

# ***DARSANA III***

**(SKT4 C12)**

**IV SEMESTER**

**CORE COURSE**

**M.A. SANSKRIT (GENERAL)**

**(2019 Admission onwards)**



***UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT***

*School of Distance Education*

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# UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT

## School of Distance Education

### Study Material

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#### M.A. SANSKRIT (GENERAL)

## ***DARSANA III***

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“The author shall be solely responsible for the content and views expressed in this book”

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## Unit I

A general survey of pre and post Sankara literature - A general survey of literature on Advaita - Vedanta - Synoptical survey and content analysis of Vedanta - Date, time and works of Dharmarajadhipati

### Pre-Sankara Advaita

The Advaita tradition has its roots in the Vedas, which have been expounded from times immemorial; it cannot be dated with great accuracy. However, the earliest formulation of the system can be traced back to the Mandukya-karikas of Gaudapada. The predecessor and teacher of Gaudapada is said to be Suka the famous author of the Bhagavatapurana. To this day, however, there is no hard evidence to support this traditional belief. Prior to Suka seems to be the sage Vyasa whom Vacaspati identifies with the author of the Brahmasutras in the introductory verse of his commentary Bhamati: "brahmasutrakrte tasmai vedavyasaya dhimate". Further, because of some references concerning Vyasa in early Samkhya, Vaishesika and Buddhist texts, we may tentatively place him in the third century BCE. Previous teachers like Parasara may very well be mythological figures. Hence, the Brahmasutras and the Mandukyakarikas are the sole reliable pre-Sankara

Advaita works available to us. The line of preceptors ranging from Narayana to Suka is a familial one--the teachings were passed on from father to son. The Upanisads themselves tell us of celebrated teachers like Atharvan, Bharadvaja, Yajnavalkya, and Uddalaka, who engaged in "meaningful" discourses with their kith and kin. These sages had ashramas in different parts of the country and Sankara must have followed their example in his decision to establish his Mathas.

### **The Brahmasutras**

It is very likely that there were many works called Brahmasutras, which object were to give a concise summary of the Upanisadic teachings. Unfortunately, the Sarirakamimamsa of Badarayana is the sole to have survived. In his work, Badarayana refers to Badari, Jaimini, Kasakrtsnam, Karsnajini, Asmarathya and Atreya, suggesting that each of the latter had written his aphorisms on the Upanisads.

The Bhakti-sutras of Sandilya and Kasyapa that were written before Shankara seem to teach theistic non-dualism and dualism, respectively. If different teachers wrote about the Upanisads highlighting different things, Badarayana, whom Vacaspati calls the universal teacher (sarvabhauma) seems to have been more thorough in his outlook, writing on karma, jnana, as well as yoga. The well-known pre-Shankara teachers were Bartprapanca, Dravidacarya, Sundarapandya, Bhatrmitra, Brahmanandin and Upavarsha. They must have been Vedantins of great stature since they are named in the works of Shankara, Sureshvara and Vacaspati Mishra. Both Shankara and Sureshvara refer to Bhartprapanca as

Upanisadam-manyā, i.e., thinking that he knew the Upanisads. He was thoroughly criticized by Sureshvara. Brahmanandin wrote the Chandogya-vakya wherein he gives the summary of the Upanisadic teachings. Dravidacarya wrote a commentary on the Chandogyopanisad. The schools of Advaita and Vishistadvaita claim Dravidacarya as a traditional teacher. Both Shankara and Ramanuja refer to Dravida in their respective commentarial works. The Advaitin Polagam Rama Sastri gives us but a glimpse of Dravida's thinking in a text published under the auspices of the Kanci Shankara Matha. Many scholars like Hiriyanna and Sudarsanasuri have attempted to formulate the philosophy of Brahmadatta and Sudarsanasuri, for instance, calls Brahmadatta as an old mayavadin (jāranmayavadin). Notwithstanding Shankara and Vacaspati's critiques of the views of Brahmadatta, the latter still remained influential within the Advaita tradition.

At the end of his commentary on the samanvayadhikarana, Shankara quotes three verses from a teacher who has been identified with Sundarapandya by later Advaitins. Since Kumarila also quotes him, it is very likely that Sundarapandya was the author of a commentary on the Sariraka-mimamsa-sutra as well as on the Mimamsa-sutras. This is what Vacaspati seems to be saying in his Bhamati: atraiva brahmavidam gatham udaharanti. Further, the Prabodha-parisuddhi, a commentary on Padmapada's Pancapadika refers to Sundarapandya directly, saying: "slokatrayam sundarapandyapranitam pramanayati iti aha.

A reference to the teacher Bhartrmitra is found in Kumarila and Mandana's writings. According to Shankara and Bhaskara, the teacher Brahmanandin (also known as Tanka) was holding the Vivartavada and parinamivada doctrines, respectively. However, Ramanuja's view is that Tanka supported Vishistadvaita doctrines. Shankara as Bhagavan Upavarsa reverentially addresses Upavarsa, another important early Advaitin. Shankara appeals to his theory on varnas to oppose that of sphota. Sabarasvamin presents Upavarsa's views in his Mimamsa-sutra bhasya. Ramanuja grounds his own Vedantic tradition in the pre- Shankara period through identifying Upavarsa with Bodhayana. The latter is said to have authored a vrtti that formed the basis for Ramanuja's bhasyas. Sadly, Bodhayana's vrtti has not survived to the present day.

In support of his own tradition, Ramanuja refers to Bodhayana, Tanka, Dramida, Guhadeva, Kapardin, Bharuci and other pre- Shankara commentators. The celebrated qualified non-dualist Yamuna refers to Bhartrhari as a pre-Shankara Advaitin. This seems to be a correct appraisal of Bhartrhari's views since at the beginning of his Vakyapadaya, he asserts that the whole universe is an appearance or vivarta of Sabdabrahman.

The Brahmasutras of Badarayana, the Mandukyakarikas of Gaudapada, along with the Vakyapadiaya and the Brahmasiddhi of Mandana as well as the prasthan granthas, i.e., the Brahmasutras and the Bhagavad-gita, are the sole extant pre Shankara Vedanta works. For centuries following the death of Shankara, numerous commentaries have been written on Badarayana's famous

sutras. Although dozens of commentaries may have been written, we only know of those authored by Bhaskara, Ramanuja, Nimbarka, Madva, Vallabha, and Baladeva. In previous lectures, I have shown the points of agreement and difference between the main commentarial schools. Gaudapada's Mandukyakarikas is a very important text since it provided the basic impetus for Shankara's writings. The latter actually refers to Gaudapada as a knower of the Vedanta tradition (sampradayavid). Regarding the teacher Bhartrhari, we find that his commentators Helaraja and Punyaraja portray him as an Advaitin who hold the view that the realization of the Absolute is possible through the knowledge of Sabda-brahman.

## **Post-Sankara Advaita**

Although the tradition of Advaita, from the Upanisadic times down to the present day, is a continuous one, still, we may speak of the tradition in terms of pre-Shankara and post-Shankara periods, making Shankara the dividing line between these two. Such formulation helps highlighting the philosophical reformulations and constructions that took place in the post-Shankara period. Although the Advaitic core of teachings remained the same throughout, significant peripheral expansions took place; new tenets were proposed and eventually accepted as original Advaitic doctrines. Traditionally, it is held that Shankara had four disciples: Padmapada, Sureshvara, Hastamalaka and Totaka. The literary output of the first two is very important from the standpoint of post-Shankara Advaita. As mentioned previously, tradition holds the view that Mandana and Sureshvara were one and

the same individual. Mandana is the author of non-Advaita treatises (the Vidhiviveka and Bhavanaviveka) as well as Advaita treatises (the Brahmasiddhi). It may be difficult to accept the identity of these two figures on the ground that by writing the Brahmasiddhi, the author would have refuted his own Mimamsa views. Naturally, some scholars hold the view that the author of the Brahmasiddhi must be different from the author of the Naiskarmyasiddhi. Yet, from surveying the nature of the above-mentioned works, it is not possible to prove that a single individual did not author them. After all, the author of the Brahmasiddhi could have been an authority in both Advaita and Mimamsa. Although the debate continues on this difficult matter, the prevalent view is that Mandana and Sureshvara were different individuals. Totaka is credited with the work Totakastakam and Hastamalaka with Hastamalakiyam.

Sureshvara is known as the Vartikakara for he wrote vartikas on Shankara's commentaries on the Taittiriya and Brhadaranyaka Upanisads. He is also the author of the Naiskarmya-siddhi, in which he claims his allegiance to the tradition of Shankara and quotes profusely from the Upadeshasahasri. His vartikas deal with what is said, not said, or otherwise said in the bhāsyas.

Sureshvara is said to have been the first preceptor of the Sringeri matha. Some say that he also presided the Kanchi matha. In the post-Shankara period, two Advaita schools came into existence, i.e., the Vivarana and the Bhamati. The origin of the Vivarana school may be traced back to Padmapada's Pancapadika. This work is unfortunately not complete. The Pancapadika-vivarana is a commentary to

this text. In the 14<sup>th</sup> century, Vidyaranya wrote his own commentary named the Vivaranaprimeya-sangraha. A large number of other commentaries were written on this important text in later times. The origin of the Bhamati school can be traced to Vacaspati Mishra's commentary on the Brahmasutras called Bhamati. There is an additional commentary called the Kalpataru, written by Amalananda. The Kalpataru, in turn, has been commented upon by Parimala. These three form the basic texts of the Bhamati school.

Vacaspati has written a commentary on the Brahmasiddhi, which has yet to be published. The basic doctrines of the Bhamati are derived from the Brahmasiddhi. As to the Vivarana tradition, we can relate it to the writings of Sureshvara. In the post-Shankara period, we find a group of texts under the name of siddhi literature, which comprises: a) the Naiskarmya-siddhi of Sureshvara, b) the Istasiddhi of Vimuktatman, c) the Advaitasiddhi of Madhusudana, and d) the Svarajyasiddhi of Gangadharendra Sarasvati. They are all complex logical texts resembling Sriharsa's Khandana khandakhadya, which refutes other schools through logic, without ever putting forth the view that he considers right.

In the post Shankara period, many independent philosophical works were written in addition to the commentaries on the prasthanatraya and other prakaranagranthas. Vidyaranya wrote an important number of Advaitic treatises like the Pancadasi, the Anubhutiprakasa, the Vivarnaprimeya sangraha, etc. Appayya diksita, another great Advaita scholar, wrote many works among which the Siddhantalesa-sangraha

stands highest. He also wrote a commentary on Yadavabhadra's Vedāntasūtra, which shows his openness towards and respect for other interpretive schools. Dharmaraja wrote a full text on Advaita epistemology called Vedāntaparibhāṣa. 20<sup>th</sup> century scholars like Ramaraja kavi, Anantakrishna Sastri, have also contributed to the development of the philosophy of Advaita. Vedānta is a living tradition that is being worked out by both modern and traditional scholars.

Advaita systems can be divided on the basis of four doctrines 1. Nirguna-brahmavada, 2. brahma-vivartavada, 3. anirvacaniya-khyativada and 4. jivanmuktivada. In post-Shankara Advaita, these four doctrines go hand in hand. The first two doctrines have metaphysical implications, the third has both metaphysical and epistemological implications and the fourth has great soteriological significance. The works of Shankara and post-Shankara Advaitins are meaningful only when viewed against the metaphysical background of the nature of the self and the theory of the identity of self and Brahman.

## **Sankara**

Sankara was an Indian philosopher and theologian who consolidated the doctrine of Advaita Vedānta. Although he is credited by some with unifying and establishing the main currents of thought in Indian philosophy, his influence on intellectual thought has been questioned; until V. Kaspati Misra (tenth century CE), his works may have been overshadowed by his older contemporary, Maṇḍana Misra. His works in Sanskrit discuss the unity

of the Atman and Nirguna Brahman "brahman without attributes". He wrote copious commentaries on the Vedic canon (*Brahma Sutras*, Principal Upanishads and *Bhagavad Gita*) in support of his thesis. His works elaborate on ideas found in the Upanishads. Shankara travelled across the Indian subcontinent to propagate his philosophy through discourses and debates with other thinkers. He established the importance of monastic life as sanctioned in the Upanishads and Brahma Sutra, in a time when the Mimamsa school established strict ritualism and ridiculed monasticism. He is reputed to have founded four mathas ("monasteries"), which helped in the historical development, revival and spread of Advaita Vedanta of which he is known as the greatest revivalist. Adi Shankara is believed to be the organiser of the Dashanami monastic order and unified the Shanmata tradition of worship.

## **The Advaita Philosophy of Sankara**

The first systematic exponent of the Advaita is Gaudapada, who is the Parama-Guru (preceptor) of Sri Sankara. Govinda was the disciple of Gaudapada. He became the preceptor of Sankara. Gaudapada has given the central teaching of Advaita Vedanta in his celebrated Mandukya Karikas. But it was Sankara who brought forth the final beautiful form of Advaita philosophy, and gave perfection and finishing touch to it. The commentary on the Vedanta Sutras by Sankara is known as Sariraka Bhashya.

The teachings of Sankara can be summed up in half a verse: "Brahma Satyam Jagan Mithya Jivo Brahmaiva Na

Aparah" Brahman (the Absolute) is alone real; this world is unreal; and the Jiva or the individual soul is non-different from Brahman. This is the quintessence of his philosophy. The Advaita taught by Sri Sankara is a rigorous, absolute one. According to Sri Sankara, whatever is, is Brahman. Brahman Itself is absolutely homogeneous. All difference and plurality are illusory.

## **Brahman**

The Atman is self-evident (Svatah-siddha). It is not established by extraneous proofs. It is not possible to deny the Atman, because It is the very essence of the one who denies It. The Atman is the basis of all kinds of knowledge, presuppositions and proofs. Self is within, Self is without; Self is before, Self is behind; Self is on the right, Self is on the left; Self is above and Self is below. Brahman is not an object, as It is Adrisya, beyond the reach of the eyes. Hence the Upanishads declare: 'Neti Neti' not this, not this.... This does not mean that Brahman is a negative concept, or a metaphysical abstraction, or a nonentity, or a void. It is not another. It is all-full, infinite, changeless, self-existent, self-delight, self-knowledge and self-bliss. It is Svarupa, essence. It is the essence of the knower. It is the Seer (Drashta), Transcendent (Turiya) and Silent Witness (Sakshi).

Sankara's Supreme Brahman is impersonal, Nirguna (without Gunas or attributes), Nirakara (formless), Nirvisesha (without special characteristics), immutable, eternal and Akarta (non-agent). It is above all needs and desires. It is always the Witnessing Subject. It can never become an object as It is beyond the reach of the senses.

Brahman is non-dual, one without a second. It has no other beside It. It is destitute of difference, either external or internal. Brahman cannot be described, because description implies distinction. Brahman cannot be distinguished from any other than It. In Brahman, there is not the distinction of substance and attribute. Sat-Chit-Ananda constitute the very essence or Svarupa of Brahman, and not just Its attributes. The Nirguna Brahman of Sankara is impersonal. It becomes a personal God or Saguna Brahman only through Its association with Maya.

Saguna Brahman and Nirguna Brahman are not two different Brahman. Nirguna Brahman is not the contrast, antithesis or opposite of Saguna Brahman. The same Nirguna Brahman appears as Saguna Brahman for the pious worship of devotees. It is the same Truth from two different points of view. Nirguna Brahman is the higher Brahman, the Brahman from the transcendental viewpoint (Paramarthika); Saguna Brahman is the lower Brahman, the Brahman from the relative viewpoint (Vyavaharika).

## **The World**

The world is not an illusion according to Sankara. The world is relatively real (Vyavaharika Satta), while Brahman is absolutely real (Paramarthika Satta). The world is the product of Maya or Avidya. The unchanging Brahman appears as the changing world through Maya. Maya is a mysterious indescribable power of the Lord which hides the real and manifests itself as the unreal: Maya is not real, because it vanishes when you attain knowledge of the Eternal. It is not unreal also, because it

exists till knowledge dawns in you. The superimposition of the world on Brahman is due to Avidya or ignorance.

## **The Jiva and the Moksha**

To Sankara, the Jiva or the individual soul is only relatively real. Its individuality lasts only so long as it is subject to unreal Upadhis or limiting conditions due to Avidya. The Jiva identifies itself with the body, mind and the senses, when it is deluded by Avidya or ignorance. It thinks, it acts and enjoys, on account of Avidya. In reality it is not different from Brahman or the Absolute. The Upanishads declare emphatically: 'Tat Tvam Asi' 'That Thou Art'. Just as the bubble becomes one with the ocean when it bursts, just as the pot-ether becomes one with the universal ether when the pot is broken, so also the Jiva or the empirical self becomes one with Brahman when it gets knowledge of Brahman. When knowledge dawns in it through annihilation of Avidya, it is freed from its individuality and finitude and realises its essential Satchidananda nature. It merges itself in the ocean of bliss. The river of life joins the ocean of existence. This is the Truth.

The release from Samsara means, according to Sankara, the absolute merging of the individual soul in Brahman due to dismissal of the erroneous notion that the soul is distinct from Brahman. According to Sankara, Karma and Bhakti are means to Jnana that is Moksa.

## **Vivarta vada or the Theory of Superimposition**

To Sankara the world is only relatively real (Vyavaharika Satta). He advocated Vivarta-Vada or the theory of appearance or superimposition (Adhyasa). Just as snake is superimposed on the rope in twilight, this world and body are superimposed on Brahman or the Supreme Self. If you get knowledge of the rope, the illusion of snake in the rope will vanish. Even so, if you get knowledge of Brahman or the Imperishable, the illusion of body and world will disappear. In Vivarta-Vada, the cause produces the effect without undergoing any change in itself. Snake is only an appearance on the rope. The rope has not transformed itself into a snake, like milk into curd. Brahman is immutable and eternal. Therefore, It cannot change Itself into the world. Brahman becomes the cause of the world through Maya, which is Its inscrutable mysterious power or Sakti.

When you come to know that it is only a rope, your fear disappears. You do not run away from it. Even so, when you realise the eternal immutable Brahman, you are not affected by the phenomena or the names and forms of this world. When Avidya or the veil of ignorance is destroyed through knowledge of the Eternal, when Mithya Jnana or false knowledge is removed by real knowledge of the Imperishable or the living Reality, you shine in your true, pristine, divine splendour and glory.

## **The Advaita**

The Advaita philosophy of Sri Sankaracharya is lofty, sublime and unique. It is a system of bold philosophy and logical subtlety. It is highly interesting, inspiring and elevating. No other philosophy can stand before it in boldness, depth and subtle thinking. Sankara's philosophy is complete and perfect.

Sri Sankara was a mighty, marvellous genius. He was a master of logic. He was a profound thinker of the first rank. He was a sage of the highest realisation. He was an Avatara of Lord Siva. His philosophy has brought solace, peace and illumination to countless persons in the East and the West. The Western thinkers bow their heads at the lotus-feet of Sri Sankara. His philosophy has soothed the sorrows and afflictions of the most forlorn persons, and brought hope, joy, wisdom, perfection, freedom and calmness to many. His system of philosophy commands the admiration of the whole world.

## **The Vedanta-Paribhasha**

The Vedanta Paribhasha by Dharmaraja Adhavarindra is a very important manual of the Vedanta philosophy and is the most widely read book on the subject next to Sadananda Yogindra's Vedanta Sara. The Author who seems to have flourished in the seventeenth century was a reputed scholar of Southern India as we know from the introductory verses to the Paribhasha as also from similar verses by his son and commentator. And we have ample evidence from the body of the book that of the two main branches of the Sankara school of Advaita Vedanta founded by Padmapadacarya and Acarya

Vacaspati Misra respectively our author belonged to the former. In his discussions he has adopted the method and phraseology of Navya Nyaya introduced by Gangesa Upadhyaya in the fourteenth century.

The first six chapters of the Paribhasa are devoted to establishing the means of valid knowledge contain refutations of other systems of philosophy particularly Nyaya Vaisesika. Being to some extent of a polemical character these chapters are rather abstruse for the beginner. But once he has ascended these rugged steps he is ushered into the realm of Vedanta Proper in the last two chapters of the book where he will find a delightful compendium of the essential doctrines of the philosophy embodying its subject matter and aim.

As regards the means of knowledge there is great divergence among the different systems of philosophy. For instance the Carvakas who are out and out materialists believe only in perception the Buddhists and the Vaissikas in perception and inference the Sankhya and Yoga Schools in perception inference and verbal testimony the Naiyayikas add to these comparison as well the Prabhakara school of Mimamsakas include presumption while the Vedantists along with the Bhatta School of Mimamsakas believe in six means of knowledge viz, perception inference comparison verbal testimony presumption and non apprehension. As against the Naiyayikas the Vedantins argue that presumption cannot be classed under inference for it is based on negative invariable concomitance which Vedanta does not admit while non apprehension cannot come under perception for according to the logicians it presupposes contact of the

organ with the object but non existence cannot come in contact with the organ.

Again with regard to the conception of knowledge Nyaya holds that knowledge is a product of the contact of the mind with the self while according to Vedanta it is eternal Pure consciousness only it is manifested through mental states. The Vedantin's theory of perception is in sharp contrast with the Naiyayika's Vedanta holds that pure consciousness has three forms as associated with the subject or knower or consciousness limited by the mind as associated with the object and as associated with the mental state and perception of any external object (that is present and capable of being perceived) takes place when these three occupy the same space by the mental state issuing through the organ and spreading over the object so as to assume a field through a channel and being shaped like the field. The mental state serves to remove the well of nescience from the consciousness associated with the object which is revealed by a reflection of the Consciousness associated with the subject (that is of the self which is of the nature of intelligence). Some Vedantists deny that the mind is an organ which is a perception of internal objects like pleasure and pain is done by the witness by which is meant that aspect of the self in which the mind instead of being a qualifying attribute is a limiting adjunct directly that is without the help of the mental state as in the case of external objects. On this point however our author differs. The distinction between a qualifying attribute and a limiting adjunct is this that the former affects (of course speaking from the phenomenal standpoint) the self while the latter only distinguishes it without affecting it in any way.

## Unit II

### Intensive study of the Vedantaparibh pratyak a pariccheda

॥ वेदा परिभाष ॥

यदविद्याविलासेन भूतभौतिकसृष्टयः ।

तं नौमि परमात्मानं सच्चिदानन्दविग्रहम् ॥ १ ॥

यदन्तेवासिपञ्चास्यैर्निरस्ता भेदिवारणाः ।

तं प्रणौमि नृसिंहाख्यं यती परमं गुरु ॥ २ ॥

श्रीमद्वेङ्कटनाथाख्यानं वेलाङ्गुडिनिवासिनः

जगद्गुरुणा व सर्वतन्त्रप्रवर्तकान् ॥ ३ ॥

येन चिन्तामणं टीका दशटीकाविभञ्जिनं ।

तर्कचूडामणिर्नाम कृता विद्वन्मनोरमा ॥ ४ ॥

टीका शशधरस्यां बालव्युत्पत्तिदायिनी ।

पदयोजनया पञ्चपादिक व्याकृतं तथा ॥ ५ ॥

तेन बोधाय मन्दा वेदान्तार्थावलम्बिनी ।

धर्मराजाध्वरीन्द्रेण परिभाष वितन्यतं ॥ ६ ॥

इह खलु धर्मार्थकाममोक्षाख्येषु चतुर्विधपुरुषार्थेषु मो एव परमपुरुषार्थः, न स पुनरावर्तते इत्यादिश्रुत्या तस्मिन् नित्यत्वावगमः, नित्यत्वावगमात् इतः त्रयाण प्रत्यक्षेण, तद्यथे कर्मजितो लोकः क्षीयते, क्षीयते एवमेवाम् पुण्यजित लोकः क्षीयते इत्यादिश्रुत्या च अनित्यत्वात् । स च ब्रह्माज्ञानादिति ब्रह्म तज् तत्प्रमाणं सप्रपञ्च निरूप्य तत् प्रमाकरं प्रमाणं । प्रमाणं तत् स्मृतिव्यावृत्तं प्रमात्वमनधिगतावाधितार्थविषयकज्ञानः । प्रमात्वमनधिगतावाधितार्थविषयकज्ञानः स्मृतिसाधारणः अवाधितार्थविषयकज्ञानत्वात् । अवाधितार्थविषयकज्ञानत्वमनीरूपस्य कालस्येन्द्रियवेद्यत्वाभ्युपगमे, धारावाहिकबुद्धेरपि पूर्वपूर्वज्ञानविषय-तत्तत्क्षणविशेषकत्वे तत्राव्याप्तिः किञ्च सिद्धान्तः धारावाहिकबुद्धिस्थलेः ज्ञानभेदः, किन्तु यावद्घटस्फुटतावद्घटाकारान्तःकरणवृत्तिरेव, वृत्तेः स्वविरोधिवृत्युत्पत्तिपर्यन्तं स्थायित्वाभ्युपगमात् ; स्थायित्वाभ्युपगमात्तथा तत्प्रतिफलितचैतन्यः तादिज्ञानमपि तत्तावत्कालीनमेकं नाव्याप्तिशङ्कां सिद्धान्तः घटादेर्मिथ्यात्वेन बाधितत्वात् कथं बाधितत्वात् कथं तज्ज प्रमाणं प्रमाणं उच्यते ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारान् केन तत्त्वे पश्य श्रुतेः, यत् सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् तत्सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् द्वैतमिव पश्य श्रुतेः, यत् संसारदशायामबाधितत्वं विवक्षितम्, विवक्षितमइति घटादिप्रमायमव्यापि तदुक्तं देहात्मप्रत्ययं यद्व प्रमाणं यद्व प्रमाणं कल्पितः तद्वदेव प्रमाणान्त्वाऽऽत्मनिश्चयात् ॥ प्रमाणान्त्वाऽऽत्मनिश्चयात् आत्मनिश्चयात् ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारपर्यन्तं

घटादिज्ञानमित्यर्थः  
 प्रमाणानि - प्रत्यक्षानुमानौ  
 अर्थापत्तिः अनुपलब्धिः । अर्थापत्तिः अनुपलब्धिभेदात् त  
 प्रत्यक्षप्रमं प्रत्यक्षप्रमं । प्रत्यक्षप्रमा प्रत्यक्षप्रमं  
 चा चैतन्यं यत्साक्षादपरोक्षात् ब्रह्म श्रुतेः  
 'अपरोक्षादि'त्यर अपरोक्षमित्यर्थः चैतन्यमनार्ति  
 कथंचक्षुरादेस्तत्करणत्वं प्रमाणत्वमिति उच्यते  
 चैतन्यस्यानादित्वे तदभिव्यक्त्या  
 अन्तःकरणवृत्तिरिन्द्रियसन्निकषादिना वृत्तिविशिष्टं  
 चैतन्यमादिमदित्युच्यते ज्ञानावच्छेदकत्वं च ज्ञानत्वोपचा-  
 तदु अन्तःकरणवृत्तौ नत्वोपचारात्  
 निरवयवस्यान्तःकरणपरिणामात्मिका वृत्तिः कथम्कथमइत्यम  
 । इत्यन्तःकरणत्वं तावदन्तःकरणत्वं तावदन्तःकरणत्वं  
 निरवयववत्सादिद्रव्यत्वेन सावयवत्वसावयवत्वसादित्वात्  
 तन्मनोऽसृज इत्यादिश्रुतं वृत्तिरूपज्ञानमनोधर्म  
 सङ्कलविचिकित्सश्रद्धाऽश्रद्धाधृतिरधृतिर्हीर्षीर्भीरित्येतत्सर्वं  
 श्रुतिर्मानम् - शब्दं वृत्तिरूपज्ञानाभिधानात्  
 । वृत्तिरूपज्ञानाभिधानमनोधर्मत्वम्  
 ॥ मनोधर्मत्वकामादेरन्तःकरणधर्मत्वम्  
 कामादेरन्तःकरणधर्मत्वे अहमिच्छामि  
 बिभेमि इत्याद्यनुभवात् आत्मधर्मत्वमवगाहमानः कथमुपपद्यते  
 उच्यते अयःपिण्डो दग्धत्वाभावेः  
 दग्धत्वाश्रयवह्नितादात्म्यं " व्यवहृत्य  
 सुखाद्याकारपरिणाम्यन्तः - करणैक्याध्या-  
 इत्यादि व्यवहृत्य  
 अन्तःकरणस्येन्द्रियतयाऽतीतं कथंचित्  
 करणस्येन्द्रियतयाऽतीन्द्रियत्वं प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वे उच्यते  
 तावदन्तःकरणमिन्द्रियमित्यर्थः मानम

मनःषष्ठानीन्द्रियाणिइति भगवद्गीतावच प्रमाणमि  
अनिन्द्रियेणां षट्त्वसंख्यापूरणाविरोधात्  
षट्त्वसंख्यापूरणाविरोधात्  
नहीन्द्रियगतसंख्यापूरणमिन्द्रियेनैवेति यजमानपञ्चः  
भक्षयन्ति इत् ऋत्विगतपञ्चत्वसं अनृत्विजाऽऽ  
वेदानध्यापयाम महाभारतपञ्चम इत्या  
वेदगतपञ्च ख्याः पूरणदर्शनात्  
इन्द्रि पूरणदर्शनात् ह्यर्था अर्थेभ्यश्च इत्यादिश्रुत्  
मनसोऽनिन्द्रियत्वावगमाच्च मनसोऽनिन्द्रि  
सुखादिप्रत्यक्ष साक्षात् स्यात् इन्द्रियाजन्यत्वात् स्यात्  
वाच ।वाच नहीन्द्रियजन्य ज्ञानस्य साक्षात्  
अनुमित्यादेरपिमनोजन्यत् साक्षात्त्वापत्तेः  
ईश्वरज्ञानस्यानिन्द्रियज साक्षात्त्वाना सिद्धात्  
प्रत्यक्षत्वप्र ज्ञानगत प्रत्यक्षत्व  
प्रयोजः पृच्छा विषयगतस आद्ये प्रमाणचैतन  
विषयावच्छिन्नचैतन्याभेदः ब्रूमः त्रिविधं चैतन  
चैतन्य विषयचैतन्य प्रमाणचैतन्य प्रमातृचै त  
घटाद्यर्वा चैत विषयचैतन्यम् अन्तःकरणवृत्त्या  
चैत प्रमाणचैत अन्तःकरणवत् चैत प्रमातृचैत  
।प्रमातृचैत त छिद्रान्निर्गत्य कुल्य  
प्रविश्य तद्वदे चतुष्कोणाद्याकां  
तैजसमन्तःकरणम् चक्षुरादिद्वा निर्गत्य ६  
गत परिणामं परिणामं  
वृत्तिरि च अनुमित्यादिस्थले अन्तःक  
वह्न्यादिदेशगमनम् वह्न्यादेश्चक्षुराद्यसन्निक  
।वह्न्यादेश्चक्षुराद्यसन्निक इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षस्थले  
घटादेस्तदाकारवृत्तेश्च बहिरेक तदुभयाव  
तदुभयावच्छिन्नचैतन्यमेत

विभाजकयोरप्यन्तःकरणवृत्तिघटादिविषय एकदेशस्थ  
 भेदाजनकत्व भेदाजनकत्व  
 मठान्तर्वर्तिघटावच्छिन्नाकाशो मठावच्छिन्नाकाशाद्भेद  
 घटप्रत्यक्षः घटाकारवृत्तेर्घटसंयोगितया  
 घटावच्छिन्नचैतन्यं तद्वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यं चाभिन्नतया त  
 घटज्ञा प्रत्यक्षत्वम् । प्रत्यक्षत्वम्  
 सुखाद्यवच्छिन्नं तद्वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यं  
 नियमेनैकदेशस्थितोपाधिद्वयावच्छिन्नः  
 इत्यादिज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षत्वम् । प्रत्यक्षत्वम् नन्द  
 स्ववृत्तिसुखादिस्मरणस्यापि सुखाद्यं प्रत्यक्षत्वापत्तिरि  
 त स्मर्यमाणसुखस्यातीतत्वेन स्मृतिरूपान्  
 करणवृत्तेर्वर्तमानत्वेन तत्रोपाध्योर्भिन्नकालीनतया  
 तत्तदवच्छिन्नचैतन्ययोर्भेदात् । तत्तदवच्छिन्नचैतन्ययोर्भेदात्  
 उपाध्योरेकदेशस्थः  
 एककालीनत्वस्यैवोपाधेयाभेदप्रयोजः  
 एककालीनत्वस्यैवोपाधेयाभेदप्रयोजः  
 चैकदेशस्थत्वमात्रमुपधेयाभेदप्रयोजः पूर्वं  
 इत्यादिस्मृतावतिव्याप्तिवा वर्तमाना  
 नन्वेवम स्वकीयधर्माः वर्तमानौ शब्दादि-  
 ज्ञायते तादृशशब्दज्ञानादावतिव्याप्तिं त धर्माद्यर्वाः  
 तद्वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्ययोरेव योग्यत्वं  
 विषयविशेषणत्वात् । विषयविशेषणत्वात्  
 अन्तःकरणधर्मत्वाविशेषेऽपि किञ्चिदयोग्याः  
 फलवलक स्वभ- न्य  
 न्यायमतेऽप्यात्मधर्मत्वाविशेषात् धर्मादिरपि  
 धर्मादिरपि प्रत्यक्षत्वापत्तिर्दुर्वाः सुख  
 वर्तमानतादशायां त इत्यादिवाक्यजन्य प्रत्यक्षता  
 स्यादिति वाच इष्ट इष्ट दशमस्त्वम् इत्या

सन्निकृष्टविष शब्दादप्यपरोक्षज्ञानाभ्युपः  
 शब्दादप्यपरोक्षज्ञानाभ्युपः पर्वतो वह्निमा  
 इत्यादिज्ञानर्मा वह्निमा बह्वं परोक्ष पर्वतांशेऽपरोक्षम्  
 पर्वताद्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्यपर्वतांशेऽपरोक्षम्  
 पर्वताद्यवच्छिन्नं बहिर्निः सृताः  
 करणवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यं । बहिर्निः सृताः  
 करणवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्याभेदं वह्न्यं अ-  
 करणवृत्तिनिर्गमनाभावेन वह्न्यवच्छिन्नचै- प्रमाणचैतन्यं  
 परसः पर्वतं पश्याः ।  
 'वह्निमनुमिनोमि' न्यायमत्तं पर्वतमनुमिनोमि  
 इत्यनुव्यवसाय असन्निकृष्टपक्षकानुमितौ त् सर्वांशेऽपि  
 ज्ञानं परोक्षं परोक्षं चन्दन इत्यादिज्ञानम्  
 चन्दनखण्डांशेऽपरोक्षः परोक्षः सौरभ  
 चक्षुरिन्द्रियायोग्य योग्यत्वघटि निरुक्तलक्षणस्याभा  
 निरुक्तलक्षणस्याभा चैवमेक ज्ञाने  
 परोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वयोरभ्युपः तयोर्जातित्वात् स्यादिति वाच्यं  
 इष्टत्वात् इष्टत्वात् जातित्वोपाधित्वपरिभाषायाः  
 सकलप्रमाणागोचरतयाऽप्रामाणिकत्व  
 सकलप्रमाणागोचरतयाऽप्रामाणिकत्व इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षं  
 घटत्वादिसद्भावे त जातित्वेपि  
 जातित्वरूपसाध्यप्रति तत्साधकानुमानस्याप्यनवकाः  
 । तत्साधकानुमानस्याप्यनवकः समवायासिद्धय  
 ब्रह्मभिन्ननिखिलप्रपञ्चस्यानित्यतया  
 नित्यत्वसमवेतत्वघटितजातित्वात् घटत्वादाव  
 एवमेवोपाधित्वात् पर्वतो वह्निमा इत्या  
 पर्वतांशे वह्न्यं चान्तःकरणवृत्तिभेदाङ्गीकारेण  
 तत्तद्गत्यवच्छेदकं परोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वयोरेकं चैत वृ-  
 कश्चि कश्चि

तत्तदिन्द्रिययोग्यवर्तमानविषयावच्छिन्नचैतन्यभिन्न  
 तत्तदाकारवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नः तत्तदं प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । प्रत्यक्षत्वं  
 घटादेर्विषयस्य प्रत्यक्षं प्रमात्रभिन्नत्वम् । प्रमात्रभिन्नत्वम्  
 घटादेरुः करणावच्छिन्नचैतन्यभेदः पश्यात्  
 उच्चं प्रमात्रं तावदैव  
 किन् प्रमातृसत्तातिरिक्तसत्ताकत्वं  
 स्वावच्छिन्नचैतन्येऽध्यस्तं विषयचैतन्यसंघातं घटादिसत्ता  
 अधिष्ठानसत्तातिरिक्तं आरोपितसत्तायानङ्गीकारं  
 । आरोपितसत्तायानङ्गीकारात् विषयचैतन्यं पूर्वोक्तप्रदं  
 प्रमातृचैतन्यमेव प्रमातृचैतन्यैस्संघातं घटाद्यधिष्ठानतः  
 प्रमातृसत्तैव घटादिसत्ता नान्येति सिद्धं घटादेरपरोक्षत्वं  
 अनुमित्यादिस्थले त्वं करणं वह्न्यादिदेशनिर्गमनाभावेन  
 वह्न्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यं प्रमातृचैतन्यात्मकं वह्न्यादिसत्ता  
 प्रमातृसत्तात् भिन्ना नातिव्याप्तिः नन्वेवम्  
 धर्माधर्मादिगोचरानुमित्यादिस्थले धर्माधर्मयोः प्रत्यक्षत्वं  
 धर्माद्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यं प्रमातृचैतन्याभिन्नतया धर्मादिसत्तायाः  
 प्रमातृसत्तानतिरेकादि योग्यत्वम्  
 विशेषविशेषणत्वात् विशेषविशेषणत्वात् नन्वेवम् रू  
 प्रत्यक्षस्थले घटगतपरिमाणादेः प्रत्यक्षत्वं  
 रूपावच्छिन्नचैतन्यं परिमाणाद्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यं  
 रूपावच्छिन्नचैतन्यं प्रमातृचैतन्यं  
 परिमाणाद्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्यापि प्रमात्रभिन्नतया  
 परिमाणादिमत्तायाः प्रमातृसत्तातिरिक्तत्वाभावात्  
 तत्तदाकारवृत्त्युपहितत्वं प्रमातृविशेषणत्वात्  
 प्रमातृविशेषणत्वात् रूपाकारवृत्तिदशायां  
 परिमाणाद्याकारवृत्त्यभेदः अतिव्याप्त्यः  
 अतिव्याप्त्यः नन्वेव वृत्तावव्याप्यं अनवस्थाभियां  
 वृत्तिगोचरवृत्त्यनङ्गीकृतं त

स्वाकारवृत्युपहितत्वघटितोक्तलक्षणाभावा  
 इतिस्वाकारवृत्युपहितत्वघटितोक्तलक्षण  
 अनवस्थाभिः वृत्तेर्वृत्यन्तराविषयत्वेऽपि स्वविषयत्वाभ्युपगमेन  
 स्वविषयवृत्युपहितप्रमातृचैतन्याभिन्नसत्ताकत्वस्य तत्रापि  
 एवाञ्चान्तःकरणतद्भर्मात् केवलसाक्षिविषयत्वेऽपि  
 तत्तदाकारवृत्यभ्युपगमे उक्तलक्षणं तत्रापि सत्तान्नाव्याप्तिः ।  
 चाः करणतद्भर्मात् वृत्तिविषयत्वाभ्युपगमे  
 केवलसाक्षिविषयत्वाभ्युपगमविरं वाच । वाच  
 वृत्तिं साक्षिविषयत्वं केवलसाक्षिवेद्यत्वम्  
 किन्त्विन्द्रियानुमानादिप्रमाणव्यापारमः केवलसाक्षिवेद्यत्वम्  
 किन्त्विन्द्रियानुमानादिप्रमाणव्यापारमन्तरेण साक्षिविषयत्वम्  
 अतसाक्षिविषयत्वम् एवाहङ्कारटीकायामाचार्यैरहमाकारान्तः  
 करणवृत्तिरङ्गीकृ प्रातिभासिकरजतस्थले  
 रजताकाराविद्यावृत्तिः साम्प्रदायिकैर तथाचाः  
 करणतद्भर्मादिः केवलसाक्षिवेद्येः वृत्युपहितत्वघटितलक्षणस  
 सत्त्वान्नाव्याप्तिः निर्गलितार्थः  
 स्वाकारवृत्युपहितप्रमातृचैतन्यसत्तातिरिक्तसत्ताकत्वशून  
 योग्यं विषयस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वं प्रत्यक्षत्वं त  
 संयुक्ततादात्म्यादीः सन्निकाशाः चैतन्याभिव्यञ्जकवृत्तिज  
 वृत्तिश्चतुर्विधः - निश्चयो गर्वः स्मरणम्  
 एवंविधवृत्तिभेदेन एवमा बुद्धिः अहङ्क  
 चित्तमिति चाख्याय तदुक्तं - तदुक्तं  
 मनोबुद्धिरहङ्कारश्चित्तंकरणमन्तः करणमन्तः  
 निश्चयो गर्वः स्म तं प्रत द्विविधम्  
 सविकल्पकनिर्विकल्पकं सविकल्पकनिर्विकल्पकभे  
 तं सविकल्पकं वैशिष्ट्यावगाहि ज्ञानम् ज्ञानम्  
 इत्यादिज्ञानं । इत्यादि निर्विकल्पकन्तु  
 संसर्गानवगाहि ज्ञानम् । ज्ञानम् देवदत्तं तत्त्वम्

इत्यादिवाव ज्ञानम् ज्ञानम् शाब्दमि ज्ञानम्  
 प्रत्यक्ष इन्द्रियाजन्य इन्द्रियज  
 प्रत्यक्ष तन् दूषितत्वात् किन् योग्यवर्तमानविषयकत्वे  
 प्रमाणचैतन्य विषयचैतन्याभिन्नत्वमित्युक्त  
 ।विषयचैतन्याभिन्नत्वमित्युक्त देवदत्त  
 वाक्यजन्य सन्निकृष्टविषयतया बहिर्निः सूतान्तःकरण  
 - भ्युपगमे देवदत्तवच्छिन्न वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्य  
 देवदत्त वाक्यजन्य प्रत्यक्ष ।प्रत्यक्ष  
 तत्त्वम् इत्यादिवाक्यजन्यज्ञानस्य त प्रमातुरे  
 तदुभयाभेद सत्त्व ।सत्त्व वाक्यजन्य  
 पदार्थसंसर्गविगाहितया । निर्विकल्पकत्वं निर्विकल्पकत्वं  
 उच्च वाक्यजन्यज्ञानवि पदार्थसंसर्ग तन्  
 अनभिमतसंसर्गस्यापि वाक्यजन्यज्ञानविषयत्वं किन्  
 तात्पर्यविषय ।तात्पर्यविषयत्व प्रकृत सोम्येदं  
 इत्युक्त तत्सत् आत् तत्त्वम् श्वेतकेतो  
 इत्युपसंहारे शुद्धेब्रह्म वेदान्तान तात्पर्यमवसित  
 तात्पर्याविषयं संसर्गमवबोधयेत् ।संसर्गमवबोधयेत्  
 तत्त्वम् इत्यादिवाक्यानामखण्डार्थ  
 संसर्गानवगाहियथार्थज्ञानजनकत्वमिति तदुक्त  
 संसर्गासङ्गिसम्यग्धी  
 उक्ताखण्डार्थ यद् तत्प्रातिपदिकार्थता ॥  
 प्रातिपदिकार्थमात्रपरत्वं वाऽखण्डार्थ इतिवाऽखण्डार्थत्व  
 चतुर्थपादार्थः त प्रत्यक्ष पुनर्द्विविधम् -पुनर्द्विविधम् जीवसाक्षि  
 ईश्वरसाक्षात् त अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्न चैतन्य  
 तत्साक्षी अन्तः चैतन्य चैतन्य अन्तःकर  
 विशेषणत्वोपाधित्वाभ्यामनयोर्भेद विशेषणञ्च कार्यान्वयि  
 वर्तमानं व्यावर्तकम् उपाधिश्च व्यावर्तकम् कार्यान्वयी व्यावर्तको  
 वर्तमान रूपविशिष्टोऽनित्यः इत् स

कर्णशष्कुल्यवर्ष श्रोत्रम् इत् कर्णशष्कुल्युपाधिः  
 अयमेवोपाधिर्नैयायिकैः परिचायक इत् प्रकृ  
 चान्तःकः विषयभासकत्वायोगे  
 विषयभासकचैतन्योपाधित्व ।विषयभासकचैतन्योपाधित्वम्  
 अय जीवसाक्षी प्रत्यात्मं एक चैत्रावग  
 मैत्रस्याप्यनुसन्धानप्र ईश्वरसाः चैतन्  
 ।चैतन् तच्चैव एकत्व ।एकत्व इ-  
 पुरुरू इत्यादिश्रुतौ मायाभिरिति बहुवच  
 मायागतशक्तिविशेषाभिप्राय  
 मायागतसत्त्वरजस्तमोरूपगुण प्रायतया वोपपत्ति  
 मायान्तुप्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं महेश्वर महेश्वर तरत्या  
 हृदि यस्मिन्निर्वो त विद्यात्  
 लोहितशुक्लकृष्ण वह प्रः  
 सरू ह्येक जहात्येन  
 भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्य इत्यादि श्रुतिस्मृतिषु  
 एक निश्चीयते तत  
 चैतन् ईश्वरसाक्षी चैतन् तच्चानात् तदुपाधेर्मायाया  
 अनादित्वात् ।अनादित्वात् मायावच्छि चैत परमेश्व  
 विशेषणत्वं ईश्वरत् उपाधितं साक्षित  
 इतीक्ष साक्षित्वयोर्भे धर्मिणोरीश्वरतत्साक्षिणोः ।  
 परमेश्व स्वोपाधिभूतमायानिष्ठसत्त्वरजस्तमोगुणभेदेन  
 ब्रह्माविष्णुमहेश्वरादिशब्दवा  
 ईश्वरसाक्षिणोऽनादित्वे तदैक्ष बहुस्य प्रजाये इत्या  
 सृष्टिपूर्वसमये परमेश्वरस्यागन्तुकमीक्षणम् कथमुपपद्य  
 उच विषयेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादिकारणवशेन  
 जीवोपाध्यन्तःकर वृत्तिभेद जाय  
 सृज्यमानप्राणिकर्मवशेन परमेश्वरोपाधिभूतमायाया वृत्तिविशेषाः  
 इदमिदानींसष्टव पालयितव

संहर्तव्यं संहर्तव्यमइत्याद्याकारा जाय वृत्तीः  
सादित्वात्तत्प्रतिबिम्बितचैतन सादीत्युच्यते  
साक्षिद्वैविध्ये प्रत्यक्षज्ञानद्वैविध्यम् प्रत्यक्षज्ञानद्वैविध्यम् प्रत्यक्षत्वं  
ज्ञेयगतं झप्ति निरूपितम् अनिरूपितम् त  
ज्ञप्तिगतप्रत्यक्षत्वस सामान्यलक्षा चित्त्वमेः पर्वतो वह्निमा  
वह्निमानइत्यादावा वह्न्यद्याकारवृत्त्युपहितत्वं स्वात्मांशे  
स्वप्रकाश प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । प्रत्य तत्तद्विषयाशप्रत्यक्ष  
पूर्वोक्त त भ्रान्तिरूपप्रत्यक्ष व्यापित्ः  
भ्रमप्रमासाधारणप्रत्यक्षत्वसामान्यनिर्वचनेन तस्या लक्ष  
लक्ष प्रत्यक्ष लक्ष वक्त  
पूर्वोक्तलक्षणेऽबाधितत्वं  
शुक्तिरूप्यादिभ्र संसारकालीनबाधविषयप्रातिभासिक  
रजतादिविषयकत्वेनोक्तलक्षणाभावा नातिव्याप्ति  
रजतादिविषयकत्वेनोक्तलक्षणाभावा विसंवादिप्रवृत्त्या  
भ्रान्तिज्ञातसिद्धा त  
प्रातिभासिकतत्कालोत्पन्नरजतादिविषयकत्वे प्रमाण  
देशान्तरीयरज क्लृप्तस्य तद्विषयत्वसम्भवादि  
तस्यासन्निद्ध प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वायोग । प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वायोगात्  
ज्ञानं त प्रत्यास ज्ञानस्य प्रत्यास वह्न्यादे  
प्रत्यक्षत्वापत्तौ अनुमानाद्युच्छेदापत्तेः रजतोत्पादकान  
शु रजतमुत्पद्य  
उच्च लोकसिद्धसा प्रातिभासिकरजतोत्पादिका  
किन् विलक्षणैव काचादिदिषदूषितलोचनस्य पुरोवर्ति -  
पुरोवर्ति द्रव्यसंयोगादिदमाकारा चाकचिक्याक  
काचिदन्तःकरणवृत्तिरुदेति त क इदमवच्छि  
प्रतिबिम्ब त पूर्वोक्तरीत् वृत्तेर्निर्गमनेन  
इदमवच्छिन्नचैतन्यवृ चैत प्रमातृचै चाभिन्नं  
तत प्रमातृचै भिन्नविषयचैतन्यनि शुक्ति

प्रकारिकाऽवि

चाकचिक्यादिसादृश्यसन्दर्शनसमुद्बोधितरजतसंस्कारसधीः

रजतरूपार्थाकारे

रजतज्ञाः

परिणमं

परिणामं

उपादानसमसत्ताककार्यापत्ति

विवर्तो

उपादानविषमसत्ताककार्यापत्तिः

प्रातिभासिकरजतञ्जाविद्यापेक्षया

परिणाम

चैतन्यापेक्षयाविव

चोच

अविद्यापरिणामरूप

तद्रजतमविद्याधिष्ठ

इदमवच्छि

वर्तते अस्म

सर्वस्यापि कार्यर

स्वोपादानाविद्याधिष्ठानाश्रितत्वनियम

।स्वोपादानाविद्याधिष्ठानाश्रितत्वनियमा

चैतन्यनिष्ठर

रजतमितिपुरवर्तिना तादात्म

।तादात्म उच

न्यायमं आत्मनिष्ठ

शरीरनिष्ठत्वेनोपा

शरीर

सुखाद्यधिकरणतावच्छेदकत्व

सुखाद्यधिकरणतावच्छेदकत्व

चैतन्य

प्रत्यनधिष्ठान

इदमवच्छिन्नचैतन्य

तदधिष्ठान

इदमोऽवच्छेदकत्

रजत

पुरोवर्तिसंसर्गप्रत्यय उपपद्य

त

विषयचैतन्यस्य

तदन्तःकरणोपहि

चैतन्याभिन्नत

विषयचैतन्येऽध्यस्तम्

साक्षिण

केवलसाक्षिवे

सुखादिवदनन्यवेद्यमिति चोच

साक्षिण्यध

तद्वा

प्रत्यय स्यात् स्यात्आ

उच

सुखादीनामन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नचैतन्यनिष्ठा विद्याकार्यत्वप्रयुक्

ज्ञानम् सुखादीनांज्ञानम्

घटादिवच्छुद्धचै

एवाध्यासात् ।एवाध्यासात्

किन् य

यदाकारानुभवाहितसंस्कारसहकृताविद्याकार

त

तदाकारानुभवविषयत् इत्येवानु

इदमाकारानुभवाहितसंस्कारसहिताविद्याकार्यत्वा

रिदमाकारानुभवविषयत

सहकृताविद्याकार्यत्वादन्तःकरणादेरहमाकारानुभवविषयत्वम्  
शरीरेन्द्रियादेरुभयविधानुभवसंस्कारसहिताविद्याकार्य  
दुभयविधानुभवविषयत् ।दुभयविधानुभवविषयत्  
मनु

ब्राह्मणः च१ श्रोत्रम प्रकृ  
प्रातिभासिकरजतस्य प्रमातृचैतन्याभिन्नेदमवच्छिन्नं  
निष्ठाविद्याकार्यत्वेऽपि इदं सत्यस्थलीयेदमाव  
नुभवाहितसंस्कारजन्यत्वाद्दिदमाकारानुभववि  
रजतमइत्यहमाकारानुभवविषय इत्यनुसन्  
।इत्यनुसन् नन्वेवम मिथ्यारजत साक्षात्  
साक्षिसम्बन्धित साक्षात् भानसम  
रजतगोचरज्ञानाभासरू अविद्यावृत्तेरभ्युपगमः किमर्थमिति  
उच

स्वगोचरवृत्त्युपहितप्रमातृचैतन्यभिन्नसत्ताकत्वात्  
विषयापरोक्षत्वरूपत रजतस्यापरोक्षसिद्ध तदभ्युपगम  
।तदभ्युपगम नन्विदंवृत्ते रजताकारवृत्ते  
प्रत्येकमेकैकविषयत गुरुमतवर्द्धि ज्ञानानप्युप  
भ्रमज्ञानासिद्धिरि वृत्तिद्व प्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यसं  
सत्यमिथ्यावस्तुतादात्म्यावगा भ्रमत्वस्व  
।भ्रमत्वस्वी साक्षिज्ञान सत्यासत्यविषय  
प्रामाण्यानियमादप्रामाण्योक्तिः साम्प्रदायिकाना  
साम्प्रदायिकाना सिद्धान  
देशान्तरीयरजतमप्यविद्याकार्यमध्यस्तञ्चेति शुक्तिरू  
वैलक्ष इतिवैलक्ष त्वन्म  
सत्यत्वाविशेषेऽपि केषाञ्चित् क्षणिक केषाञ्चित्  
क्षणिकत्वंकेषाञ्चित् स्थायित्व केषाञ्चित् स्थायित्व इ

स्वभावविशेषाः यद् घटाद्यध्य  
 अविद्यै दोषत्वं शुक्तिरूपाद्यध्या  
 तथाचागन्तुकदोषजन्यं प्रातिभासिकत्वे प्रयोजक  
 ।प्रयोजक  
 स्वप्नोपलब्धरथादीनामागन्तुकनिद्रादोष  
 स्वप्नोपलब्धरथादीनामागन्तु निद्रादोषजन्यत्वा  
 प्रातिभासिकत्वम् ।प्रातिभासिकत्वम् स्वप्न  
 पूर्वानुभूतरथादेः स्मरणमात्रेण व्यवहारोपरं  
 रथादिसृष्टिकल्पना  
 स्मृतिमात्राभ्युपगमे पश्याः स्वप्ने रथमद्रा  
 मद्राक्ष्यमइत्याद्यनुभवविरोधः  
 २ रथादिसृष्टिप्रतिपादकश्रुति विरोधापत्ते  
 तस्मिन् शुक्तिरूप्यवत् शुक्तिरू  
 स्वप्नोपलब्धरथादयोऽपि शुक्तिरू प्रातिभासिका  
 यावत्प्रातिभासमवतिष्ठन्ते स्वप्ने  
 रथाद्यधिष्ठानतयोपलभ्यमानदेशविशेषस्या तदाऽसन्निकृष्टतया  
 अनिर्वचनीयप्रातिभासिकदेशोऽभ्युपगम्यत्वा रथाद्यध्य  
 कु चैतन्यस्य स्वयंप्रद रथाद्यधिष्ठानत्वा  
 रथाद्यधिष्ठानत्वा प्रतीयमा रथाद्यस्तीत्येत् प्रतीय सद्रूपे  
 प्रकाशः चैतन्यमेवाधिष्ठानम् चैतन्यमेवाधिष्ठान-  
 चिदध्य प्रातिभासिकः  
 रथादाविन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वमपि प्रातिभासिकम्  
 सर्वेन्द्रियाणामुपरमात् सर्वेन्द्रियाणामुपरमात्  
 इत्यादिप्रतीत्यापादनन्तु पूर्ववन्निरसनीयम् पूर्ववन्निरसनीय  
 स्वप्नरथ साक्षान्मायापरिणामा  
 अन्तःकरण तत्परिण इत्य-  
 शुद्धचैतन्याध्यस तत्साक्षात्काराभावेनजागरणेऽपि  
 स्वप्नोपलब्धरथादयोऽनुव ।स्वप्नोपलब्धरथादयोऽनुवर्ते

उच्च कार्यविनाशो द्विविधः का कश्चि  
 विद्यमानएवोपादाने आद्वितीय निवृत्तिः । आद्य  
 कारणमधिष्ठानतत्त्वसाक्षादविद्या  
 अनिवृत्तेः द्वितीय विरोधिवृत्त्युत्पत्तिर्दोषनिवृत्तिव  
 ब्रह्मसाक्षात्काराभावात् स्वप्नप्रपञ्च ब्रह्मसाक्षात्काराभावात्  
 बाधिष्ठ मुसलप्रहारे घटादेरित् विरोधिप्रत्ययान्तरोदयेन  
 स्वजनकीभूतनिद्रादिदोषनाः रथादिनिवृत्तौ  
 शक्तिरूप्यस्य शुक्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यनिष्ठतू  
 कार्यत्वं शक्तिरितिज्ञा तदज्ञाने रजत  
 मूलाविद्याकार्यत्वपक्षे मूलाविद्याय  
 ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारमात्रनिवर्त्यतया रजत त  
 शक्तिज्ञानान्निवृत्तिमात्रम् मु प्रहारे घटस्य शु  
 रजत प्रतिभाससमये प्रातिभासिकसत्ताभ्युपगमे :  
 त्रैकालिकनिषेधज्ञानं न स्यात् किन्  
 स्यात् श्याम्  
 त रजतत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभावो  
 किन् लौकिकपारमार्थिकत्वावच्छिन्न  
 प्रातिभासिकरजतप्रतियोगिताकः  
 व्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभावाभ्युपगमात्  
 व्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिता भावाभ्युपगमा  
 प्रातिभासिके र पारमार्थिकत्वमवगतं :  
 प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नरजतस्त्वज्ञानाभाव  
 प्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तिर् अवगमेऽपरोक्षावभासस्य  
 तत्कालीनविषयसत्तानियतत्वं  
 पारमार्थिकत्वमप्यनिर्वचनीयं रजतदेवोत्पन्नमिति  
 तदवच्छिन्नर तदवच्छिन्नाभावस्य वर्तत  
 पारमार्थिकत्वस्याधिष्ठाननिष्ठस्य प्रतिभाससम्भ  
 रजतनिष्ठपारमार्थिकत्वोत्पत्त्यनभ्युपग

।रजतनिष्ठपारमार्थिकत्वोत्पत्त्यनभ्युपगमात् यत्रा मसन्निकृष्ट  
 तत्रै प्रातिभासिकवस्तुत्पत्तेरङ्गीकारात्  
 ।प्रातिभासिकवस्तुत्पत्तेरङ्गीकारात् ; इन्द्रियसन्निकृष्ट  
 जवाकुसुमगतलौहित्यस्य स्फटि भानसम्भट  
 स्फटिकेऽनिर्वचनीयलौहित्योत्पत्तिः नन् य  
 द्रव्यान्तरव्यवधानादसन्निकृष्टं त्र लौहित्यप्रतीत्या प्रातिभासिकं  
 लौहित स्वीक्रियतामिति इष्ट इष्टत्व  
 प्रत्यक्षभ्रमान्तरेष्वपिप्रत्यक्षसामा  
 यथार्थप्रत्यक्षलक्षणासद्दर्शनीयः उ प्रत्यक्ष  
 प्रकारान्तरेण द्विविधम् -द्विविधम् इन्द्रियज तदज  
 तत्रेन्द्रियाज सुखादित्रय इन्द्रियत्वनिराकर  
 ।इन्द्रियत्वनिराकरणात् इन्द्रियाणि प  
 घ्राणरसनचक्षुःश्रोत्रत्वगात्मकानि । सर्वाणि चेन्द्रियाणि  
 स्वस्वविषयसंयुक्त प्रत्यक्षज्ञ जनयन्ति त  
 घ्राणरसनत्वगिन्द्रियाणि स स्थानस्थितान्  
 गन्धरसस्पर्शोप जनयन्ति स्पर्शोपलम्भान् चक्षुःश्रोत्रेः स  
 गत् स्वस्वदि गृह्णी श्रोत्रस्यापि चक्षुरादिवत्  
 परिच्छिन्नतयाभेयादिदेशगमनसम्भवात्  
 ।परिच्छिन्नतयाभेयादिदेशगमनसम्भवात्  
 भेरीशः श्रुतः वीचितरङ्गादिन्यायेन  
 कर्णशष्कुलीप्रदेशेऽनन्तशब्दोत्पत्तिकल्पनायां गौ भेरीशः  
 श्रुतः प्रत्यक्षर भ्रमत्वकल्पना स्यात् ।स्यात्  
 व्याख्या प्रत्यक्षम् ।प्रत्यक्ष वेदान्तपरिभष  
 प्रत्यक्षपरिच्छे

## **Valid knowledge and its means**

Valid knowledge (prama) is defined as that knowledge which has for its object something that is not already known and is uncontradicted (anadhigata-abaadhita-arthavishayaka-jnaanam). The qualification 'something that is not already known' is meant to exclude recollection. The word 'un-contradicted' excludes illusion or error, as when a rope is mistaken for a snake.

The Mimamsakas hold that time is also cognised through the organs of sense. Thus, when an object is seen, the cognition is connected with the moment when it is seen. As a result, when an object is seen continuously for several moments, the cognition at each moment is considered to be different from the cognition of the same object at the previous or next moment. In this view, the cognition at each moment is a new cognition and so the qualification 'something that is not already known' applies and the definition is applicable. According to Vedanta, however, a continuous cognition for several moments is one single cognition. The knowledge of a pot, for example, is Consciousness reflected in the mental modification (vritti) in the form of the pot and this is just one throughout the time the same pot continues to be seen. In this view also the definition applies.

Objection: According to Advaita Vedanta, all objects such as pot are unreal, being 'mithya', and so the knowledge of the pot is contradicted and it cannot be valid knowledge. Answer: It is only after the realisation of Brahman that the pot is contradicted. In the above definition,

'uncontradicted' means 'not contradicted during the transmigratory state'.

## **Perception as a means of knowledge**

Valid perceptual knowledge is nothing but Pure Consciousness.

Objection: Consciousness is without a beginning; i.e. it is eternal. So why should it need the eye, etc as an instrument to produce it?

Answer: Although Consciousness is eternal, the vritti that reveals it arises only through the contact of the organ with the object. It is Consciousness reflected in the vritti that is spoken of as having a beginning. The vritti is figuratively designated as knowledge (though it is by itself insentient).

The mind is a substance with a beginning and so it has parts. The knowledge which is a mental modification (vritti) is an attribute of the mind, just as desire, etc are. See Br.up. 1.5.3-- "Desire, resolve, --- all these are but the mind".

Though desire, etc are attributes of the mind, they are wrongly thought to be attributes of the self, in the same way as it is said that a hot iron rod 'burns' when it is really the fire that burns. The false identification of the self with the mind is the reason for considering desire, happiness, etc as attributes of the self.

According to the author of Vedanta Paribhasha the mind is not an organ. (However, in the Bhashya on Brahmasutra, 2.4.17, Sri Sankara says:-- In the Smriti the

organs are counted as eleven, and hence the mind also is accepted to be an organ like those of hearing, etc. The Smriti referred to here is Bhagavad gita, 13.5, second line. In the Bhashya on this it is said, "The five organs, ear etc., which are called the sense organs and the five organs which accomplish actions, and the mind, the eleventh". According to Vivarana, the mind is not an indriya, but according to Bhamati it is an indriya).

Objection: If the mind is not considered as an indriya, the perception of happiness, etc, which is produced by the mind, and not by any of the other sense-organ such as the eye, cannot be considered to be immediate (sakshat), because only perceptions produced by an indriya can be accepted as immediate.

Answer: No, because the immediacy of knowledge does not depend on its being produced by an indriya. If it is contended that only knowledge produced by an indriya is immediate, it would mean that God's knowledge, which is not produced by any indriya, is not immediate, and God would never have any perceptual knowledge. On the other hand, if all knowledge produced by an indriya is considered as immediate, and the mind is considered as an indriya, then inference, which is produced by the mind, would also have to be accepted as immediate, which is not acceptable to any one.

## **Perceptual knowledge**

Perceptual knowledge (pratyaksha jnanam) arises when the Consciousness limited by the mental mode (pramana chaitanyam) coincides with the Consciousness limited by the object. In perception the Consciousness becomes three

fold-- (1) Consciousness limited by the object (prameya-chaitanyam), (2) Consciousness limited by the mental mode (vritti) (pramana-chaitanyam) and (3) Consciousness limited by the mind (pramatr-chaitanyam).

The process of visual perception, according to Advaita Vedanta , is described in chapter 1 of Vedanta Paribhashathus. Just as the water in a tank, issuing through a hole, enters, through a channel, a number of fields and assumes the shapes of those fields, so also the luminous mind, stretching out through the eye, goes to the space occupied by objects and becomes modified into the forms of those objects. Such a modification is called a vritti of the mind. The same fact is also stated in Panchadasi, 4.27, 28 and 29, based on Sri Sankara's Upadesasahasri, Metrical portion, chapter 14, verses 3 &4. The whole process of visual perception consists of the following steps:--

(1) The mind stretches out through the eye, reaches the object and takes the form of the object. This is called a vritti or mode of the mind.

(2) The mental mode removes the veil of ignorance that hides the object.

(3) Consciousness underlying the object, being manifest through the mental mode, illumines the object.

(4) The mental mode associates the object-consciousness with the subject-consciousness.

(5) The subject perceives the object.

Consciousness manifest through the mental mode coincident with the object serves as the knowledge of the object. This is known as phala (fruit), being the resultant knowledge.

The mind has three main divisions in this process, namely,

- (1) the part within the body,
- (2) the part that extends from the body to the object perceived,
- (3) the part that coincides with the object.

The first part above is known as pramaataa and the consciousness manifest in it is called pramaata-chaitanya. This is the perceiver. The consciousness manifest in the second part is called pramaana-chaitanya, or the means of knowledge. The consciousness manifest in the third part is pramiti-chaitanya or percept.

The object perceived is called prameya. Since the third part of the mind mentioned above coincides with the object, prameya-chaitanya, the consciousness underlying the object and pramiti-chaitanya become identical. The point to be kept in mind here is that all objects in this world are superimposed on Consciousness, i.e. Brahman. All objects are covered by a veil of ignorance, which has to be removed for seeing the object. It is only consciousness that reveals the objects, since the objects themselves are non-luminous.

The object perceived is but the underlying consciousness manifest or appearing as such. It has no existence apart from the all-pervading Consciousness. That all-pervading

Consciousness (Brahma-chaitanya) which underlies the object known, that is to say, to be known, becomes manifest as the object known".

(This matter is dealt with in great detail in Panchadasi, chapter VIII- Kutastha dipa.) In the case of feelings such as happiness, since the Consciousness limited by happiness, etc., coincides with the Consciousness limited by the vritti in the form of happiness, the knowledge in the form 'I am happy' is also a perception (pratyakshajnanam).

Objection: In that case, recollection of past happiness would also have to be considered as pratyaksha.

Answer: No; the two limiting adjuncts, the vritti in the form of recollection and the vritti in the form of past happiness, belong to different times and so they cannot coincide. The criterion is that the two limiting adjuncts must occupy the same space at the same time.

Though punya and papa are also attributes of the mind, they are, by nature, incapable of being perceived. Capability of being perceived is another criterion. The knowledge in the form 'the hill has fire' is pratyaksha in respect of the hill and anumana in respect of fire. Knowledge such as 'this is a fragrant piece of sandal' is aparoksham (immediate) in respect of the sandal, but paroksham (mediate) in respect of the fragrance. According to Nyaya, such a knowledge is called jnanalakshana pratyaksha (See Bhasha-Pariccheda- sl. 65).

(Nyaya recognises ordinary (laukika) and extra-ordinary (alaukika) perception. Ordinary or laukika perception is of two kinds- (1) internal (maanasa), where the mind comes into contact with psychical states and processes like cognition, affection, conation, desire, pain, pleasure, aversion, etc; and (2) external perception in which the five external organs of sense come into contact with external objects.

Extra-ordinary oralaukika perception is of three kinds-- samanyalakshana, jnanalakshana and yogaja. The first is the perception of the universals. Whenever we perceive a particular cow we first perceive the 'universal cowness' inhering in it.

Jnanalakshana is the 'complicated perception through association'. For example, I see a blooming rose at a distance and say, "I see a fragrant rose". Here the visual perception of the rose revives in memory, by association, the idea of fragrance, which was perceived in the past through the nose. It is perception revived in memory through the cognition (jnana) of the object in the past. Other examples are-'the piece of sandalwood looks fragrant', 'ice looks cold', etc. The theory of anyathakhyati is based on this kind of perception. Anyatha means 'otherwise' and 'elsewhere'. The shell and the silver are both separately real; only their synthesis is unreal. The shell is directly present as 'this' while the silver exists elsewhere and is revived in memory through jnanalakshana perception. Yogaja is the perception of all objects, past, present, etc, through yogic power.) Ageneric attribute (jati) is a distinct category according to Nyaya and is defined as "that which is eternal and inherent

in many things", for example, jarhood (ghatatva). Vedanta does not accept such generic attributes. According to Vedanta, jarhood is the sum total of the characteristics of a jar, which distinguishes it from other things. It is not eternal. These characteristics are just attributes.

According to Nyaya, inherence (samavaya) is eternal relation. It is the relation between the whole and parts, jati and vyakti, qualities or actions and the substances possessing them, and ultimate difference (visesha) and the eternal substances-- atoms, ether, time, space, etc. Vedanta denies inherence and substitutes tadatmya, or difference-cum- identity,

Knowledge that is limited by mental modifications in the form of particular objects is a perception in respect of such knowledge, when it is not different from the Consciousness limited by objects that are present and are capable of being apprehended by particular organs. This is a comprehensive statement about the criterion of perceptuality of knowledge.

## **The perceptuality of objects**

The perceptuality of objects such as a jar (which are superimposed on the Consciousness limited by them), consists in their not being different from the Consciousness associated with the subject (pramaata-chaitanyam).

But in the case of inference, etc, since the mind does not go out to the space covered by the fire, etc, the Consciousness limited by the fire is not one with the Consciousness associated with the subject, and therefore

the existence of the fire, etc, is distinct from that of the subject. So the definition of perception does not wrongly extend to such cases.

In the case of an inference regarding righteousness and unrighteousness, though the Consciousness limited by them is not distinct from the Consciousness associated with the subject, they cannot become pratyaksha because they are not capable of being perceived.

Being cognised by the witness alone (kevalasakshivedyatvam) does not mean that they are objects of the witness without the presence of the mental modifications corresponding to them, but that they are objects of the witness without the activity of pramanas such as the sense-organs and inference. Hence Prakasatmayati has, in Vivarana, admitted a mental modification in the form of the ego-- ahamakara-vritti. So also, in the case of an illusory piece of silver, a vritti of nescience in the form of silver (rajata-akara-avidya-vritti) has been admitted in works such as Samkshepa-sariraka. The illusory silver is 'sakshi-bhasyam', cognised by the witness-self, since the mental modification is not of the vyavaharika mind, but is a vritti of avidya. (See page 22 of commentary by Abhyankar on Siddhantabindu). Thus, an object is said to be cognised by perception when it is capable of being perceived and is devoid of any existence apart from that of the Consciousness associated with the subject, which Consciousness has for its limiting adjunct a mental modification in the form of that object.

Samyoga - conjunction - when a sense-organ is in contact with a substance such as a pot. This is called samyoga in Nyaya also.

Samyukta-tadatmya- contact of organ with qualities and other attributes of substances, such as the colour of a pot. Here the organ is connected with the pot and the colour, according to Vedanta, is identical with the pot. This is called samyukta-samavaya in Nyaya.

Sound is a quality of ether and is therefore identical with it.

Sabdatva is identical with sound, which is identical with ether.

In Nyaya the conjunction of organs with objects which causes perception is of six kinds:--  
Samyoga - contact of a pot by the eye.

Samyukta-samavaya - in the perception of colour of the pot.

Samyukta-samaveta-samavaya- the perception of the universal genus such as rupa, colourness. In Vedanta this is called samyukta-abhinna-tadatmya.  
Samavaya - the hearing of sound by the organ of hearing, which is the ether in the cavity of the ear. Sound is a quality of ether and quality and the qualified are connected by samavaya.

Samaveta-samavaya - the contact in cognising soundness.

Viseshana-viseshya-bhava-sannikarsha- the conjunction in the perception of negation, as in the cognition: ghata-abhavavad-bhutam.

Vedanta denies the relation of viseshya-viseshana-bhava admitted by Nyaya, as in the sentence "The ground has no jar". For tadatmya Nyaya substitutes samavaya or inherence.

In Nyaya also, sound is a quality of ether. Since qualities inhere in substances, they cannot be perceived apart from the latter, except in the case of sound, which, though a quality, is perceived by itself.

According to Bhatta Mimamsa, however, sound is a substance.

Savikalpaka-pratyaksham- determinate perception, is that knowledge which apprehends relatedness (of the substantive and the qualifying attribute) (vaisishtya), such as, "I know the jar". (Here there is the relation of subject and object). In Nyaya determinate perception is cognition which involves an attribute or an adjunct, such as "This is a Brahmana", "This is black", "This is a cook". See page 163 of A Primer of Indian Logic by Prof. S. Kuppaswami Sastri).

Nirvikalpaka-pratyaksha - indeterminate perception, is that knowledge that does not apprehend this relatedness; for example, knowledge arising from sentences like, "This is that Devadatta" or "Thou art That". In these cases the knowledge arises by ignoring the particular features of 'This' and 'Devadatta' or 'Thou' and 'That'. In Nyaya indeterminate perception is a cognition which does not involve any attribute or adjunct (prakara).

The criterion of perception is not the fact of its being due to an organ. The criterion is the fact of the Consciousness associated with the means of knowledge not being different from the Consciousness associated with the object, when the object is present and is capable of being perceived, i.e., the identity of pramana-chaitanya and prameya-chaitanya.

Hence the knowledge arising from the sentence "Thou art That" is pratyaksha, because the subject itself being the object, the condition about the identity of the Consciousness limited by That and that limited by Thou is satisfied.

There is a difference between perceptuality of cognition and perceptuality of objects. In the inference, 'The hill has fire, because it has smoke', both the hill and the smoke are objects of perception, but not the fire, which is inferred. Hence, if the perception is considered only with regard to the objects, then the knowledge of the fire would not be a perception. But if perceptuality is considered in respect of the cognition, the cognition of fire is a case of perception, since all knowledge is perceptual in respect of itself in Vedanta.

## **Dream Perception**

Consciousness, which is self-effulgent, is the sub-stratum of the chariot, etc, seen in dream. They are experienced as existent; hence it is Consciousness manifesting itself as Existence that is the substratum.

Some hold that the chariot, etc, seen in dream are direct transformations of Maya; others that they are its transformations through the medium of the mind

### **.Two fold destruction of effects**

The destruction of an effect is of two kinds. In one the destruction is together with that of the material cause, and in the other the material cause remains intact. The first is nullification or badha and the second is cessation or nivrtti. The cause of the first is the realisation of the truth of the substratum, Brahman for, without that, nescience, which is the material cause, is not removed. The cause of the second is the rise of a contrary mental modification, or the removal of defects. Hence, although on waking up the world conjured up in dream may not be nullified, i.e., destroyed with its material cause, nescience, in the absence of realisation of Brahman, yet, like the cessation of a pot by the blow of a club, the cessation of the chariot seen in dream occurs as a result of a contrary cognition, or through the removal of the defect of sleep.

Thus, according to the view that the silver seen in a nacre is an effect of the subsidiary nescience abiding in the Consciousness limited by the nacre, there is nullification of the silver together with the nescience regarding the nacre by the knowledge that the apparent silver is only nacre. Nevertheless, according to the view that the silver is an effect of the primal nescience, since the latter is destroyed only by the realisation of Brahman, there is just a cessation of the silver through the knowledge that it is a nacre-- as in the case of the destruction of a pot through the blow of a club.

## **Perception through or without an organ**

The perception of happiness, etc, is not due to an organ, since the mind is not considered as an organ. The nose, tongue and skin generate cognitions of smell, taste and touch, just remaining at their seats, while the eye and ear apprehend their objects by themselves reaching the spot occupied by the objects.

According to Nyaya, the cognition 'This is a jar is manifested by a subsequent reflective knowledge (anuvyavasaya) in the form of 'I have the knowledge of the jar'. But according to Bhatta Mimamsa, the knowledge of the jar is known by inference. When the jar is known it acquires the quality of 'knownness' (jnaatataa), which is observable. By perceiving this mark of 'knownness' in the jar one infers one's antecedent knowledge of the jar. Thus, while the jar is known directly, its knowledge is known indirectly, by inference. Both Bhatta and Nyaya hold the theory known as paratah-prakasa-vada, according to which the manifestation of a particular knowledge does not rest on itself, but on another knowledge. Vedanta rejects both the above views. If knowledge is not self-manifest, if one knowledge depends on another for its manifestation, then the second would depend on a third, and so on, ad infinitum.

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