Structure and Functions of Panchayati Raj Institutions:

As said before, the structure of Panchayati Raj (PR) varies from state to state. Some states have three-tier structure (Gram Panchayat at the village level, Panchayat Samiti at block level and Zilla Parishad at district level), whereas some have two-tier structure (Gram Panchayat at village level and Panchayat Samiti at block level). A few states have only single-tier structure at the village level. In Rajasthan, the Panchayati Raj model is of three levels, viz., Gram Panchayats (village level), Panchayat Samitis (block level) and Zilla Parishads (district level). The chairperson of Gram Panchayat is known as Sarpanch, of Panchayat Samiti, Pradhan and of Zilla Parishad, Zilla Pramukh. Their nomenclature, composition and tenure vary from state to state. The structure and functions of the PRIs in terms of Gram Panchayat, Panchayat Samiti and Zilla Parishad are relevant in the history of Panchayati Raj.

### Gram Panchayat:

Gram Panchayat is the base or bottom tier of the PR system. It is the first executive tier having jurisdiction over a village or group of villages. The members of the Gram Panchayat—the Panchas and Sarpanch (chairman)—are directly elected. Their number in

each panchayat varies from 5 to 31 according to population of the concerned village (s). In addition to the elected Panchas and Sarpanch, there is a provision for co-option of two ladies, and one SC and ST member each, if they have not been elected as Panchas.

The main functions of the Gram Panchayat are:

1. Law and order:

Maintenance of peace and harmony in the panchayat circle.

2. Civic:

Construction of wells, ponds, water reservoirs and distribution tanks; construction of public streets, public latrines and maintenance of roads, etc.

3. Welfare:

Famine and flood relief work, welfare programmes for women, children, handicapped and weaker sections.

4. Administrative:

Collection of funds, maintenance of records, budget and accounts, registration of births and deaths, etc.;

5. Commercial:

Supervision of community orchards, grazing ground, etc.

6. Developmental:

Preparation and execution of plans for the promotion of agriculture, irrigation, co-operatives, cottage and small-scale industries. The main sources of income of panchayats are the grants from government, taxes on buildings, vehicles, etc., octroi

on goods and animals, pilgrim tax, etc.

### Panchayat Samiti:

It is the middle tier of the PR system—between Gram Panchayat and Zilla Parishad. This tier was coterminous with the tehsil or taluka. This is composed of Sarpanchas (ex-officio members) of all the Gram Panchayats within a block along with MLA of the area (without right of vote). In addition to these ex-officio members, there are some co-opted members—two women, one SC and ST representatives each, if they have not already been elected as primary members. The chairperson of the Panchayat Samiti is called Pradhan. He is elected by the members of the Panchayat Samiti amongst themselves. At certain places, such as in Rajasthan, Panchas of Gram Panchayat also take part in the election of Pradhans.

The main functions of the Panchayat Samiti are:

- (i) Agriculture—formulation of plans of development of agriculture, tree plantation and soil conservation;
- (ii) animal husbandry;
- (iii) health and sanitation;
- (iv) education—running primary schools;
- (v) communication—construction and maintenance of inter-panchayat roads, etc.;
- (vi) co-operation—promotion of co-operative societies;
- (vii) development of cottage and small-scale industries; and
- (viii) miscellaneous work.

The main sources of income of Panchayat Samiti are annual grants by state government, share from land revenue, proceeds from taxes, fees and loans, contributions, etc.

Zilla Parishad:

It is the apex body of the PR system located at the district level. It is also known as District Development Council in some states (such as Tamil Nadu).

It is composed of:

- (i) Chairpersons/Presidents of Panchayat Samitis within its jurisdiction;
- (ii) MPs, MLAs, and MLCs of the area;
- (iii) members representing women, SCs and STs are co-opted if they are not otherwise members;
- (iv) representatives of co-operative societies, municipalities of the area; and
- (v) some persons having experience in the field of administration, public life or rural development are also co-opted.

The membership of the Zilla Parishad remains in the range of 40 to 60 persons. The elected head of Zilla Parishad is known as Zilla Pramukh (President). He is elected either directly or indirectly from amongst the members of the Zilla Parishad. Zilla Pramukh works through committees which look after specific works like education, planning and finance. The main sources of income of the Zilla Parishads are grants-in-aid from the state government, share in the land revenue and other taxes like the cess. The above structure and functions of all the PR bodies have been changing over the years. It has aroused a spirit of self-help

and popular participation to some extent among the rural people. The process of decision-making has come close to the rural people. It has also helped in the emergence of a new democratic leadership at the local level. But, the competitive elections have politicized the environment of all villages. This spirit has even entered into the family circles also. It is alleged that panchayat elections have given birth to caste politics (casteism), communal politics (communalism) and groupism and factionalism in the villages. It is also alleged that due to panchayat elections, a 'cold war' atmosphere prevails among various sections of the village people. Some studies made on the PR system revealed that functional tensions are on the increase and this can be seen during elections and panchayat meetings.

The so-called harmonious relations of the villages have almost vanished. People did not extend full cooperation from the core of their heart to the panchayats and as a result developmental activity has slowed down. Theoretically, the decisions had to be taken by the non-officials at all the three tiers of the PR system, but in practice, it was the government officials who used to take the decisions. Thus, to conclude, it can be stated that the devolution of power to the people without requisite development of character, training and capacity had been found to be a curse in the functioning of democratic institutions in our country and there were apprehensions that this new step in democratic decentralization, designed to be blessing, would turn out to be a curse to the people in the villages. The success of the step more than anything else depended on the quality of elected representative—Panchas and Sarpanchas—of these institutions. In the beginning, responsibility for the planned development of the country through CDP and cooperative institutions was imposed on the people who were expected to discharge them in PRIs who were mostly uneducated and untrained mass of people. But there is a great change now in this condition. Obviously, such a step, though basic and pregnant with great possibilities to

strengthen the roots of democracy, was fraught with grave risks, disappointments and failures in its traditional phase.

### Nehruvian Era

Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru was born in Allahabad on November 14, 1889. He received his early education at home under private tutors. At the age of fifteen, he went to England and after two years at Harrow, joined Cambridge University where he took his tripos in Natural Sciences. He was later called to the Bar from Inner Temple. He returned to India in 1912 and plunged straight into politics. Even as a student, he had been interested in the struggle of all nations who suffered under foreign domination. He took keen interest in the Sinn Fein Movement in Ireland. In India, he was inevitably drawn into the struggle for independence. In 1912, he attended the Bankipore Congress as a delegate, and became Secretary of the Home Rule League, Allahabad in 1919. In 1916 he had his first meeting with Mahatma Gandhi and felt immensely inspired by him. He organised the first Kisan March in Pratapgarh District of Uttar Pradesh in 1920. He was twice imprisoned in connection with the Non-Cooperation Movement of 1920-22. Pt. Nehru became the General Secretary of the All India Congress Committee in September 1923. He toured Italy, Switzerland, England, Belgium, Germany and Russia in 1926. In Belgium, he attended the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities in Brussels as an official delegate of the Indian National Congress. While leading a procession against the Simon commission, he was lathi-charged in Lucknow in 1928. On August 29, 1928 he attended the All-Party Congress and was one of the signatories to the Nehru Report on Indian Constitutional Reform, named after his father Shri Motilal Nehru. The same year, he also founded the 'Independence for India League', which advocated complete severance of the British connection with India, and became its General Secretary.

In 1929, Pt. Nehru was elected President of the Lahore Session of the Indian National Congress, where complete independence for the country was adopted as the goal. He was imprisoned several times during 1930-35 in connection with the Salt Satyagraha and other movements launched by the Congress. He completed his 'Autobiography' in Almora Jail on February 14, 1935. After release, he flew to Switzerland to see his ailing wife and visited London in February-March, 1936. He also visited Spain in July 1938, when the country was in the throws of Civil War. Just before the court-break of the Second World War, he visited China too.

On October 31, 1940 Pt. Nehru was arrested for offering individual Satyagraha to protest against India's forced participation in war. He was released along with the other leaders in December 1941. On August 7, 1942 Pt. Nehru moved the historic 'Quit India' resolution at the A.I.C.C. session in Bombay. On August 8, 1942 he was arrested along with other leaders and taken to Ahmednagar Fort. This was his longest and also his last detention. In all, he suffered imprisonment nine times. After his release in January 1945, he organized legal defence for those officers and men of the INA charged with treason. In March 1946, Pt. Nehru toured South East Asia. He was elected President of the Congress for the fourth time on July 6, 1946 and again for three more terms from 1951 to 1954.

Nehru imparted a socialistic vision to the Indian development. Nehru adopted Marxism in the 1930s as a tool for understanding society, social development and the national movement itself. He disagreed, on one basic question at least after 1936, with the contemporary Marxist position. He used Marxism to understand Indian social development even after 1947. It was diluted over the years. He did not see nationalism as inherently a 'bourgeoisie' ideology, though he saw the national movement being dominated at the time by the middle classes. He felt, in the colonial and post-colonial situation that nationalism could be and had to be,

articulated and integrated with socialist ideology. Nehru kept his commitment to nationalism, national unity and national independence after 1947. He safeguarded the political independence won in 1947, and he laid the foundations of a democratic and civilian polity, and also carried forward the process of the making of the Indian nation. Nehru was interested in building a just and democratic society and in consolidating India into a nation. Nehru set out to build the structure of an independent and self-reliant economy, and made an all out effort to break out of colonial under development and to ensure self-sustaining and self-generating growth, both in agriculture and industry.

Nehru emphasized self-reliance and cautioned against dependence. And the biggest achievement he claimed for planning and for Congress rule was the creation of 'a feeling of self-reliance'. Nehru emphasized on rapid industrialization, planning, public sector and development of heavy industry, science and technology and technical modernization, the training of a large technical and scientific cadre and atomic energy, and saw them as necessary in the effort to achieve independent economic development. At the same time, he believed that an independent economy and self-reliance would strengthen the psychological basis of national independence and thereby increase the self-confidence and self-respect of the people. There is hardly any doubt that Nehru was successful in laying the foundations of an independent economy, otherwise known as mixed economy, through a capitalist economy.

Elections, civil liberties and freedom to organize and grass root democracy through institutions such as Panchayat Raj would enable the people to mobilize themselves to exert pressure from below, compelling the political party in power either to make the necessary changes or get swept away. Nehru acknowledged in 1964 that we are also losing the battle for socialism and equitable distribution and frankly accepted this. While industrial and agricultural

production has increased considerably, though not to the extent planned, the tendency has been towards the accumulation of the national wealth in the hands of few people at the top, that is, the big business; because of this inequitable distribution of wealth, it led to a serious economic crisis.

Nehru was fascinated by the Soviet Union's Five-Year-Plans and tried implementing the same in India. He wanted India to have the best combination of socialism and capitalism and tried to implement 'Democratic Socialism'. He wanted the state to be a principal entrepreneur and all its citizens its equal shareholders. He strengthened the democratic pillars of the nation by creating proper wealth distribution systems at all levels. Critics often confuse Nehru's economic policies with those of his daughter, Indira Gandhi, who was seen more as left-oriented. Nehru's economics of state intervention and investment were conceived at a time when the transfers of capital and technology that were important to India were not easily forthcoming from the developed world. Economic equality means nationalization of means of production, economic rights and participation in decision-making along with the management, granting of economic rights in all spheres, ceiling of property, progressive legislation on property rights, de-concentration of wealth, and state intervention to the extent of securing economic equality. Soviet Union was the only major power to allow India to develop independent capabilities in many spheres of heavy industry, engineering and cutting edge technologies. India's combination of internal political freedom, economic and political independence throughout its existence can be favorably compared with many client states of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Nehru pursued a foreign policy of non-alignment and became a founder and leader of the Non-aligned Movement. As prime minister, he pursued India's claim to Kashmir in the face of Pakistani opposition, resulting in the First Kashmir War (1947). Military defeat at the hands of the People's Republic of China in the Sino-Indian War (1962) brought strong criticism of military

unpreparedness and Nehru's policy of friendship with India's mighty neighbour. During the Cold War period, on 27 November 1946, Prime Minister Nehru appealed to the United States and the Soviet Union to end nuclear testing and to start nuclear disarmament, stating that such an action would 'save human-ity from the ultimate disaster'. His charisma extended to the world stage where under his leadership, India was often able to be 'punching above its weight'. Democracy was, in his conception, linked to the unity of the country.

Democracy would also guarantee that the process of nation-building would be accomplished through social justice and equity. People would use the democratic system to generate political progress to achieve its social objectives.

For him, political equality implies universal adult suffrage, organization of a strong democratic polity, political parties, legislatures with a true representative character, public opinion, freedom of the press, electoral reforms, political rights, constitutional safeguards, constitutional methods, faith in constitutional process, legitimization of the constitutional system and lastly secularism. Nehru helped to create a country with enduring civic institutions, a strong and socially responsive judiciary, a committed civilian oversight of the army and overall egalitarianism. For him, social equality aims for the removal of social discrimination on the grounds of race, sex, gender and natural incapacities. It means equal opportunities to lead a happy life in the social sphere. It also includes elimination of poverty, social stigma and inhuman activities; extension of voting rights to the underprivileged, equal participation without gender inequality, in the political process and receiving equal benefits as the members of a society. India is one of the few ex-colonial countries, which made the structural transition from a colonial to an independent economy. The anti-zamindari land reforms were implemented in a manner that the agrarian structure was transformed, but the rural poor were left high and dry, leaving behind a legacy of economic

inequality, social oppression and violence in rural India. The second stage of land reforms represented by the land ceiling legislation was not successfully implemented in India.

Moreover, the other weaknesses in the agrarian sector were the failure to prevent large scale ejection of tenants at will in both zamindari and ryothwari areas and the absence of any ameliorative radical measures so far as the agricultural laborers, who constituted nearly 40 per cent of the rural population, were concerned. Nehru's policies are credited with setting up India's infrastructure for scientific education, nuclear programme, space programme, the extensive Indian Railways network, and the pharmaceutical industry. It is to his credit that he did not abuse his power and constantly attempted to deepen the democratic nature and institutions of the newly independent times. However, in his later years, nationalists have criticized him, both past and present, for not sufficiently confronting Pakistan and China in their differences with India. India's defeat in the war with China seemed to bear out his critics, and dimmed his public stature, affecting his great personality. Critical commentators of the present day often criticize Nehru, when the transfers of capital are unhindered, easily channeled by the recipient nations, and even encouraged for their high returns in the emerging markets.

Jawaharlal Nehru was an economic modernist. He believed that rapid industrialisation was the most effective way to win the battle against mass poverty. This was in stark contrast with the medieval Gandhian economic vision centred on household production. Nehru, was just one among several important nationalist leaders who were enthusiastic about modern industry. B.R. Ambedkar had argued in one of his earliest articles that the solution to surplus labour in agriculture was in the growth of modern industry. M. Visvesvaraya created a national plan in 1934 that aimed to double national income in a decade, led by a massive increase in industrial investment. Subhas Chandra Bose was Congress

president in 1938 when he set up a National Planning Committee to examine how India could industrialise rapidly once it got political independence. V.D. Savarkar told Indians to embrace the age of the machine. All these leaders believed that the state should take the lead in the push towards industrialisation.

It was left to Nehru to actually put much of this into practice after he became the first prime minister of independent India. Economic modernization was an essential part of his overall vision of an India that could hold its own in the world after centuries of foreign domination. In his *The Idea of India*, a classic study of Nehruvian India published in 1997, the political scientist Sunil Khilnani wrote: "Discussions on national progress were now being formulated in the technical vocabulary of economics...Nehru's intention had been to subordinate the civil servants to the superior rationality of economists and scientists." Nehru also invited some of the greatest economists from around the world to participate in the formulation of the landmark Second Five-Year Plan that was launched in 1956.

The statistician P.C. Mahalanobis built on a model developed by Russian economist G.A. Feldman to provide a theoretical core to the Second Five-Year Plan. An early discussion of the technical details underlying the Indian plans is available in a survey by economists Jagdish Bhagwati and Sukhamoy Chakravarty in the September 1969 issue of the *American Economic Review*. A clear analysis of the economics of Nehruvian planning was written in 1997 by Ajit Karnik of Mumbai University, who taught me growth models at university. The theoretical debates about Indian planning models are numbing. Here, I try to focus on four broad principles in the Nehruvian economic strategy to show how Nehru was a hostage to the development economics consensus of his times, both in terms of its insights as well as its policy flaws.

First, the development economists of the day said that the

basic challenge for a poor country such as India was to increase its stock of productive capital as well as absorb modern technology. This was in line with what many other nationalist leaders believed in the decades preceding independence. The Estonian development economist Ragnar Nurkse had put capital accumulation at the very centre of his 1953 book, *Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries*. A.K. Dasgupta, a renowned scholar who taught Amartya Sen, also argued that the primary challenge was capital accumulation, drawing inspiration from classical rather than Keynesian economics.

Second, the speed at which capital could be accumulated depended on the domestic savings rate. The West Indian Nobel laureate W. Arthur Lewis had succinctly presented the problem in terms of how a poor country can raise its voluntary savings rate from 5% to 20% of national income. In short, the main focus of the development strategy was on increasing savings to create resources for asset creation. The Harrod-Domar model that was popular at the time also sought to explain economic growth in terms of the savings rate and the productivity of capital. It is interesting that you will struggle to find subsidies or entitlements in the Nehruvian plans to lift India out of poverty.

Third, the government was to take the lead in industrialisation. This was very much part of the development consensus of those years. The early success of the Soviet experiment had, unfortunately, enchanted many intellectuals. But there was a deeper historical learning as well. The Russian economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron had argued in his theory of economic backwardness that countries that had not yet industrialised did not have to wait for the right conditions to appear. Gerschenkron had studied the development experience of Europe in great detail. He said that institutional innovation was the way forward for those who were late into the game: Germany had used investment banks to push its initial industrialisation, while Russia had used the state (he was referring to imperial Russia before

the communists takeover).

The Nehruvian plans had a similar logic of using the state as an entrepreneur as well as providing capital to private industry through special development banks in the absence of deep financial markets. This is the famous quest of controlling the commanding heights of the economy. A more technically correct explanation would be that Nehru wanted the state to dominate the production of capital goods and intermediate goods so that the Indian economy has enough strategic depth to withstand any future attacks on its political autonomy. It is a theme that still resonates in some parts of the Indian policy establishment that worries about the growing role of Chinese equipment suppliers in Indian power and telecom sectors. But it was eventually the shortage of food in the late 1960s that forced India to compromise on its foreign policy in return for wheat shipments.

Fourth, there was a deep suspicion of foreign trade. Some scholars believe that this was the reaction of a country that had initially been colonised by a trading company, while others argue it was a more practical response to the declining terms of trade for underdeveloped countries thanks to falling commodity prices after the end of the Korean War. Much of this export pessimism was based on the work of two economists: the Argentine Raul Prebisch and the Briton Hans Singer. There was no export strategy in the Nehruvian plans—a flaw pointed out in 1963 by a young economist named Manmohan Singh. The main focus was on import substitution: make at home rather than buy abroad. This not only meant that India failed to take advantage of an expanding world economy, but also that it remained dependent on foreign aid to fund its essential imports. The decision to go into a cocoon was perhaps the biggest economic flaw of the Nehru years.

The Nehruvian economic development strategy had its critics as well. The unsung prophet B.R. Shenoy—who was a student of the

libertarian economist F.A. Hayek—wrote a famous dissent note in the memorandum of the panel of economists advising on the second plan. Shenoy made two very significant points: the dependence on deficit financing would be inflationary and the growing role of the government could eventually undermine democracy. Shenoy also more or less predicted the balance of payments crisis that hit India in 1957.

To be fair to them, the planners had also accepted the fact that there was an inflationary bias to their plans, as higher production of capital goods would create money incomes while there would be a shortage of consumer goods to satisfy the new demand; and it was assumed that the Reserve Bank of India would passively fund the budget deficits by creating new money.

Was the Nehruvian economic strategy a success? It was in the initial years. The Indian economy had essentially been stagnant in the five decades before India became a sovereign republic. The economy grew at an average rate of 4.09% between fiscal years 1952 and 1965. The growth crisis came later. It was the first economic boom that India had seen in nearly a century. Industrial output grew much faster than the overall economy, the first step towards a growing role for industry in the India economy since deindustrialisation began in the late Mughal period. The government also managed to run a tight ship. Fiscal deficits were low. A look at the financing pattern of the Second Five-Year Plan shows that Nehru's economists had assumed that at least part of the ambitious investment programme would be financed by revenue surpluses as well as profits from the railways. The longer-term report card is far less impressive, as is now well known. The Nehruvian economic model had already run out of steam by the time of his death. India was left with an inefficient industrial structure, too much government regulation of its economy, an inability to compete in the global market and inadequate supply of consumer goods. It also put India at the mercy of foreign aid givers—ironical because Nehru believed a strong

economy was essential to protect Indian political autonomy.

Many other Asian countries switched their economic development strategy after 1965. India failed to do so. It became a laggard. Nehru was too impressed by the ability of governments to manage complex economies. He failed to see that the enlightened bureaucracy he hoped for would end up as the corrupt inspectors of the licence-permit raj that C. Rajagopalachari and Minoo Masani of the Swatantra Party had presciently warned against very early in the planning era. Nehruvian planning failed to meet its grand hope despite an encouraging start. But important parts of the vision are still relevant in India today: the central role given to economic growth in the battle against mass poverty, a relentless focus on capital accumulation, a higher savings rate to fund asset creation, strategic depth to the industrial structure and fiscal conservatism. All this is a far cry from what recent profligate governments that claim to follow Nehru have done.

### Indira Gandhi and Internal Emergency

Indira Gandhi was born on 19 November 1917 at Anand Bhawan, Allahabad (Prayagraj). She was the illustrious daughter of the renowned Indian leader and freedom fighter, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru who became the first Prime Minister of India after she gained freedom on 15th August 1947. Her mother's name was Kamala Nehru. During her prime ministership, she faced many problems but with her firm intention, courage, and patience, she faced every problem firmly. Famine problem of 1966, presidential election 1969, or general election of 1971 – Indira Gandhi faced all the crises and succeeded in them. Indira showed her ability and courage by creating Bangladesh after the severe defeat of Pakistan in the 1971 war. In 1975, Indira Gandhi had to impose an internal emergency, which many political thinkers and especially ordinary people thought of and still consider to be a major mistake. At first, it seemed that the situation would improve with the introduction of an internal

emergency.

A nation is an entity that holds a number of lives together, and in times of emergency a nation either stands together or perishes. History has taught us that much repeatedly. The framers of the Constitution were conscious of this reality, which is why they inserted the provision for the proclamation of emergency by the President of India under Article 352. Article 352 provides for the proclamation of emergency if there is a war or armed rebellion. This proclamation can be made before the war or armed rebellion breaks out. Besides, financial emergency can also be declared by the President if national economy becomes unstable. The proclamation of emergency is to be discussed before both Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha and should be approved by both the Houses within one month from the date of issue. The period of emergency exists up to six months and it can also be extended for up to further six months.

The Government cited threats to national security, as a war with Pakistan had recently been concluded. Due to the war and additional challenges of drought and the 1973 oil crisis, the economy was in poor condition. The Government claimed that the strikes and protests had paralysed the government and hurt the economy of the country greatly. In the face of massive political opposition, desertion and disorder across the country and the party, Gandhi stuck to the advice of a few loyalists and her younger son Sanjay Gandhi, whose own power had grown considerably over the last few years to become an "extra-constitutional authority". Siddhartha Shankar Ray, the Chief Minister of West Bengal, proposed to the prime minister to impose an "internal emergency". He drafted a letter for the President to issue the proclamation based on information Indira had received that "there is an imminent danger to the security of India being threatened by internal disturbances". He showed how democratic freedom could be suspended while remaining within the ambit of the Constitution.

During the emergency the State Governments function under the direct control of the Central Government. The fundamental rights of the citizens of India are also suspended during the emergency. Uptill now only three times the emergency has been declared; in 1962, during China-Indo War, in the year 1971 during Pak-India War and the third time in the year 1975 by the Indira Gandhi Government due to what was then called 'internal disturbance'. Between June 1975 and January 1977 Indian democracy took an extended leave of absence. Under directions from the Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, political opponents were jailed, human rights extinguished, news censored, and a personality cult of the Leader promoted. The 'Emergency', as it is known, was once regarded as a defining moment in the history of independent India. After it was lifted, and Mrs Gandhi dethroned, the Emergency experience was viewed as a 'near miss' so to say, whereby this country had narrowly failed to permanently join the well subscribed ranks of the world's dictatorships. Political commentators alerted the citizenry to its lessons—not to allow bureaucrats and judges to ally with political parties, never to justify curbs on freedom of expression, above all, to always put faith in process rather than personality.

Indira Gandhi 'advised' the then President of the country Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed to declare a state of internal emergency in India using Article 352. The Emergency was declared without warning on the midnight of 25th June and the country woke up to the death of democracy. A national emergency was being declared in India for the third time, the first two times were during the wars with China and Pakistan in 1962 and 1971 respectively. In 1971, Indira Gandhi's won the general elections with a huge majority. She had won popular support with pro-poor and leftist policies like the nationalisation of banks and the abolition of the Privy Purse. Gandhi wielded almost autocratic control over the cabinet. She had absolute control over the government. The 1971 war had reduced the GDP of the country. The country also faced many droughts and an oil crisis. Unemployment rates had also spiked up. A railway workers'

strike led by George Fernandes in 1974 was severely suppressed by the government. There were also attempts by the government to interfere in judicial matters. The Allahabad High Court declared that Gandhi's election to the Lok Sabha was void due to electoral malpractice. Janata Party leader Jayaprakash Narayan (JP) called for the ouster of the government. He championed a program called Sampoorna Kranti (total revolution). He asked members of the police and the military to disobey unconstitutional orders. When things were heating up for the government, Gandhi declared democracy and immediately arrested all major opposition leaders including JP, Morarji Desai, Charan Singh, Acharya Kripalani, etc.

Even Congress leaders who were opposed to the emergency were arrested. During the emergency, civil liberties were severely restrained. The freedom of the press was strictly curtailed and anything published had to pass the Information and Broadcasting ministry. Indira Gandhi's son Sanjay Gandhi wielded extra-constitutional powers. He conducted forceful mass sterilisation of people in a bid to control the population of the country. Non-Congress state governments were sacked. Many slums in Delhi were destroyed. There were many instances of human rights violations in India. Curfews were imposed and the police detained people without trial. The government amended the constitution many times (after the emergency was lifted, the new government undid these amendments). The emergency is often dubbed the 'darkest hour' of free India.

In January 1977, Gandhi called for fresh elections not reading the mood of the people of the country. All political prisoners were released. Officially, the emergency was lifted on 21 March 1977. The people handed Gandhi and her party a very heavy defeat. Both Indira Gandhi and her son were defeated in the election. The Janata Party won the election and the new government was headed by Morarji Desai as the Prime Minister. Desai was the first non- Congress PM of India.

Most people believe Indira Gandhi imposed Emergency on June 25th-26th, 1975 to save her prime ministership. However, both her principal secretary, Prithvi Nath Dhar, and my father, HY Sharada Prasad, who was her information advisor, believed Emergency was the culmination of a series of political miscalculations and missed chances, arising from three confrontations against Indira Gandhi being waged simultaneously: the Nav Nirman Andolan led by Morarji Desai in Gujarat; the railway strike led by George Fernandes in May 1974; and most importantly, the Sampoorna Kranti led by Jayaprakash Narayan. The Nav Nirman Andolan started off as a student protest in December 1973 against high hostel fees and bad food in college canteens. The agitation spread within days as housewives joined to protest against high food prices and shortages of numerous commodities. By the end of January 1974, over a hundred protesters had been killed, and several thousand injured, in clashes with the police and army.

## Rise of Janata Party

A national party is not built in one election; the BJP's rise from 2 seats in the 8th Lok Sabha to 282 seats in 16th Lok Sabha is testimony to the fact that ideology and organisational rigor are more effective than TRP theatrics and divisive election arithmetic. To any Sangh outsider, the rise of the BJP in the last three and half decades is easily understood when attributed to causes like rise in Hindu Nationalism and Hindu consolidation. However, to those who have seen the working of the RSS from close quarters, BJP's formidable rise is the result of a hard-fought battle to politically validate a long-standing and intrinsically nationalistic cultural identity. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Indian People's Party, pro-Hindu political party of post-independence India. The party has enjoyed broad support among members of the higher castes and in northern India. It has attempted to attract support from lower castes, particularly through the appointment of several lower-caste members to prominent party positions.

The BJP traces its roots to the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS; Indian People's Association), which was established in 1951 as the political wing of the pro-Hindu group Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS; "National Volunteers Corps") by Shyama Prasad Mukherjee. The BJS advocated the rebuilding of India in accordance with Hindu culture and called for the formation of a strong unified state. In 1967 the BJS gained a considerable foothold in the Hindi-speaking regions of northern India. Ten years later the party, led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, joined three other political parties to form the Janata Party and took over the reins of government. Plagued by factionalism and internal disputes, however, the government collapsed in July 1979. The BJP was formally established in 1980, following a split by dissidents within the Janata coalition, whose leaders wanted to prohibit elected BJS officials from participating in the RSS. (Critics of the RSS have consistently accused it of political and religious extremism, particularly because one of its members had assassinated Mahatma Gandhi.) The BJS subsequently reorganized itself as the BJP under

the leadership of Vajpayee, Lal Krishan Advani, and Murali Manohar Joshi.

The BJP advocated Hindutva (“Hindu-ness”), an ideology that sought to define Indian culture in terms of Hindu values, and it was highly critical of the secular policies and practices of the Indian National Congress (Congress Party). The BJP began to have electoral success in 1989, when it capitalized on anti-Muslim feeling by calling for the erection of a Hindu temple in an area in Ayodhya considered sacred by Hindus but at that time occupied by the Babri Masjid (Mosque of Babur). By 1991 the BJP had considerably increased its political appeal, capturing 117 seats in the Lok Sabha (lower chamber of the Indian parliament) and taking power in four states. The demolition of the Babri Masjid in December 1992 by organizations seen to be associated with the BJP caused a major backlash against the party. The mosque’s destruction also led to violence throughout the country that left more than 1,000 dead. The party was regarded with scepticism and suspicion by many committed to secularism in contemporary India. To alleviate fear among the public, restore confidence in the party, and expand its base, the BJP’s leaders undertook a series of rath yatras (“journeys on the carriage”), or political marches, in which the Hindu god Rama was symbolically invoked as the symbol of cultural renaissance.

In elections in 1996 the BJP emerged as the largest single party in the Lok Sabha and was invited by India’s president to form a government. However, its tenure in office was short-lived, as it could not muster the majority required to rule in the 545-member lower house. In 1998 the BJP and its allies were able to form a majority government with Vajpayee as prime minister. In May of that year, nuclear weapons tests ordered by Vajpayee drew widespread international condemnation. After 13 months in office, coalition partner All India Dravidian Progressive Federation (All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) withdrew its support, and Vajpayee was prompted to seek a vote of confidence in the Lok

Sabha, which he lost by the margin of a single vote.

The BJP contested the 1999 parliamentary elections as the organizer of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a coalition of more than 20 national and regional parties. The alliance secured a governing majority, with the BJP winning 182 of the coalition's 294 seats. Vajpayee, as leader of the largest party in the alliance, was again elected prime minister.

Although Vajpayee sought to resolve the country's long-standing conflict with Pakistan over the Kashmir region and made India a world leader in information technology, the coalition lost its majority in the 2004 parliamentary elections to the Congress Party's United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition, and Vajpayee resigned from office. The party's share of seats in the Lok Sabha was reduced from 137 to 116 in the 2009 parliamentary elections, as the UPA coalition again prevailed.

As the 2014 Lok Sabha elections grew near, however, the BJP's fortunes began to rise, largely because of growing discontent with Congress Party rule. Narendra Modi, the long-time chief minister (head of government) of Gujarat state, was chosen to lead the BJP electoral campaign, thus making him the party's candidate for prime minister. The polling—held in several stages in April and May—produced an overwhelming victory for the BJP. The party won 282 seats outright, a clear majority in the chamber, and its NDA partners added 54 more. Shortly after election results were announced, Modi was named head of the party members in parliament, and he began forming a government that included not only senior BJP officials but also several leaders from parties allied with the coalition. Modi was sworn in as prime minister on May 26, 2014.

BJP rule included a mixture of policies relating to the economy and

to promoting Hindutva. On November 8, 2016, 500- and 1,000-rupee banknotes were demonetized with just a few hours' notice with the intent of stopping "black money"—cash used for illicit activities. More than 99 percent of the banknotes were returned and replaced, indicating even "black money" had been successfully exchanged and returned to circulation. But the policy did broaden the income tax base through increased bank activity and stimulated the use of cashless transactions. In 2017 the Goods and Services Tax (GST) was introduced, reforming the collection of consumption taxes nationwide. Meanwhile, the BJP appealed to notions of Hindutva through measures such as banning the sale of cows for slaughter, a move later overturned by the Supreme Court. The party likewise legislated name changes for certain jurisdictions.

In late 2018 the BJP suffered large election losses. Five states held elections in November and December, and the BJP lost in all five, including its strongholds of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Chhattisgarh. The loss was attributed to the rise in the cost of living and in unemployment, and Modi's grandiose promises on economic growth remained unfulfilled. A security crisis over Jammu and Kashmir in February 2019, which raised tensions with Pakistan to their highest level in decades, won back some support for the party. As elections for the Lok Sabha drew near, the BJP dominated media attention. The party was returned to power in a landslide victory in the spring of 2019 and expanded its representation in the legislative body.

The party's second term in power was marked by swift and heavy-handed actions. In August 2019 the BJP-led government stripped Jammu and Kashmir of its autonomy and in October brought the former state under the direct control of the union government; communications and movement in Jammu and Kashmir were severely restricted during the transition. In March 2020 the spread of the global COVID-19 pandemic prompted the government to implement a strict national lockdown until June. As restrictions

were eased, the BJP made efforts to counter the economic impact of the pandemic, including Modi's use of executive action to reduce obstacles to selling produce and encourage private investment. Critics argued that the changes would make farmers vulnerable to exploitation, but the reforms were nevertheless codified into law without input from those concerned. When protests against the measures escalated in January 2021 (including clashes with police and the storming of the Red Fort on Republic Day), the government took extraordinary measures to stifle them, implementing Internet blackouts and punishing organizers, participants, and journalists.

Although the newly formed BJP was technically distinct from the Jana Sangh, the bulk of its rank and file were identical to its predecessor, with Vajpayee being its first president. Historian Ramachandra Guha writes that the early 1980s were marked by a wave of violence between Hindus and Muslims. The BJP initially moderated the Hindu nationalist stance of its predecessor the Jana Sangh to gain a wider appeal, emphasising its links to the Janata Party and the ideology of Gandhian Socialism. This was unsuccessful, as it won only two Lok Sabha seats in the elections of 1984. The assassination of Indira Gandhi a few months earlier resulted in a wave of support for the Congress which won a record tally of 403 seats, contributing to the low number for the BJP.

The failure of Vajpayee's moderate strategy led to a shift in the ideology of the party toward a policy of more hardline Hindu nationalism. In 1984, Advani was appointed president of the party, and under him it became the political voice of the Ram Janmabhoomi movement. In the early 1980s, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) began a campaign for the construction of a temple dedicated to the Hindu deity Rama at the disputed site of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya. The mosque had been constructed by the Mughal Emperor Babur in 1527. There is a dispute about whether a temple once stood there. The agitation was on the basis of the belief that the site is the birthplace of Rama, and that a temple had

been demolished to construct the mosque. The BJP threw its support behind this campaign, and made it a part of their election platform. It won 86 Lok Sabha seats in 1989, a tally which made its support crucial to the National Front government of V. P. Singh.

In September 1990, Advani began a rath yatra (chariot journey) to Ayodhya in support of the Ram temple movement. According to Guha, the imagery employed by the yatra was "religious, allusive, militant, masculine, and anti-Muslim", and the speeches delivered by Advani during the yatra accused the government of appeasing Muslims and practising "pseudo-secularism" that obstructed the legitimate aspirations of Hindus. Advani defended the yatra, stating that it had been free of incident from Somnath to Ayodhya, and that the English media were to blame for the violence that followed. Advani was placed under preventive detention on the orders of the then Bihar chief minister Lalu Prasad Yadav. A large number of kar sevaks nonetheless converged at Ayodhya. On the orders of Uttar Pradesh chief minister Mulayam Singh Yadav, 150,000 of them were detained, yet half as many managed to reach Ayodhya and some attacked the mosque. Three days of fighting with the paramilitary forces ended with the deaths of several kar sevaks. Hindus were urged by VHP to "take revenge" for these deaths, resulting in riots against Muslims across Uttar Pradesh. The BJP withdrew its support from the V.P. Singh government, leading to fresh general elections. It once again increased its tally, to 120 seats, and won a majority in the Uttar Pradesh assembly.

On 6 December 1992, the RSS and its affiliates organised a rally involving more than 100,000 VHP and BJP activists at the site of the mosque. Under circumstances that are not entirely clear, the rally developed into a frenzied attack that ended with the demolition of the mosque. Over the following weeks, waves of violence between Hindus and Muslims erupted all over the country, killing over 2,000 people. The government briefly banned the VHP, and many BJP leaders, including Advani were arrested for making

inflammatory speeches provoking the demolition. Several historians have said that the demolition was the product of a conspiracy by the Sangh Parivar, and not a spontaneous act.

A 2009 report, authored by Justice Manmohan Singh Liberhan, found that 68 people were responsible for the demolition, mostly leaders from the BJP. Among those named were Vajpayee, Advani, and Murli Manohar Joshi. The report also criticised Kalyan Singh, Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh during the demolition. He was accused of posting bureaucrats and police officers who would stay silent during the demolition. Anju Gupta, an Indian Police Service officer in charge of Advani's security, appeared as a prominent witness before the commission. She said that Advani and Joshi made provocative speeches that were a major factor in the mob's behaviour. However in a Judgement on 30 September 2020, the Supreme Court of India acquitted all of the accused in the demolition including Advani and Joshi.

There were numerous controversies under BJP. In 2001, Bangaru Laxman, then the BJP president, was filmed accepting a bribe of ₹100,000 (equivalent to ₹320,000 or US\$4,500 in 2019) to recommend the purchase of hand-held thermal imagers for the Indian Army to the Defence Ministry, in a sting operation by Tehelka journalists. The BJP was forced to make him resign and he was subsequently prosecuted. In April 2012, he was sentenced to four years in prison.

Gujarat violence was the most discussed among the controversies. On 27 February 2002, a train carrying Hindu pilgrims was burned outside the town of Godhra, killing 59 people. The incident was seen as an attack upon Hindus, and sparked off massive anti-Muslim violence across the state of Gujarat that lasted several weeks. The death toll estimated was as high as 2000, while 150,000 were displaced. Rape, mutilation, and torture were also

widespread. The then-Gujarat chief minister Narendra Modi and several high-ranking government officials were accused of initiating and condoning the violence, as were police officers who allegedly directed the rioters and gave them lists of Muslim-owned properties. In April 2009, a Special Investigation Team (SIT) was appointed by the Supreme Court to investigate and expedite the Gujarat riots cases. In 2012, Modi was cleared of complicity in the violence by the SIT and BJP MLA Maya Kodnani, who later held a cabinet portfolio in the Modi government, was convicted of having orchestrated one of the riots and sentenced to 28 years imprisonment; she was later acquitted by the Gujarat High Court. Scholars such as Paul Brass, Martha Nussbaum and Dipankar Gupta have said that there was a high level of state complicity in the incidents.

General election defeat led to a considerable talk in Indian politics. Vajpayee called for early elections in 2004, six months ahead of schedule. The NDA's campaign was based on the slogan "India Shining", which sought to depict it as responsible for a rapid economic transformation of the country. However, the NDA unexpectedly suffered a heavy defeat, winning only 186 seats in the Lok Sabha, compared to the 222 of the Congress and its allies. Manmohan Singh succeeded Vajpayee as Prime Minister as the head of the United Progressive Alliance. The NDA's failure to reach out to rural Indians was provided as an explanation for its defeat, as was its divisive policy agenda.

In May 2008, the BJP won the state elections in Karnataka. This was the first time that the party won assembly elections in any South Indian state. In the 2009 general elections, its strength in the Lok Sabha was reduced to 116 seats. It lost the Karnataka assembly election in 2013. Narendra Modi became the Prime Minister of India, following the 2014 Indian general election. In the 2014 Indian general election, the BJP won 282 seats, leading the NDA to a tally of 336 seats in the 543-seat Lok Sabha. Narendra Modi

was sworn in as the 14th Prime Minister of India on 26 May 2014. The vote share of the BJP was 31% of all votes cast, a low figure relative to the number of seats it won. This was the first instance since 1984 of a single party achieving an outright majority in the Indian Parliament and the first time that it achieved a majority in the Lok Sabha on its own strength. Support was concentrated in the Hindi-speaking belt in North-central India. The magnitude of the victory was not predicted by most opinion and exit polls. Political analysts have suggested several reasons for this victory, including the popularity of Modi, and the loss of support for the Congress due to the corruption scandals in its previous term. The BJP was also able to expand its traditionally upper-caste, upper-class support base and received significant support from middle-class and Dalit people, as well as among Other Backward Classes. Its support among Muslims remained low; only 8% of Muslim voters voted for the BJP. The BJP was also very successful at mobilising its supporters, and raising voter turnout among them.

In 2019, the BJP won the general election with a majority. Soon after coming to power, on 5 August 2019, the Modi administration revoked the special status, or limited autonomy, granted under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution to Jammu and Kashmir—a region administered by India as a state and this state consists of the larger part of Kashmir which has been the subject of dispute among India, Pakistan, and China since 1947. Later in 2019, the Modi government introduced the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019, which was passed by the Parliament of India on 11 December 2019. It amended the Citizenship Act, 1955 by providing a path to Indian citizenship for illegal immigrant of Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi, and Christian religious minorities, who had fled persecution from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan before December 2014. Muslims from those countries were not given such eligibility. The act was the first time religion had been overtly used as a criterion for citizenship under Indian law.

## Coalition of Government

Indian political system takes place within the framework of a constitution. India is declared as a federal, parliamentary, multi-party, representative-democratic, republic modelled after the British West Minister system. As like any other democracy, political party represent different sections among the Indian society and regions, and their core value place a major role in the politics of India. India has a multi party system where there is number of national and regional political parties existing in India because of which there is an emergence of coalition governments in India. A coalition government is a cabinet of a parliamentary government in which several political parties cooperate to reduce or to avoid the dominance of any one party within that coalition. The usual reason given for this arrangement is that no party on its own can achieve a majority in the parliament. Coalition cabinets are common in countries in whose parliament is elected by proportional representation, with several organized political represented. It's usually does not appear in countries in which the cabinet is chosen by the executive rather than by a lower house such as US. While in India, the government is formed by the party, which wins the majority votes in Lok sabha Elections. Countries which often operate with coalition government include The Nordic countries, Benelux countries, Germany, Ireland, Italy etc. Federal system is the important feature in Indian political system. In a federal system, the states are affected and in turn affect the national system.

We come across number of regional political parties today in India. The rise of regional political parties might be because of loss of trust in National parties in fulfilling people's demand or in solving the local issues in the regions. After 1967 in states and 1977 at centre Indian political system had seen tremendous changes in its political system that is from the Single-party dominance to multi-party coalitions. We have seen three coalitions so far in India in

each coalition two prime ministers and coalitions lost in Instability. After 1999 till 2014 all the coalitions were stable coalitions. Even 2014 are a coalition government which has got the majority it is yet to complete its term. The most crucial problem that Indian Parliamentary Democracy faces today is the Political instability at Central level and also state levels. Politics in India has been going through a dramatic transformation. India's electoral politics is packed with full surprises. Alliances either pre-alliances or post-alliances is the feature of electoral politics. Alliance means to go or grow together. According to the dictionary, Coalition means an act of coalescing, or unity in to one body, a union of persons, states or an alliance. In the strict political sense, the word coalition is used for an alliance of temporary union for joint action of various powers or states. According to F.A.Ogg, "The term Coalitions employed in political parties or at all events members such parties unite are to form a government or ministry." In the opinion of William H. Riker "The word Coalition has long been used on ordinary English to refer to a group of people who come together to attain some end.<sup>5</sup> Unlike general perception, Coalition in politics is not a new concept for Indian politics. Undivided India got its first experience of coalition government in 1937, when the Government of India Act, 1935 became operative.

At that time, Jinnah asked for a coalition consisting of Congress and Muslim League in UP. However, Congress, the party-holding majority did not entertain this demand. Mohammed Ali Jinnah at that time argued that in India, Coalition was the only respectable device to give to the Muslims a fair share in governance, in other states like North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Punjab Congress formed coalitions with other regional parties. (Indian Constitution by M V PYLEE ). In 1937 the Interim Government under the Prime Ministership Nehru was the first formal coalition consisting of the Congress, the Muslim League, the Hindu Mahasabha etc. The Electoral history of India and the record of Union Government since independence can be divided into three phases:

First up to 1989, a period of eight elections resulting in electoral majority for one party and relatively stable Union Governments except for a period of 1967-72 and The second, the decade since 1989 marked by fractured verdicts in 1989, 1991, 1996 and 1998 Third phase is stable coalitions in the year 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014 resulting in the formation of minority or coalition governments. Politics in state have been dominated by several national parties including the INC, BJP, CPI (M) and various regional parties. From 1950 to 1990, barring two brief periods, the INC enjoyed the parliamentary majority. The INC out of power between 1977 and 1980, when the Janatha Party won the election owing to public discontent with the corruption of the then prime minister Indira Gandhi. The first non- congress party came in to power with the Prime minister ship of Morarji Desai which was welcomed by all over the country. Due to lack of confidence he has to resign. In 1979 Charan Singh sworn in as the Prime minister of the nation, stayed in a power for a shorter term and had to resign. He is the very unfortunate Prime Minister of India who sat on the Prime minister's seat in Lok sabha after submitting his resignation to President. The emergency what was declared by Indira Gandhi, during 1975-77, led the foundations for the coalitions in India. This was the first coalition formed informally gathering in one place to avoid Congress party from capturing the power. The only agenda of Morarji Desai and other parties were to capture and form non – congress government at centre. In 1989, the Janatha Dal – led national Front coalition in alliance with the Left Front Coalition, won the election led by V.P. Singh as Prime minister. It was the first-time minority government was formed, but managed to stay in power for only Two years. In the year 1990 there was change in leadership of the coalition government whereas Chandra shekar from Janata dal sworn in as the Prime minister of the nation. The third force is not merely an accumulation of parties, but a platform invented by the disappointed leaders of the nation to show their unhappiness through third force. Third force has got a challenging structure,

especially in view of its well- directed-effort at organizing the marginalised socio-economic groups. Some of the political parties were united together with ideological back-up as anticongress and anti-BJP alliances.

As the 1991 election gave no political party a majority, the INC formed the minority government under prime minister P V Narasimha Rao and was able to complete its five years. In the year 1996 A.B.Vapayee failed to prove majority. The years 1996-1998 were a period of disorder in the federal government with several short – lived alliance holding sways. This phase distinguished as the era of Coalition of empirical appearances of coalition government in India. The BJP formed a government briefly in 1996, followed by United Front coalition that excluded both BJP and INC. (INC refused to form the government). H.D.Deve Gowda sworn in as the Prime Minister of the third coalitions with the Congress supported United Front from outside, but H.D.Deve Gowda was in powers as long as P.V. Narasimha Rao was the president of the Congress and once Sita Ram Kesari had become the president he withdrew the support and insisted for change of Leadership to continue the support of congress party. In 1998, the BJP formed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) with several other parties and assumed power which was the Third coalition government in three years. This government had lost power because of the regional political party support withdrawn. In 1999 the alliance what is led in 1998 continued in 1999 too, it had 24 partners. BJP led coalition won a decisive victory, winning 299 seats and became the first non - congress government to complete full five year term under the leadership of A.B.Vajpayee. In the 14th Lok Sabha elections held in 2004, it was immediately apparent that the ruling coalition – the National Democratic Alliance(NDA)– had been voted out of power and its place taken by another coalition of political parties, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), 2004-2009. In the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, UPA won again with a surprising majority, the INC self – winning more

than 200 seats. Manmohan Singh continued as the Prime minister of the nation. In the 2014, 16th Lok Sabha Elections, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), led by the BJP, won a sweeping victory, taking 336 seats, the BJP self winning 282 seats. It is the first time since the 1984 Indian general elections that party has won enough seats to govern without the support of other parties.

State governments are also witnessing the coalition governments today, either through pre- alliances or post- alliances. E.g. Kerala, West Bengal, Maharashtra, Jammu Kashmir, Jharkhand and other states also witness the coalition governments and very recently in Bihar too we see the Coalition governments. **CONCLUSION** The coalitions play a significant role today in the democratic nation like India. In the first three coalitions of India were unstable coalitions. The support had been withdrawn by the ally partners on their demands, either it is Change of leader or local govt dismissal or might be some other. In 1996 we could see the term had seen Three Prime Ministers still not completed the term. Though this time BJP has been able to win on its own still it has Coalition Partners. Telugu Desam, Shivaseena YSR Congress, AIDMK etc. as it had made pre-alliances. Analysing the past successful, stable coalition governments in India, I conclude stating Coalition Government does definitely provide a good and prosperous option at centre to form a government in India. Formation of Coalition governments reflects the transition in Indian politics away from the national parties towards smaller i.e., regional parties. India now looks forward to a stable future of coalition Governments, as Single - party majority seem to be a thing of the past now. The successful completion of coalition governments NDA 1, UPA 1 and 2 and today NDA 2 guarantees not only the decline of one party rule and rise of regional political parties. Coalition governments are inevitable today in India. Through which it is reflecting the Indian democracy as well as the federal character of the nation. It must be the responsibility of each and every political party irrespective of National or regional to think towards not only the

power but also National security and development. Instead of taking the situation as an opportunity if parties think about development in the spheres there is a success of democracy. Many a times there is a fall of governments that to till 1999 we are able to see only unsuccessful coalitions. But later period till today is the stable coalitions. Though Single party is winning the majority number because of pre-alliances it will be remained as the Coalitional government.

### Role of Left

It was the tenth anniversary of the historic revolution in Russia that shook the world by establishing that the real power lay in the hands of common people who could rise up to overthrow their exploiters. The future prime minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru paid his first ever visit to the land of socialism that he had been studying minutely since the earliest days of the revolution. In Russia, Nehru strove to find a solution to the struggles of a colonised India. He studied the works of Marx and Lenin and admitted that he was greatly influenced by their ideologies of development. “We began a new phase in our struggle for freedom in India at about the same time as the October Revolution led by the great Lenin. We admired Lenin whose example influenced us greatly,” he wrote later.

By the second decade of the twentieth century, Indians were slowly but steadily acquainting themselves with the Gandhian philosophy of peaceful confrontation as a means to overpower their colonial rulers. The Russian revolution, however, set in a new course in the trajectory of nationalist struggle. The Marxist ideology of the working class, overthrowing the propertied exploiter, by sheer force, struck a chord deep within the hearts of the agitators of nationalism. The appeal was almost uniform among all those looking for an alternative to the Gandhian mode of peaceful demonstration, and in fact, inspired even a staunch

Gandhian like Nehru. The aggressive revolutionary, Bhagat Singh, is noted to have studied in detail the life of Lenin and the Communist Manifesto during his time in jail. So deep was his attachment to the Russian philosophy, that his last wish was to complete reading the life of Lenin. Down South, on the other hand, the social activist Periyar, who started the ‘self-respect movement’ and also the Dravida Kazhagam, is known to have drawn inspiration from the Russian Communist method of bringing social justice, which he thought was best applicable to the plight of the lower castes in India. But, of course, it was MN Roy, the founder of the Communist Party of India (CPI), who was personally mentored by Lenin in Russia to prepare Indian soil for revolution against the foreign colonisers. The history of Left politics in India runs deep into the very heart of the freedom struggle. It can hardly be denied that both the freedom struggle and the political landscape of free India was for the longest period of time hued in various shades of red. “It is very difficult to conceptualise Leftism in terms of one country of India as a whole. You need to think of the cultural specificity of the context in which you are talking about ideology. For instance, Periyar drew on empowerment of underprivileged. Now this is leftist ideology, but this is also the ideology of Jyotirao Phule, of Hinduism, of Jainism,” explains political scientist Bidyut Chakrabarty speaking about the unique way in which Leftism in India developed in close ties with the culture in which it was rooted.

Despite the broad appeal of Left ideology though, it was MN Roy’s CPI and its later offshoots that went on to become the face of Left politics in India. During its initial days, the CPI focused on mobilising peasants and workers towards a revolutionary cause, while at the same time influencing the Congress in developing a sturdy Left leaning ideology. However, having its roots in the international Communist movement meant that the CPI struggled hard to keep its feet rooted in the nationalist movement. Trouble arose when in the 1940s Gandhi launched the Quit India

movement against the British almost at the same time when the Soviet Union urged the CPI to back the British war efforts in the fight against Fascism. In their efforts to please the Russians, they alienated themselves from the nationalist struggle. Post-Independence though, the party sprung back to form leading armed struggles in several principalities where the princely rulers were reluctant to give up on power. Most noteworthy among these was the rebellion against the Nizam of Hyderabad. In Manipur and Bihar too, the party made its ideological impact felt strong in terms of the agrarian and trade union movements they led. By 1952, it realised the need to occupy the space of governance rather than just the streets and decided to embrace parliamentary politics. Having been successful in garnering enough support among some sections of the Indian population, it soon emerged as the first leading opposition party that the Congress faced.

Soon after, the party experienced its first-ever electoral success in the state of Kerala in the 1957 Legislative Assembly elections. Two decades later the party gained a footing in West Bengal and soon after in Tripura. By the early 1960s, however, the international conditions affecting Communism had altered yet again, the ripples of which would be felt strongly in the Left politics of India. The Soviet Union and China (two most important Communist powers of the world) were at daggers drawn over ideological implications of Left politics. The Chinese, led by Mao Zedong, denounced the Russians for leaning towards the West as a diplomatic means of spreading Communism, rather than leading to an armed struggle. The ideological conflict between the two countries had its immediate effect on the CPI, drawing sturdy lines between those who leaned towards a Soviet philosophy and those who supported the Chinese. The political soil in India too was conducive to the conflict within the CPI. The Indo- China border war in 1962 affected the politics within the party with one section backing Nehru, while the other radical section opposed to what they believed was an unqualified aggression towards China.

The internal politics within the CPI soon manifested itself in the famous split of 1964, when the radical section leaning towards China walked out of a meeting held in Delhi, calling themselves the 'real communist party'. Soon after they would form the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M), which eventually overshadowed the CPI in parliamentary politics. Three years after the split of 1964, however, there was yet another dissension within the CPI- M, with a faction of radicals claiming that the party, engrossed in parliamentary politics, had given up on the original cause of armed revolution. In 1969, this group, led by Charu Mazumdar led violent attacks at Naxalbari in North Bengal in an effort to replicate a Chinese revolution. The movement was soon crushed when the CPI-M, which was at that moment part of a coalition government in Bengal, came down heavily upon it, ironically accusing it of drawing inspiration from Mao, rather than following what India stood for. Despite the failure of Mazumdar's movement though, the revolution he attempted to ignite, established the roots of what is now the Maoist movement in the country.

The recurring splits within the party, primarily based on what precisely the Marxist ideology entailed, however, could not shake the Left's influence on the three states it had gained control over in the 50s and 60s. In Kerala the Left Front kept alternating with the Congress in presiding over the government, in West Bengal the CPI-M, once elected to power in 1977 under Jyoti Basu's leadership, held on to power for the three decades. In Tripura too the CPI- M came to power in 1988, and except a brief moment of Congress rule between 1992 and 1998, the state was governed by the Left up until the overthrown by the BJP earlier this month. Interestingly, while the Congress and the Left kept tussling for power in these three states, they were rather insulated from the approach of saffron in their territory for years. "The sort of ideological disposition that Jan Sangh had it was not culturally conducive to draw on Bengali psyche. For instance, in Bengal Ram

Navami has no appeal because Bengalis don't have anything called Ram Navami in our cultural universe," says Chakrabarty explaining why the Jan Sangh could not effectively make space for itself in West Bengal in opposition to the Congress. He extended the same argument to Kerala as well, where he said historically, a rich cultural tradition of internationalism existed that could not cohabit with the ideological leanings of the Jan Sangh or the BJP that was rooted in a nationalist spirit. However, what is noteworthy is that cultural tradition and ideological positioning of a certain community can never decide the fate of a party in electoral politics. This was first made evident when the Left suffered a drastic loss of power in West Bengal in 2011 to the All India Trinamool Congress led by Mamata Banerjee. The policy of rapid industrialisation of the state since 1994, leading to a spree of forcible land acquisitions soon alienated large sections of the rural population, made space for an alternative political party to take center stage.

But a ruder shock for the Left was yet to come in March 2018, when the BJP made history by introducing saffron to the land of red in Tripura. The trouncing of the ruling party has raised serious questions over both the future of Left politics in India and the extent to which the ideology of Marx has been effective in improving the practical realities of everyday life in India. "When you think of elections in India, they are decided not on the basis of ideological priorities but on the basis of people's disillusionment with the ruling authority. If you look at Tripura, do you think BJP has got any cultural authority there? I doubt it. BJP has won because people are disillusioned with the incumbent Left Front government," says Chakrabarty. As Narendra Modi's party makes its first-ever inroads into a Left bastion, the real question on everyone's mind is if the era of Left politics in India is about to meet its end. "In India Left ideology has evolved in contrast with the prevalent system of government led by Congress. Since it is oppositional politics, conceptually it cannot be over ever," explains Chakrabarty.

## Growth of Hindutva Politics

Politics of India today is a combination of liberal democracy and religious sentiments that has resulted in religiously rooted nationalism. This blending in India has been observed since pre-partition. Sentiments for nationalism emerged in twentieth century against British rule with non-cooperation of 1920 and other religiously motivated movements. It started in 1890s with Bal Gangadhar Tilak who took his inspirations from orthodox Hinduism for his nationalist movements, alienating Muslims in process generating a cause for communal violence. After that British played a game of divide and rule by educating young Hindus and employing them on prominent positions in British Indian setups undermining other minorities. Which is why when first congress party meeting was held in 1885 there were only 2 Muslim representatives and 54 were Hindus, who were educated and Brahmans, out of total of 73 members. It is assumed that twenty first century is marked by the rise of right-wing populism and this kind of populism is dangerous for the international relations. Right wing populism is much stern in its nature as it focusses more closely on the cultural backlash of the globalized world. For these radical rights nativism and nationalism are their core concerns where anti-immigrant sentiments get hyped and take the form of xenophobic form of nationalism right wing populist tends to prioritize the cultural and ethno-national sentiments of the population that would emotionally hit the public and the establishment on focal point. Therefore, in this fight between people and elite, fight get more intense towards the significant other that results in the politics of expulsion, where a particular group of minorities is excluded from the definition of the pure people. The people in populist ideology will always be against everything that wouldn't satisfy their ideological basics. Similarly rise of BJP in India is working for Hindu nationalism that makes the politics more Islamophobic and situation even more favourable for Hindu population to rise.

The thinking behind a populist up rise is that it considers society to be impure amalgamation of multiple castes that has caused an erosion of the nation state. Ethnopluralism and multinationalism become the core cause for right wing populist to gather a racist public opinion without being identified as a racist. A divide in society was instigated, that got fired up with the first partition of Bengal in 1905. British contended that Bengal is too big a region to be consider as a single province, therefore they divided Bengal. Giving politically less active Hindu areas of Bihar to intellectual Hindu political leaders of Calcutta and a new Muslim majority of eastern Bengal and Assam was created with Dacca as its capital. After the partition a new wave of vindictive nationalism was ascended by intellectual of Calcutta, the bhadralok, staunch Bengali Hindu believer, asserted that this was an attempt to divide the mother province, a home of Hindu goddesses “Kali Mata and Durga Mata,” resulting in the new slogan of Bande Mataram that became Congress’ new anthem (Menon, 2013). Political agitation after partition of Bengal became intense as Congress decided to move on with the swadeshi movement, that was a boycott of British goods. Muslims opposed this movement claiming that they wanted to have a mark in business. Congress felt embarrassed and betrayed of partition by the British rule, although 1911 Bengal unified again but radical sentiments in Hindus had already been prompted and unification also made Muslims feel betrayed. Amidst the political unrest of Bengal partition, the first leader of Indian independence movement surfaced, Bal Gangadhar Tilak. He was a man who opposed liberal trend and had special dislike for lower castes and Muslims. He also came to be the first right populist leader in India; Tilak was known as “lokmanya” which means “accepted by the people as their leader.” He was leader who initiated the swadeshi movement and thus became the reason for polarizing the Indian Congress. Tilak along with Lala Lajpat Rai and Bipin Chandra Pal, known as the Lal-Bal- Pal were Hindu nationalists that transformed political discourse of Indian Independence Movement. They were known as the extremist

Hindus and were considered as populist because of their fight for the Hindu population against the British Raj. Populism in India was not always targeted towards Muslims but eventually it got diverted towards them. Lal-Bal-Pal were the first radical right populists in India that politically raised their voices against British in favour of Indian Independence. They mobilized masses in their cause under the flags of Kesari due to which Muslims got estranged. Their belief on Ramayana and Gita made them resent the lower castes and other religions in their subconscious. Lajpat Rai among them was influenced by Arya Samajh, which was a Hindu moment believing in reviving Hinduism to its formal glory. For this purpose, they initiated a Shuddhi movement in 1920s, targeting Christians and Muslims to either convert or reconvert them to Hinduism. Movement cemented Hindu Majoritarianism in Congress. Tilak also favoured Vedas teachings and alienated Muslims in many fronts. Both considered India to be a home to Hindus and Muslims but polarization in Indian society had already been prompted. In early 1900s when Muslim league was formed under the fear of Muslims being the minority, subverted off their rights, another radical right Hindu was also nourishing Hindu believes under the Hindu Mahasabha, a sub-party lobbying under Congress, was Vinayak Damodar Savarkar. During this time situations aggravated in a very hasty manner multiple historically important events were shaping the future of South Asia we see today. When on one hand Indian nationalist like Tilak were fighting for India other radical right groups like Hindu Mahasabha were fighting a religious battle for Hinduism and Hindu Rashtriya. End of World War 1 has left Indian Hindus and Indian Muslims both in betrayal. Hindus started non-cooperation in 1920 due to Rowlatt anti-Sedition bills of 1919 and Muslims initiated Khilafat movement to favour the Caliphate of Ottoman Empire. Both religious groups stand against the elite i.e. British for each of them the other were Muslims and Hindus respectively.

Hindu nationalism was born in wake of the Khilafat movement,

in form of Hindutva by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar. Hindu Mahasabha along with Arya Samajh was convinced that Muslims have started to pose Hinduism a greater threat, which is why they initiated their Shuddhi Tehreek in 1923 that turned controversial, damaging Hindu Muslim relations even more. Shuddhi Tehreek was followed with Sangathan movement, deepening Hindu grandeur posture of themselves creating problems for other religions. Concept of Hindu Nationalism now was expanding its grasp. Idea of Swaraj presented by Lal-Bal-Pal became vastly accepted by radical right Hindu masses. Gandhi in 1920s also got against British and a divide in Congress also got intensified with two distinct factions, faction related to Gandhi wanted a secular democratic state. Tilak and his faction, on the other hand had his inclination upon different ideology regarding Indian nationalism, his idea was of Hindus ruling India as divine majority. The ideologies of Tilak and Savarkar gave birth to Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and rise of right in India today is due to BJP that is an offspring to sentiments that were generated a century ago. India now is not just of Hindus but over centuries diverse racial connections have developed into the Indian society and they have become an important part of Indian politics as well. Having a long history (of multiple religious, ethnic, and cultural society, caste and

casteism) has become a dominant factor in Indian social structure and politics. Presence of communal tensions are exploited even further in name of religion, and this pose a greater danger to the integrity of the Indian nation.

Regionalism, on the other hand, is also playing its part in Indian socio-political system, this regional diversity led different political likings and ideologies that comes in way of stable government. At time of independence congress was the sole political party that had the faith of all India, but with time underdevelopment and inequality in India rose. Religion, caste and language became main determinants of Indian political and social order, regional political parties up surged amid the concern for wellbeing of their own states of U.P, Bihar, Rajasthan Tamil Nadu and many more.(Regionalism and Effects in Indian Polity. Feeling of regionalism is furthered due to religion also, for instant Laddakh as Buddhist dominated region and Jammu and Kashmir as Muslim dominated region.

Casteism in India is also a problem. Hindus have been divided in a hierarchical order for past thousand years based on their karma and dharma. Mainly there are four castes but there are the outcastes of Hindu dharma known as the Dalits. These are the people that are facing discrimination and violence even today at hands of high caste Hindus. They have faced cruelty in terms of education, health, job, and overall rights. After India's independence reforms were made to make Dalits welcome in the society but it failed. Dalits along with Muslims have been lynched by the cow vigilantes of Hindu extremist groups. Even today these outcastes of India are facing major challenge in Indian community, institutionally and socially. Hindu radical rights have often picked up a saffron flag and attacked these lower castes who are merely trying to make a living for themselves and their families, who just want to be treated as humans that they are born to be.

Radicalization is a process that is considered to adopt a radical political stance mostly depending upon the religious ideas that work against the status quo, modern ideas, and expression of the state as whole. Radicalization is also considered to be violent, where the proponents may also resort to forceful methods to achieve their ideological goals. Indian democracy today is facing deeper challenges because of the radicalization of Indian society. A prolonged clash between religious, ethnic diversity and caste has shaped Indian socio-political order today. Radicalization is also known as an emotional process that motivates a group to assume a violent behaviour. Hindus and Muslims are two most prominent religions of South Asia and India is home to both these religions, whereas twenty first century has observed a heightened radical right in India. Nevertheless, radicalization in Indian society is age old, traces of it could also be observed in an era pre-partition when some prominent Hindu leaders refused to take part in freedom fight on bases that real fight should be between Hindus and Muslims and not the British. India, also a home to multiple other religions like Sikhism, Buddhism and Christianity, faces a problem of polarized society. This religion are other minorities that have delinquent relation with Hinduism. Sikhism is fourth largest religion in India having a huge diaspora, but relation between Hinduism and Sikhism are troubled. Their disagreements started in 1980s when Khalistan movement was struck down with the operation blue star, but in its essence the disagreement was that Hindu Extremist would urge that Sikhism is like their dharmic religion. On multiple occasions Sikhs have denied this relation of Hinduism with Sikhism and Sikh diaspora in Canada and UK would assert that they may be proud Indians, but they are not Hindu. Sikhs on many occasions have put emphasis on issue that hatred is not with all Indian or Hindus but with those right radical populist Hindus that are forcing Sikhism to be sub-part of Hinduism. Christianity, similarly, faces problems in India. For

years Christianity has also suffered at hands of Hindu radicalisms.  
Radicalright

Hindus have carried out many unspeakable acts against Christian. As Christianity is the third largest religion in India they have suffered equally as that of Muslims. Hindu extremist militants in 2007 and 2008 burned churches, houses and markets of Christian community leaving 91 dead, wounding 18000 and making more than 60000 homeless.

Hindu Muslim divide in subcontinent is found way before British arrived, and with every passing decade this historic dissention got fuelled. In 1947, one reason for subcontinent to get divided was the two-nation theory. After partition India became the country with largest population of Muslims as minorities. Religious violence became part of India's socio-political structure. However, this religious violence was not targeted just towards Muslims but Hindus were also faced with anti-Hindu violence. On multiple occasions Hindus have suffered a similar backlash from another religious group. There has been attacks on numerous Hindu pundits, temples and places of religious importance. Most prominent among them are 1998 Chamba massacre, 2002 temple attacks and Godhra train burning,) but these are much less in compare to what right radical Hindus have perpetrated against them. This confirms that hatred on both sides is justified and long build. It's just now that all that was veiled has been unleashed and a divide in society that was maintained due to democracy has derailed. Hindu Muslim relation in India has always been marked by continuous use of violence against each other. Muslims in India have suffered at multiple forums like economics, education, health and life itself. This divided relationship is also very much visible between India and Pakistan.

Historically, radical Hindus have always made their point clear of impure infiltrations in Hindu society, which means that other religions are impure fractions of the society and as world Hindu council made it clear that they won't tolerate Hindus becoming a minority in their own country. Major Hindu Muslim antagonism is

observed in Kashmir that, is said by Pakistani

Prime minister Imran Khan has an unfinished agenda of partition. Kashmir is a haven on earth that is home to majority Muslim population but at times of partition this princely state Maharaja sided with India and Kashmir got divided in its own territory. Today Muslims in Indian occupied Kashmir are suffering greatly. Other than Kashmir, major mutiny between these two Indian factions began in 1948 with the assassination of Gandhi and in 1992 the demolition of Babri Masjid. These two events were the initial warnings that Hindu radical right in India is mobilizing although traces of these radical rights are pre-partition and after that it was a series of different and mutual acts against each other. The year 2014 was when radical rights won and secular state of India did not remain secular after all. After BJP assumed power, the situation deteriorated, the divide between Hindus and Muslims has become unbridgeable. Modi, after winning re-election with landslide victory, Hindu rights became more powerful and violence against Muslims also rampaged the Indian society. Many Indian Muslims are asserting that for the first time now they are living in fear.

Right wing populism in India today is deep-rooted in the past. Savarkar and Tilak may have died but their ideologies lived on and India today has been engulfed by these ideas that were presented almost a century ago. In 1925 a major radical rights group was formed that changed Hindu radicalism, known as Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, RSS. An intermix accession of Swaraj and Hindu Rashtriya made politics more complex and future more dangerous. Incidents related to communal violence in India after independence, like Babri Masjid, were conducted through forces of RSS who were inspired by Hindutva ideology of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar. Savarkar's early life was very much inspired by Lokmanya Tilak and his idea of Hindu nationalism under the essence of Swaraj. Savarkar's Hindutva was gaining its popularity and ideology reached Keshav Baliram Hedgewar. Being a disciple of Tilak and inspired by Hinduness of Hindutva of

Savarkar, Hedgewar in 1925 formed Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, RSS. Populist call to Hindus were made under the conception of Akhand Baharat where Christians, Muslims and British were considered as aliens to Hindu nation rooted in Hindu motherland. With time RSS grew stronger and more devoted towards the thought of AkhandBaharat.

India currently has its 23rd government in power headed by BJP's Modi. Narendra Modi had has his first term served as prime minister of India in 2014, which marks the rise of right wing in India. As we maintained that populism is not new to India but its advent to state government is first. Before BJP, India was under a dynastic rule, a democracy that got corrupted and hit hard by globalization. the majority and large Hindu population living in poor circumstances, chants of development and Hindutva among frustrated Hindus fed Indian population with just what BJP needed to gain success. Success of BJP is more of a win for Modi, a personality-based win, which was possible because of wide spread Indian media and social media. They have used fear as a weapon in order to emotionally jag the imagination of Hindu population, combining religion with politics and answering complex question with simple answers. Like all the populist, BJP called to the people, Hindu people, to answer their complex question with providing them a narrative of Muslims as a security threat and soft handling of the others by the elite. Victory of BJP and Modi has forced India towards a non- secular and saffronised state. Wearing saffron robes and scarves RSS volunteers have had Indian minorities ripped off of their Placidity. BJP is a political wing of RSS, which is why after it's ascended to power there has been an increase in activities against religious minorities. Saffronisation in India begun just after Modi's electoral win. Aggressive and hasty decisions were made without considering the consequences. History is repeating itself an incident that instigated and cemented Hindu Muslim divide leading to major communal violence in past was Shuddhi Tehreek and today its known as the ghar wapsi. Just

after BJP assume power in 2014 began a discourse towards religious conversions of Muslims and Christians to Hinduism, followed by anti-cow slaughter campaign that became reason for the murder of many Muslims and Dalits. In past few years Muslims and other minorities have become an official “other” of the India society. Landslide victory of BJP and Narendra Modi also proves that Indian society polarization is vital to its politics and policies. Contemporary Indian politics is plagued by the rift of Indian society. Historical dissensions related to Muslims within state and Pakistan creates a rift between liberal democracy and liberal diplomacy. Yogi Adityanath a Hindu nationalist and current chief minister of Uttar Pradesh is also affiliated with BJP, he is a very prominent figure serving as the right-wing populist.

### Populism in India

Populism refers to a range of political stances that emphasise the idea of "the people" and often juxtapose this group against "the elite". The term dates back to the Populares, (Latin for 'favoring the people', singular popularis) who were a political faction in the late Roman Republic who favoured the cause of the plebeians (the commoners), and has been applied to various politicians, parties, and movements since that time, although it has rarely been chosen as a self-description. Within political science and other social sciences, several different definitions of populism have been employed, with some scholars proposing that the term be rejected altogether.

Populist political forces have played significant roles in Indian politics, and have varied in their vision of political community, in the social groups they targeted, in the policies they pursued, and in their impact on democracy. The Indian National Congress had populist aspects in the interwar period, and then again under Indira Gandhi's leadership from the late 1960s to the late 1970s. Movements and parties that represented particular language and

caste groups also employed populist rhetoric and methods of mobilization, and pursued populist policies. The nature of the populist organizations influenced the effect of populism on democracy. While Indira Gandhi's populism weakened Indian democracy, leading to a period of authoritarian rule, the populism of many of India's language and caste parties strengthened democracy. Populism is likely to continue in Indian politics, and is particularly significant currently in the mobilization of the lower castes.

Significant roles populism has played in societies at different levels of industrialization, with varying degrees of citizen organization, and in association with different kinds of regimes, varied movement and party organizations, and various policy frameworks. Populism was important in the mainly agrarian Eastern European and South Asian societies of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, in rapidly industrializing Latin American countries in the mid-20th century, and in the post-industrial United States and Europe. While citizen organization was low in pre-communist Eastern Europe, it is high in contemporary Western Europe. Populism shaped authoritarian regimes such as those of Vargas in Brazil and Marcos in the Philippines and semi-democracies such as those that existed during the rule of the Pakistan People's Party and Chavez's United Socialist Party of Venezuela. Indian nationalism of the interwar period and the PASOK in Greece in the 1970s enabled transitions to democracy, and the Movement for Socialism aided the consolidation of democracy in Bolivia over the past two decades. Moreover, populist forces enhanced the quality of India's consolidated democracy since the 1960s by increasing emergent group representation, but diminished the quality of some of Western Europe's consolidated democracies by attacking minority rights over the past two decades. Populist organizations such as Peron's Justiciaries Party in Argentina were loose and leader-centered, while others such as Morales's Movement for Socialism were more cadre-based and

socially engaged. Populist policy frameworks ranged from the agro-artisanal romanticism of Mohandas Gandhi and the peasant egalitarianism of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union between the two World Wars to import-substitution industrialization in Argentina and Brazil from the 1930s to the 1950s, neo-liberalism in Peru and Brazil in the 1990s, and redistributive reactions against neo-liberalism in Venezuela and Bolivia over the past two decades. Cas Mudde's and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser's understanding of populism as a thin-centered ideology based on a limited number of core concepts, which need to be combined with other concepts and ideologies, enables one to understand how distinctions between the people and the elite vary with context and are paired with rather different ideologies, ranging from fascism to socialism. (Mudde 2004; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012) Populists distinguish plebeian from patrician with reference to categories such as language and dialect use, pigmentation, occupation, levels of education, types of education (colonial/traditional), and patterns of worship. Although this increases the political significance of certain cultural differences, populist discourses sometimes enable inter-ethnic coalitions by conceiving the popular community as composed of various partly overlapping ethnic, status, and class categories.

In India, populist discourses, modes of mobilization, mentalities, and policies were most often and centrally associated with appeals to nationhood, caste, and language, and less frequently and crucially with religious political forces. Two kinds of political forces deployed populist appeals extensively in the late colonial period – multi-ethnic Indian nationalism and middle and low caste movements. Gandhi's revaluation of an imagined pre-colonial social economy based in self-sufficient villages had marked populist characteristics. It mobilized peasants and artisans as well as groups of middling and high class and caste status into anti-colonial agitations, and influenced a strategy alternating between

non-violent civil disobedience and social work to rebuild village social infrastructure. This vision of a popular national community aiming for cultural and political decolonization also built a multi-religious and multi-ethnic alliance, albeit one fraught with tensions.

Low and middle caste movements were particularly strong in western and southern India. In regions that became Maharashtra state, the Satya Shodhak Samaj (Truth Seeker Society) led by Jyotirao Phule appealed to a bahun samaj (a popular/ majority community) composed mainly of the low and middle castes, to oppose various caste inequalities and exclusions, particularly the dominance of the upper Brahman caste. Moreover, certain members of formerly untouchable castes, notably Bhimrao Ambedkar, adopted the label dalit (meaning broken people) to express their determination to gain full citizenship in alliance with other underprivileged groups. (O'Hanlon 1985; Rao 2009) In the current state of Tamil Nadu, the Self Respect Association and the Dravidar Kazhagam (DK - Dravidian Party) mobilized middle castes, and to a lesser extent low caste, to reclaim the autonomy these groups enjoyed. These organizations only had small pockets of support before Indian independence, but effectively pressed larger organizations to promote caste mobility. They inspired various later initiatives for low and middle caste empowerment that gained greater support. (Subramanian 1999)

The Congress Party's populist features diminished when postcolonial state-building and state-led industrialization began in the 1950s and the 1960s. Democracy was consolidated through this period, but political participation was low especially among lower strata, whose substantive representation was limited by the close links between the state and dominant groups. From the late 1960s onward, the participation and representation of middling and lower strata increased, inspired in part by populist forces. The populist challengers to the Congress Party included forces that

foregrounded caste (the socialist parties, middle caste parties such as the Janata Dal (People's Party), the Samajwadi Party (SP - Socialist Party) and the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD - National People's Party), and low caste parties, particularly the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP – Party of the Popular Community)), caste and language (especially the later Dravidian parties, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK – Party for the Progress of Dravidam) and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK)) or class (the communist parties, that also deployed populist discourses at times), or revived aspects of Gandhian Indian nationalism (e.g., the socialist parties, the movement that opposed the erosion of democracy in the mid-1970s under Jayaprakash Narayan's leadership, and movements that resisted logging in the Himalayas in the 1970s and that protested the construction of the Narmada dam in western India from the 1990s onward).

The socialist parties and their successors adopted certain Gandhian ideas, gained considerable middle caste support in states such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Karnataka, and became important parts of national coalition governments from 1977 to 1980, from 1989 to 1991, and from 1996 to 1998. The later Dravidian parties connected the movement's initial focus on the middle castes to the Tamil language and to various indicators of modest status. Their populist articulation of ethnicity lent them strategic flexibility and increased their support so that they dominated Tamil Nadu politics from the late 1960s. Moreover, it made them more tolerant of groups at the margins of the movement's early visions, such as Brahmans, non-Tamil-speakers, low castes, and non-Hindus. Besides, the Dravidian parties built close political links across religious boundaries and thereby inhibited the growth of Hindu nationalism, which promoted attacks on non-Hindus, tribal groups, and sometimes also low castes in its bastions. The success of the Dravidian parties influenced the formation of similar ethno-populist parties later, notably the Telugu Desam and the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), which have

been important forces in the states of Andhra Pradesh and Assam respectively since the 1980s.

More recently, the BSP became the most successful low-caste-led party. It incorporated certain ethnic and subaltern notions developed by early low and middle caste mobilizers (specifically, dalit and bahujan) into a vision of a multi-ethnic popular community. Aware that the influence of earlier low caste parties such as the Republican Party of India had been restricted by their failure to build multi-caste support, the BSP leaders prioritized doing so as a means to acquire state power. Their encompassing communitarian vision helped them recruit Muslim, middle caste, and upper caste candidates and build significant though inconsistent support among these groups. This enabled the party to rule the largest state of Uttar Pradesh at times, either on its own or in alliance with other parties (1993-5, 1997, 2002- 3, 2007-12), and gain significant support in other north Indian states, including Uttarakhand, Punjab, Madhya Pradesh, Haryana, and Bihar.

In response to such challenges, the Congress Party's populist features were revived, particularly through the 1970s. Indira Gandhi, who then led the party, replaced many party leaders - who she claimed had helped maintain elite dominance - and concentrated power in her hands, pledging to use this power to end poverty. These promises strengthened the Congress Party among marginal groups, and motivated anti-poverty policies that however aided only a small proportion of the poor. The nationalization of some major banks in 1969, purportedly to enable microcredit provision, was the most noted of these measures. The partial dismantlement of Congress Party institutions focused the popular mandate on the leader, encouraging her to repress opponents and curtail the autonomy of other parties, civil society, and opposition party-ruled state governments. These changes led to the imposition of authoritarian rule from 1975 to 1977. Popular opposition to this move caused the Congress Party to lose control

over the national government for the first time in 1977, after which Indira

Gandhi retreated from populist rhetoric and policies.

Populism's demonstrated mobilizing success led the two parties that have ruled India since 1998, the Congress Party and the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), to use populist appeals at times and to introduce new anti-poverty measures even after they adopted a neo-liberal agenda in the 1990s. While the Congress Party's recent populist rhetoric associated it with common people, the BJP also presented itself as offering a popular indigenous alternative to India's secularist and multicultural institutions, which it portrays as Western imports that enjoy support only among a narrow elite. Despite their use of such appeals, populism was not central to the functioning of either the BJP or the Congress Party since the 1980s.

All of India's populist forces increased the political participation and representation of emergent groups, and provided some members of these groups increased benefits. However, their discourses, forms of organization, and policies varied, with different consequences for democracy, inclusion, equality, and conflict.

Gandhian populism dramatically increased political participation in opposition to the authoritarian colonial regime, organized this opposition in a durable party, pressed the colonial regime to grant some authority at times to local and provincial governments that were popularly elected albeit under a limited franchise, and enabled decolonization. These experiences in turn made much more likely the consolidation of democracy after independence especially as representative institutions were introduced despite Gandhi's preference for direct democracy. Gandhi used his charismatic authority to contain pressures for the rapid redistribution of power and resources. This made it easier for

his postcolonial successors to implement their growth agenda more than their redistributive promises, and encouraged them to limit the upward mobility in the Congress Party of those who prioritized faster redistribution. Thus, the legacies of Gandhian populism helped the consolidation of democracy, but also limited its quality.

By weakening party institutions and civil society, Indira Gandhi prepared the way to override democratic institutions and curtail resistance to authoritarianism in the mid-1970s. Yet her populist claim that her authoritarian rule enjoyed popular support might have encouraged her to call competitive elections within two years, and to respect the popular mandate when the majority of voters rejected the abandonment of democracy. The welfare policies that accompanied her populist rhetoric provided limited benefits to a small number of poorer citizens, but also helped her contain growing pressures for the more extensive representation and entitlement of emergent groups.

The late colonial middle and low caste movements increased their target groups' power and public presence in their regions of strength, and developed idioms in which these groups conceived their projects later in certain other regions too. Despite their use of inclusive rhetoric, their support remained largely restricted to the castes that led them. Their postcolonial successors were more attentive to and successful in gaining broad support partly because their strategies were shaped by competition in universal franchise elections. They built parties deeply embedded among the middling and lower strata, which nevertheless varied in how authority was distributed between leaders and cadre. While the cadre enjoyed considerable autonomy in the socialist parties, the DMK, and the AGP in their early years, leaders exercised much more control, either individually or collectively, over the SP, the RJD, the BSP, the AIADMK, the Telugu Desam, and the communist parties. These parties increased the representation of

middling and lower strata and gained them greater patronage and policy benefits. The most important redistributive and welfare policies with which they were associated were middle caste quotas in higher education and government employment, introduced in some states from the 1950s to the 1990s and then in national government employment and national educational institutions in 1990, and free lunch schemes that were adopted in various states from the 1980s. Moreover, their pressures contributed to the adoption of low caste quotas in higher education, government employment, and political representation at the national and state levels in 1950, and the extension of these quotas to local government representation in 1993. The BSP's mobilization empowered low castes in particular in parts of north India. When it ruled Uttar Pradesh, the party pressed for low caste quotas to be filled in the elite bureaucratic layers, for low caste bureaucrats to be promoted, for social infrastructure to be improved in low caste neighborhoods, and for the police to better address violations of low caste civil rights, and erected statues of major low caste leaders throughout the state. Besides, the communists introduced extensive land reforms or caused their competitors to do so in their regions of strength - Kerala, Bengal, and Tripura. The populist forces that focused on the intermediate and lower strata thus increased the symbolic, political, and, to a lesser extent, material inclusion of these groups.

However, certain populist forces limited redistribution to lower strata and increased conflicts between middle castes and low castes. This was particularly the case with the middle caste parties that aided their supporters in their conflicts with low castes over resources and access to public space, restricted the fulfillment of low caste quotas, and redirected resources earmarked for low castes to middle castes. The communist parties, whose leaders were drawn more from upper and middle castes than from low castes, distributed land more extensively to the middle castes although more of the low castes were landless and

land-poor. Furthermore, it was the most advanced low caste of north India, the Chamars, which was predominant in the leadership and cadre of the BSP, which directed most resources to the upwardly mobile among the low castes. Thus, populist forces usually channeled only meager resources to the most marginalized, and obscured this tendency through allusions to a broad popular community including the middling strata. Worse, the populist rhetoric and welfare policies of the Congress Party and the BJP helped contain opposition to the regressive neo-liberal policies of the past quarter century, and in the case of the Hindu nationalists, also increased support for their attacks on the rights and persons of the religious minorities, tribal groups, and sometimes the low castes.

Populism in twenty-first century has become a new normal in international politics, this reality has found its way into modern political affairs of India under Modi's Rule. Rise of BJP under Modi has marked a final rise of right-wing populism in India as traces of populism were found in past among leaders like Lokmanya Tilak who had their ideological base embedded in Hindutva of Savarkar, which today are main ideology of current Indian government.

### Educational Reformations in India

Right from the beginning of their relationship with India, the British, who had come as traders and had become rulers and administrators, had influenced the economic, political and educational systems of the country. Their impact on the cultural and social life of India was gradual. It is essential to review the educational policies under the British rule to understand visualize the future. Development of education system during the British period was determined by the needs of the colonial powers. Keeping their motives in mind, the British developed the education system accordingly. The Charter Act of 1813

constitutes a landmark in the educational history of British India. Section 43 of the Charter Act 1813 contained the first legislative admission of the right of education in India in the public revenues. The said section only defined the objects of the educational policy, viz. ‘the revival and improvement of literature’, ‘the encouragement of learned natives of India’ and ‘the introduction and promotion of a knowledge of sciences among the inhabitants of the British territories in India’.

However, it had no directions regarding the methods to be employed to secure these objects.

A decade before Lord Macaulay arrived in India; the General Committee of Public Instruction was formed in 1823. The Committee’s primary aim was to guide the company on the matter of education. The first Law Member to be appointed was Macaulay who came to India in 1834. This marked a substantial change in the history of educational policy in India.

Macaulay’s Resolution provided a somewhat clear picture of the British education policy. Macaulay argued that the object of promoting a knowledge of sciences could only be accomplished by the adoption of English as the medium of instruction. Macaulay rejected the claims of Arabic and Sanskrit as against English. He considered English to be the key to modern knowledge as it was the language sponsored by the ruling class. His Minute also stated that British government’s main aim was to spread European literature and science among Indians and so all the money granted for education would be spent for that purpose through English medium. The Orientalists dominated the committee and advocated the promotion of Oriental learning rather than the Anglican one. In 1835, the differences of opinion over the competing aims of oriental and occidental learning began to come to surface. The spread of education in India was halted until 1835 as a result of the Orientalist-Anglicist controversy. This marked a substantial

change in the history of educational policy in India. His Minute ultimately decided the policy, medium, means and aims of education in India as the then Governor-in General himself was admirer of English Language.

Promotion of Western science and arts was acknowledged as the avowed object of the British Government in India. Bentinck's proclamation gave birth to the following results in Indian education:

- The aims of education in India were determined by the British.
- The promotion of Western arts and sciences was acknowledged as the avowed object.
- The printing of oriental works was to be stopped.
- New grants or stipends to students of oriental institutions were to be stopped in future.
- The medium of education would be English.
- This proclamation promised to supply Government with English educated Indian servants cheap but capable at the same time. This proclamation had far-reaching consequences. It gave rise to two new castes in a caste – ridden country, English –knowing caste and non-English knowing mass of people

. The Policy of Downward Filtration Theory; In the beginning of 19th century, the British rulers' thoughts that in order to run the British rule in India peacefully, it is essential to make higher classes blind followers of the Government. This they wanted to achieve though educating the higher classes. According to this famous doctrine, "Education was to permeate the masses from above. Drop by drop from the Himalayas of Indian life useful information was to trickle downwards, forming in time a broad and stately stream to irrigate the thirsty plains. Reasons for Adopting Filtration Theory are,

- The British rulers needed educated employees to run the commerce and administration.
- The Government did not receive sufficient funds for educating the masses.
- The educated people educated on British lines through English medium would get higher post in Government services and in return they would use their influence in controlling the masses

from going against the Government rule.

- After educating

Some people, the responsibility of educating the masses could be left to them. Lord William Bentinck, the Governor –General of India appointed William Adam (1789-1868) in 1835 to survey the state of education in Bengal and Bihar and to suggest reforms. Adam submitted three reports (1835-1838) Before Adam submitted his third Report, Macaulay, as the chairman of the Committee had pronounced his verdict. Macaulay willfully assented with the Filtration theory and believed firmly in the superiority of western civilization.

Wood's Despatch, 1854, the Charter Act of the East India Company was to be reviewed in 1853 by the British Parliament. The British Parliament appointed a Special Parliamentary Committee to suggest a suitable educational policy for India. The Committee made a thorough evaluation of the educational policy followed by the Company in India. On the basis of this evaluation, a Despatch (a policy document on education) was prepared for the functioning of education system in India. As Charles Wood was the President of the Board of Control for India, the despatch was christened as Educational Policies in India under the British Rule. The objective of the Despatch was “not only to produce a higher degree of intellectual fitness but to raise the moral character and to supply with servants”. The function of education was to diffuse European knowledge – arts, philosophy, science and literature. English and vernacular languages of India would be the media for the diffusion of European knowledge. An immediate outcome of this Despatch was the passing of the three University Acts of 1857 establishing universities at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. Thus, the consequences of this event directed the centre of interest in education to be shifted from London to Calcutta and the Parliamentary interest in Indian education

being reduced to a minimum. The Government of India became the most effective authority to deal with important educational issues. This period of about five decades between the Despatch of 1854 and the appointment of the Indian Universities Commission in 1902 is described as the Victorian Era in Indian Education.

The Indian Education Commission (1882) was set up to review the educational policies during the period of 1854 and 1902. The Report of the Indian Educational Commission, 1882, was a revised and enlarged version of Charles Wood's Despatch of 1854. Within ten months the Commission submitted a report which was a new version of Wood's original proposal for the education system in India. In 1902, the Government of India established the first national school system in the world.

Major Recommendations of the Commission included: Encouraging and support to indigenous schools for extending elementary education. Government should completely withdraw itself from direct enterprise and should hand over all the State schools to local boards. The Report encouraged Indian private enterprise and awakened public enthusiasm for the cause of education for the first time in India. It recommended gradual transfer of government institutions to efficient private bodies.

Lord Curzon's Educational Conference, convened at Simla by Lord Curzon, adopted 150 resolutions which touched almost every conceivable branch of education. The main results were transfer of complete control of primary education to Local Boards and Municipalities; state policy of not to open more colleges and secondary schools; and recognition of the principle that the missionary enterprise can occupy only a subordinate position in a national system of Education. The Simla conference on September 1901 was a starting point of an era of increased activity and prosecution of educational reforms. All these changes had a great impact on the growth of education during two decades. The

Indian Universities Act was passed in 1904. In 1913, the next major change was the declaration of the Educational Policy.

Curzon was trying to bring education under the control of the Government to suppress the nationalist movement in India. Curzon's educational policy introduced efficiency and improvement in the quality of education, writes Gokhale. He says Curzon had a far-reaching consequence in the subsequent period.

British Government rejected the Gopal Krishna Gokhale's Bill and refused to recognise the principle of compulsory education for paucity of funds. Calcutta University Commission was appointed by the Government of India in 1917 to inquire into the condition and prospects of Calcutta. It proposed to streamline inspection and supervision, appoint trained teachers, subsidize Makhtabs and Pathshalas, improve school facilities, and encourage girl's education. In 1923, in a time of financial stress, the Central Advisory Board of Education was abolished without even a reference to provincial Governments as to the advisability of its continuance.

The Hartog Committee examined secondary and university education in India. The main conclusion of the report was that the quantitative increase of education inevitably led to deterioration of quality and lowering of standards. It recommended the introduction of varied curricula in middle\ n\ n vernacular schools and the retention of a large number of pupils in such schools. It also criticised the policy of indiscriminate admission at university level which led to lowering of standard. The Committee highlighted that a policy of expansion resulted in Wastage and Retention and thus weakened the need for a rapid expansion of primary education irrespective of quality. Briefly speaking, the Report like Macaulay's filtration theory stopped the progress of the growth of primary education.

In 1935, the British Parliament passed the Government of India Act which divided all activities into two categories only – Federal (Central) and State (Provincial) Education under Provincial Autonomy was introduced in 1937. During the period between 1940-1946, due to absence of popular ministries, domination of the Indian scene by political problems and the preoccupation of the government with war efforts, the pace of educational progress slowed down. After the end of Second World War, the Central Advisory Committee set up by the Central and Provincial Governments discussed various problems of education in India. A new plan for the education system in Uganda has been published by the government. It recommends free, universal and compulsory education for 3-6 years age group; high school education for 11-17 years for selected children; a university course of 3 years after higher secondary; and stress on teachers' training, physical education, education for the physically and mentally handicapped.

After independence, several committees and commissions were required to review the educational problems in India. The most strenuous problems in the field of education before the national government were expansion of facilities for mass compulsory elementary education, reform of the secondary and university educational systems, and reorganizing the structure of educational administration. An effective Constitution to provide free education to the people of India was needed at the time. The setting up of the University Education Commission popularly known as the Radhakrishnan Commission in 1948 was a major landmark for enunciating the goals and objectives of higher education in Independent India. The Commission emphasized the role of post-graduate education, training and research for the advancement of knowledge. It stressed the university's role in studying agriculture in an agrarian economy like India. The Government of India appointed the Secondary Education Commission/ Mudaliar Commission under the Chairmanship of

Dr. A.L. Swami Mudalar on September 23, 1952. The Commission submitted its report on August 29, 1953 in 240 pages consisting of 15 chapters. It was basically required to suggest measures for reforms on aims, teaching arrangements, organization, the relationship of secondary education with primary education and university education.

The Government appointed the University Education Commission in 1948 and Secondary Education Commission in 1952 for suggesting reforms in education. The recommendations of these Commissions could not be implemented in their entirety. For removal of these defects the Government of India appointed a Commission in 1964 under the Chairmanship of Dr. D.S. Kothari. The purpose of the Commission of 1964 was to study the countless problems and suggest measures for removing defects in the system. The Commission set out the following functions for the universities in the modern world: To seek and cultivate new knowledge, to engage vigorously and fearlessly in the pursuit of truth. To strive to promote equality and social justice and to reduce social and cultural differences through education. To foster in the teachers and students, and through them in the society generally, the attitudes and values needed for developing the 'good life' in individuals and society.

The necessity of national policy on education cannot be over emphasized, as it is related to the essential development of a country. In 1968, for the first time that a national policy was formulated for preparing suitable hands for shouldering responsibilities in the various fields of our national reconstructions. After 20 years of implantation of National Education Policy 1968 Government of India made some change on it to response the changing face on different sector. The National Policy on Education (NPE), 1986 and its Programme of Action

(POA) which was the result of deliberations, consultations and consensus was reviewed and updated in 1992.

The Government has rightly chosen to educate the illiterate adults. The main purpose of this Adult Education Programme is to increase the working efficiency of the adults and to create in them a social and national consciousness. The purpose is to impart higher education to youths of rural areas after secondary education in order to enable them to contribute in the development of rural community. The Indian Education System is generally marks-based. The Government has reserved seats for SC/STs in all areas of education. Seats have been reserved for candidates belonging to Other Backward Classes as well in some states like Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. In 2005, the Kerala government introduced a grades-based system in the hope that it will help students to move away from cutthroat competition and rote learning and will be able to focus on creative aspects.

### Films and Society

India has one of the oldest and largest film industries in the world. It was in early 1913 that an Indian film received a public screening. The film was Raja Harishchandra. Its director, Dadasaheb Phalke is now remembered through a life-time achievement award bestowed by the film industry in his name. At that point of time it was really hard to arrange somebody to portray the role of females. Among the middle classes, that association of acting with the loss of virtue, female modesty, and respectability has only recently been put into question.

While a number of other film-makers, working in several Indian languages, pioneered the growth and development of Indian cinema, the studio system began to emerge in the early 1930s. Its most successful early film was Devdas (1935), whose director, P.C. Barua also appeared in the lead role. The Prabhat Film Company, established by V. G. Damle, Shantaram, S. Fatehlal, and two other

men in 1929, also achieved its first success around this time. Damle and Fatehlal's *Sant Tukaram* (1936), made in Marathi was the first Indian film to gain international recognition. The social films of V. Shantaram, more than anything else, paved the way for an entire set of directors who took it upon themselves to interrogate not only the institutions of marriage, dowry, and widowhood, but the grave inequities created by caste and class distinctions. Some of the social problems received their most unequivocal expression in *Achhut Kanya* ("Untouchable Girl", 1936), a film directed by Himanshu Rai of Bombay Talkies. The film portrays the travails of a Harijan girl, played by Devika Rani, and a Brahmin boy, played by Ashok Kumar. The next noteworthy phase of Hindi cinema is associated with personalities such as Raj Kapoor, Bimal Roy, and Guru Dutt. The son of Prithviraj Kapoor, Raj Kapoor created some of the most admired and memorable films in Hindi cinema.

*Awaara* (The Vagabond, 1951), *Shri 420* (1955), and *Jagte Raho* (1957) were both commercial and critical successes. Bimal Roy's *Do Bigha Zamin*, which shows the influence of Italian neo-realism, explored the hard life of the rural peasantry under the harshest conditions. In the meantime, the Hindi cinema had seen the rise of its first acknowledged genius, Guru Dutt, whose films critiqued the conventions of society and deplored the conditions which induce artists to relinquish their inspiration. From Barua's *Devdas* (1935) to Guru Dutt's *Sahib, Bibi aur Gulam*, the motif of "predestined love" looms large: to many opponents, a mawkish sentimentality characterizes even the best of the Hindi cinema before the arrival of the new or alternative Indian cinema in the 1970s. It is without doubt that under the influence of the Bengali film-makers like Satyajit Ray, Ritwik Ghatak, and Mrinal Sen, the Indian cinema, not only in Hindi, also began to take a somewhat different turn in the 1970s against the tide of commercial cinema, characterized by song-and-dance routines, insignificant plots, and family dramas. Ghatak went on to serve as

Director of the Film and Television School at Pune, from where the first generation of a new breed of Indian film-makers and actors - Naseeruddin Shah, Shabana Azmi, Smita Patil, and Om Puri among the latter was to emerge.

These film-makers, such as Shyam Benegal, Ketan Mehta, Govind Nihalani, and Saeed Mirza, exhibited a different aesthetic and political sensibility and were inclined to explore the caste and class contradictions of Indian society, the nature of oppression suffered by women, the dislocations created by industrialism and the migration from rural to urban areas, the problem of landlessness, the impotency of ordinary democratic and constitutional procedures of redress, and so on. The well-liked Hindi cinema is characterized by important changes too numerous to receive more than the slightest mention. The song-and-dance routine is now more systematized, more regular in its patterns; the 'other', whether in the shape of the terrorist or the unalterable villain, has a more gloomy presence; the nation-state is more fixated in its demands on our loyalties and curtsy; the Indian Diaspora is a larger presence in the Indian imagination and so on. These are only some considerations: anyone wishing to discover the world of Indian cinema should also replicate on its presence in Indian spaces, its relation to vernacular art forms and mass art.

The Indian film industry, famously known as Bollywood, is the largest in the world, and has major film studios in Mumbai (Bombay), Calcutta, Chennai, Bangalore and Hyderabad. Between them, they turn out more than 1000 films a year to hugely appreciative audiences around the world. For nearly 50 years, the Indian cinema has been the central form of entertainment in India, and with its increased visibility and success abroad, it won't be long until the Indian film industry will be well thought-out to be its western counterpart- Hollywood. Mainstream commercial releases, however, continue to dominate the market, and not only in India, but wherever Indian cinema has a large following, whether

in much of the British Caribbean, Fiji, East and South Africa, the U.K., United States, Canada, or the Middle East.

India is well known for its commercial cinema, better known as Bollywood. In addition to commercial cinema, there is also Indian art cinema, known to film critics as "New Indian Cinema" or sometimes "the Indian New Wave" (see the Encyclopedia of Indian Cinema). Many people in India plainly call such films as "art films" as opposed to mainstream commercial cinema. From the 1960s through the 1980s, the art film or the parallel cinema was usually government-aided cinema. Commercial cinema is the most popular form of cinema in India. Ever since its inception the commercial Indian movies have seen huge following. Commercial or popular cinema is made not only in Hindi but also in many other regional languages of East and South India. Let's look at some of the general conventions of commercial films in India.

Commercial films, in whatever languages they are made, tend to be quite long (approx three hours), with an interval. Another important feature of commercial cinema in India is music.

India is home to one of the largest film industries in the world. Every year thousands of movies are produced in India. Indian film industry comprises of Hindi films, regional movies and art cinema. The Indian film industry is supported mainly by a vast film-going Indian public, though Indian films have been gaining increasing popularity in the rest of the world, especially in countries with large numbers of emigrant Indians. In our society there are many practices and traditions which are based on ignorance and which have withheld the progress of our society. Rigidity of caste system, untouchability, dowry system and purdah system have done enormous harm to our society. Cinema films can do a lot to eradicate these evils. They can be used for promoting national integration, Prohibition, intercaste marriages, family planning, eradication of illiteracy, etc. Such themes can help the

transformation of our society. The cinema can be used as an instrument to help people get rid of obscurantism and also to guide them along the right path. It can help in removing ignorance from our society. Not only this, several much needed social reforms can be introduced and brought about with the help of the cinema. There are variable views about the effects of cinema. Producers and financiers consider it as a tempting and lucrative business. For actors and actresses, it is a means to earn money and popularity among masses. The director, story-writer, song-writer and cinematographer take it as an art work. To some, it is an audio-visual translation of literatures and has its own message. As for government, it is a potential source of revenue and employment. For majority of cinema-goers, it is nothing but a cheap and interesting form of entertainment and pastime. Whatever may be the reason, cinema has occupied a major share of market for its cine lovers. Since its beginning with the film 'Raja Harish Chandra' (1913), the cinema has remained the most powerful media for mass communication in India.

Since its beginning with the film 'Raja Harish Chandra' (1913), the cinema has remained the most powerful media for mass communication in India. Cinema has the ability to combine entertainment with communication of ideas. It has the potential appeal for its audience. It certainly leaves other media far behind in making such an appeal. As in literature, cinema has produced much which touches the innermost layers of the man. It mirrors the episodes in such a manner that leaves an impact on the coming generations. Cinema presents an image of the society in which it is born and the hopes, aspirations, frustration and contradictions present in any given social order.

In the present era, cinema is getting replaced by small screen productions. Televised serials and programmes are replacing craze. They advertise and earn revenue for industry. Thus films telecast has become a source of further income for the industry and

trade. Man has instincts, different thoughts flow which leave an effect on the minds. The person laughs with the films and tears with them. Scenes of ‘Shaheed Bhagat Singh’, a film by Raj Kumar Santoshi and Manoj Goswami makes people national-minded and sentimentally involved in the film show.

The film dialogues are occupying places in our real life. Dialogues of Mughal Azam found place in the normal interaction of people for a long time. People talked and walked like Prithvi Raj, the great king Akbar. In the same way, plays by Agha Hashat and Devdas by Sharat Chandra left a deep impact on the masses. In the same way, film ‘Sholey’ created an immense effect on so many. Realism and Modernity are two words closely associated with Bengali cinema. Some of the greatest and among the most popular filmmakers of Bengal took realist genre of films to a new height, alongside reflecting modernist ideas. Realism and modernity go hand-in-hand in Bengali films, especially in the work of greats like Satyajit Ray and Ritwik Ghatak.

Although defining ‘modernity’ would mean at least a few more pages, for the sake of this essay, we would deduct it down to merely social, political and artistic modernization. Satyajit Ray’s magnum opus ‘*Pather Panchali*’ is one of the greatest examples of realist films portraying various elements of ‘modernity’. Inspired by Italian neo-realism (especially Vittorio De Sica’s *Bicycle Thief*, 1948), Ray created his first film and a masterpiece reflecting the evolution and social change in Bengal and a modernization of ideas and concepts. In *Pather Panchali*, Ray talks about leaving old ideas behind and moving on. He talks about how over time, old ways of living, ancestral ideas and traditional lifestyle has become stale and needs to be changed. Apu, with his family, leaves his home and village at the end because the ancestral house held them behind. They moved to find a better way of living. They moved to get rid of the old house which couldn’t help them in anyway, but instead took their daughter’s life.

This whole film is a transition from pre-modern to a modern way of living. Ray distributes several metaphors throughout the film – metaphors of modernity and need for change. One important character which served as a metaphor for me was that of the old aunt. She's old, tired and just wanders around the house doing nothing. She's often told to go indicating she's not wanted in the house. The family is fed up of her just as they're fed up of traditions and the same lifestyle they'd been living – in the fear of famine, poverty and survival. The old aunt wanders, trying to find a place for herself, and when she doesn't, she dies. Ray shows death of old ideas. Ray wants change. He shows a need for change and a breakaway from traditions which are holding you back. He wants to show there's always a need for change. The old aunt is a mere metaphor for him to show how traditions have become stale.

'Charulata' (1964), another one of the great films by Ray, also talks about change. But here, he sets it in an upper middle class Bengali society where a lonely housewife falls in love with her brother-in-law while they both encourage each other to write. He puts two different ideas of home and desire, literature and politics, pre-modernism and modernity face-to-face. Ray's films have a humanistic touch. He uses his 'craft' to get to the deepest part of human heart and extract out the emotions from there. Scenes like Apu throwing away the necklace Durga had stolen, Amal leaving home to avoid being unfaithful, Durga stealing food for her aunt add to the humanistic approach of Satyajit Ray's work. Neo-realism is another thing that inspired Ray. According to me, it's mainly because his stories were about society. He couldn't have made them in a fictional style because then they wouldn't be relevant to the society. His stories were not meant to be mere films, but a reality somewhere in time which needed to be imitated in Bengali society and which was a reflection of the same society he lived in. His characters were sketches of real people. They were close to real. For example, when you think Durga, you don't think of her as a two-dimensional good or evil character, but as a girl who

existed and had different attributes to her personality just like everybody else. She wasn't a puppet.

Similarly, Ritwik Ghatak's films introduced different modern themes to the evolving society of Bengal such as alienation, isolation, need for home. In one of his most 'personal' and also socially relevant films 'Ajantrik', Ghatak introduces the concept of alienation and isolation from the society. He shows a man's attachment to his car, an inanimate object and a troubled social life where he can't connect well to the people around him. Scenes like where the character Bimal is talking to his car, the car responding to him, him taking care of the car like a companion and not caring about what his society says, show how important a character Jagaddal (the car) is. Ghatak doesn't treat the car as a prop, but as a character itself. He tries to show the car's point of view; he wants to make us feel its presence thus implying the fact how relations have also evolved along with modernization of ideas and society; how people have become more involved with their property rather than fellow human beings.

Similarly, in *Subarnarekha* (1965), Ghatak reflects on the feeling of home (along with many other sub-themes such as happiness, relations). His work has been about change, modernity and its effects and mainly, how partition has affected society and Ghatak himself. In *Subarnarekha*, he tells a story of a family moving to the bank of Subarnarekha River after the partition and how the girl Sita seeks happiness throughout the film. Moreover, he tells of her feeling at the new home. The river becomes the new home for her who she confides in her secrets, woes and happiness. From what I observed in Ghatak's films, he believes that society has changed from being a 'community' to more of a collective living of different individuals. I observed individualism in his work, and how people have turned from their fellows to nature or man-made beauty whether it is mountains and rivers to cars and property. There are many modernist elements found in both Satyajit Ray and

Ritwik Ghatak's films ranging from their content and themes (home, anthropomorphism, modernity itself) to their craft (use of POV shots, different style of cinematography, manipulating space and even the use of Brechtian elements). It is always good and well groomed to see good subjects on cinema. They have a very positive and long-lasting effect on the minds whereas cheap and shabby movies affect the tender minds of audience very badly. There is general feeling that present day crimes are all due to effects of cinema. Besides open and demonstrative subjects throw tarnished messages. They spoil our culture, and society. Cinema and TV badly affect the health of the youngsters. They neglect studies and physical games to spend more time on this entertainment. School-going children and society children fail to make use of good impacts and are influenced by the bad part of the programmes on the air. The motive is not to discard cinema or TV telecast so easily. The desirable act will be to selective and choosy for programmes. Good movies should be seen by the students. The movies of TV shows should be very much restricted and for a fix time.

The cinema exercises a great influence on the mind of the people. It has a great educative value. It can achieve splendid results in the field of expansion of education. There are certain subjects, such as science and geography, which can be more effectively taught with the help of talkies. Lessons on road sense, rules of hygiene and civic sense can be taught to the students and the 'public as well in a very effective manner with the help of cinema pictures. Many successful experiments have been made in various countries on the utility of films as a means of education. Feature films have been produced for school and college students and students are being benefitted by them. Cinema films have the power to influence the thinking of the people. They have changed the society and social trends. They have introduced new fashions in society. They may be described as pace-setters. They can create a direct impact

on our social life. Films can go a long way towards arousing national consciousness and also in utilising the energies of the youth in social reconstruction and nation-building by a skilful adaptation of good moral, social and educative themes, and by introduction of popular sentiments, films can, to a great extent, formulate and guide public opinion

### Theatre

The history of ancient Indian theatre dates back to the Vedic age. Theatre in its rudiment form in ancient India was very popular with the Vedic people. It is believed that the theatrical culture in India originated in the times of Rig Veda. Themes regarding wild animals and hunters played the most pivotal role in the ancient Indian theatres. However, the ingredients for theatre were there already in India steeped in folklores, myths, tradition and legends written in umpteen languages as India is always the land of stories. However, the main idea and storyline of the ancient Indian theatres used to be the depiction of events of everyday life, dance and food. Ritualism made a great impact in the presentation of ancient Indian theatre and indeed paved the way of a rather classical presentation of Indian theatre.

Theatre in ancient India of course played a major role in the over all enrichment of Indian tradition, culture, artistry and creativity. The origin of theatre in ancient India has been marked as the result of the religious ritualism of the "Vedic Aryans". The copious tradition of Indian drama unfolds the fact that theatre in ancient India in a rather systematic form was first introduced by "Bharata Muni". It is in his "Natya Shastra Bharata first prefaced the term "roopaka" which means portrayal of the reality in a very subtle way. According to the "Natya Shastra"- speech , poise, dance, mudra, rhythm and music offers an articulate dimension to action and emotion which are definitely the two important elements of Indian drama. This however clearly illustrates the

richness of Indian theater that was even prevalent even in the long gone days of the ancient time.

Sanskrit plays were the first recognized representation of the Indian theatre. Illustrations of daily events, rituals, tradition, dance and music laced the Sanskrit plays while making the plays the classical representation of applied art form in ancient India. Although in much a crude manner the Sanskrit theatre did originate in India somewhat about 3500 years ago, yet its artistic glory never faded away with time. It remained popular as an Indian art form till the last part of the 17th Century. It is right after the maturity of Indian classical dance form and with the development of Indian traditional Mudraas and ragas, Sanskrit plays, slowly evolved as one of the prominent art form of "Indian classical dance drama". "Ramayana" and the "Mahabharata" therefore can be considered as the first recognized classical plays that initiated in India. That was of course just the beginning of a rather contemporary approach in Indian classical drama which later influenced the whole of Asia with its creativity and innovativeness. Ramayana and Mahabharata, the two epics became the source of inspiration for the Indian dramatists like Bhasa in the 2nd century BC. Theater in ancient India was an aristocratic and religious form of expression which also received royal patronage. The great Indian emperor Harshavardhana wrote three plays Ratnavali, Priyadarsika and Nagananda Eminent playwrights such as "Kalidasa", "Bhasa", "Shudraka", "Vishakhadutta" contributed a lot with their artistic splendor. Kalidasa brought about more plays in the history of ancient Indian theatres. These were: Malavikagnimitram, Vikramuurvashiiya and Abhijnanasakuntala.

Theatre in ancient India started as a narrative form of expression and gradually incorporated dance, song and recitation as an integral part of the art form. This is perhaps the reason why ancient

Indian theatre comprehended a varied art form amidst its presentation. In the long gone days of the ancient era, Indian theater originated in a rather haphazard way. The modish approach was not there; the a la mode elegance was also missing as theatre in ancient India was an instrument of humanizing people. The chronicle of Indian drama uncovers the fact that theatre in medieval India, for the first time germinated the seed of the modern drama in a significant way. It was during the gothic period in Indian culture, theatre and drama broke the tradition of illustrating the facts from epics and eposes and developed a rather systematic dramatic form.

Theatre in medieval India therefore not only was a narration of the epic poems but it was during that period the very concept of "Theatrical art" was introduced. The fragrance of the "Nine Rasas" which Bhasa introduced in his Natya Shastra started evolving around each play for the greater objective of producing harmony. Bhavabhuti, the famous dramatist of medieval India in his three important plays- Malati-Madhava, Mahaviracharita and the Uttar Ramacharita, almost played with the nine rasas distinctively. Till the fag end of the fifteenth century, Sanskrit dramas were performed on stage. However it is with the introduction of the Indian classical dance drama, the true aura of Indian theatre was felt for the first time. Theatre in medieval India further witnessed a new genre of Indian drama with the introduction and later on with the popularity of Indian classical dance drama. In this classical genre of Indian theatre, style, idea, logic, poise and above all dramatic development all gained a typical shape amidst the artistic expression through timber, music, songs and mudraas. Theatre in medieval India gradually became quite a thriving personification and of course a refined embodiment of the realities of life through dance, music and poise. The introduction of "Loknatya" during the mid 16th and late 16th century again added a whole fresh enunciation to Indian theater during the medieval period. The over theatrical pattern of the ancient drama gained a rather rational

rhythm in the style and pattern of theatres in medieval India.

The practice of theatre in medieval India was mainly based on oral traditions. Songs, dance and recitation based plays like Rasleela, Ramlila, Bhand Nautanki and Wang ruled the drama pattern in the medieval India. Religion played a pivotal role in shaping the medieval Indian theatre as devotional plays, mythological plays and other religious plays reverberated the aura of Bhakti Movement in the timeline of Indian theatre. Although not in a very structured way, yet the very aureole of the regional theatres started evolving during that era. However, historically it was during the 15 and 16th century the folk theatre emerged forcefully in different regions. It used different languages, the languages of the regions in which it emerged. This indeed paved the way of the historical development of regional theatres in India. Theater in medieval India unveils the voyage of Indian theater from the age old eposes to the traditional rasalilas. It is the account of an altering tradition and the legend of that ever- changing Indian culture, art and folklore which from the remote past supported India in standing apart with her rich heritage, mores and civilization.

History of modern Indian theatre depicts one of the productive phase in Indian theatre. Modernity of Indian theatre reached on the coattails of the British Raj in the mid-nineteenth century. As a result there were sweeping changes in theatre stages of India over the next hundred years, until 1947 and perhaps the subsequent decade, so that the only accurate adjectives for the following fifty years up till now can be post-modern, postcolonial or even contemporary. It is somewhat easy to determine the beginnings of modernism in Indian theatre, because the shift from pre-modern forms to modern ones here is so clearly distinguishable. Chronologically, too, it seems to nearly coincide with that turning point in Indian history, 1857, the First War of Indian Independence. However, modernism in theatres took some time to reach some theatre

regions, as late as the mid-twentieth century - in alphabetical order, Dogri theatre, Kashmiri theatre, Konkani theatre, Maithili theatre, Manipuri theatre, Rajasthani theatre and Sindhi theatre.

But to rewind to the beginning, mere importation of the proscenium arch in itself did not herald modern Indian theatre, for the Playhouse (Kolkata, 1753) and Bombay Theatre (1776) catered exclusively to the small British populations in those harbour towns. Although the Russian bandleader Herasim Lebedeff opened his Bengali Theatre (Kolkata, 1795) with two Bengali productions, it proved a cul-de-sac that did not lead to a stage tradition either directly or indirectly. Since the British brought modern ideas to India, quite appropriately, the first 'modern' Indian play was written in English by Reverend Krishna Mohan Banerjee in 1831 - *The Persecuted, or Dramatic Scenes Illustrative of the Present State of Hindoo Society in Kolkata* - though it was neither staged, nor did it inspire any successors. Another milestone on the road to modern theatre passed in 1853, when Vishnudas Bhave presented in Marathi language the first ticketed shows for native audiences at the Grant Road Theatre, Mumbai. Professionalism is not a key factor in the emergence of modern Indian theatre because many traditional troupes performed as professionals.

In Kolkata, the Bengali stage remained within the confines of private family theatres open only to invited audiences. But what the enlightened joint households of the Bengal Renaissance lacked by way of organized financial acumen, they amply compensated for by means of trailblazing drama. Some of them established competitions for original plays on socially relevant issues, which they then staged. This reformist zeal shaped frontline modernist theatre across the world. Consequently, by 1870 modernism was well under way, established thematically in eastern India and commercially in Mumbai. In 1872, the Kolkata stage also went professional, but in an absolutely unprecedented

direction. From the inaugural production - Nil Darpan by Dinabandhu Mitra, about tyrannical indigo planters, was blatantly polemical and anti-British. Within four years the Bengali theatre outraged the colonial authorities so much that they passed the Dramatic Performances Act in 1876 to curb its subversive, seditious and provocatively patriotic tendencies. Like all the important elements of modernism, this legislation survives into post-modern times, virtually to the letter, as most state governments have not repealed it, ironically enough even invoking it to stifle their own opposition. In general, social and political plays comprise the core of meaningful Indian drama down to the present, definite legacies of modernism. What has not lasted, however, is the mass appeal of theatre to Indians a hundred years ago. From the 1870s to 1930, theatre's popularity touched its high-water mark in India, its place as favourite entertainment afterwards usurped by cinema and now perhaps by television. Modern Indian theatre in the West never attracted such a fervent following. In India, on the other hand, professional troupes rapidly evolved a formula combining melodrama with musical, which they used as a device to capture full houses and as an unlikely vehicle to express social or political messages when necessary.

### Music and Other Literary Forms in India

History of Indian music has its origins in divine tradition. The rich history of Indian music unveils the fact that the divine sage Narada introduced the art of music to the Earth from heaven. This is how music is said to have commenced on earth. According to Hindu mythology, the first ever sound to have been heard in the universe is the Naadbrahma or Om mantra. This sound pervades the entire universe. Since it is a manifestation of the divine power (Brahma), it is the purest sound to be heard. It is believed that the musician attempts to achieve this very purity in his 'sadhana' or dedicated pursuit. History of Indian music unfolds the verity that music gradually changed in shape and form. In the beginning the

music was devotional in content and was restricted to religious and ritualistic purposes and was purely used in temples only. Indian music developed from the ritualistic music in association with folk music and other musical forms of India and gradually derived its own musical characteristics.

The earliest history of music in India can be traced back to the Vedic ages, over two thousand years back. The concept of Naadbrahma is seen being manifest in the Vedic ages. All organised music traces its origins back to the Sama veda which contains the earliest known form of organised music. The earliest raga owes its origin to the Sama veda. The first reference to music was made by Panini in 500 BC and the first reference to musical theory was found in 'Rikpratisakhya' in 400 BC. Bharata Natyashastra, which was written on 4th century AD, contains several chapters on music, which was probably the first clear written work on music that has divided music into octaves and twenty-two keys. The next important work on music was 'Dathilan' that also mentions the existence of twenty-two srutis per octave. Other works written during this period include 'Brihaddesi' written by Matanga on 9th AD, which attempts to define Raga; 'Sangeeta Makaranda; written by Narada on eleventh century AD, which enumerates ninety-three Raagas and classifies them into masculine and feminine species; 'Swaramela Kalanidhi' written by Ramamatya in the sixteenth century AD and 'Chaturdandi Prakssika' written by Venkata Makhhi in the seventeenth century AD.

During the late Vedic Period i.e. from three thousand to twelve hundred B.C., music prevailed in the form called Samgana, which was purely a chanting of the verses in musical patterns.

After that music changed its course a little bit. The epics were narrated in musical tones called 'Jatigan.' Between the second to the seventh century AD, a form of music called 'Prabandh Sangeet', written in Sanskrit language became very popular. This form gave

rise to a simpler form called Dhruvpad, which used Hindi language as the medium. The Gupta period is considered as the golden era in the development of Indian Music.

In the medieval period, the nature of Indian music underwent a change due as a result of the impact of the Muslim invasion. At this time, Indian music slowly started branching off into the two distinct forms of Hindustani and Carnatic music. This two traditions of music started to diverge only around 14th century AD. The Persian influence brought a substantial change in the Northern style of Indian music. In the fifteenth century AD, the devotional Dhruvpad transformed into the Dhrupad or classical form of singing. The Khayal developed as a new form of singing in the eighteenth century AD. Carnatic classical or kriti is mainly based on the Saahitya or lyric oriented, while Hindustani music emphasizes on the musical structure. Hindustani music adopted a scale of Shudha Swara Saptaka or Octave of natural notes while Carnatic music retains the style of traditional octave.

With the advent of the British in India, the court arts underwent a decline. Since most of the nawabs and noblemen no longer had lost their wealth and did not have the rewards to lavish on performers, most of the musicians had to move over to other occupations. A few gharanas did however manage to survive the ravages of time and continued strong after independence. However, on the whole, Indian music took a backseat and interest and resources to sustain this art started to fade. There was increasingly seen the spread of popular music or 'pop' music as it is called, and this trend increased with the spread of cinema. Classical music too started being exported out of the country in the 60's, and an experiment of combining western music with the Indian Classical form. This gave rise to what is popularly referred to as fusion music. In the 70's and 80's disco and pop music entered the Indian musical scene. The 90's further popularised the pop trend among the Indian audiences. With the further spread of information technology

and an increasingly global world, we see a host of musical forms existing in contemporary India- rock music, R and B, Hip-hop, jazz etc. Apart from these western forms of music, traditional forms of Indian music, such as Khayal, Ghazal, Geet, Thumri, Qawwali etc. also find place in the contemporary musical scenario. Bhajans and Kirtans, which form a separate stream of religious songs, are also quite widely sung across the country.

Folk music in India has seen a long and continuous journey down the ages. It has been around since ancient times, and continued its existence right down till the modern time. In India, the theoretical writings of the learned Pundits are not very different from the oral tradition of recounting historical vignettes of folk life in ballad. The Mahabharata and the Ramayana, the two great Indian epics composed in the earliest centuries of Aryan India, were oral lore. Folk music, thus, continued to lead its own existence down the ages, unaffected by the upheavals and turmoil of history.

The forms of Indian literature entwined with its ancientness and modernity are perhaps one of the most complementary yet dichotomous facet, always charming and captivating its readers along the way. Indian literature, its composers, its authors, its philosophers, its pandits (scholarly men, or gurus from erstwhile Vedic Ages), all had generously contributed to the literary. Indian literature wholly mirrors the highly well-heelled culture as well as tradition of ancient India. Literature in India and its literary customs are intimately and integrally linked with the rich past of the nation. Regarded as one of the oldest literary works in the world, history of Indian literature is almost wholly and entirely influenced by the Hindu literary traditions. Indeed, Hinduism and its religious concepts were the only refined and sophisticated aspects, which had thoroughly charmed and enthralled every Indian interested in treatises.

Ancientness of literary tradition in India states that the first ever

traces of forms in Indian literature being propagated were primarily delivered orally in vernacular languages. Indeed, Indian oral literature is one such domain in history of literature, which can perhaps never be viewed by contemporary, or for that matter, by any other generation that had occurred previously. As can be very well grasped, this form in Indian literature entirely had depended solely on the word of mouth, first initiated in the gurukul form of teaching and imparting, in the guru-shishya parampara (the teacher-student relationship and its legacy). It was precisely during the 16th century that an extensive and an all-encompassing format of written literature appeared, forever veering the course of Indian literature and its forms.

Written literature in India had come about due to several changes in the tradition of Hinduism and religious scholars, but not just a sudden and ill-fated decision of ill-thinkers. Indeed, umpteen intelligent and meritorious minds had gone behind the research work and denomination of literature in India in the written layout. The reason for this change and alteration in the forms of Indian literature was the absolute literary predominance of Sanskrit language and the gradual surfacing of Hindu pietistic movements, that had assayed to reach the mass in their vernacular languages. The most foremost and earlier forms of Indian literature were out-and-out religious in nature and essence. The bunch includes the four Vedas (Rig Veda, Yajur Veda, Sama Veda and Atharva Veda), the Samhitas, the Brahmanas, the Aryankas, the Upanishads, the Sanskrit Epics- Ramayana and Mahabharatha, the Brahmasastras and the mythological writings acknowledged as Puranas

The earliest written form of Indian literature took the form of the canonical Hindu sacred compositions, acknowledged as the Veda, which were penned in Sanskrit language. To this Veda were added prose commentaries, such as the tremendously admired and scholarly Brahmanas and the Upanishads. Immortal epics like

Mahabharata, Ramayana or the Puranas were written during this period, i.e. the Vedic Age (held from second and first millennia BCE. continuing up to the 6th century BCE). The bulk of traditional Indian literature is deduced and drawn in theme and form not only from Sanskrit literature, but also from the Buddhist and Jain texts written in the Pali language and the other Prakrits (medieval dialects of Sanskrit). Invasions of Persians and Turks, commencing from the 14th century had ensued in the influence of Persian and Islamic culture in Urdu, although significant Islamic chains can be witnessed in other literatures as well. This influence was perhaps the most potent in those written in Bengali, Gujarati, and Kashmiri. Post 1817, entirely new forms in Indian literature and its literary values were established, which still remain dominant to this day.

### Sports Nationalism

On April 2, 2011, when we won the Cricket world cup, the streets of India were flooded. There were strangers embracing and sharing their praising words. It was not a matter of being a Hindu or Muslim, a lower caste or an upper caste. It was an Indian Identity that emerged and transformed a diverse community into united. Ramchandra Guha, an Indian historian, and writer, in an article in Outlook magazine, said that the institutions that keep us together are those bequests of the British: the civil service, the army, the railways, and cricket. All the linguistic, pluralistic, regional, caste barriers are superseded by the feeling of brotherhood and nationalism.

The feeling of national identity even resides in the heart of Indians residing in other countries of the world. Indian Diaspora across the world rooting for the Indian team is the identity of a nationalist sentiment. It was clearly seen in the cricket match recently held in Florida. It was the first time when America hosted the international cricket match. Half of the stadium was filled with Indian

immigrants. The national flags flying all over the stadium, people cheering the Indian players, praising India in a common voice, depicts the Indian Diaspora's feeling of being a part of India. Sport not only has the power to influence community identity but the nationalist sentiments also. Sports manage to maintain the links between the Indian Diaspora and Indian culture.

Sports create a shared experience which inculcates a collective consciousness among the people. There is no powerful medium than sports to inspire and bring people together for a common purpose. Other than cricket, sports event like Olympics is of phenomenal importance to create a feeling of nationalism. Recently when summer Olympics were held in Rio de Janeiro, every Indian living in any part of India, belonging to any religion or caste realised that they are the part of a single identity "Indian". The badminton women's singles final between PV Sindhu and Carolina Marin was being watched by Indians sitting in different corners of the Nation. But they all shared a common thought. Irrespective of different caste, religion or region, they all had a common wish of PV Sindhu winning the finals. It shows how the citizens of our nation who holds different opinions and views for different incidents held the common imagination of winning the Gold medal. This is the strength of sports, which makes our nation united and brings us under a common umbrella.

Benedict Anderson, a historian, political scientist, and polyglot, calls the nation as an imagined community which is limited and sovereign, in his book "Imagined Communities". The imagined community of millions of people in a nation appears to be real when a few individuals or a team represent the whole nation. Despite various disparities, there are factors that bring the citizens of our country together, with common views – sports being the most important of all. The feeling of nationalism is indispensable to the idea of nation- building. Apart from religion (which has been aptly described as "opium of the masses" by Karl Marx), sports is

the only common thread that binds people together and helps in developing a feeling of patriotism and unity that can counter regional factionalism and sinister design of various separatist forces.

Any major international sporting event like the Olympics or a World Cup promotes universal brotherhood and gives one a sense of belonging to a larger global community. Sportspeople have always been very successful goodwill ambassadors for any country and have admirers across borders. The moment we hear ‘Brazil’ or ‘Argentina’, one of the first thoughts that cross our mind is that of football and its legends “Pele” and “Maradona”. Similarly, Kapil, Sachin, Ganguly or Virat are household names in any cricket playing nation. Nelson Mandela’s beautiful quote sums up it up in a very meaningful way. “Sport has the power to change the world,” Mandela said. “It has the power to inspire. It has the power to unite people in a way that little else does. It speaks to youth in a language they understand. Sport can create hope where once there was only despair. It is more powerful than government in breaking down racial barriers.

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