

***INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL
TRADITIONS: THEORIES
AND CONCEPTS***

(SKT1 C04)

I SEMESTER

CORE COURSE

M.A. SANSKRIT GENERAL

(2019 Admission onwards)



UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT

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UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT

School of Distance Education

Study Material

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INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS: THEORIES AND CONCEPTS

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First Semester MA General 2019 Admission

SKT 1CO4 : Indian Philosophical Traditions: Theories and Concepts

Theories and Concepts Answers should be written either in English or in Sanskrit. In writing Sanskrit, Devanagari script should be used. Number of Credits : 5 Instructional Hours 6/weeks Weightage: 30

Unit 1:

Epistemology - Pramāṇas in major philosophical systems-based on Nyāya model - The nature and concept of Jñāna - essentially focusing on Mīmāṃsā, Advaita Vedanta and Buddhist systems Epistemology of Jainism: Nature of knowledge – kinds of knowledge – Nayavāda – Syādvāda. – Means of Valid knowledge in Nyāya – Vaiśeṣika -Definition and classification of knowledge, Pramāṇas: Pratyakṣa, Nirvikalpa and Savikalpa, Laukika and Alaukika Anumāna: Definition and nature of anumāna, vyāpti, svārthānumāna and 8 parārthānumāna, hetvābhāsa-kinds- Śābda: Classifications of śābda, kinds of śābda, Upamāna(Comparison)-theory of valid knowledge and theory of error. -Pūrvamīmāṃsā-The sources of knowledge- theory of truth and error svataḥpramāṇyavāda - Pramāṇas: Prabhākara and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, major points of difference- self and knowledge- nature of reality- concept of Dharma. -Advaita Vedanta of Śaṅkara: Reality of atman- brahman as the ultimate realitydoctrine of Māyā- phenomenal world- levels of reality- Vivarttavāda-

individual self, jīva and sākṣin- knowledge and liberation. - Theory of Knowledge, and theory of error according to different systems.

Unit II:

Ontology - Ontology in Nyāya Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya Yoga systems of thoughts. - Ontology in Advaita Vedānta.

Essential Reading :

1. Outlines of Indian Philosophy - Hiriyanna, MLBD; Fifth Reprint edition, 2014.
2. A Critical survey of Indian Philosophy, Chandradhar Sarma, MLBD, Delhi, 2003
3. Mīmāṃsā: The Ancient Indian Science of Sentence Interpretation: G.V Devasthali, Sri Garibdas Oriental Series No: 123, Sri Sadguru Publications, Delhi, 1991.
4. Epistemology, Logic and Grammar (Analysis of Sentence Meaning) Vol. II, Dr. V.P Bhatta, Eastern Book Linkers, 1992. Additional Reading: 1. Indian Philosophy, Vol I & II, Jadunath Sinha, MLBD, 2006 2. A History of Indian Philosophy, 5 Vols, Dasgupta, S.N., MLBD, New Delhi. 1988 3. Essentials of Indian Philosophy, Hiriyanna, MLBD, Delhi, 2015. 4. Buddhism and World Culture, (Ed.) Samiran Chandra Chakravarty, School of Vedic Studies, Ravindra Bharati University, 1998.

5. Buddhism, Mrs. Rhys Davis, Williams And Norgate, London, 1870.
6. From early Vedanta to Kashmir Saivism, Isayeva, Nataliya, Sri Satguru Publications, A Division of Indian Books Centre, Delhi, 1997.
7. Abhinavagupta: A Historical & Philosophical Study, K.C Pandey, Chaukhamba Amarabharati Prakasan, Varanasi, 2000.
8. An Introduction to the Advaita Saiva Philosophy of Kashmir, Debabrata Sen Sharma, Indica Books, Varanasi, 2009.
9. Pratyabhijñāvimarśinī, K.C Pandey, Sampurnananda Sanskrit University, Varanasi, 1998.
10. Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā of Utpaladeva- Verses on the Recognition of the Lord, Pandit, B.N., Muktabodha Indological Research Institute, New Delhi, 2004.
11. Kashmir Shaivism: The Secret Supreme, Swami Lakshman Joo, Ishwar Ashram Trust, 2016
12. Indian Philosophy, Vol. I & II, Dr. S Radhakrishnan, Blacki and Son Publishers (P) Ltd., Bombay, 1977. (Pvt) Ltd., New Delhi, 2002. Prakasan, Varanasi, 1982.
13. The Philosophy of Language in Classical Indian Tradition, K. S Prasad, Decent Books, New Delhi, 2002.

Unit 1

Epistemology - Pramāṇas in major philosophical systems-based on Nyāya model - The nature and concept of Jñāna - essentially focusing on Mīmāṃsā, Advaita Vedanta and Buddhist systems Epistemology of Jainism: Nature of knowledge – kinds of knowledge – Nayavāda – Syādvāda. – Means of Valid knowledge in Nyāya – Vaiśeṣika -Definition and classification of knowledge, Pramāṇas: Pratyakṣa, Nirvikalpa and Savikalpa, Laukika and Alaukika Anumāna: Definition and nature of anumāna, vyāpti, svārthānumāna and 8 parārthānumāna, hetvābhāsa-kinds- Śābda: Classifications of śābda, kinds of śābda, Upamāna (Comparison)-theory of valid knowledge and theory of error. -Pūrvamīmāṃsā-The sources of knowledge- theory of truth and error svataḥprāmāṇyavāda - Pramāṇas: Prabhākara and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, major points of difference- self and knowledge- nature of reality- concept of Dharma. -Advaita Vedanta of Śaṅkara: Reality of atman- Brahman as the ultimate realitydoctrine of Māyā- phenomenal world- levels of reality- Vivarttavāda-individual self, jīva and sākṣin- knowledge and liberation. - Theory of Knowledge, and theory of error according to different systems.

Epistemology - Pramāṇas in major philosophical systems- based on Nyāya model

Introduction

Indian philosophy is intensely spiritual and emphasizes the need of practical realization of truth. As philosophy aims at knowledge of truth, it is termed in Indian literature, ‘the vision of truth’ (dars’ana). The word ‘dars’ana’ means ‘vision’ and also the ‘instrument of vision’. It stands for the direct, immediate and intuitive vision of Reality, the actual perception of Truth, and also includes the means which lead to this realization. ‘See the Self’ is the keynote of all schools of Indian Philosophy.

The schools or systems of Indian philosophy are divided into two broad classes, namely, orthodox (astika, Vedic) and heterodox (nastika, Non-Vedic). To the first group belong the six chief philosophical systems (popularly known as sad-darsana), namely, Mimamsa, Vedanta, Sankhya, Yoga, Nyaya and Vaisesika. These are regarded as orthodox (astika), not because they believe in God, but because they accept the authority of the Vedas. The Mimamsa and the Sankhya do not believe in God as the creator of the world, yet they are called orthodox (astika), because they believe in the authoritativeness of the Vedas. Under the other class of Heterodox systems, the chief three are the schools of the Materialists like the Carvakas, the Bauddhas and the Jains. They are called heterodox because they do not believe in the authority of the Vedas.

Indian thought has been concerned with various philosophical problems, significant among which are the nature of the world (cosmology), the nature of reality (metaphysics), logic, the nature of knowledge (epistemology), ethics, and the philosophy of religion. Indian epistemology or the theory of knowledge attempts to provide a rational basis for an intelligible discourse on matters of common, everyday experience, on the one hand, and in concentrating on the subject of cognition, it attempts to offer insights into the real, that is, essential, nature of this subject, the being who cognizes. In this sense, the concern with epistemology in Indian philosophy may be said to represent a philosophy of being and knowing involving, thereby, the metaphysical concern implicit in epistemology, where the subject-object distinction in the case of a knowledge of the subject breaks down.

Epistemology is a branch of philosophy that is concerned with various theories of knowledge. It enquires into the origin of knowledge and the conditions of its validity. The Indian epistemological tradition comprises six important sources of knowledge. They are: perception (pratyaksa), inference (anumana), verbal testimony (Sabda), comparison (upamana), presupposition (arthapatti) and nonapprehension (anupalabdhi).

The Nyāya School is founded by the sage Gotama. He is familiarized as 'Aksapāda'. Nyāya means correct thinking with proper arguments and valid reasoning. Thus, Nyāya philosophy is known as tarkashāstra (the science of reasoning); pramānashāstra (the science of logic and epistemology); hetuvidyā (the science of causes); vādaavidyā

(the science of debate); and anviksiki (the science of critical study). The Nyāya philosophy as a practitioner and believer of realism seeks for acquiring knowledge of reality.

Nyaya philosophy accepts four Pramanas that is Perception, inference, comparison or analogy and verbal testimony are the four kinds of valid knowledge.

Perception

Gotama defines perception as ‘non-erroneous cognition which is produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects, which is not associated with a name and which is well-defined. This definition of perception excludes divine and yogic perception which is not generated by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects. Perception is a kind of knowledge and it’s the attribute of the self. Ordinary perception presupposes the sense-organs, the objects, the manas and the self and their mutual contacts. The self comes into contact with the manas, the manas with the senseorgans and the sense organs with the objects. The Naiyayika maintains two stages in perception. The first is called indeterminate or nirvikalpa the second, determinate or savikalpa. They are not two different kinds of perception, but only the earlier and the later stages in the same complex process of perception quoted above. Perception is ‘unassociated with a name’ which means ‘determinate’ and it is “well-defind” which means determinate. Perception, again, may be ordinary (laukika) and extra ordinary (alaukika) when the sense- organs come into contact with the objects present to them in the usual way, we have laukika perception. And if the contact of the sense-organs with the objects is in an unusual

way, i.e, if the objects are not ordinarily present to the senses but are conveyed to them through an extra ordinary medium, we have Alaukika perception. Ordinary perception is of two kinds-internal and external. In internal perception, the mind which is the internal organ comes into contact with the psychical states and process like cognition, affection, conation, desire, pain, pleasure, aversion etc. external perception takes place when the five external organs of sense came into contact with the external objects. It is of five kinds- Visual, auditory, tactual, quotatiory and of factory, brought about by the sense-organs sight, sound, touch, taste and smell respectively when they come into contact with the external objects. Extra ordinary perception is of three kinds-samanya laksana, jnana laksana and yogaja. Samanyalaksana perception is the perception of the Universals. An individual belongs to a particular class because the universal of that class in hires in it. Thus a cow becomes a cow because it has the universal cowness inhering in it. We perceive particular cows but we do not perceive a universal cow. Hence the Nyaya maintains that the universals are perceived extraordinarily. Jnanalaksana perception is the ‘complicated’ perception through association. Here an object is not directly presented to a sense-organ, but is revived in memory through the past cognition of it and is perceived through representation for example, I look at a blooming rose from a distance and say. I see a fragrant rose’. Here the visual perception of the rose revives in memory the idea of fragrance by association which was perceived in the past through the nose. Yogaya perception is the intuitive and immediate perception of all objects, past, present & future, possessed by the yogina through the power of meditation.

Inference

It is defined as that cognition which presupposes some other cognition. It is knowledge (mana) which arises after (anu) other knowledge. Invariable concomitance (Vyapti) is the nerve of inference. The presence of the middle term in the minor term is called pakṣadharmatā. The invariable association of the middle term with the major term is called vyapti. The knowledge of pakṣadharmatā as qualified by vyapti is called paramarśa. And inference is defined as knowledge arising through paramarśa i.e. The knowledge of the presence of the major in the minor through the middle which resides in the minor and is invariably associated with the major. We know that smoke is invariably associated with fire and if we see smoke in a hill we conclude that there must be fire in that hill. Hill in the minor term, fire in the major term, smoke is the middle term. Inference is generally regarded as of two kinds svartha (for oneself) and parartha (for others). Gotama speaks of three kinds of inference purvavat, sesavat and samanyatodrsta. When we infer the unperceived effect from a perceived cause we have purvavat inference e.g. When we infer future rain from dark clouds in the sky. When we infer the unperceived cause from a perceived effect we have Sesavat inference e.g. when we infer past rain from the swift muddy flooded water of a river. When inference is based not on causation but on uniformity of coexistence, it is called samanyatodrsta e.g. when we infer cloven hoofs of an animal by its horns.

Comparison or analogy

It has been defined as the knowledge of the relation between a word and its denotation. It is produced by the knowledge of resemblance or similarity for example, a man who has never seen a gavaya or a wild cow and does not know what it is, it told by a person that a wild cow is an animal like a cow, subsequently comes across a wild cow in a forest and recognizes it as the wild cow, then his knowledge is due to upamana.

Verbal testimony

It is defined as the statement of a trustworthy person and consists in understanding its meaning. Testimony is of two kinds- vaidika and secular. The vaidika testimony is perfect and infallible because the Vedas are spoken by God. secular testimony, being the words of human beings who are liable to error, is not infallible. Only the words of trust worthy persons who always speak the truth are valid, others are not.

Njana

The word jñâna is derived from the root jñâ, which is etymologically related to the English word know. In Indian Philosophy the word Jñâna denotes for both true cognition or knowledge and false cognition or apramâ (false knowledge). For this reason in Indian philosophy the word ‘pramâ’ stands for true cognition (Yathârthâjñâna). And the cognition which is not true is called ‘apramâ’. In Western philosophy knowledge always stands only for the cognition that is true. The false knowledge is not a cognition. Cognition is always

mingled with belief and truth. So, cognition turns out to be false if there is no belief or truth. So, knowledge always stand only for a cognition that is true. The division of knowledge into true knowledge and false knowledge is meaningless and false knowledge is only a name for no knowledge. So, the word false is positively contradictory. Knowledge reveals the world of reality. By true knowledge we can act successfully. True knowledge is the correct representation of reality. The self is a spiritual substance and intelligence (caitanyaśraya) is an essential property of the self. Desire, pain, pleasure and cognition are the specific properties of the self. The different ontologies of the various traditions of Indian Philosophy necessitate different notions of jñāna.

Njana in Mimamsa

The Mimamsa philosophers accepted the logical and philosophical teachings of the other schools, but felt they did not sufficiently emphasise attention to right action. They believed that the other schools of thought that aimed for release (moksa) were not allowed for complete freedom from desire and selfishness, because the very striving for liberation stemmed from a simple desire to be free. According to Mimamsa thought, only by acting in accordance with the prescriptions of the Vedas may one attain salvation. The Mimamsa school later shifted its views and began to teach the doctrines of Brahman and freedom. Its adherents then advocated the release or escape of the soul from its constraints through enlightened activity. Although Mimamsa does not receive much scholarly attention, its influence can be felt in

the life of the practising , because all rituals, ceremony, and law is influenced by this school.

Njana in Advaita Vedanta

According to AdvaitaVedânta knowledge grows by connecting the unknown with the known. Our mind is not a blank sheet of paper. The mind is already in possession of some knowledge. This is incomplete knowledge and making use of these we make it more complete and fruitful knowledge. Advaita holds that knowledge is not an acquisition of the soul but its very essence. It is not adventitious but constitutive of the soul. The precondition of all knowledge is consciousness. No knowledge will arise if they are not illumined by consciousness.

The main feature of Advaita Vedanta is to understand Brahman, the Supreme Soul. To understand Brahman one has to attain knowledge, overcome ignorance, and be liberated and be in vigilant state at the conscious level. Advaita Vedanta teaches three stages of truth. The first stage is the transcendental or Paramarthika in which Brahman is the only reality and nothing else. The second stage is the pragmatic or Vyavaharika in which both Jiva (living creatures and individual souls) and God are true, and the material world is also true. The third and the last stage is the apparent or Prathibhasika in which material world reality is actually false, like mistaking a rope for a snake. To comprehend the essence of Advaita philosophy one has to understand these topics: Brahman and Atman, Avidya and Maya (Ignorance and illusion), Karya and karana (effect and cause), Knowledge, Attaining Liberation through Knowledge.

Njana in Buddhism

In Indian philosophy the Bauddha uphold the view that knowledge, as an existent fact, consists in the act of showing and leads to an object. Jñāna refers to pure awareness that is free of conceptual encumbrances, and is contrasted with vijñāna, which is a moment of 'divided knowing'. Entrance to, and progression through the ten stages of jñāna (Bodhisattva bhūmis), will lead one to complete enlightenment and nirvana.

In Theravada Buddhism there are various vipassana-jñānas or "insight knowledges" on the path of insight into the true nature of reality. As a person meditates these *ñānas* or "knowledges" will be experienced in order. The experience of each may be brief or may last for years and the subjective intensity of each is variable. Each *ñāna* could also be considered a *jhāna* although many are not stable and the mind has no way to remain embedded in the experience. Experiencing all the *ñānas* will lead to the first of the Four stages of enlightenment then the cycle will start over at a subtler level.

Epistemology in Jainism

In Jainism, knowledge is considered as one of the means to attain liberation. Jainism has a totally different view of knowledge. Knowledge is not something to be grasped and possessed by the soul, but is a state of the soul itself. Knowledge is the essence of the soul. The liberated soul alone knows all objects in all aspects. Consciousness is the inseparable essence of every soul which is able to manifest itself and other objects. Jainism propagates the theory of 'The

Doctrine of Relativity of Knowledge and Judgments.’ Jainism divides all knowledge into two classes, the mediate (paroksa) and the immediate (aparoksa). Mediate knowledge is any knowledge which the soul comes to have by the mediation of sense organs; any knowledge whose acquisition involves something other than the soul itself. On the other hand, immediate knowledge is that which the soul obtains without the intervention of the sense organs. The Jaina classification of knowledge is based on the manner of acquiring knowledge, rather than on the objects of knowledge. The basic difference between these two main types of knowledge rest on the way it is perceived; the former is cognized with the help of senses, while the latter is cognized without any help of the senses. Knowledge by direct perception, internal or external, which is regarded by many schools as immediate knowledge, is regarded as mediate by Jainism, since the sense and mind (things other than the soul itself) play a role in it. Sometimes Jainism speaks of such perceptual knowledge as relatively immediate and as distinct from absolutely immediate knowledge, which the soul has in virtue of that consciousness attained by freeing itself from all the karmic obstacles. We may call the absolutely immediate knowledge ‘supra-sensual, non-conceptual, non-perceptual, intuitive knowledge (kevalajnana)’. So, knowledge is not something external to be grasped and possessed by the soul, but is a state of the soul itself. Immediate knowledge is divided into Avadhi, Manahpariyaya, and Kevala; and mediate knowledge into Mati and Shruta. Avadhi: Clairvoyance: When a person is partially freed from the influences of the karmas, he acquires the power of knowing objects which have forms, but are too distant, or minute, or obscure to be observed by the senses or mind. Such

immediate knowledge is limited, and is therefore called avadhijnana. Manahparyaya: Telepathy: Manahparyaya is direct knowledge of the thoughts of others. When a person has overcome hatred, jealousy, etc. (which create obstacles that stand in the way of knowing other minds), he can have direct access to the present and past thoughts of others. This knowledge is called manah-paryaya (entering a mind). In both Avadhi and Manahparyaya, the soul has direct knowledge unaided by the senses or the mind. Hence they are called immediate, though limited. Kevala: Omniscience: When all karmas that obstruct knowledge are completely removed from the soul, there arises in it the absolute knowledge or omniscience. This is called Kevalajnana. It is unlimited and absolute knowledge. These three are extraordinary or extra-sensory perceptions which are immediate. But in addition to these, there are two kinds of ordinary knowledge possessed by an average person. They are called mati and sruta. Mati: Sensuous Cognition: Matijnana is known as sensory comprehension. Here, sense organs and the mind are the essential aid for cognition. Ordinarily, mati means any kind of knowledge which we can obtain through the senses or through manas. Jains give an account of the process by which mati takes place, in the following way. At first there is only a sensation, and it is not yet known what it means. This primary state of consciousness is called avagraha (sensation).

Srutajnana:

Sruta is knowledge obtained from authority. This is usually interpreted as knowledge obtained from what is heard from others. This includes all kinds of knowledge derived from

spoken or written authority. As the understanding of any authority is dependent on the perception of sounds or written letters, sruta is said to be preceded by mati. These two kinds of ordinary knowledge (namely, mati and sruta), as well as the lowest kind of immediate extraordinary knowledge (namely, avadhi), are not absolutely free from chances of error. But the two higher kinds of immediate extra-sensory knowledge (manahparyaya and kevala) are never liable to any error. For ordinary purposes, knowledge may be again divided into two kinds – Pramana or knowledge of a thing as it is, and Naya or knowledge of a thing in its relation. The Jains accept the general view that there are three pramanas, namely, perception, inference, and testimony. Naya means a standpoint of thought from which we make a statement about a thing. In all the systems of Indian philosophy, there is a clear cut distinction between ‘valid’ and ‘invalid’ knowledge. Valid knowledge always stands for that form of cognition which reveals reality in its true colour (yatharthyena) and leads us to successful activity in the light of it. The result of such valid knowledge is technically called prama. Invalid knowledge falls short in its grasp of reality and fails to lead us to successful activity, and the result of invalid knowledge is technically called aprama. The sources or methodology of valid knowledge is therefore been called pramana.

Syādvāda

Syadvada holds all knowledge to be only probable. Every proposition gives us only a perhaps, a may be or a syad. We cannot affirm or deny anything absolutely of any object. There is nothing certain on account of the endless complexity of

things. It emphasises the extremely complex nature of reality and its indefiniteness. It does not deny the possibility of predication, though it disallows absolute or categorical predication. The dynamic character of reality can consist only with relative or conditional predication. Every proposition is true, but only under certain condition i.e. hypothetically. It holds that there are seven different ways of speaking of thing or its attributes, according to the point of view. There is a point of view from which substance or attribute (1) is, (2) is not, (3) is and is not, (4) is unpredictable, (5) is and is unpredictable, (6) is not and is unpredictable, and (7) is, is not and is unpredictable.

1. Syadasti. From the point of view of its own material, place, time and nature, a thing is i.e. exists as itself. The jar exists as made of clay, in my room at the present moments, of such and such a shape and size.

2. Syadnasti. From the point of view of the material, place, time and nature of another thing, a thing is not, i.e., it is not nothing. The jar does not exist as made of metal, at a different place or time or if a different shape and size.

3. Syadasti nasti. From the point of view of the same quaternary, relating to itself and another thing, it may be said that a thing is and is not. In a certain sense the jar exists and in a certain sense it does not. We say here what a thing is as well as what it is not.

4. Syad avaktavyam. While in three we make statements that a thing is in its own self and is not, as another successively, it becomes impossible to make these statements at once. In this

sense a thing is unpredictable. Though the presence of its own nature and the absence of other - nature are both together in the jar, still we cannot express them.

5. Syadasti avaktavyam. From the point of view of its own quaternary and at the same time from the joint quaternary of itself and nothing, a thing is and is unpredictable. We note both the existence of a thing and its indescribability.

6. Syad nasti avaktavyam. From the point of view of the quaternary of the nothing and at the same time from the joint quaternary of itself and nothing, a thing is not and is also unpredictable. We note here what thing is not as well as its indescribability.

7. Syad asti nasti avaktavyam. From the point of view of its own quaternary as well as that of nothing and at the same time from the joint quaternary of itself and nothing, a thing is, is not and is indescribable. We bring out the inexpressibility of a thing as well as it is and what it is not. Of these possible ways of speaking about a thing or its attributes, the first two are the chief, the simple affirmative that a thing is in its svarupa (own form), svadravya (own matter), svaksetra (own place), and svakala (own time), and the simple negative that a thing is not in its pararupa (other form), paradravya (other matter), paraksetra (other place), and parakala (other time). The latter is the negative fact. This doctrine insists on the correlativity of affirmation and negation. All judgments are double edged in their character. All things are existent as well as nonexistent. This is the theory of syadavada given by Jaina.

Means of Valid knowledge in Nyāya – Vaiśeṣika -Definition and classification of knowledge

The Nyaya is the work of the great philosopher and sage Gautama. It is a realistic philosophy based mainly on logical grounds. It admits four separate sources of true knowledge. Perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna) and testimony (śabda) are the sources of true knowledge. Perception is the direct knowledge of objects produced by their relation to our senses. Inference is the knowledge of objects not through perception but through the apprehension of some mark. Comparison is the knowledge of the relation between a name and things so named on the basis of a given description of their similarity to some familiar object. Testimony is the knowledge about anything derived from the statements of authoritative persons. The objects of knowledge, according to the Nyaya, are the self, the body, the senses and their objects, cognition (buddhi), mind (manas), activity (pravṛtti), mental defects (doṣa) rebirth (pretyabhava), the feeling of pleasure and pain (phala), suffering (dukkha), and freedom from suffering (apavarga). The Nyaya seeks to deliver the self from its bondage to the body, the senses and their objects. It says that the self is distinct from the body and the mind. The body is only a composite substance made of matter. The mind is a subtle, indivisible and eternal substance. It serves the soul as an instrument for the perception of psychic qualities like pleasure, pain, etc; it is, therefore, called an internal sense. The self (atman) is another substance which is quite distinct from the mind and the body. Liberation (apavarga) means the absolute cessation of all pain and suffering brought about by the right knowledge of reality

(tattva jnana). Liberation is only release from pain. The existence of God is proved by the Nyaya by several arguments. God is the ultimate cause of the creation, maintenance and destruction of the world. Nyaya did not create the world out of nothing, but out of eternal atoms, space, time, ether, minds and souls.

The Vaisesika system is regarded as conducive to the study of all systems. Its main purpose is to deal with the categories and to unfold its atomistic pluralism. A category is called padartha and the entire universe is reduced to six or seven padarthas. Padartha literally means the meaning of a word or the object signified by a word. All objects of knowledge or all reals come under padartha. Padartha means an object which can be thought and named. Originally the Vaisesika believed in the six categories and the seventh, that of abhava or negation was added later on. Though Kanada himself speaks of abhava, yet he does not give it the status of a category to which it was raised only by the later Vaisesikas. The Vaisesika divides all existent reals which are all objects of knowledge into two classes; bhava or being and abhava or non-being. Six categories come under bhava and the seventh is abhava. All knowledge necessarily points to an object of knowledge and is called a padartha. The seven padarthas are: 1 substance (dravya), 2 quality (guna), 3 Activity (karma), 4 generality (samanya), 5 particularity (visesa), 6 inherence (samavaya), and 7. non-being (abhava).

Pramāṇas: Pratyakṣa

In Indian philosophy, perception, the first of the five means of knowledge, or pramanas, that enable a person to have correct cognitions of the world. Pratyaksha is of two kinds, direct perception (anubhava) and remembered perception (smriti). Some schools make a further distinction between indiscriminate perception (nirvikalpaka), in which the object is perceived without its distinguishing features, and discriminate perception (savikalpaka), in which the distinguishing features are both observed and recognized. Indiscriminate perception is important to the followers of the Advaita (Nondualist) school of Vedanta, for it allows for the liberating perception of brahman (ultimate reality), which is without features.

According to the Nyaya, in one way perception is of two kinds viz. (a) ordinary perception or Laukika Pratyakṣa and (b) extra-ordinary perception or alaukika Pratyakṣa. Ordinary perception, again, is of two types, viz. {i} determinate perception and (ii). indeterminate perception. Determinate perception is just opposite to Indeterminate perception i.e., it possesses determinate character and it is relational Perception generally is the perception of definite object. Substantives attributes and substantives as characterised by attributes these three make qualified cognition. The perception which is of the

nature of Visistajnana (relational perceptual cognition) is called determinate perception.

Anumāna

In Nyaya philosophy anumana is knowledge (mānā) which arises after (anu) other knowledge. Thus the literal meaning of anumāna is knowledge which comes after some other knowledge. The presence of the middle term in the minor term is called Paksadharmata and the invariable association of the middle term with the major term is called Vyāpti. The knowledge of Paksadharmata as qualified by Vyāpti is called Parāmarsa. And anumāna is defined as knowledge arising through Parāmarsa i.e. the knowledge of the presence of the major in the minor through the middle which resides in the minor and is invariably associated with the major.

Structure of Anumāna:

In every anumāna, there are three terms viz. Sadhya, Paksa and Hetu. These three terms correspond to the major, minor and middle term respectively. Hetu is also called linga. Vyāpti is the ground of Anumāna.

Kinds of Anumāna:

There are three different classifications according to three different principles.

- 1) According to Purpose anumāna is of two kinds: (a) Svarthānumāna or anumāna for oneself and (b) Parārthānumāna or anumāna for other. There are five members of Parārthānumāna viz. Pratijñā, Hetu,

Udāharana, Upanaya and Nigamana. In Svārthānumāna a man seeks only to reach the conclusion for himself. This is illustrated in the case of a man who infers the existence of fire in a hill because he first perceives a mass of smoke in it and then remembers that there is a universal relation between smoke and fire. In Parārthānumāna a man having inferred the existence of fire in a hill lays it down as a thesis and proves it as a conclusion following from the major and minor premises and the conclusion into a third premise.

According to Causal relation anumāna is of three kinds: (a) Purvavat: In Purvavat anumāna, we infer the unperceived effect from a perceived cause. For example, when from the presence of dark heavy clouds in the sky, we infer that there will be rainfall. (b) Sesavat: Here, we infer the unperceived cause from a perceived effect. For example, when we see a river in flood and infer that there was heavy rain, we have a case of Sesavat inference. (c) Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa: This inference is based on certain observed points of general similarity. For example, when we see a horned animal and infer that it has cloven hoofs, we have a case of this inference. There is uniformity of coexistence between horns and cloven hoofs, though they are not causally related.

According to the Application, anumāna is of three kinds: (i) Kevalānvayi: An inference is called Kevalānvayi when it is based on a middle term which is only positively

related to the major term. For example, All knowable objects are namable. The Pot is a knowable object. Therefore, The Pot is a namable object. (ii) Kevalavyatireki: An inference is kevalavyatireki when it is based on a middle term which is only negatively related to the major term. It is based on the invariable concomitance between the middle term, which is established by the method of agreement in absence (Vyatireka) since there can be no positive instances of agreement in presence between the terms. For example, No non-soul substance has life. All beings possessing animal functions have life, Therefore, all beings possessing animal functions have soul. (iii) Anvaya-Vyatireki: An inference is anvaya-vyatireki when it is based on a middle term which is both positively and negatively related to the major term. The universal relation (vyāpti) in this inference is established by the method of agreement in presence (anvaya) and agreement in absence (vyātireka). (a) All Smokey objects are fiery The hill is smoky Therefore, the hill is Fiery. (b) No non-fiery objects are Smokey. The hill is Smoky. Therefore, the hill is fiery.

SABDA

Testimony (sabda-pramāna) is an important source of knowledge. Our experience shows that the major part of a person's stock of knowledge about the world is acquired from the oral or written testimony of other persons. The importance of testimony becomes obvious when we imagine a person deprived of all contact with other persons and books in which case he would simply be reduced to the level of a brute. Testimony has been recognized as an independent source of

knowledge by all Indian philosophers except the Carvaka, the Buddhists and the Vaisesika.

THE MEANING OF SABDA AND VARIOUS TYPES OF SABDA

Gautama defines Sabda as āptopadēsa, instruction from an apt or fit person and later on as āpta-vākya. The fit person is defined as yathārtha vakta, speaker of truth.

Definition of sabda:

Aptasya vacanam sabdah. The reliability of a person making a statement is a condition ensuring the validity of the knowledge derived in this way. There are two ways of classifying testimony. According to one classification testimony can be of two kinds that relating to perceptible object and that relating to imperceptible objects. The trustworthy assertions of ordinary, the saints and the scriptures about the perceptible objects of the world such as the statements of a reliable farmer about plants, the scriptural injunctions to perform certain rites to bring about rainfall etc. and the assertions of trustworthy persons, saints, prophets and the scriptures about super-sensible realities such as a scientists' assertions about atoms, ether etc., the prophet's instructions regarding virtue and vice, the scriptural texts regarding God, freedom, immortality etc. come under first classification.

According to another classification, there are two kinds of testimony, the scriptural (vaidika) and the secular (laukika). The Vedas are not impersonal but personal compositions of

God, the omniscient person and are therefore perfect and valid. The secular testimony of trustworthy persons is valid while that of unworthy persons is invalid. The first classification is based on the nature of the objects of knowledge and the second on the source of knowledge. But the two classifications agree in implying that testimony must always be personal, that is, based on the words of some trustworthy person, human or divine. In short, testimony may be verbal or non-verbal. Non-verbal testimony consists of gestures. But it is not important because it lacks precision. Gautama defines verbal testimony as the statement of a reliable person. Verbal testimony consists of verbal statements of people intended to express certain facts.

UPAMANA

According to the Nyaya Philosophy, comparison (upamana) is the third source of valid knowledge. The expression ‘upamana’, is derived from two words, ‘upa’ and ‘mana’. The word ‘upa’ means similarity or ‘sadrśya’ and the word ‘mana’ means ‘cognition’. Thus, generally speaking, upamāna as a source of knowledge is derived from the similarity between two things/objects. It is a source of knowledge of the relation between a word and its denotation.

Example of Upamāna: A person does not know what a ‘squirrel’ is? S(he) is told by a forester that it is a small animal like rat, but it has a long furry tail and strips on its body. After some period of time, when s(he) sees such an animal in the forest, s(he) knows that it is a squirrel. There are four steps involved in acquiring knowledge of an object in comparison (upamāna). First: We have an authoritative statement that a

word denotes objects of a certain description. Second: When one observes any such object she/he has the knowledge that it answers to the given description. Third: There is a recollection of the descriptive statement received from authority. Four/Finally: There is the resulting knowledge that, this kind of objects are denoted by the word is same.

THEORIES OF ERROR (Khyativada)

The theory of error is called as 'khyativada'. It is opposed to the theory 'pramanyavada' (validity of knowledge). The term 'khyativada' is associated with invalid or erroneous knowledge. In the case of valid knowledge the presentation of object is found what it really is, but in case of error, it is found in inverse mode. In error, an object is cognized as having certain characteristics that really fall outside of its being. Thus, it is a wrong apprehension in which the object is taken for what it is not. All error is subjective in their nature. For example; we cognize a snake instead of a rope. This happens because the characteristics of a snake are found in the rope. In the similar way we cognize shell erroneously as silver.

Akhyativada

This theory of error is advocated by Prabhakara school of Mimansa. It is also called as 'viveka khyati'. According to Prabhakara School of Mimansa, there is no invalid cognition. A particular cognition may be less than true but it can never be untrue. They recognize two fold classification of cognition. These are; i) Valid cognition ii) Memory But they did not acknowledge delusive cognition as a third class. This is so because delusive cognition generates out of the above two

cognitions. For example, 'This is silver'. The 'this' is perceptually cognized and the 'silver' is remembered. The cognition of the 'this' is perceptual because there is sense contact with what is present before us, i.e. shell. However, the cognition of silver is a memory being generated by our sense impression. In this case, the cognizer fails to demarcate percept from smṛti. As a result, our knowledge on the object is treated as erroneous. Hence, we cognize shell as silver.

Anirvacaniya Khyativada

This theory of error is proposed by Advaita Vedantins. It states that something is presented to our senses because of avidya or ignorance. Due to avidya the cognizer cognizes an object something different from what it is. For example, we cognize shell as silver. In this case our knowledge of silver is imposed on the object 'shell'. So it is erroneous. Further, they said that nothing is found real in this world because knowledge of an object is altered in the next moment. Due to 'I-ness' we cognize objects in the world. But the fact is that, there is only one reality that is eternal and unchanging is known as Brahman. Hence, whatever we cognize is not real. Therefore, the nature of creation is indescribable. This implies cognition of shell as well as silver is not real. Hence, the theory of error is indescribable.

Viparita Khyativada

In regard to the theory of error, Bhatta School of Mimamsa proposed a new theory known as 'viparita khyativada'. On their view, error lies because of the wrong relation between the object and sense organs, but it is not due to the objects which

are real. For example, people belong to different parts of the world seeing one and the same moon but wrongly claim that they are seeing different moon. This theory of error is reversal of right behavior towards an object.

Pūrvamīmāṃsā-The sources of knowledge- theory of truth and error svataḥprāmāṇyavāda - Pramāṇas: Prabhākara and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, major points of difference- self and knowledge- nature of reality- concept of Dharma. –

The Mimamsa Philosophy believes in the existence of eternal world and the innumerable individual souls within it. They also admit the existence (presence) of other eternal and infinite substances in the earth. They viewed that the world is constituted of three types of elements. These are; body, sense organs and eternal things. The self in the body enjoys the fruit of its actions. Sense organs used as the means to experience pleasure and pain. External things are meant for enjoyment. Apart from all these realities they also believe in many other realities like, the existence of heaven, hell, etc. although these are not perceivable. Thus, Mimansakas are treated as pluralistic realist. The Mimansikas agreed upon the view that the creation and destruction of the world is based on our karmas. Hence, they ruled out the existence of God behind the creation of the world. For them, God is an unseen power who guides/ instructs us to do certain karmas in certain time/period. Regarding categories, Prabhakara School of Mimamsa recognizes seven categories. These are; substance (Dravya), quality (guna), action (karma), generality (samanya), inherence (paratantrata), force (shakti), and similarity (sadrshya). Differing from prabhakara, kumarila admits only

four positive categories out of seven. These are; substance, quality, generality and action. Further, Kumarila adds two more categories in his list- 'sound' and 'darkness'. But these two categories are not accepted by Prabhakara.

Kumarila says that there is no knowledge of self as we have the knowledge of external objects like, tree, grass, bird, etc. Thus, for him, self is the object of self consciousness. Further, he states that when we concentrate on self we realize 'I exist'. Refuting this view Prabhakara Mimansa expresses that the self can't be the subject and object of the same knowledge. This is so because one thing can't be both the 'doer' and the 'deed' at the same time, and in addition to that the function of the doer and the deed are opposite/contrast to each other. Thus, on the account of prabhakara, an objective knowledge constitutes of three constituents; the knower, the known, and the knowledge. All these three constituents are known simultaneously for acquiring the knowledge of an object. For example, "I know this table". Here, the knower is "I", the known is 'table' and the knowledge that acquires is about the object 'table'.

A valid knowledge is one, that doesn't arise from defective causes, it is devoid of contradictions and dealt with object. The Mimansa philosophy states about svatah pramanyavada (intrinsic validity) and paratah pramanyavada (extrinsic validity). It accepts six pramanas (sources of valid knowledge). These are: i) Perception ii) Inference iii) Comparison iv) Verbal Testimony v) Arthapati (Postulation) vi) Aupalabdhī (non apprehension) The first four pramanas are similar to the Nyaya philosophy but the later additions are made by Mimansa philosophy. Theories of Error is opposed to

valid knowledge. All error is subjective. In other words, to cognize an object not as it is leads to erroneous cognition. For example, cognizing a rope as a snake instead of rope. There are different opinions given by different schools on theory of error. ‘Akhyativada’ is advocated by Prabhakara School of Mimamsa whereas, Bhatta School of Mimamsa ‘viparita-khyativada’.

According to the Prabhakara Misra school, every knowledge is true, and that nothing false ever appears in error. Their theory of error is known as akhyativada or denial of illusory appearance. Let us see that view now with the rope-snake example. When I perceive a rope as a snake, there is a mixture of two types of knowledge – the perception of a long thing (perceived thing) and our memory of a snake perceived in the past (remembered thing). Here, the distinction between the perceived thing and the remembered thing is not perceived by us. Hence we are afraid of a rope as though it is a snake. Now, our behaviour towards rope is faulty and not our knowledge (because there are two kinds of knowledge here, namely knowledge of a long thing and our memory of a snake without the knowledge of distinction between them). Therefore, we do not erroneously perceive a rope to be a snake but that there is only a cognitive defect coupled with non-discrimination. This is negative, according to the Prabhakara Misra school of Mimamsa but not the same as error. Error is not merely want of knowledge but a positive mental state. The Bhatta school of Mimamsa does not accept this view. To them, mere nondiscrimination cannot explain error. We cannot deny that sometimes the illusory object appears positively before us. If my eye-ball is pressed while looking at the moon, two moons

positively appear before us. The snake illusion is also similar to this. Now, the Bhatta school argues that when we perceive a snake in a rope and judge that it is a snake, both the subject and the predicate are real. The rope is brought under the class of snakes which also exists. Error consists, however, in relating these two really existing but separate things in the subject-predicate way. Thus error is always wrong relation and is not to be found in the object. The Bhatta theory of error is known as viparitakyativada. Thus the Prabhakaras exempt all knowledge from error while the Bhattas admit that error may affect some cognitive relations of objects, though the objects themselves are always correctly perceived. One thing common to both schools is that error affects activity rather than knowledge. Thus error becomes an exceptional case of the falsification of the normal claim that every knowledge makes for truth.

According to Prabhakara, liberation consists in the total disappearance of dharma and adharma, whose operation is the cause of rebirth. Another important term that needs mention here is apurva (or unseen force or imperceptible antecedent of the fruit of our actions. All acts bear fruits. Of course, not all acts can result in its fructification immediately. Some may effect a result later. Jaimini assumes the existence of such unseen force as apurva. It can be considered as the metaphysical link between the action and its result. Now, it is this unseen force that determines whether the soul is in bondage or liberated. Hence Mimamsa prescribes that certain duties as enjoined in the Vedas are to be performed. These duties help man in the right path and thus are responsible for delivering good results. The highest good, according to early

Mimamsa, appeared to have been the attainment of heaven or a state of bliss. However, the later Mimamsa thinkers fall in line with other Indian philosophical schools in holding that the highest good is liberation or freedom from bondage to the body. To them, liberation is an unconscious state, which is free from pleasure and pain. Mimamsa, interprets the ritualistic side of the Vedas. Thus, this school emphasizes the idea of dharma – that is, the criteria of discussion here is how man ought to live. Whatever has been said about knowledge, its validity or about error is in relation to this idea of dharma. Mimamsakas believe in the authority of the Vedas. But the traditional conception of Mimamsa is atheistic – non-belief in the existence of God. The Mimamsakas argue that if a creator-God is accepted then He is liable to the charges of cruelty, partiality etc. Therefore, they deny any such creator-God.

Mimamsakas reject the proofs for the existence of God. Thus Mimamsa seems to be atheistic. It might be pointed out that Mimamsa accepts Vedas which talk of a variety of deities – sun, moon, fire etc. These are, at best, deities who are not objects of worship. They are not referred to as existing somewhere bound by space-time continuum; nor are they imaginary entities. Instead, they are eternal and self-manifesting entities described by the eternal, self revealing Vedas. The Mimamsa was interested mainly in the performance of rituals and these gods were spoken of only in so far as they help man perform the rituals with piety.

Advaita Vedanta of Śaṅkara: Reality of atman- brahman as the ultimate reality doctrine of Māyā- phenomenal world- levels of reality- Vivarttavāda- individual self, jīva and sākṣin-

knowledge and liberation. -Theory of Knowledge, and theory of error according to different systems.

The word Advaita according to the dictionary is non-dualism, especially in relation to identifying Brahman with the Universal, or with Soul or the spirit and matter. It also means peerless and unique. Literal meaning of Vedanta is the end of Veda. Upanishads came at the end of Veda, they are the Jnana Kandas. They teach knowledge of Brahman or the universal Spirit, who is described as both - Creator and Creation, Actor and Act, Existence, Knowledge, and Joy. Upanishad's Major Teachings are – the Self exists, it is immortal without a beginning or an end, essentially non – material, and the self is identical with Brahman, the highest Reality, and the Absolute. The main feature of Advaita Vedanta is to understand Brahman, the Supreme Soul. To understand Brahman one has to attain knowledge, overcome ignorance, and be liberated and be in vigilant state at the conscious level.

Advaita Vedanta teaches three stages of truth. The first stage is the transcendental or Paramarthika in which Brahman is the only reality and nothing else. The second stage is the pragmatic or Vyavaharika in which both Jiva (living creatures and individual souls) and God are true, and the material world is also true. The third and the last stage is the apparent or Prathibhasika in which material world reality is actually false, like mistaking a rope for a snake. To comprehend the essence of Advaita philosophy one has to understand these topics: Brahman and Atman, Avidya and Maya (Ignorance and illusion), Karya and karana (effect and cause), Knowledge, Attaining Liberation through Knowledge.

Around 7th century Gaudapada, the author of Mandukya Karika, a commentary on Mandukya Upanishad discussed that there was no duality, awake or dream, the mind moves through illusion (Maya) and only nonduality (Advaita) is the final truth. The truth is difficult to know because of ignorance or illusion. There is no becoming of the thing by itself or from some other thing. There is only Atman, ‘all –soul’, there is no individual soul. An individual soul is temporarily delineated, as the space that a jar contains is delineated from the main space; once the jar is broken the space within the jar merges with the vast space.

Sankara built further on Gaudapada’s foundation and gave more strength to the Advaita Vedanta. His three major commentaries are on Brahmasutras, Upanishads and the Bhagavad-Gita. Sankara while propounding his philosophy does not start from the empirical world with logical analysis but, rather, directly from the Absolute, Brahman. Sankara’s metaphysics stands on the criterion that the Real is that whose negation is impossible. Building his argument that the Upanishads teach the nature of Brahman, he develops a complete epistemology to account for the human error in taking the world as real. He justifies that Brahman is outside time, space, and causality, which are simply forms of empirical experience; no distinction in Brahman or from Brahman is possible. Sankara strongly supporting that the world is not real but illusion, logically analyses his statement:

1. Whatever remains eternal is true, and whatsoever is destroyed is non–eternal and is untrue. As the world is created and destroyed, it is not real.

2. Truth is unchanging. Since the world is changing, it is not real.
3. Things that are independent of time and space are real, and whatever is in space and time is unreal.
4. Just as one sees the dream in sleep, one sees a kind of dream even when one is awake. The world is compared to this conscious dream.
5. The world is superimposition of Brahman. Superimposition cannot be real.

BRAHMAN AND ATMAN

According to dictionary meaning, Brahman is sacred learning, a divine source. Brahman is considered as the Supreme, all-pervading spirit and the Soul of the Universe, the divine essence and source of all being from which all created things emanate and to which they return. Brahman as supreme Spirit is not an object of worship in the usual sense of the term, but Brahman is meditated upon by the devout with profound veneration. Mandana Misra accepting Bhartrhari's thesis says that Brahman is language (Sabdadvaita). Brahman is consciousness, and three consciousness is the power of speech, so Brahman is speech of the whole Universe manifestation of Vivarta (speech). Brahman was the center theme in Upanishads, Jnana Kanda. In Chandogya Upanishad, Tat tvam asi, (that thou art), Jiva is identified with Brahman. Brahman and the Self are the one and the same. According to Advaita there is no duality. One and many, infinite and finite, the subject and the object etc. are the limitation of consciousness

that cannot comprehend the Brahman due to ignorance or Avidya. There is no language to describe Brahman, it is like ‘neti, neti’, ‘not this, not this.’ Understanding Brahman is beyond the senses, He is the purest Knowledge and illuminates like the source of light. Brahman is self-existent, He is described as ‘Sachidananda’ – meaning Sat infinite truth, cit infinite Consciousness, ananda infinite Bliss. Sankara sketches Him as “Satyam Jnanam anantam brahma” (Taitiriyā Up. II.1), Brahman is the Truth, Knowledge and Endless. Brahman is free from any kind of differences or differentiation. Brahman is neither Sajatiya (homogeneous) because there is no second to Him nor Vijatiya (heterogeneous) because none other than Him exist; Ekamevadviyam, it is one without a second (Chandogya Upanishad). Advaita philosophy is built on the strong hold of Upanishads and Brahmasutra. Upanishads give various incidences where it is highlighted that Brahman = Atman; Prajanam brahma, consciousness is Brahman (Aitareya Upanishad), Aham bramasmī, I am Brahman (Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, Ayamātma brahma, this Atman is Brahman (Mandukya Upanishad). Brahmasutra starts with - ”athato brahma jignasa” . Taking these as examples, the philosophy puts forth the unique theory that Brahman is the One, the Whole and only reality. Other than Brahman everything else, including the Universe, material objects and individual are false. Brahman is infinite, omnipresent, omnipotent, incorporeal, impersonal transcendent reality; that is the divine ground for all Being. There is no separation or distinction between Brahman and others in the Universe. That is how when one achieves the turiya state, one experiences that one’s soul becomes one with everything else.

Atman: Atman exactly means breath but according to some it is connected with aham (I) and according to others contrast of avatman. From Vedic period Atman is interpreted as breath, soul, the principle of life and sensation. After the Vedic period, in Indian philosophy, Atman is described as the eternal core of the personality which survives after death and transmigrates to a new life or is released from the bond of existence. Upanishads define Atman as part of the universal Brahman, with which it can commune or even fuse. So Atman is deemed to be the central circle identified with Brahma. Advaita Vedanta understands Atman not as a part of Brahman that ultimately dissolves into Brahman, but as the whole of Brahman itself. One has to understand how the individual soul, which is limited and one in each body can be same as Brahman. The philosophy argues that Self is not an individual concept, Atman is only one and unique. It is like the same moon that appears as several moons on its reflections on the surface of the water covered with bubbles; Atman appears as different Atman in different bodies.

Atman is the silent witness of all the life happening and free from and beyond sin and merit. It is incorporeal and independent. When the reflection of Atman leads to avidya (ignorance), Atman becomes jiva – a living being with a body and senses. Each jiva feels that he has his own, unique and distinct Atman called jivatman. The concept of jiva is true in pragmatic level. In the 4th transcendental level, the Atman is equal to Brahman. The Advaita Vedanta explains the relative and the unreal nature of the objective world; it propounds the Advaita (one without a second) and states three levels of

experience of the Atman – waking (vaisvanara), dreaming (taijasa) and deep sleep (prajna).

AVIDYA AND MAYA

Sankara distinguishes Brahman as Higher Brahman and Lower Brahman in his major Commentaries. According to him the Higher Brahman is understood only by knowledge (Vidya), He is free from attachment, names and forms; He is Nirguna Brahman; this understanding brings about Liberation. Saguna Brahman or God according to Sankara is Lower Brahman; he says that this Brahman is viewed from the aspects of ignorance (Avidya). Arguing further, Sankara asks when The Higher Brahman is the Absolute where is the cause for the distinction? He further says that The Lower Brahman is the cause of diversity. The entire Advaita philosophy concentrates on how one can understand Brahman. Philosophers discuss the hurdles that are faced while understanding Brahman. The main characteristic to understand Brahman is Vidya (Knowledge). Knowledge is possible only when the mind is cleared from doubts and apprehensions. As long as there is no transparency learning becomes ignorance (avidya). Gaudapada calls ignorance as vikalpa (wrong interpretation) and Sankara calls it as adhyasa (superimposition).

Samkhya gives an example for cause and effect; the pot is a transformation of the clay; it is and real. But Advaita philosophy says that except Brahman the rest of the thing is only an appearance, because of Avidya. Even the pot and clay, effect and cause become ‘unreal’ at ‘Higher Standpoint’ (Paramarthika) but ‘real’ at empirical standpoint (vyavaharica). Gaudapada says that people fail to understand

at the ‘higher point of view’ because of wrong interpretation. He gives another example how things are seen differently; One sees a rope at dusk and thinks it as a snake, due to the wrong interpretation of the senses. Sankara calls this wrong interpretation ‘superimposition’ (adhyasa). He defines it as “the appearance, in the form of a memory, of something personally experienced in some other place.” Unless one has the idea of or seen a snake, it is not possible to mistake a rope for a snake. Similarly it is natural tendency to superimpose the qualities of the object on its subject and vice versa. Karl H. Potter writes, “.... We identify our self quo seat of consciousness with our self quo body, mind, memory etc. all of which are objects, not subjects, and so have at least one property that the self quo subject cannot have.” Sankara identifies such superimposition with the result of avidya (ignorance). The only way to overcome ignorance is to thrive by Vidya (knowledge).

Maya

There are references to the use of the word ‘Maya’ in the Rig Veda and in a few Upanishads as ‘mysteries’. Even Advaita Vedanta uses the same meaning in its interpretation of the word ‘Maya’. Gaudapada uses Maya in different occasions not only to mean the power of apparently creating things but also to speak of the things so created. This kind of usage is found in Buddhism. In this respect Goudapada is influenced by Buddhism. He does not identify Maya with avidya but Sankara does. Sankara uses the term avidya to speak of that which creates the world of Maya or name and form, but does not refer to the world itself as avidya. Joshi has pointed out

that Sankara is not consistent in this respect. But it is indicated, Sankara uses avidya while discussing superimposition and Maya while mentioning prakruti or namarupa. Karl Potter writes, “Sankara makes it known that superimposition does not need a cause as it is beginning less. Avidya is for the empirical objects in the world but for the false awareness of those objects.”

A few scholars question the identical use of avidya and Maya; they argue, if ignorance is of jiva, then it belongs to Brahman. Maya is God’s power to produce the world as illusion. The main concept of Advaita Vedanta is that there is no individual self or jivas and everything is Brahman. If such is the case then ignorance is of Brahman. The question arises “What is avidya?” Mandana Mishra says that ignorance is anirvachaniya (as neither real nor unreal). Sureshwara points out that avidya is unreal, so, it does not affect Brahma. However the jiva takes avidya for real, so it is jiva which is ignorant. Even though Sankara does not have definite terminology to distinguish between avidya and Maya; he stresses, “Avidya and Maya are causing us to experience (superimposition) the thing that we do, which is to give it a positive function beyond that of merely veiling Brahman.” Maya has a complex illusory power of Brahman which causes the Brahman to be seen as the material world of separate forms. Maya has two functions; one is to ‘hide’ Brahman from ordinary human perception, and the other is to present the material world in its (Brahman) place, Maya is also said to be indescribable, though it may be said that sense data entering ones awareness via the five senses are Maya, since the fundamental reality underlying sensory perception is

completely hidden. The credibility of Maya being real or unreal is not for sure. But Brahman is not touched by Maya. It is like the magician who is not affected by his own tricks.

Both avidya and Maya are temporary. An action is not necessary to overcome avidya. It is naturally removed by its opposite Vidya (knowledge). Knowing needs intention and depends on the agent. For example to milk a cow, what is needed is a cow and the cognition of milking. Whereas, if one has a false understanding, mistake can be rectified by correct information; a false understanding of a rope as a snake is removed when one receives the information that it is rope. Knowledge is gained by personal perseverance to know the Truth. The truth is realized at two levels, one is to study the great Scripture with the guidance of a Teacher (guru) and the second level is to examine one's 'miss' interpretation of things and situation. The self examination starts with the questioning of one's own understanding of the present and the previous experiences; one has to examine the reasons for the false interpretation and realize the 'higher' knowledge governed by nothing but the truth: how is that the snake is superimposed on a rope? Is it due to fear of the snake or the failure of the senses to recognize correctly? Are rope and snake two different objects? If they are two distinct objects then why one is superimposed on the other? Clarity in understanding brings about Truth. The truth is the knowledge.

Unit II:

Ontology - Ontology in Nyāya Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya Yoga systems of thoughts. - Ontology in Advaita Vedānta.

All Indian philosophical traditions are deeply engaged with ontology, the study of being, since clarity about the nature of reality is at the heart of three intimately connected goals: knowledge, proper conduct and liberation from the continued suffering that is part of all human existence.

The formulation of a list of ontological categories, a classification of reality by division into several fundamental objective kinds, however, is less widespread. There is little room for a doctrine of distinct, if related, ontological categories in a philosophical school that takes reality as one, even less if that one lies beyond description. If the phenomenal world is but illusory appearance, as, for example, in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara, then a determination of kinds of entities does not recommend itself as a means to adequate analysis of the world. Even the Sāṅkhya tradition's realism reduces the world to an evolution from two fundamental entities, spirit and matter. Categories make sense within the context of a pluralistic realism, an analysis of the world that finds it to be composed of a multiplicity of real entities. Such a view is found to some extent in Jaina philosophy, but is primarily defended and developed in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.

Ontology in Nyaya Vaisesika

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories are seven: substance, quality, motion, universal, particular, inherence and not-being. While all are understood as real entities and objects of knowledge, substance is most fundamental as each of the others in some way depends on substance. Substances are nine: earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, self and mind. The first four are atomic: they may combine to form macroscopic substance, such as a clay pot, but in incomposite form they are indestructible atoms, as are the last two. Ether, time and space, likewise indestructible, are unitary and pervade all. In its irreducible parts, all substance is eternal; every composite whole is a destructible substance.

A relation of containment, called inherence, structures the categories. The qualities, actions and universals by which we might characterize a pot inhere in it. They are distinct entities from the pot, yet cannot exist apart from their underlying substrate. Composite substances like a pot are also contained in their parts by inherence, but the smallest parts, eternal substances, exist independently as receptacles that contain nothing. A whole, greater than the sum of its parts, is said to inhere in the parts while the parts are the inherence cause of the whole.

Eternal substance, the ultimate substrate of all, is a bare particular. An entity that is nothing but a receptacle for other entities, it furnishes criteria for separability and individuality, but cannot be defined in itself apart from others. This aspect of the concept of substance leads later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika into extensive analysis of relations and negation.

Nyaya is a system of atomic pluralism and logical realism. It is allied to the Vaisesika system which is regarded as ‘Samanatantra or similar philosophy. Vaisesika develops metaphysics and ontology. Nyaya develops logic and epistemology. Both agree in viewing the earthly life as full of suffering, as bondage of the soul; liberation is absolute cessation of suffering as the supreme end of life. Both agree that bondage is due to ignorance of reality and that liberation is due to right knowledge of reality. Vaisesika takes up the exposition of reality and Nyaya mostly accepts the Vaisesika metaphysics. But there are some important points of difference between them which may be noted. Firstly, while the Vaisesika recognizes seven categories and classifies all real under them, the Nyaya recognizes sixteen categories and includes all the seven categories of the Vaisesikas in one of them called prameya or the knowable, the second in the sixteen. The first category is pramana or the valid means of knowledge. This clearly brings out the predominantly logical and epistemological character of the Nyaya system. Secondly, while the Vaisesika recognizes only two pramanas, perception and inference and reduces comparison and verbal authority to inference, the Nyaya recognizes all the four as separate – perception, inference, comparison and verbal authority.

NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge or Cognition is defined as apprehension or consciousness. Nyaya believes that knowledge reveals both the subject and the object; they are quite distinct from knowledge. All knowledge is a revelation or manifestation of objects. Just as a lamp manifests physical things placed before

it, so knowledge reveals all objects which come before it. Knowledge may be valid or invalid. Valid knowledge is defined as the right apprehension of an object. It is the manifestation of an object as it is. Nyaya maintains the theory of correspondence (paratah pramanya). Knowledge in order to be valid, must correspond to reality. Valid knowledge is produced by the four valid means of knowledge-perception, inference, comparison and testimony. Invalid knowledge includes memory (smrti), doubt (samsaya), error (viparyaya) and hypothetical reasoning (tarka). Memory is not valid because it is not present cognition but a represented one. The object remembered is not directly presented to the soul, but only indirectly recalled. Doubt is uncertainty in cognition. Error is misapprehension as it does not correspond to the real object. Hypothetical reasoning is no real knowledge. Perception, inference, comparison or analogy and verbal testimony are the four kinds of valid knowledge. Let us consider them one by one. Sage Gotama defines perception as non-erroneous cognition which is produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects; it is not associated with a name and which is well-defined. Inference is defined as that cognition which presupposes some other cognition. Inference is mediate and indirect. Comparison defined as the knowledge of the relation between a word and its denotation. It is produced by the knowledge of resemblance or similarity. Verbal testimony is defined as the statement of a trustworthy person and consists in understanding its meaning.

NYAYA THEORY OF CAUSATION

A cause is defined as an unconditional and invariable antecedent of an effect. The same cause produces the same effect and the same effect is produced by the same cause. Plurality of cause is ruled out. The first essential characteristic of a cause is its antecedence; the fact that it should precede the effect. The second is its invariability; it must invariably precede the effect. The third is its unconditionality or necessity; it must unconditionally precede the effect. Nyaya recognizes five kinds of accidental antecedents which are not real causes. Firstly, the qualities of a cause are mere accidental antecedents. The color of a potter's staff is not the cause of a pot. Secondly, the cause of a cause or a remote cause is not unconditional. The potter's father is not the cause of a pot. Thirdly, the co-effects of a cause are themselves not causally related. The sound produced by the potter's staff is not the cause of a pot, though it may invariably precede the pot. Night and day are not causally related. Fourthly, eternal substances like space are not unconditional antecedents. Fifthly, unnecessary things like the potter's ass are not unconditional antecedents; though the potter's ass may be invariably present when the potter is making a pot, yet it is not the cause of the pot. A cause must be an unconditional and necessary antecedent. Nyaya emphasizes the sequence view of causality. Cause and effect are never simultaneous. Plurality of causes is also wrong because causal relation is reciprocal. The same effect cannot be produced by another cause. Each effect has its distinctive features and has only one specific cause. An effect is defined as the counter-entity of its own prior non-existence. It is the negation of its own prior negation. It comes into being

and destroys its prior non-existence. It was non-existent before its production. It did not pre-exist in its cause. It is a fresh beginning, a new creation.

NYAYA THEORY OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD

The physical world is constituted by the four physical substances of earth, water, fire and air. The ultimate constituents of these four substances are the eternal and unchanging atoms of earth, water, fire and air. Akasa or ether, kala or time, and dik or space is eternal and infinite substances, each being one single whole. Thus the physical world is the product of the four kinds of atoms of earth, water, fire and air. It contains all the composite products of these atoms, and their qualities and relations, including organic bodies, the senses, and the sensible qualities of things. According to Gautama the objects of knowledge are the self, the body, the senses and their objects, knowledge, mind, activity, the mental imperfections, rebirth, the feelings of pleasure and pain, suffering, absolute freedom from all suffering. All of these knowable are not to be found in the physical world, because it includes only those objects that either physical or somehow belong to the world of physical nature. Thus the self, its attribute of knowledge and manas are not at all physical. Time and space are two substances which although different from the physical substances, yet somehow belong to the physical world. Akasa is a physical substance which is not a productive cause of anything.

NYAYA CONCEPT OF GOD

God is the ultimate cause of creation, maintenance and destruction of the world. God is the eternal infinite self who creates, maintains and destroys the world. He does not create the world out of nothing, but out of eternal atoms, space, time, ether, minds and souls. The creation of the world means the ordering of the eternal entities, which are co-existent with God, into a moral world, in which individual selves enjoy and suffer according to the merit and demerit of their actions, and all physical objects serve as means to the moral and spiritual ends of our life. God is thus the creator of the world in the sense of being the first efficient cause of the world and not its material cause. He is also the preserver of the world in so far as the world is kept in existence by the will of God. So also He is the destroyer who lets loose the forces of destruction when the exigencies of the moral world require it. Then, God is one, infinite and eternal, since the world of space and time, minds and souls does not limit him, but is related to Him as a body to the self which resides in it. He is omnipotent, although He is guided in His activities by moral considerations of the merit and demerit of human actions. He is omniscient in so far as He possesses right knowledge of all things and events. He has eternal consciousness as a power of direct and steadfast cognition of all objects. Eternal consciousness is only an inseparable attribute of God, not His very essence, as maintained in the Advaita Vedanta. He possesses to the full all the six perfections and is majestic, almighty, all glorious, infinitely beautiful and possessed of infinite knowledge and perfect freedom from attachment. Just as God is the efficient cause of the world, so He is the directive cause of the actions

of all living beings. Nyaya gives the following arguments to prove the existence of God

1. The world is an effect and hence it must have an efficient cause. This intelligent agent is God. The order, design, co-ordination between different phenomena comes from God.

2. The atoms being essentially inactive cannot form the different combinations unless God gives motion to them. The Unseen Power, the Adrsta, requires the intelligence of God. Without God it cannot supply motion to the atoms.

3. The world is sustained by God's will. Unintelligent Adrsta cannot do this. And the world is destroyed by God's will.

4. A word has a meaning and signifies an object. The power of words to signify their objects comes from God.

5. God is the author of the infallible Veda.

6. The Veda testifies to the existence of God.

7. The Vedic sentences deal with moral injunctions and prohibitions. The Vedic commands are the Divine commands. God is the creator and promulgator of the moral laws.

8. According to Nyaya the magnitude of a dyad is not produced by the infinitesimal magnitude of the two atoms each, but by the number of the two atoms. Number 'one' is directly perceived, but other numbers are conceptual creations. Numerical conception is related to the mind of the perceiver. At the time of creation, the souls are unconscious. And the atoms and the unseen Power and space, time, mind are all

unconscious. Hence the numerical conception depends upon the Divine Consciousness. So God must exist.

9. We reap the fruits of our own actions. Merit and demerit accrue from our actions and the stock of merit and demerit is called Adrsta, the unseen power. But this Unseen Power, being unintelligent, needs the guidance of a supremely intelligent God.

VAISESIKA CONCEPT OF PADARTHA OR CATEGORY

The Vaisesika system is regarded as conducive to the study of all systems. Its main purpose is to deal with the categories and to unfold its atomistic pluralism. A category is called padartha and the entire universe is reduced to six or seven padarthas. Padartha literally means the meaning of a word or the object signified by a word. All objects of knowledge or all reals come under padartha. Padartha means an object which can be thought and named. Originally the Vaisesika believed in the six categories and the seventh, that of abhava or negation was added later on. Though Kanada himself speaks of abhava, yet he does not give it the status of a category to which it was raised only by the later Vaisesikas. The Vaisesika divides all existent reals which are all objects of knowledge into two classes; bhava or being and abhava or non-being. Six categories come under bhava and the seventh is abhava. All knowledge necessarily points to an object of knowledge and is called a padartha. The seven padarthas are: 1 substance (dravya), 2 quality (guna), 3 Activity (karma), 4 generality (samanya), 5 particularity (visesa), 6 inherence (samavaya), and 7. non-being (abhava).

1. Dravya Or Substance

Dravya or substance is defined as the substratum where actions and qualities in here and which is the coexistent material cause of the composite things produce from it. Substance signifies the self-subsistence, the absolute and independent nature of things. The category of substance is the substratum of qualities and actions. The dravyas are nine and include material as well as spiritual substances. The Vaisesika philosophy is pluralistic and realistic but not materialistic since it admits spiritual substances. The nine substances are: 1) earth (prthivi), 2) Water (Ap), 3) Fire (tejas), 4) Air (vayu), 5) ether (akasa), 6) time (kala), 7) space (dik), 8) spirit (atman) and 9) mind (manas). Earth, water, fire and air really signify not compound transient objects made out of them, but the ultimate elements, the supersensible eternal part less unique atoms which are individual and infinitesimal. Earth, water, fire, air and ether are the five gross elements. These and manas are physical. Soul is spiritual. Time and space are objective and not subjective forms of experience. Ether, space, time and soul are all-pervading and eternal. Atoms, minds and souls are infinite in number. Ether, space and time are one each.

2. Guna or Quality

The second category is guna or quality. Unlike substance, it cannot exist independently by itself and possesses no quality or action. It inheres in a substance and depends for its existence on the substance and is not a constitutive cause of anything. It is called an independent reality

because it can be conceived, thought and named independent of a substance where it inheres. The qualities are therefore called objective entities. They are not necessarily eternal. They include both material and mental qualities. They are a static and permanent feature of a substance, whole action of a dynamic and transient feature of a substance. A quality, therefore, is different from both substance and action. Qualities include material and spiritual properties. Smell is the quality of earth; taste of water; color of fire; touch of air; and sound of ether. Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition are the mental qualities which inhere in the self.

3.Karma or Action

The third category is karma or action. Like quality, it belongs to and inheres in a substance and cannot exist separately from it. But while a quality is a static and permanent feature of a substance, an action is a dynamic and transient feature of it. Unlike a quality, an action is the cause of conjunction and disjunction. Action is said to be of five kinds: 1) upward movement, 2) downward movement, 3) contraction, 4) expansion, and 5) locomotion.

4. Samanya or Generality

The fourth category is samanya or generality. Samanya is generality. Generality is class-concept, class-essence or universal. It is the common character of the things which fall under the same class. The universals reside in substances, qualities and actions. They are of two kinds,

higher and lower. The higher generality is that of 'being'. It includes everything and itself is not included in anything. Every other generality is lower because it covers a limited number of things and cannot cover all things. A universal cannot subsist in another universal; otherwise an individual may be a man, a cow, and a horse at the same time.

5. Visesa or Particularity

The fifth category is Visesa or particularity. It enables us to perceive things as different from one another. Every individual is a particular, a single and a unique thing different from all others. It has got a unique of its own which constitutes its particularity. It is opposed to generality. Generality is inclusive; particularly is exclusive. Generality forms the basis of assimilation; particularity forms the basis of discrimination. It is very important to remember that the composite objects of this world which we generally call 'particular' objects are not real particular.

6. Samavaya or Inherence

The sixth category is Samavaya or inseparable relation called 'inherence.' It is different conjunction or samyoga which is separable and transient relation and is a quality. Samavaya is an independent category. Kanada calls it the relation between cause and effect. Samvaya is one and eternal relationship subsisting between two things inseparably connected.

7. Abhava

The seventh category is Abhava or non-existence. Kanada does not mention it as a separate category. Absence of an object and knowledge of its absence are different. The first six categories are positive. This is negative. The other categories are regarded as absolute, but this category is relative in its conception. Non-existence is of four kinds: 1) antecedent nonexistence, 2) subsequent non-existence, 3) mutual non-existence and 4) absolute non-existence.

VAISESIKA ON ATOMS AND CREATION

According to Vaisesika diversity and not unity is at the root of the universe. Vaisesika says that atom is the minutest particle of matter which may not be further divisible. The indivisible, partless and eternal particle of matter is called an atom (paramanu). All physical things are produced by the combination of atoms. Therefore creation means the combination of atoms in different proportions and destruction means the dissolution of such combination. The material cause of the universe is neither produced nor destroyed. It is the eternal atoms. The atoms are said to be of four kinds; of earth, water, fire and air. Ether or akasha is not atomic. It is one and all-pervading and affords the medium for the combinations of the atoms. The atoms differ from one another both in quantity and in quality. Each has a particularity of its own and exists as a separate reality. During dissolution, they remain inactive. Motion is imparted to them by the unseen power (adrsta) of merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) which resides in the individual souls and wants to fructify in the form of enjoyment or suffering. Atoms are suprasensible. Atoms increase by

multiplication and not by mere addition. When motion is imparted to them by the unseen power, they begin to vibrate and immediately change into dyads. A dyad is produced by the combination of two atoms. The atoms are its inherent cause; conjunction is its non-inherent cause; and the Unseen power is its efficient cause. An atom is indivisible, spherical and imperceptible. A dyad (dvyanuka) is minute (anu), short (hrasva) and imperceptible. From the standpoint of ancient Indian philosophy the world including physical nature is a moral stage for the education and emancipation of individual souls. The Vaisesika atomic theory of the world is guided by spiritual outlook of ancient Indian philosophy. The atomic theory of the Vaisesika explains that part of the world which is non-eternal subject to origin and destruction in time. The eternal constituents of the universe, namely, the four kinds of atoms, and the five substances of akasa, space, time, mind, and soul, do not come within the purview of their atomic theory, because these can neither be created nor destroyed. On the other hand, all composite objects, beginning with a dyad or the first compound of only two atoms (dvyanuka) are non-eternal. So the atomic theory explains the order of creation and destruction of these non-eternal objects. All composite objects are constituted by the combination of atoms and destroyed through their separation. The first combination of two atoms is called a dvyanuka or dyad, and a combination of three dyads (dvyanukas) is called a tryanuka or triad. The Tryanuka is also called the trasarenu and it is the minimum perceptible object according to the Vaisesika. The paramanu or atom and the dvyanuka or dyad, being smaller than the tryanuka or triad, cannot be perceived, but are known through inference. All the finite objects of the physical world and the physical world

itself are composed of the four kinds of atoms in the form of dyads, triads and other larger compounds arise out of these. The world or the universe is a system of physical things and living beings having bodies with senses and possessing mind, intellect and egoism. All these exist and interact with one another, in time, space and akasa. Living beings are souls who enjoy or suffer in this world according to their character; wise or ignorant, good or bad, virtuous or vicious. The order of the world is, on the whole, a moral order in which the life and destiny of all individual selves are governed, not only by the physical laws of time and space, but also by the universal moral law of karma. In the simplest form this law means 'as you sow, so you reap,' just as the physical law of causation, in its most abstract form, means that there can be no effect without a cause. Vaisesika admits the reality of the spiritual substances, souls and God, and also admits the law of karma. The atoms are the material cause of the world of which God, assisted by the Unseen power, is the efficient cause. The physical world presupposes the moral order. Evolution is due to the Unseen Power consisting of merits and demerits of the individual souls which want to bear fruits as enjoyments or sufferings to be experienced by the souls. Keeping in view this moral order of the universe, the Vaisesika explains the process of creation and destruction of the world as follows: The starting-point of the process of creation or destruction is the will of the supreme Lord (Mahesvara) who is the ruler of the whole universe. The Lord conceives the will to create a universe in which individual beings may get their proper share of the experience of pleasure and pain according to their deserts. The world being beginningless (anadi), we cannot speak of a first creation of the world. In truth, every creation

is preceded by some order of creation. To create is to destroy an existing order of things and usher in a new order. Hence it is that God's creative will has reference to the stock of merit and demerit act with souls, endowed with the creative function of *adrsta* that first sets in motion the atoms acquired by individual souls in a previous life lived in some other world. When God thus wills to create a world, the unseen forces of moral deserts in the eternal individual souls begin to function in the direction of creation and the active life of experiences. And it is the content of air. Out of the combination of air-atoms, in the form of dyads and triads, arises the gross physical element of air, and it exists as an incessantly vibrating medium in the eternal *akasa*. Then, in a similar way, there is motion in the atoms of water and the creation of the gross element of water which exists in the air and is moved by it. Next, the atoms of earth are set in motion in a similar way and compose the gross element of earth which exists in the vast expanse of the gross elemental water. Then from the atoms of light arises in a similar way, the gross element of light and exists with its luminosity in the gross water. After this and by the mere thought of God, there appears the embryo of a world out of the atoms of light and earth. God animates that great embryo with *Brahma*, the world-soul, who is endowed with supreme wisdom, detachment and excellence. To *Brahma* God entrusts the work of creation in its concrete details and with proper adjustment between merit and demerit on the one hand, and happiness and misery on the other. The created world runs its course for many years. But it cannot continue to exist and endure for all time to come. Just as after the stress and strain of the day's work God allows us rest at night, so after the trials and tribulations of many lives in one created world. God

provides a way of escape from suffering for all living beings for some time. This is done by him through the destruction of the world. So the period of creation is followed by a state of destruction. The process of the world's dissolution is as follows: When in the course of time Brahma, the worldsoul, gives up his body like other souls, there appears in Mahesvara or the supreme Lord a desire to destroy the world. With this, the creative adrsta or unseen moral agency in living beings is counteracted by the corresponding destructive adrsta and ceases to function for the active life of experience. It is in contact with such souls, in which the destructive adrsta begins to operate, that there is motion in the constituent atoms of their body and senses. On account of this motion there is disjunction of the atoms and consequent disintegration of the body and the senses. The body with the senses being thus destroyed, what remain are only the atoms in their isolation. So also, there is motion in the constituent atoms of the elemental earth, and its consequent destruction through the cessation of their conjunction. In this way there is the destruction of the physical elements of earth, water, light and air, one after the other. Thus these four physical elements and all bodies and sense organs are disintegrated and destroyed. What remain are the four kinds of atoms of earth, water, light and air in their isolation, and the eternal substances of akasa, time, apace, minds and souls with their stock of merit, demerit and past impressions. It will be observed here that while in the order of destruction, earth compounds come first, then those of water, light and air in succession, in the order of creation, air compounds come first, water compounds next, and then those of the great earth and light appear in succession.

VAISESIKA CONCEPT OF BONDAGE AND LIBERATION

The Vaisesika regards bondage as due to ignorance and liberation as due to knowledge. The soul, due to ignorance, performs actions. Actions lead to merits or demerits. They are due to attachment or aversion and aim at obtaining pleasure or avoiding pain. The merits and demerits of the individual souls make up the unseen moral power, the *adrsta*. According to the law of Karma, one has to reap the fruits of actions one has performed whether they are good or bad according to the *karmas* one performed. This *adrsta*, guided by God, imparts motion to the atoms and leads to creation for the sake of enjoyment or suffering of the individual souls. Liberation is cessation of all life, all consciousness, all bliss, together with all pain and all qualities. It is qualityless, indeterminate, pure nature of the individual soul as pure substance devoid of all qualities.

Ontology in Sankhya and Yoga

The Sāṃkhya Philosophy is regarded as dualistic realism. It is dualistic because it holds the doctrine of two ultimate realities; *Prakṛti* and *Purusas*. Further, it maintains the plurality of *Purusas* (self) and the existence of matter, hence, treated as pluralistic. It is realism because they viewed that both matter and spirit are equally real. The Sāṃkhya school expresses that the self (*Purusa*) and the non-self (*Prakṛti*) are radically different from each other, as like, subject and object. As subject can never be the object, similarly, an object can never be the subject. In Sankhya philosophy *Prakṛiti* is the ultimate (first) cause of all objects, including our mind, body and sense

organs. It is observed that every effect must have a cause. Cause and effect are two inseparable components stand for all sorts of creation in the cosmos. Hence, all objects of the world are bounded in the chain of cause-effect relation. This relation Sāṃkhya named as ‘satkāryavāda’ and populated as ‘theory of causation’.

THEORY OF CAUSATION

The Sāṃkhya theory of causation is known as satkāryavāda. It explains the effect exists in its material cause prior to its production. For example, curd was existing in the milk before comes into existence. Hence, the effect is not a real beginning or a new creation. It is also named as ‘parināmavāda’.

The following arguments uphold by Sāṃkhya to support the theory satkāryavāda.

- i) If the effect does not exist in the cause prior to its operation, none can bring into existence out of the cause. For example, blue cannot be turned into yellow even by a thousand artists. The effect is related to its cause. Effect is nothing but the manifestation of the cause, as oil will be produced from oil seeds only. Thus, effect pre-exists in the material cause in a latent or un-manifest condition.
- ii) A particular effect can be produced out of a particular material cause. A mud jar can be produced out of clay only; cloth can be produced out of threads only. Thus, it proves that the effects are existing in the cause in a latent condition.

iii) If the effect is not related to its cause, then every effect would arise from every cause. But this does not happen. Every effect does not arise from every cause. For example, butter cannot be produced from sands, waters, or oils. It is produced from milk only.

iv) The effect pre-exists in the cause since it can be produced by a potent cause only. A potent cause has causal energy to produce a particular effect. The causal energy in this case is inferred from the perception of the effect. If the effect is not existent in the cause, then the causal energy can't be related to it. If the causal energy is unrelated to the effect, then any effect will arise from any cause. Hence, the effect must be pre-existent in its potent cause only.

v) The effect pre-exists in the cause since it is identical in nature with its cause. The effect is not different from the cause. The cause is existent and therefore, the effect cannot be nonexistent. Hence, effect inheres in its cause. This is so because there is no identity between entity and non-entity.

The Sāṃkhya disagrees with Nyāyikas and said that if curd as an effect is a new creation and does not exist in its material cause (milk) prior to its production, then can we produce curd from some other liquids like oil, kerosene, diesel etc. Hence, each effect exists in its material cause prior to its production in a hidden form.

Prakṛti

Prakṛti is the ultimate cause of the universe. It is regarded as the first cause. All effects of the universe are based upon it.

Being the first element of the universe, Prakṛti itself is uncaused, eternal, and all pervading. Hence, it is called “pradhāna”. It can’t be perceived but can be inferred from its effect. Thus, it is known as ‘anumā’. In the form of conscious elements, it is called jada, and in the form of the unmanifested objects, it is called ‘avyakta’.

Differences between Prakṛti and Objects

Objects are the effects of Prakṛti. These are dependant, relative, many and non-eternal because they are created and destroyed. But Prakṛti, on the other hand, has neither beginning nor end. It is unborn, independent, absolute, one, eternal and beyond creation and destruction. Objects are limited within the space-time continuum but Prakṛti is beyond of it. Objects are manifest and composite but Prakṛti is unmanifest and without parts. Thus, Vyāsa says that Prakṛti is both ‘is’ and ‘is-not’.

Proofs for the existence of Prakṛti

There are five arguments offered by Isvarakṛshna for the existence of Prakṛti. These are as follows;

- i) The world is constituted of manifold of objects. The existence of all the objects must have a cause. This is so because they themselves can’t be the cause of their creation. Further, they are limited, dependent, relative and have an end. Hence, the cause which creates them should be unlimited, exists beyond creation and destruction, independent and eternal. Such a cause is the Prakṛti.

- ii) The world is an amalgam of all varieties of objects. However, some common qualities are found among all the objects. As a result, pleasure, pain, and indifference subsist among all varieties of objects. This implies that there should be a common cause which possesses these three qualities (pleasure, pain and indifference) and share in all the objects once they created. This cause is Prakṛti.
- iii) The activity is generated in the potent cause. All effects arise out of causes in which they were present in an unmanifest form. Evolution means the manifestation of that which is involved. The world of objects which are effect must therefore be implicitly contained in some world cause.
- iv) Every cause has its effect. Thus, cause and effect are distinct from each other although the effect exists in its material cause prior to its production (satkāryavāda). By implication therefore, the universe must have a cause. This cause unmanifests the universe in its totality. This cause in nothing but the Prakṛti.
- v) Sāṃkhya satkāryavāda accepts the cause-effect relation as an inherence form which implies every effect inheres in its material cause. This holds that if the effect rolls back toward its cause, then it will dissolve in its cause. This helps to maintain the homogeneity in the universe. The balance universe from where everything manifold is regarded as Prakṛti.

Gunās of Prakṛti

The Sāṃkhya Philosophy advocates three gunās of Prakṛti. These are; Sattva, rajas and tamas. Prakṛti is a state of equilibrium of these three gunās. The word ‘guna’ is understood here as quality or attribute. Now, let us know about these three gunās.

- i) Sattva: Sattva is that element of Prakṛti which is of the nature of pleasure, light (laghu) and bright or illuminating (prakāśaka). The tendency towards conscious manifestation in the senses, the mind and the intellect; the luminosity of light and the power of reflection in a mirror or crystal are all due to the operation of the element of Sattva in the constitution of things. For example, blazing up a fire, upward curve of vapour etc. Sattva is believed to be white.
- ii) Rajas: Rajas is the principle of activity in things. Its colour is red. It is active because of its mobility and stimulation. It is also the nature of pain. For example, on account of rajas, fire spread; wind blows; the mind becomes restless, etc.
- iii) Tamas: Tamas is the principle of passivity and negativity in things. Its colour is black. It is opposed to the Sattva guna because it is heavy, laziness, drowsiness. It produces ignorance and darkness and leads to confusion and bewilderment. Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas contradict as well as cooperate among each other to produce an object. These three gunās are present in all the objects of the world. None of them exist alone.

Among them each guna tries to dominate the other two. Hence, they can't exist in a tranquility state. As a result, they can't remain pure for a single moment. Since they are changing continuously, distortion is their nature. There are two types of transformations occur in the gunas. These are, 'svarupa' and 'virupa'.

Svarupa

During pralaya or dissolution of the world, the gunas are changing within themselves without disturbing the others. That is, Sattva changes into Sattva, rajas changes into rajas and tamaj changes into tamaj. Such transformation of the gunas is called 'svarupaparināma' or change into the homogenous. In this stage, the gunas can neither create nor produce anything.

Virupa

In case of pralaya or dissolution of the world the gunas are in a state of constant flux and each tries to dominate the others. It is this flux of gunas that results in the formation of various objects. This kind of transformation is called virupa transformation or change into the heterogeneous. So, it is the starting point of the world's evolution.

Purusa

According to the Sāṃkhya Philosophy, Purusa or self is an eternal reality. Purusa is the self, subject and knower. It never be an object because, the existence of objects can be proved in some ways whereas, non-existence can't be proved in anyways. Purusa is neither the body, nor the mind (mānas), neither ego (ahaṃkāra) nor intellect (buddhi). It is not the

substance which has the quality of consciousness. It is itself pure-consciousness. It is the basis of all knowledge and is the supreme knower. It can't be the object of knowledge. It is the observer, eternally free, the impartial spectator and peaceful. It is beyond the space-time continuum, change, and activity. It is the self enlightened, self-proved and hence, *causasui*. It is all pervading, formless, and eternal. Its existence can't be doubted because in its absence, all knowledge even doubt is not possible. It has been described as, devoid of three *gunas*, negative, inactive, solitary witness, observer, knower and of the nature of illumination. According to Sāṃkhya Philosophy, the *purusa* is of the nature of pure consciousness and hence beyond the limits of *Prakṛti*. It is free from distortions. Its objects changes but it itself never changes. It is above self-arrogance, aversion and attachment.

There are five arguments Sāṃkhya has given for establishing the existence of *purusa*. These are as follows;

- a) All the worldly objects are meant for some one. This is so because the conscious *Prakṛti* can't make use of them. Hence, all these substances are for *Purusa* or self. *Prakṛti* evolves itself in order to serve the *Purusa*'s end. The three *gunas*, *Prakṛti*, and the subtle body, all are served to the *Purusa*.
- b) Substances of the universe are composed of three *gunas*. The *purusa* is the witness of three *gunas* and he is beyond from these *gunas*.
- c) *Purusa* is a pure consciousness which is beyond our experience and analysis. It is the substratum of all knowledge both positive and negative. There can be no experience without

him. This is so because he is the sole authority of all experiential knowledge.

d) Since Prakṛti is unconscious, it can't enjoy her creation. Hence, a conscious element is needed to make use of them. Prakṛti is the one to be enjoyed (bhogyā) and so there must be an enjoyer (bhoktā). This argument supports the existence of Purusa.

e) There are persons who try to get relieved from all sorts of sufferings of the world. The desire for liberation and emancipation implies the existence of a person who can try for and obtain liberation. Hence, it is enforced to accept the existence of Purusa. On the account of Sāṃkhya, there are pluralities of self or purusa. All these Purusas are identical in their essences and they are embedded with consciousness. Hence, consciousness is found in all the selves. This view is similar to Jainism, and Mimamsa because they believe in the plurality of selves.

Evolution

The world and worldly objects are created because of the contact between Prakṛti and Purusa. The Prakṛti alone can't create the world because it is material. In the same manner the Purusa can't create the world independently because he is inactive. Hence, the contact between Prakṛti and Purusa is necessary for the evolution to start though they are possessing different and opposite natures.

The Prakṛti is like a blind man and the Purusa is like a lame man cooperate each other to reach their destination. The lame

man sits on the shoulders of the blind mind and pointing to him the way where to go and in which direction to move. In much the same manner, the inactive eternal Purusa and the conscious Prakṛti cooperate with each other in order to start the evolution.

Regarding their contact, the Sāṃkhya says, there is no real contact took place between Prakṛti and Purusa. But their mere closeness or nearness with each other disturbs the stability of the gunas of Prakṛti. When these three gunas; sattva, rajas, tamas disturb and disrupt, they are constantly mixing and dissociating. As a consequence, evolution begins.

A sage named Kapila has described the order of creation which is accepted by the Sāṃkhya Philosophy. The order of creation is as follow.

i) Mahat

Mahat is the first product of evolution. It is cosmic in its nature. Besides this fact, it has psychological aspect in which it is called intellect or buddhi. Here, it is important to mention that buddhi should not be understood as the same as consciousness. The reason is buddhi is material whereas consciousness is eternal. An important function of buddhi is to take decision which is a part of memory act. This helps to distinguish between the known and the knower. Sattva is predominately found as an attribute of buddhi. Buddhi helps to identify the soul or the ātman which differs from all physical objects and their qualities.

ii) Ahaṁkāra

Ahaṁkāra is understood as ‘ego’ in English. It is the second product of evolution. Ego is identified as “I” or “mine” feelings of an individual. Every individual has buddhi, and since ahaṁkāra is a practical element of buddhi, it is found in all individuals. Because of ego the purusa looks upon himself as an active agent, desire and strive for ends, and possesses characteristics. An individual perceives an object through sense organs. Then mind reflects on these perceptions and determines their nature. Following this, the attitude of ‘mine’ and ‘for me’ is attributed to these objects. This is nothing but regarded as ‘ego’. In this product (ahaṁkāra), all these three gunas of prakṛti operates.

iii) Mānas

According to the Sāṁkhya Philosophy, mānas or mind is neither eternal nor atomic. It is constituted with parts and thus can come into contact with the different sense organs simultaneously. Mind helps to analyze and synthesize the sense-data into determinate perceptions. Being an internal sense organ, it is aware of objects belonging to the past, present, and the future.

iv) Jñānendriyas

Jñānendriyas are known as five sense organs; nose, ears, eyes, skin, and tongue. On Sāṁkhya views, sense is an imperceptible energy or force which exists in the perceived organs and apprehends the object. This

implies, the sense is not the ears but their power of hearing. Thus, the senses are not perceptible but can infer. They are informed from the functions that they perform. The five sense organs produce knowledge of touch, colour, smell, heard, and taste. All these are born because of the Purusa and they are the result of ego or ahamkāra.

v) Karmendriyas

Karmendriyas is understood as the five organs of action which reside in mouth, ears, feet, anus, and the sex organ. They perform the functions respectively as speech, hearing, movement, excretion, and reproduction. The cause of the creation of these organs is the desire of Purusa for his experience.

vi) Tanmātrās

There are five tanmātrās; sabda or sound, sparsa or touch, rupa or form, rasa or taste, and gandha or smell. All are very subtle because they are the elements of the objects. Hence, they can't be perceived but inferred. The Sāṃkhya School viewed that the five elements; earth, water, air, fire, and ether have their origin in the five tanmātrās.

vii) Mahābhutas

There are five mahābhutas found in the cosmos namely;
• Air or Vāyu • Fire or Agni • Akāsa or Ether • Water or Jala • Prathivi or Earth Their respective qualities are; touch, colour, sound, taste, and smell. The Sāṃkhya

theory of evolution is illustrated in the following diagram for your clarity and better understanding.

BONDAGE AND LIBERATION

The self, who is eternal, pure conscious, and all pervading, due to its ignorance identifies itself with the mānas, ahṁkāra, and mahat which are the products of Prakṛti. Thus, it experiences the worldly pain and suffering. The universe is constituted of manifold objects, and since objects are embedded with gunas and selves and even interrelated among them, suffering is unavoidable. This is so because the Sāṁkhya claims that wherever there is guna there is suffering. Further, they said that the life in heaven is also controlled by the gunas.

Since there are sufferings and bondage, there are also paths leads to liberation, emancipation or salvation. On Sāṁkhya account, there are two sorts of liberation. These are;

i) Jivanmukti ii) Videhamukti

The self attains freedom from worldly suffering and realizes truth in one's life living in the earth is known as jivanmukti. In case of videhamukti, the self attains complete liberation from all sorts of sufferings. This is achieved after death only. Thus, videhamukti is known as kaivalya. This is understood as liberation from the gross body. The Sāṁkhya theory of liberation is termed as 'apavarga', the purusartha or the summum bonum of life.

Yoga

The Yoga philosophy speaks about the theory and practice for the realization of the ultimate truth concerning human being and the world. In Vedanta, yoga is understood as ‘union’, i.e. spiritual union of the individual soul with the supreme soul. This view is not explained clearly. Patanjali, who is the founder of the Yoga System says, yoga is a spiritual effort to attain perfection through the control of sense organs, gross body, subtle mind, intellect and ego. It guides to achieve the highest wisdom through spiritual realization. Patanjali’s ‘Yoga-sutras’ are the first and foremost systematic and authoritative presentations of yoga in both its theoretical and practical aspects. Followed by Patanjali, Vasys’s “Yoga–bhasya” and Vacasvpati Misra’s ‘Tattva-vaisaradi” are the good additions to Yoga philosophy. These two works are treated as commentaries on Yoga-sutras. The Yoga Philosophy is closely associated with Samkhya philosophy. The Yoga presents a practical path for the realization of the self whereas the Samkhya emphasizes the attainment of knowledge of self by means of concentration and meditation. Thus, it won’t be incorrect to state that yoga is the practice and Samkhya is its theory. The Gita says that Yoga and Samkhya are the practical and theoretical sides of the same system. Although there are many similarities found between Samkhya and Yoga system yet a few dissimilarities are highlighted. The similarities are; both the schools uphold that liberation can be attained through knowledge. And, to attain this knowledge it requires the power to control body, mind, senses, intellect and ego. Yoga accepts three pramanas which are agreed by the Samkhya. These three Pramanas are; perception, inference and

verbal testimony. There are twenty five metaphysical Principles as viewed by the Samkhya and it is agreed by the Yoga. The dissimilarities lie when Yoga states that there is only one and one Purusa is known as ‘Supreme self’ who is eternal, ubiquitous, beyond time and space. Rejecting this view, Samkhya expresses that there are many Purusas and hence, there are innumerable number of selves.

PSYCHOLOGY OF YOGA

Psychological foundation is the prerequisite to understand the path of yoga. In other words, a basic understanding of psychology helps to understand the path of yoga in a clear form. The most important element in the psychology of yoga is citta. ‘Citta’ means the three internal organs as described in the Samkhya philosophy- buddhi or intellect, ahamkara or ego, and manas or mind. It is the first modifications of the Prakriti in which sattva guna dominates rajas and tamas. It is material by nature, but due to nearness or closeness with the Purusa, it acquires consciousness. But when it relates to an object, it assumes the ‘form’ of that object. This form is called Vritti or modification. Due to the modifications of Citta, the self knows the worldly objects. There is no real or actual modification occurred in the self. But due to the reflection of the Purusa in the modifications of Citta, there is an appearance of change found in it. Just as the moon appears as moving in the river and waves of the river appear as luminous, similarly Purusa appears as undergoing modifications and citta appears as conscious due to Purusa’s reflection in it. When the knowledge of an object is attained the self ceases to exist from the modifications of Citta. It even detached from the association

and aversion of the worldly joys and pain. This attachment and aversion is nothing but 'bondage'. To get rid from these bondage human beings need to control the modifications of citta. One can control the modifications of citta only by practicing yoga in continuous manner. In this regard, Patanjali defines yoga as the cessation of the modification of citta. On the account of Yoga philosophy, citta has different stages and various forms. Stages of Citta There are five stages of citta called as 'citta bhumi'.

a. Ksipta (Restless) This is the first-stage of citta. In this stage citta is very much distributed and attached with worldly objects. For example, Citta of those intoxicated by the possession of power and money.

b. Mudha (Torpid) In this stage, tamas dominates the other two gunas; sattva and rajas. This stage of citta is known as mudha. For example, citta of the intoxicated persons.

c. Viksipta (Distracted) This is the third stage of citta where sattva guna dominates the other two gunas. In this stage yoga begins and citta tries to attain god or supreme soul. Due to the sattva dominance, it is found that there is temporary ceasing of the modifications of the citta.

d. Ekagra (concentrated) This is the fourth stage of Citta. In this stage, citta is fixed to some object due to the sattva preponderance. It is known as ekagra. For example, the flame of a candle light remains always pointing up without flicking hither and thither.

e. Niruddha (Restricted) The fifth and final stage of citta is niruddha. In this stage the impressions remain in the citta after the cessation of modifications. This stage is known as yoga. Out of these five stages the last two are very helpful and hence useful in yoga. But the remaining stages are harmful for practicing in yoga and thus, these may be removed by practice.

Forms of Citta

Citta is embedded with three gunas -sattva, rajas and tamas, it constantly changes. This is so because of the dominance nature of one guna on others. Hence, there are three forms of citta noticed. These are; i) Prakhya ii) Pravrti iii) Sthiti Prakhya Sattva Guna is dominating in this stage. But, tamas remains as subordinate to sattva. The citta aspires for different powers of yoga in this form. For example, anima, siddhi. etc, Pravrti In this form, the citta is predominated by rajas. Tamas, here, becomes weak. Thus, this form appears to be enlightened. Example of this form of citta would be “dhyana” or “dharana”. Sthiti The citta is predominated by sattva, and rajas is subordinating to it. In this form citta holds its own form and differentiating from others. An important aspect of citta is that it modifies. And, the modified citta is known as vrtti on the view of Yoga Philosophy.

Modifications of Citta

The citta gets modify or change and acquires consciousness due to the reflection of the Purusa or the self. But the real nature of citta is material. The changes in citta are known as modifications of Vrttis. The modifications of citta are of five types. These are, i) Pramana (right cognition) ii) Viparyaya

(wrong cognition) iii) Vikalpa (imagination) iv) Nidra (sleep) v) Smrti (memory) Pramana Yoga school, like Samkhya adheres to three pramanas. These are; perception, inference and sabda (verbal testimony). In the case of perception, the citta through sense organs (both external and internal) comes into contact with external objects of the world and assumes its form. In case of inference, the citta cognizes the generic nature of objects and this is equally applicable to verbal testimony also. Viparyaya The expression 'Viparyaya' is understood as 'doubt'. To possess not determinate knowledge of an object is known as doubt. For example, seeing an object and not able to cognize whether it is a shell or a silver is resulted in doubt. Vikalpa It is the knowledge in which the object is known but the object does not exist. Thus, it is treated it as merely a verbal cognition. For example, barren women's child, horses' horn, etc. Nidra Nidra is a mental modification where there will be no cognition. It is the knowledge of the absence of objects. In this stage, the citta is predominated by tamas. However, this stage won't ignore the mild presence of knowledge while some body is in sleep. This is so because after waking up from sleep the person has consciousness that (s)he had slept well and knew nothing. Thus, some sorts of modifications are occurred even in sleep. Smrti Memory or smrti is the recapitulation or recollection of past experiences. Recapitulation is possible through our impressions that we left on the objects while cognized. Thus in this stage some sorts of modifications are found in citta.

Kinds of Klesas

There are several causes responsible for the disturbances in the citta. Among those a few are; attachment with objects of the world, cognizing the objects wrongly, inactivity, doubt, carelessness, etc. These causes arise because citta imagines itself as the agent and the enjoyer because of Purusa's reflection on it. Hence, we find the earthly sufferings (klesas). The Yoga philosophy mentions that there are five kinds of klesas or suffering. These are; i) Avidya (ignorance) ii) Asmita (egoism) iii) Raga (attachment) iv) Dvesa (aversion) v) Abhinivesa (clinging for long life and fear of death) Avidya arises when we cognizing the self as non-eternal and material. But the real nature of the self is bliss, eternal, and possesses pure consciousness. Asmita is wrongly identifying Purusa and Prakrti, and further, bringing them in an equal platform. But in reality, purusa and Prakrti are two distinct entities, thus, can't be equated with each other. Raga is the craving to get worldly pleasure like power, money, etc. Dvesa is anger in the means of suffering. The last, abhinivesa is fear of death which finds among all living beings in the earth.

THE EIGHT-FOLD YOGA (Astanga Yoga)

We the human beings have body, sense organs, and mind, hence, it is obvious to have sensual attachment and passion towards worldly objects. As a result, we have drawn in the river of bondage and worldly sufferings. To get rid of earthly suffering and to remove the ignorance that find within us, we have to conquer our sense organs, mind and even our bodily act. To do so the citta needs to be controlled. In this respect, yoga philosophy prescribes eight-fold path which helps to

control our passions and craving for worldly pleasures. These eight fold path are as follows. i) Yama ii) Niyama iii) Asana iv) Pranayama v) Pratyahara vi) Dharana vii) Dhyana viii) Samadhi

i) Yama

It is the control of mind, body, and speech. The five yamas are: a) Ahimsa: it means to accept the principle non-violence. It upholds that not to kill or do any injuries to any living beings. b) Satya: Satya or truth says that to speak the truth and adhere to truth even in your thinking. c) Asteya: it upholds the principle non-stealing. This includes both not desiring on others' wealth and not stealing any goods from others. d) Brahmacharya: it is known as celibacy. Here one needs to control his/her senses towards the attachment of heavenly pleasures. It restrains somebody for not having sexual life. e) Aparigraha: it says not to accept and aspire for any sorts of unnecessary lavish things for life enjoyment like gold, diamond, etc. All these yamas are badly required for the concentration of citta.

ii) Niyama

It speaks about the rules for possessing good conduct. There are five niyamas as follows. a) Sauch: it says about cleanliness which includes both external cleaning (e.g. bath, pure diet, hair cutting and cleaning, nail cutting etc.) and internal cleaning (e.g. friendliness, empathy, happiness, smile, etc. b) Santosh: it is understood as contentment. It means be satisfy with yourself whatever

you attain or possess. In other words, “what you are, you must be happy with that”. c) Tapa: Tapa or penance includes the power of tolerance. To tolerate extreme and maximum cold and heat, one needs to do the hard practices. And, this is possible through tapa. d) Swadhyaya: it says one needs to study religious scriptures to develop his/her spiritual knowledge. It is considered as one of the good principle to possess good conduct. e) Iswara Pranidhan: It says always remember God is the supreme authority and all mighty. One should completely surrender himself/herself to him. This is a practice which helps for the development of good conduct upholds by yoga philosophy.

iii) Asana

It is an advanced stage of yoga. It speaks about to do various bodily postures which helps to retain concentration of citta and even helps to control the body as well as mind. There are various types of asana. Among them, a few includes, padma, sirsa, chakra, garuda, maura etc. It is advisable to do regular practice of asana. The reason is, it not only controls the body such as keeps the body flexible, increase the immunity, etc. but also keeps the body free from diseases and make it strong and healthy. By doing regular asana one can control the different external and internal organs of the body.

iv) Pranayama

This is the fourth stage in the practice of yoga. Pranayama is understood as control of breath. It suggests that

practicing pranayama helps the agent to control his/her inhaling and exhaling of breath. This helps the citta to remain concentrate and focused. Through pranayama one can control his/her body by doing some postures. This makes agent remains healthy and good. Pranayama has three steps. These are; a) Puraka b) Kumbhaka c) Recaka The first step puraka conveys to take as much air as possible. It is known as inhaling. The second step Kumbhaka expresses after inhaling as much air as possible tries to retain it for half of the time taken in inhaling. The third step' recaka' states that gradually exhale the air by taking the same time that your had consumed while taking inhalation. These three steps will gradually accelerate, so that in due course of time the agent may control his/her breath which helps the citta to remain concentrate and not disturbed.

v) Pratyahara

In this stage, the agent should control his/her sense organs for not being attracted by the worldly objects. He/she will try to restrain the sense organs for not clinging desperately for the objects of the world. Hence, craving for an object would be ceased. By practicing this yoga, the agent can keep his/her mind undisturbed from worldly objects even while living in the earth. To do this practice it requires strong determination and repression of the senses.

vi) Dharana

Our mind constantly shifts from one object to another. To keep our mind focused in one particular point and tries to

check for its frequency of shifting one object to another is called as dharana. In this stage, the agent keeps his/her mind continuously engage in one object and tries to bring back the mind to that particular object if it is shifted to another object as quick as possible. Example, an agent tries to concentrate to the top of the flame of a candle, concentrating on the cap of a water bottle.

vii) Dhyana

It is one step ahead to dharana. In this stage, the aspirant becomes successful to remain concentrate on an object in a longer time. Here, the aspirant realizes the whole object by concentrating its one part. This step is known as meditation. It helps to realize the true nature of the citta.

viii) Samadhi

The eight and last step of yoga is known as samadhi. This is the apex stage of yoga. In this stage, the aspirant negates the differences between subject and object, realizes the true nature of the citta that how it attains the form of the object. Here, the process of concentration and the object becomes one and identical. This stage is known as cessation of modification of the citta. 9 Samadhi is of two kinds. Samprajnat or sabeej (attributed samadhi) and asamprajnat or nirbija (attributeless samadhi). Samprajnat (Conscious Samadhi) In this form of samadhi, the aspirant becomes aware of his/her concentration. When the citta is concentrated on one object, the similar kind of object of modifications occurs in the citta. This is known as conscious samadhi or samprajnat. Concentrating on one

object leads to controlling the distracted mind which often attaches to different objects of the world. Thus, it is said that focusing on one object implies dissociating from other objects. Since attachment for worldly pleasures cause suffering, the attention towards a particular object removes worldly sufferings (klesas) and passion for worldly pleasures. This helps to receive the real knowledge of an object and becomes free from law of karma or karmic influx. This conscious samadhi is further divided in four types. These are; a) Savitarka samadhi b) Savicar samadhi c) Sanand samadhi d) Sasmit samadhi Savitarka Samadhi In this stage, the citta is concentrated on a gross object and clearly identify it through meditation. For example, meditating to see the top of a nose. Savicar Samadhi In this stage, the citta is concentrated on subtle object and assumes its form. For example, concentrating on tanmantras (rupa, rasa, gandha, sabda, sparsa). Sanand Samadhi

In this stage, the citta is concentrated on a sattvika subtler object and produces happiness and joy. It even helps in attaining bliss. Sasmit Samadhi In this stage, the citta is concentrated on the ego-substance which is identified with the self. Hence, individuality becomes an existent. Asamprajnat (Supra-conscious) This is the highest form of samadhi. In this stage, there will be no distinction found between subject and object. The worldly attachment and sufferings disappear. Thus, it is known as attribute less samadhi or nirbija. Out of these eight stages of yoga, the first five are to be practiced by external means and the remaining three stages are to be practiced by internal means. This is so because the first five

stages are merely preparatory to the latter three stages. The last three stages of yoga are directly connected with yoga.

GOD AND LIBERATION

The Yoga school while accepting the existence of God explains the salient features of God that are found in ‘Yoga sutra’. According to the Yoga Philosophy, God is free from the law of karma, pain, pleasure, joys, and all sorts of worldly attachments. He is omniscient, omnipresent and omnipotent. In the Yoga Philosophy, God is called as ‘Iswara’. He has eternal knowledge and bliss. His existence is beyond all limitations. He is the supreme authority. What he does, it is not for his own sake but only for the sake of the universe.

Since God is eternal, benevolent, all mighty and all pervasive, he is dissociated from law of karma. Therefore, he does not need any kind of liberation. An individual (Jiva) seeks liberation because he/she has to bear the fruits of his/her karmas. But God is transcendent to everything. Thus, he is detached from liberation. The Yoga school of liberation is named as ‘kevali’. There are three arguments offered by the Yoga school for the existence of God. These are; i) Scriptural testimony: scriptures are ancient and old but stands as references for the existence of god. In Vedas and the Upanishads, it is described that God is the ultimate existence, eternal and sumum bonum of life. ii) The efficient cause: Prakrti and Purusa, since they are different and distinct in their nature, they can’t come close to each other without intervention of an efficient cause. This efficient cause is ‘God’. He is responsible for bringing prakriti near to the purusa. As a result, the world and living beings in it are created. iii) The

ultimate in hierarchy: we the human beings possess limited knowledge. Hence, we have ego, intellect and buddhi. But God is free from all these properties. He is the ‘Supreme Being’ and the source of all substratum of the universe and became the creator of all living creatures in the earth. He is the creator and the destroyer of the universe. The whole world is so vast that an ordinary human being can neither create nor control over it. Hence, God’s existence is acclaimed.

Advaita Vedanta

Advaita philosophy rests on assumptions of non-dualism. The Advaitic’s fundamental tenet is that that all forms of matters are interconnected by an all pervasive energy. The central texts of this school are Samkara’s commentaries on the principal Upanishads, the Bhagavadgita and the Vedanta Sutra. This philosophy can be summed up in a single dictum, “Tatsvam Asi,” meaning “You are that,” that meaning the other. Another gem of this philosophy is “Aham Brahman,” “I am Brahman,” and therefore, it is not separate from me. All matter throughout the universe is the outcome of one primal matter called Akasha; and all force, whether gravitational, attraction or repulsion, or life, is the outcome of one primal force called Prana. This approach does not separate the spiritual from the mundane because they are all parts of the same ultimate reality, “It is the soul’s experience of the essential unity with the whole of being that is brought out in the words, “Thou in me and I in thee.” This philosophy is concerned with understanding human existence as an integral part of a larger and interconnected whole . This is a socio-ecological relational approach to reality – one that does not separate nature from other living creatures .

Advaitic Epistemology Ontological assumptions undergird epistemological positions about whether the nature of knowledge is hard, real and capable of being transmitted in a tangible form, or whether “knowledge” is a softer, more subjective, spiritual, or even transcendental kind, based on experience and insight of unique and essentially personal nature. The fundamental tenet of advaitic epistemology is satchitananda (Existence-Knowledge-Realization/Bliss). It is the process of experiential transformation . Advaita is governed by non-cognition of duality because the ultimate reality is nondual and the world of duality is the world of maya . Freedom is the realization of the Brahman in the individual soul. Unchangeable reality expresses itself in the changing universe without forfeiting its nature.

Knowledge according to advaita philosophy is a personal search for the truth and integrates multiple ways and sources of knowing. It includes the sensory perception of a subjective actor, intellectual detachment of reason and logic, all nested within a spiritual consciousness cognizant of the spiritual interconnectedness. This knowledge values both ideal and material realities. Conventional dualistic approach that guides most research today operates under the assumption that material and ideal realities are irreconcilable and a researcher has to pick one or the other as the ultimate truth. Ideal or subjective reality contains entities like consciousness, discursive acts like conversations, stories, and metaphors. Entities that belong to the material realm are hard and tangible.

AVIDYA AND MAYA

Sankara distinguishes Brahman as Higher Brahman and Lower Brahman in his major Commentaries. According to him the Higher Brahman is understood only by knowledge (Vidya), He is free from attachment, names and forms; He is Nirguna Brahman; this understanding brings about Liberation. Saguna Brahman or God according to Sankara is Lower Brahman; he says that this Brahman is viewed from the aspects of ignorance (Avidya). The entire Advaita philosophy concentrates on how one can understand Brahman. Philosophers discuss the hurdles that are faced while understanding Brahman. The main characteristic to understand Brahman is Vidya (Knowledge). Knowledge is possible only when the mind is cleared from doubts and apprehensions. As long as there is no transparency learning becomes ignorance (avidya). Gaudapada calls ignorance as vikalpa (wrong interpretation) and Sankara calls it as adhyasa (superimposition). Samkhya gives an example for cause and effect; the pot is a transformation of the clay; it is and real. But Advaita philosophy says that except Brahman the rest of the thing is only an appearance, because of Avidya. Even the pot and clay, effect and cause become ‘unreal’ at ‘Higher Standpoint’ (Paramarthika) but ‘real’ at empirical standpoint (vyavaharika). Gaudapada says that people fail to understand at the ‘higher point of view’ because of wrong interpretation. He gives another example how things are seen differently; One sees a rope at dusk and thinks it as a snake, due to the wrong interpretation of the senses. Sankara calls this wrong interpretation ‘superimposition’ (adhyasa). He defines it as “the appearance, in the form of a memory, of something personally experienced in some other place.” Unless one has the idea of or seen a snake, it is not possible to mistake a rope

for a snake. Similarly it is natural tendency to superimpose the qualities of the object on its subject and vice versa. Sankara identifies such superimposition with the result of avidya (ignorance). The only way to overcome ignorance is to thrive by Vidya (knowledge). Maya There are references to the use of the word 'Maya' in the Rig Veda and in a few Upanishads as 'mysterieries'. Even Advaita Vedanta uses the same meaning in its interpretation of the word 'Maya'. Sankara uses the term avidya to speak of that which creates the world of Maya or name and form, but does not refer to the world itself as avidya.

KARYA AND KARANA (EFFECT AND CAUSE)

Gaudapada justifies that an object which is not existing at the beginning can exist in the end or in the middle, that is to say an object is not completely nonexistent. He gives an example of a dream. When one dreams, he knows that it does not exist. In sleep, the dream originates, exists for some time; once the sleeper wakes up the dream ceases to exist. Gaudapada says even the objects one sees in wakeful state are unreal as they originate like in dream. He divides objects in two groups—Real (sat) and unreal (asat). Unreal objects are born and seen to be real. Discussing the relation of cause and effect, he says that both cause and effects are unreal under four possibilities:

1. If the effect is different from the cause, then it is not real
2. If the cause is unreal and becomes real in effect it will be absurd like like son of a barren woman.
3. The cause is real and the effect is not.

4. The last one is, both cause and effect are unreal, in which case nothing ever comes to existence or goes out of existence.

KNOWLEDGE

True Knowledge is attained by eagerness to learn. The ambition to know the ultimate ‘Truth’ leads to wisdom. When snake is superimposed on the rope, correct information that it is only a rope not a snake must be clarified. The person who has mistaken the rope for a snake must understand the object rope as the existing thing and snake as an illusion. Before deciding to perceive an object right or wrong one has to know how the things are perceived in the first place. Advaita philosophy states that there are six different ways of learning –

- Pratyaksha – the knowledge gained by the senses

- Anumana - the knowledge gained by inference
- Upamana – the knowledge gained by analogy
- Sabda or agama – knowledge gained by testimony
- Arthapatti – the knowledge gained by superimposing the known knowledge on an appearing knowledge that does not occur with the known knowledge.
- Anupalabdhi – the knowledge gained by negation among all these the importance is given to verbal testimony (sabda or agama).

To acquire knowledge pramatra (the subject), the knower of the knowledge, pramana (the cause or the means) of knowledge

and the prameya (the object) of knowledge are very essential. Knowledge is achieved by mediate or immediate, the difference is that while in the first, only ‘that’ of the object is known, in the second, ‘what’ is also understood. Both are alike vritti (behaviour) of the internal organ in which the sakshin (what is present) is imminent. In some cases to obtain knowledge, it does not involve sensory perception. The empirical self is understood immediately but it is not presented to any senses. So, the word ‘pratyaksa’ (present to the sense) is replaced with ‘aparoksa’ (not immediate). Knowledge is immediate whether it is by the senses or not. The object must be such that one can comprehend directly (yogya). For example, a chair is understood by looking at it but not kindness. Other condition is that the object must be present at the time. Finally there must be an intimate relationship between the subject and the object in question. For the external object the vritti flows out to understand where as internal, it originates inside; like understanding happiness or sorrow. Accomplishment of knowledge happens when subject and object come together and by hypothesis they are removed from each other and occupy a different place in space; the vritti relates these two and brings about for the time being identical ground for the two.

ATTAINING LIBERATION THROUGH KNOWLEDGE

Almost all Indian philosophical systems give importance to ‘Liberation’ and looks at it as the main aim of the mankind and Advaita is no exception. Advaita Vedanta looks at Liberation as Being, Knowing and experiencing one’s True Self. Pure knowledge is not under other’s control nor is it under any control, it is something one has. All it needs is a quest to know

the Truth and Reality, once one has the thrust to know immediately the pure knowledge surfaces to understanding. According to Sankara there are four outstanding characteristics of a person who is in quest of the Pure Knowledge. He is able to distinguish between what is eternal and what is not. He will be non-attached to present and future actions. He acquires moral virtues like tranquility, restraint etc. He desires liberation, Advaita says that liberation is free from differentiation and identifies only with 'True Self', which is without beginning and end and without any change of any sort. Sankara disputes the idea of the Mimamsas that Liberation is a result of action. Firstly, he says that liberation is identical with 'True Self'; the true self does not have a commencement or finish, whereas the result of an action, has a starting and comes to existence when an act is performed. So, the Liberation cannot be the result of an action. Secondly, there are four kinds of actions – Utpatti, (the origination), for example, a potter making a pot; Apati, (the attainment) of a state, like arriving at a place; Samskara (the purification), performing rituals; Vikara (the modification), change taking place like milk turning to curds. To attain Liberation these actions are not necessary. The only entity of Liberation is to cognize Brahman, this is the heart of Advaita epistemology and philosophy of language. Liberation is not a product. Liberation does not change a person; the liberated need not have to become someone or something else. Liberation is not to reach a place (heaven) as a result of an action. The liberated will not die and be born again. Sankara propounds that liberation is not a future state or goal, but it exists in the present, past and the future without any time bound. The Self realization brings about the awareness that Brahman is pure

consciousness (Cit), awareness (Jnana) and witness (saksin), Brahman is self luminous, by His light everything shines out. While such an understanding is reached then the relationship between knower and the known merges. There will be no subject and object relationship.

Unit III: Psychical apparatus in Indian Philosophy

(Specifically focusing on S mkhya Yoga and Advaita Vedanta)

-Ideas, thoughts and concepts regarding mind- its nature
- its different phases- its components- different phases of evolution of Mind -The process of evolution in S khya-citta and its varieties-Bh mikas in Yoga- s k ma ar ra (li ga ar ra) and its components- anta kara a- pañcako a- the concept of four phases of Mind (j grat, svapna, su upti and tur ya)- the Nature of Mind (manas , buddhi, aha k ra and citta)

Evolution in S mkhya

Prak ti is regarded as essentially dynamic. If motion were not inherent in Prak ti, it could not be given to it by any outside agency; and if motion once ceased in Prak ti, it could not reappear. Hence Prak ti is always changing. Even in dissolution, there is homogeneous change (sar pa or saj t ya pari ma) in Prak ti when all the three gu as are in the state of equilibrium. It is only when heterogeneous change takes place and rajas vibrate and makes sattva and tamas vibrate that the equilibrium is disturbed and evolution takes place. Sattva, the principle of manifestation and rajas, the principle of activity were formerly held in check by tamas, the principle of non-manifestation and non-activity. But

when rajas, the principle of activity vibrates and makes the other two vibrate, the process of creation begins.

And creation is not the new creation of the worldly objects, but only their manifestation. It is only making explicit of that which was formerly implicit. Evolution is regarded as cyclic and not linear. There is no continuous progress in one direction, but alternating periods of evolution (sarga) and dissolution (pralaya) in a cyclic order. Evolution is again said to be teleological and not mechanical or blind. Evolution takes place for serving the purpose of the Puru a.

Prak ti, the gu as, the senses, the mind, the ego, the intellect, the subtle body— all are constantly serving the end of the Puru a. This end is either worldly experience (bhoga) or liberation (apavarga). Puru a needs Prak ti for enjoyment as well as for liberation, for samsara as well as for Kaivalya.


Evolution supplies objects to be enjoyed to the Puru a and also works for his liberation by enabling him to discriminate between himself and Prak ti.

Evolutes

1. Prak ti



2. Mahat



(The 25th is the Puru ā, untouched by this evolution)

The concept of four phases of Mind

J grat refers to that state wherein one is full of awareness from his own point of view of individual consciousness, not from the point of view of subjective consciousness.

J grat in all these four states

The state of J grat, wakefulness exists in all these four states.

1) The first state is *J grat J grat*, wakefulness in the world of wakefulness. This objective wakefulness is the

absence of wakefulness actually because in this state only the world of objectivity exists and there is complete loss of subjective consciousness. When they observe any object such as a lotus they become completely one with that object and lose consciousness that they are the observers.

2) *J grat svapna* is the next state, i.e., dreaming in the state of wakefulness. When subjective consciousness enters into objective consciousness and loses consciousness of that objectivity and lives, while in wakefulness, only in the impressions of objectivity, this is dreaming in the state of wakefulness. For instance, when in the objective world, you look at a particular person and you are not aware of looking at that person, then you are traveling in your own impressions, this is *J grat svapna* in other words, day dreaming; in philosophy this state is termed as *Buddh vasth* , that state which has some awareness, some consciousness.

3) *J grat Su upti*, deep sleep in the state of wakefulness, the next state in *J grat* is, when in the state of wakefulness that individual subjective body loses consciousness of the objective world and loses consciousness of the world of impressions; when externally he is not experiencing the objective world and internally he is not experiencing the objective world of impressions.

4) *J grat Tur ya*, the fourth state in the state of wakefulness is the highest and most refined state in *J grat*. In this state, the individual subjective body, after losing consciousness of both external and internal objectivity, enters into some consciousness of self, of Being. He is partly illuminated by that awareness of self and he becomes quite aware internally of the consciousness of self. He moves and travels in the objective world, and at the same time he resides in self consciousness. He does not lose hold of his internal subjective consciousness.

Svapna

Svapna, the state of dreaming, where you travel only in impressions, the four states of *J grat*, *svapna*, *Su upti* and *Tur ya* are found. *Svapna* is the state found in dreaming, in impressions, in memory, in madness, and in intoxication.

***Svapna* in all these four states**

1) *Svapna J grat* is the first state in *svapna*, i.e., wakefulness in the state of dreaming. When the subjective body travels in impressions and is given to those impressions in the field of objectivity and at the same time loses consciousness of those impressions, this is the state of individuality in the waves of impressions and sometimes travels in the waves of objectivity. Everything in this state, whether normal or abnormal,

seems normal and ordinary to him. It is objective because one travels in objectivity and is lost in the object.

2) *Svapna svapna*, dreaming in the state of dreaming is the next stage found in *svapna*, the dreaming state. In this state the individual subjective body travels only in the world of impressions without the least awareness of their connection of one to the other. You see a pencil, then you see a book, then you fly in the air, then you are driving a motor car and yet you are not aware of any of this. You feel that everything is perfectly alright.

3) *Svapna Su upti*, deep sleep in the state of dreaming is the third state found in *svapna*. Sometimes in the dreaming state this subjective body, while traveling in the world of impressions and thoughts, also develops some awareness of subjectivity. Realization that you are not awake, that you must be dreaming exists. One is traveling in subjectivity; however, that subjectivity does not remain. As this state is *Su upti* in the state of dreaming one's subjective consciousness comes and goes. Questions and arguments arise and then they are forgotten. There exists the loss of this consciousness and again the travel in impressions. This state of individuality is called *Sa gatam*, which means 'touched'. Experience of the occasional touch of consciousness is the significance of this state.

4) *Svapna Tur ya*, the fourth state in the state of dreaming is the next and highest state in *Svapna*. When one is in the dreaming state and observes some particular object, he perceives this particular object in the world of impressions. At that very moment, while in the dreaming state, he becomes aware and becomes conscious that he is not awake, that he is in the dreaming state and, by the grace of his Guru, he casts away the objective world of impressions and enters into *sam dhi*, this is the state of *Svapna Tur ya*. This state, however, is not permanent. Again he falls into the dreaming state full of impressions and begins to dream. Realizing that he is again dreaming he enters again into *sam dhi* and then again another dream comes and takes him away. He moves from the dreaming state to *sam dhi* and then back to the dreaming state and again to *sam dhi* and so forth. He is incapable of maintaining that state of *sam dhi*.

The dreaming state is called *Svapna*, (the absence of worldly activity) by worldly people because the outer objective world is absent in this state.

Su upti

The *Su upti* is state of deep sleep *Su upti* (asleep) because knowledge of objectivity is absent in this state. In this state there is neither objectivity nor impressions. This state for worldly people is full of unconsciousness. This state is an appeased state, *T mbh va*, which means 'absolute silence'. They feel that after leaving this

state they are more peaceful and find this state to be nourishing.

***Su upti* in all these four states**

1) The first state of these four states in *Su upti*, deep sleep is *Su upti J grat*, wakefulness in the state of deep sleep. In this state of deep sleep, there is loss of all impressions and thoughts and dwelling in absolute void (*nya*). While remaining in this state one is not aware and does not taste its joy. In this state of dreamless sound sleep, one neither travels in objectivity nor in impressions, and on coming out from the dreamless state, there is this experience “I was peacefully sleeping,” does not occur in *Su upti J grat*. In *Su upti J grat* you remember afterwards that you were experiencing nothing.

2) *Su upti svapna*, dreaming in the state of deep sleep is the next state in deep sleep, where in deep sleep one travels in the world of unconscious subjectivity. It is the world of subjectivity where subjectivity is absent from consciousness. In deep sleep there is no consciousness, nor awareness of that subjectivity. One remains in that subjectivity without knowledge that he is in subjectivity. In this state however, one has some impression of being in subjectivity, there is some cognition of remaining in that subjectivity. In this state one is slightly conscious of his traveling in subjectivity.

3) *Su upti Su upti*, deep sleep in the state of deep sleep is the third state of deep sleep. In this state, while one is traveling in the world of subjective consciousness, the impression, and the faint idea that this is the world of subjective consciousness remains in the background throughout, without interruption as against the interrupted perception in the state of *Su upti svapna*. However in both *Su upti svapna* and *Su upti Su upti*, where the impression, the faint idea that this is the world of subjective consciousness remains in the background, *Su upti* is in predominance.

4) *Su upti Tur ya*, the fourth state in the state of deep sleep is the fourth state of deep sleep. In this state one travels in the world of subjective consciousness. He is aware in the background of that subjective consciousness in continuation and at the same time experiences the bliss of this state. In the state *Su upti Su upti* experience is not of the real bliss of this subjective state, but only the experience of peace. In *Su upti Tur ya*, however, there is experience of the positive bliss of this state. This state leads one enter into *sam dhi* while consciousness still remains in the background.

Peculiarity of *Tur ya* state

In the state of *Tur ya* the penetration of all energies is simultaneous, not in succession. All of the energies are residing together without distinction there, but not in manifestation. *Tur ya* is

called *Savy p ra* because all of the energies get their power to function in that state. This state is also known as *An M ya* because it remains unagitated by all of these energies.

The touch of one's self was found in sound sleep (*Su upti*), however, the establishment of this takes place in *Tur ya*.

Tur ya in the three states of J grat, Svapna and Su upti

The states of *Tur ya J grat*, *Tur ya svapna*, and *Tur ya Su upti* only are possible in *Tur ya*. As *Tur ya* cannot be divided *Tur ya Tur ya* is not possible. The preceding states of individual subjective consciousness, *J grat*, *Svapna*, and *Su upti*, each have four aspects, the state of *Tur ya* has only three.

1) The state of *Tur ya J grat* exists when the consciousness of *Tur ya* is not vividly manifested. The consciousness of *Tur ya* is in a subconscious state, found in the background as unmanifested. In this state, though strong consciousness exists, it is not manifested totally, it is yet to be manifested. *Tur ya J grat* is called *Manonmanam* 'beyond the span of the mind', because it is that state where the mind has taken rise in mindlessness, complete thoughtlessness.

2) In *Tur ya svapna* the consciousness of *Tur ya* is more vividly manifested. Consciousness is stronger here. The

state of *Tur ya svapna* is named *Anantam* which means 'unlimited' as there is found the unlimitedness of the Self. There is no limitation of Being here. This is the state of unlimited Being.

3) In the state of *Tur ya Su upti* the consciousness of *Tur ya* is most vivid. Consciousness is the strongest. *Tur ya Su upti* is called *Sarv rtha*. *Sarv rtham* means that in this state, although you are unlimited, yet you find existing here all of the limitations of the universe.

***Tur y t ta* the ultimate state**

Tur y t ta is that state which is the absolute fullness of Self. It is filled with all consciousness and bliss. It is really the last and the supreme state of the Self. This state is found in *sam dhi*, as well as in each and every activity of the world. There is no possibility in this state for the practice of yoga. If you can practice yoga then you are not in *Tur y t ta*. In yoga there is the intention of going somewhere. Here, there is nowhere to go, nothing to achieve. As concentration does not exist here the existence of the hand of yoga is not possible.

There are only two names actually attributed to this state of *Tur y t ta*, one given by worldly people and one by *Jñ nis*. Worldly people, because they know nothing about this state, call it *Tur y t ta*, which means

‘that state which is beyond the fourth.’ *Jñ nis*, on the other hand, have named this state as *Mah pracaya* which means ‘the unlimited and unexplainable supreme totality.’

Mahat

The first evolute of the Prak ti is generated by a preponderance of the sattva (intelligence-stuff); This is indeed the earliest state from which all the rest of the world has sprung forth; and it is a state in which the stuff of sattva predominates. It thus holds within it the minds (buddhi) of all Puru as which were lost in the Prak ti during the pralaya. The very first work of the evolution of Prak ti to serve the Puru as is thus manifested by the separating out of the old buddhis or minds (of the Puru as) which hold within themselves the old specific ignorance (avidya) inherent in them with reference to each Puru a with which any particular buddhi is associated from beginningless time before the pralaya. This state of evolution consisting of all the collected minds (buddhi) of all the Puru as is therefore called buddhitattva. It is a state which holds or comprehends within it the buddhis of all individuals. The individual buddhis of individual Puru as are on one hand integrated with the buddhitattva and on the other associated with their specific Puru as. When some buddhis once begin to be separated from the Prak ti, other buddhi evolutions take place. In other words, we are to understand that once the transformation of buddhis is effected for the

service of the Puru as, all the other direct transformations that take place from the Prak ti take the same line, i.e., a preponderance of sattva being once created by the bringing out of some buddhis, other transformations of Prak ti that follow them have also the sattva preponderance, which thus have exactly the same composition as the first buddhis. Thus the first transformation from Prak ti becomes buddhi-transformation. This stage of buddhis may thus be regarded as the most universal stage, which comprehends within it all the buddhis of individuals and potentially all the matter of which the gross world is formed. Looked at from this point of view it has the widest and most universal existence comprising all creation, and is thus called mahat (the great one). It is called linga (sign), as the other later existences or evolutes give us the ground of inferring its existence, and as such must be distinguished from the Prak ti which is called alinga, i.e. of which no linga or characteristic may be affirmed.

Ahamk ra

This mahat-tattva being once produced, further modifications begin to take place in three lines by three different kinds of undulations representing the sattva preponderance, rajas preponderance and tamas preponderance. This state when the mahat is disturbed by the three parallel tendencies of a preponderance of tamas, rajas and sattva is called ahamk ra.

Ahamk ra is said to be of three kinds:

(1) Vaikarika or sattvika, when sattva predominates. Viewed as cosmic, it produces manas and five sensory organs and five motor organs. Viewed as psychological, it produces good deeds.

(2) Bhut di or tamasa, when tamas predominates. Viewed as cosmic, it produces the five subtle elements (tan-m tras). Viewed as psychological, it leads to indifferent acts or to idleness and sloth.

(3) Taijasa or r jasa, when rajas predominates. Viewed as cosmic, it supplies the energy by which the S ttvika and the Tamasa produce their respective evolutes. Viewed as psychological, it produces evil deeds.

The r jasika ahamk ra cannot mark a new preponderance by itself; it only helps (sahak ri) the transformations of the sattva preponderance and the tamas preponderance. The development of the former preponderance, as is easy to see; is only the assumption of a more and more determinate character of the buddhi, for we remember that buddhi itself has been the resulting transformation of a sattva preponderance. Further development with the help of rajas on the line of sattva development could only take place when the buddhi as mind determined itself in specific ways. The first development of the buddhi on this line is called s ttvika

or vaik rika ahamk ra. This ahamk ra represents the development in buddhi to produce a consciousness-stuff as I or rather "mine," and must thus be distinguished from the first stage as buddhi, the function of which is a mere understanding and general datum as thisness.

The ego or ahamk ra (abhim na-dravya) is the specific expression of the general consciousness which takes experience as mine. The function of the ego is therefore called abhim na (self-assertion). From this again come the five cognitive senses of vision, touch, smell, taste, and hearing, the five cognitive senses of speech, handling, foot-movement, the ejective sense and the generative sense; the pr ās (bio-motor force) which help both conation and cognition are but aspects of buddhi-movement as life. The individual ahamk ras and senses are related to the individual buddhis by the developing sattva determinations from which they had come into being. Each buddhi with its own group of ahamk ra (ego) and sense-evolutes thus forms a microcosm separate from similar other buddhis with their associated groups. So far therefore as knowledge is subject to sense-influence and the ego, it is different for each individual, but so far as a general mind (kara a buddhi) apart from sense knowledge is concerned, there is a community of all buddhis in the buddhitattva. Even there however each buddhi is separated from other buddhis by its own peculiarly associated ignorance (avidya). The buddhi and its sattva evolutes of ahamk ra and the senses are so related that though they are

different from buddhi in their functions, they are all comprehended in the buddhi, and mark only its gradual differentiations and modes. We must again remember in this connection the doctrine of refilling, for as buddhi exhausts its part in giving rise to ahamk ra, the deficiency of buddhi is made good by Prak ti; again as ahamk ra partially exhausts itself in generating sense-faculties, the deficiency is made good by a refilling from the buddhi. Thus the change and wastage of each of the stadia are always made good and kept constant by a constant refilling from each higher state and finally from Prak ti.

Manas

Manas or mind which arises from the Sattvika Ahankara is the subtle and central sense-organ. It can come into contact with the several sense-organs at the same time. According to the Ny ya-Vai e ika School, manas is eternal and atomic and cannot come into contact with several senses simultaneously. According to S mkhya, it is neither eternal nor atomic. It is made up of parts and so can come into contact with the different senses simultaneously. S mkhya assigns to manas the important function of synthesizing the sense-data into determinate perceptions, passing them on to the ego, and carrying out the orders of the ego through the motor organs.

Buddhi, ahamkara and manas represent the three psychological aspects of knowing, willing and feeling or cognition, conation and affection respectively. Sankhya calls them material and derives them from Prakriti. They shine through the light of the Purusha and are apparently conscious. All the three are called the internal organs or antahkara and vital breaths (pranas) are said to be their modifications. The five sensory and the five motor organs together are called the ten external organs or bahyahkara. These are the thirteen karas or organs of the Sankhya.

Chitta

Chitta is a word in Sanskrit as well as Pali language which means the consciousness of the human mind. In the famous book *Yoga Sutra* of Patanjali, he describes Chitta in detail. The most beautiful exposition of *Yoga Sutra* can be found in Vyasa's commentary of the *Yoga Sstras*. He has described five types of Chitta and their nature as Patanjali wrote. Vyasa has made *Yoga Sutra* very simple to understand.

The meaning of Chitta is the mind or our heart or the emotional part of our self which can affect all our activities of daily life. Chitta can lead us in the direction of its nature. There are five states of our chitta. We can upgrade our state of Chitta by regular practice of yoga. Yoga can neutralize our Chitta and maintain the peace of

mind. Patañjali focuses on removing the Vrttis (the fluctuation of the mind) of Chitta.

Types of Chittas

Five types of Chittas: क्षिप्ता (wild), प्रमूढा (ignorant), विक्षिप्ता (unsteady), एकाग्र (One -Pointed) and निरोधा (cessation)

1. क्षिप्ता (wild)

K ipta is the state of mind where most of the people are standing, most of the time. In general, people are in this state with the fluctuation of the mind. In the waking time we are in this state but not in sleeping. In this state, we are in the reckless situation. Our mind fluctuates with thoughts and feelings. This state is led by the Rajas Guna. In this state, people run for the materialistic gain. They want to work more and more for their growth. The chain of our desire never ends and we cannot come out from this state without great commitment. They indulge in love and hate. They have the ambition to achieve something in their life. They want to show to the people who he or she is.

Attachment and selfishness lead us to this state of mind. This is the agitated state of the mind. The mind cannot stay in one place and it scatters around different affairs of our life. We have to practice to be one-minded

to get rid of this state. The regular practice of yoga can bring us one-mindedness.

2. प्रमूढा (ignorant)

प्रमूढा (ignorant) is the lowest state of our consciousness of the mind. This state of our mind leads us to the dullness, laziness, delusion, fear, and sleepiness. Lust, greed and other many negative feelings can cause this kind of state of mind. This is the state; one doesn't want to work anymore. The person in this state has the bad habits and he or she can't think what is wrong and what is right. The restless mind brings us in this state. This state of the mind is led by the Tama Gu a. This kind of mind is not alert to anything.

In this state of the mind, we cannot perform any creative activities because the mind becomes lethargic. Sometimes our mind cannot decide what to do and can't think anymore. In that state of mind, we can be in the pram ha state. This kind of state of mind can lead us to the depression if we are in this state for the long period of time. This kind of mind is bad for anyone and we have to come out of this mind as soon as possible. In yogic practice, we can find the way to be free from this state of mind.

3. विक्षिप्ता (unsteady)

This is the state of our mind, sometimes concentrated and sometimes distracted. In the search for spirituality, we want to become one-minded but our mind cannot be still. This is the mid-state in the quest for higher achievement. We are led by the Sattva Gu a sometimes and sometimes we cannot be in sattva gu a. We can be in the rajas and tamas sometimes.

In this state, our mind cannot focus continuously on the spiritual path. In the concentration, we can be distracted and we have to bring our awareness again. It is not negative but we have to come out from distraction to the concentration again and again. We have to determine to continue the spiritual path at any cost. We should have firm determination to continue our spiritual path despite the distraction. We donot have to be affected by any kinds of fluctuation of our mind.

4. एकाग्र (One -Pointed)

In the path of spirituality when we can focus on the meditation only, we can be in the Ek gra (Partially concentrated) state. This is the state of one-mindedness in our goal. If we cross the Vik ipta state, we can be in this state. It is the higher state of the spiritual path but not the highest state. We have to continue to practice our task in this state even we get the hints of our successful ascendance.

Ek gra Chitta is led by the Satva Gu a. When the detachment increases with worldly affairs in our practice of yoga, we can realize that we are in the Ek gra state. Yogis are in this state and this can be said the Short-term Sam dhi, lower Sam dhi. Yogis can stay in one place without eating anything in the meditation. They get the wisdom inside.

5. निरोधा (cessation)

Nirodha is the state of our mind which is the highest. In this state, the yogis are in the state of beyond three Gu as. This is the state of higher Sam dhi or the state of Kaivalya, as many Hindu scriptures mentioned. The perfected yogi only can be in this state. In this state, yogi gets the liberation.

This is the state of complete control of the mind in the hand of Yogi. Yogi can lead his thoughts and feelings what he wants. He doesn't become a slave to the thoughts rather than the yogi can control all the thoughts and feelings. Now, he needs nothing but he does everything as usual. No task is become compelled for him to do. He never affects the outside situation of this world. He doesn't walk by the ego, his ego totally dissolves and he gets the supreme state. In this state, all the V ttis of Chitta can be controlled by the yogis. All three Gunas are balanced and yogi becomes more than Gu as.

In this way, we can say that the Nirodha Chitta is the higher state of our mind. To get this state, we have to practice yoga continuously. When we can omit all the V tti of our Chitta, our goal of spirituality can be achieved. Without removing all the fluctuations of our mind, we can't achieve the Nirodha state of Chitta. This may take a long period of time; we should continue our journey without rushing. We have to be happy in the process of our journey.

Processes of Chittas

The Chittas have five processes (V tti). प्रमाणा (valid cognitive states such as are generated by perception, inference and scriptural testimony), विपर्यय (false knowledge, illusion etc.), विकल्पा (abstraction, construction and different kinds of imagination), निद्रा (sleep, is a vacant state of mind, in which tamas tends to predominate) and स्मृति (memory).

These states of mind (V tti) comprise our inner experience. When they lead us towards sams ra into the course of passions and their satisfactions, they are said to be Kli ta (afflicted or leading to affliction); when they lead us towards liberation they are called akli ta (unafflicted). To whichever side we go, towards sams ra or towards mukti, we have to make use of our states of mind; the states which are bad often alternate with good

states, and whichever slate should tend towards our final good (liberation) must be regarded as good.

This draws attention to that important characteristic of chitta that it sometimes tends towards good (i.e. liberation) and sometimes towards bad (sams ra). It is like a river, as the Vy sabh ya says which flows both ways, towards sin and towards the good. The teleology of Prak ti requires that it should produce in man the sams ra as well as the liberation tendency.

Thus in accordance with it in the midst of many bad thoughts and bad habits there come good moral will and good thoughts, and in the midst of good thoughts and habits come also bad thoughts and vicious tendencies. The will to be good is therefore never lost in man, as it is an innate tendency in him which is as strong as his desire to enjoy pleasures. This point is rather remarkable, for it gives us the key of Yoga ethics and shows that our desire of Liberation is not actuated by any hedonistic attraction for happiness or even removal of pain, but by an innate tendency of the mind to follow the path of liberation. Removal of pains is of course the concomitant effect of following such a course, but still the motive to follow this path is a natural and irresistible tendency of the mind. Man has power (शक्ति) stored up in his chitta, and he has to use it in such a way that this tendency may gradually grow stronger and stronger and

ultimately uproot the other. He must succeed in this, since Prak ti wants liberation for her final realization.

Suk ma ar ra

From consciousness associated with the projecting power of ignorance which has a preponderance of the quality of darkness, has evolved ether which, in its turn, has produced air, from air has come fire, from fire, water, and from water, earth.

On account of the preponderance of inertia observed in them, their cause also must have an excess of the quality of darkness (Tamas). At that time the qualities of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas are reproduced in ether etc., in accordance with the law that the qualities of the cause determine the qualities of the effect. These are called subtle matter, rudimentary elements (Tanm tras) and uncompounded (Apancik ta) elements. From these subtle elements are produced subtle bodies and gross elements.

Linga ar ra

The subtle bodies are what are known as the Linga ar ras having seventeen component parts. The component parts (of the Linga ar ras) are the five organs of perception, the intellect, the mind, the five organs of action and the five vital forces.

The five organs of perception are the ears, the skin, the eyes, the tongue and the nose. These are produced separately in consecutive order from the Sattva particles of ether etc.

Intellect (Buddhi) is that modification of the internal instrument (Antahkara a) which determines.

The mind (Manas) is that modification of the internal instrument which considers the pros and cons of a subject (Sankalpa and Vikalpa).

The mind-stuff (Chitta) and egoism (Ahamk ra) are included in the intellect (Buddhi) and the mind (Manas) respectively. Memory (Chitta) is that modification of the inner organ which remembers.

Egoism (Ahamk ra) is that modification of the inner organ which is characterized by Self-consciousness. These, be it noted, are produced from the combination of the Sattva particles of ether etc.

On account of their being luminous they are said to be the products of the Sattva particles. This intellect (Buddhi) together with the organs of perception constitutes the intelligent sheath (Viñj naM yako a). This Viñj naM yako a, on account of its being conscious that it is an agent and enjoyer and that it is happy or miserable etc., is called the phenomenal J va (the individual self) subject to transmigration to this and the other worlds.

The mind with the organs of perception constitutes the mental sheath (ManoM yako a). The organs of action are the organ of speech, the hands, the feet and the organs of evacuation and generation. These are produced separately in consecutive order from the active (Rajas) particles of ether etc.

The five vital forces are the Pr a, Ap na, Vy na, Sam na and Ud na. Pr na is that vital force which goes upward and has its seat at the tip of the nose. Ap na is that vital force which goes downward and has its seat in the organs of excretion. Vy na is that vital force which moves in all directions and pervades the entire body. Ud na is the ascending vital force which helps the passing out from the body and has its seat in the throat. Sam na is that vital force which assimilates food and drink and has its seat in the middle of the body. Assimilation means digestion of food and its conversion into chyle, blood, and other materials of the body.

Others say that there are five more vital forces known as N ga, K rma, K k la, Devadatta and Dhanañjaya. Of these N ga is that which causes vomiting or eructation, K rma opens the eye-lids, K k la creates hunger, Devadatta produces yawning and Dhanañjaya nourishes the body.

Some say that on account of their being included in Pr a etc., the vital forces are really five in number. These five vital forces, viz., Pr a etc., are produced

from the combination of the active (Rajas) particles of ether etc. These five vital forces such as Prāṇa etc., together with the organs of action, constitute the vital sheath (PrāṇaM yako a). Its active nature shows that it is the product of the particles of Rajas. Among these sheaths, the intelligent sheath (ViñjānaM yako a) which is endowed with the power of knowledge is the agent mental sheath (ManoM yako a) which is endowed with will-power is the instrument; and the vital sheath (PrāṇaM yako a) which is endowed with activity is the product. This division has been made according to their respective functions. These three sheaths together constitute the subtle body.

Pancako a

Pancako a (five sheaths) are the layers of the body that seemingly cover the Atman (self consciousness). AnnaM yako a, PrāṇaM yako a, manoM yako a, vijñānaM yako a and AnandaM yako a are the Pancako a. In this ko a PrāṇaM yako a, ManoM yako a and ViñjānaM yako a are discussed in the part of Linga ar ra.

In the five ko a, the gross body is called the alimentary sheath (AnnaM yako a) on account of its being a modification of food, and is said to be in the waking state on account of its being the medium for the enjoyment of gross objects. Consciousness associated with the individual gross body is designated as Viswa on

account of its entering the gross body etc. without giving up its identification with the subtle body.

This individual gross body of his (of the Jiva) is also called the alimentary sheath on account of its being a modification of food, and is said to be in the waking state.

Anandam yako a means composed nanda, or bliss; it is the subtlest of the five ko as. In the in deep sleep, when the mind and senses cease functioning, it still stands between the finite world and the self. AnandaM yako a, or that which is composed of supreme bliss, is regarded as the innermost of all. The bliss sheath normally has its fullest play during deep sleep. While in the dreaming and wakeful states, it has only a partial manifestation. The blissful sheath (AnandaM yako a) is a reflection of the Atman which is truth, beauty, and bliss absolute.

Unit IV: - Semantic tools of P rvaṃ m āns

M m āns as science of Interpretation- tools of interpretation- six types of li gaṣ (upakrama, upasa h ra, abhy sa, ap rvaṭ , phala, arthav da and upapatti) and ruty di- ruti, li ga, sam khy etc. (refer Arthasa graha of Laug k i Bh skara and M ma s ny yaprak ā of padeva)

Semantic tools of P rvaṃ m āns

M m āns is a scripture related to Hindu Religion and is considered the most important tool for the interpretation of other Hindu Scriptures. The meaning of M m āns refers to the act of taking serious concern over the religious matters stated in the Vedas. It provides particular methods for interpreting the matters stated in the scriptures like 'Vedas', 'Sm ties' etc. In the course of interpretation, there can be found many methods of interpretation given by Manu, Yagyabalkya, N rad, Vy sa, Bh haspati and others but no concrete method of interpretation is given by them as given by Jaimini in M m āns . The M m āns Principles were the traditional system of interpretation of legal texts. Although originally they were created for interpreting religious texts [pertaining to the Yaga / sacrifice], gradually they came to be utilized for interpreting legal texts and also for interpreting texts on philosophy, grammar, etc. i.e. they became of universal application.

Thus, Sankar charya has used the Mīmāṃsā adhikara as in his bhāṣya on the Vedānta sūtras. There were hundreds of books [all in Sanskrit] written on the subject, though only a few dozen have survived the ravages of time.

Mīmāṃsā is divided into two parts the first one is the Eastern Mīmāṃsā (Purva Mīmāṃsā) which is propounded by Jaimini while the other is the Northern Mīmāṃsā (Uttara Mīmāṃsā). The Purva Mīmāṃsā decides about the proper interpretation rules of the Karmakāṇḍa Mantras and Vedas while the Uttara Mīmāṃsā (also known as Vedānta) consists of the situation of the eternity. In the course of interpretation, the Purva Mīmāṃsā is the main reference.

Rule for interpretation under Mīmāṃsā

The Rules of Interpretation under Mīmāṃsā can be classified into following five categories:

a. Primary Rules of Interpretation

The primary rules of interpretation are classified into following categories:

i. Sūtrākhyā (सार्थक्य)

It states that every word that is stated in the scriptures consists of meaning and there is no word which is used there without meaning.

ii. L gab (लागभ)

This rule indicates that in the case a single rule is generated from a particular text or word, other interpretation giving different interpretation should not be resolved.

iii. Arthekatva (अर्थकत्व)

This rule signifies that the single word or the sentence used must be given single meaning and should not be given different meanings.

iv. Gu apradh n (गुणप्रधान)

It states that whenever a word denoting the secondary thought stands contrary to the primary thought, the word should either be corrected as per the primary thought or should be left.

v. S mañjasya (सामञ्जस्य)

It states that the possible coalition between the word and sentence of the particular text should be used as per the spirit of the text itself. The contrary coalition of the words and sentence should not be used.

vi. Vikalpa (विकल्प)

It states that whenever there arises controversy between two texts exists; any one text should be adopted as an alternative.

b. Basic Principles of Interpretation

The basic principles of interpretation also consists of following categories:

i. ruti (श्रुति)

It refers that the words should be taken in their simplest meaning.

ii. Vacan (वचन)

Vacan indicates that if there arises any conflict regarding the resolving meaning of the word in terms of tense, the interpretation should be made looking at the tense used in remaining texts or words. In this regard, Maxwell has also given similar kind of rule of interpretation that the interpretation of particular text should be done in accordance to other texts as well. No interpretation of the tenses contrary to the Vedic Vacan is permitted under M m s . However, a general rule under this principle has been propounded that says that the word denoting singular thing also denotes the plural things.

iii. Linga (लिंग)

This rule states that in the condition where a word cannot stand on its ordinary meaning, then the technical meaning of that word should be resolved. For example, the word denoting the masculine gender also refers to the feminine gender.

iv. V kya (वाक्य)

This rule states that whenever a word or a sentence in the text does not give clear meaning, then the composition of such sentence or word should be taken into concern and the possible relevant meaning should be resolved.

v. Prakara a (प्रकरण)

When the words or the sentence of text fails to give concrete meaning, the meaning of those words of sentences should be resolved with the context of the text.

c. General Rules regarding the application of texts

These rules are also divided into four categories:

i. The principle of conceptualizing the texts of compulsive, quasi-compulsive and non-compulsive nature

The following five groups are divided under this rule:

a. Vidhi (विधि)

It defines law as a command which is positive in nature, possesses meaning and has meaningful objective.

b. Ni edha (निषेध)

It refers to such a law which is mandatory in nature. It consists such provisions which denote “not to be done”. Thus all the texts of Sm tis which signify the actions which should not be done, fall under this category.

c. Arthav da (अर्थवाद) and Namadheya (नामधेय)

They are not mandatory in nature. It is used only in the course of helping the interpretation and clarification of law.

d. Mantra (मन्त्र)

Mantra is considered as the formula. It is sometimes mandatory in nature and sometimes not-mandatory in depending upon the situation.

ii. Adhik ra Vidhi (अधिकार विधि)

Adhik ra Vidhi states to whom the law applies to. It directs towards the ownership of result of any action of someone.

iii. ha Vic ra (उह विचार)

The general meaning of ha Vic ra is 'Arguments.'

iv. Vadha (वध)

Vadha is such a principle of interpretation which talks about the exclusion of some things which are contrary. This principle helps to coordinate conflict of texts. It says that if two unusual procedures are such that one is former while the other is latter, the latter would prevail.

e. Principles having special relation with the interpretation of texts and customs

According to this rule, Sm ties are superior than rutis but the customs are superior than Sm ties. Such customs can also be denied under undesirable condition. In the situation the two customs contradict to each other, the customs which are supported by the Sastras are followed.

f. Formula or Justice

This rule is applied in special matters. There are many such formulae in Mīmāṃsā. The formulae on “रात्रीसूत्र न्याय” resembles with the modern rules of interpretation of statute.

LI GAS

The six fold indicatory marks required for ascertaining the purport of a text are mentioned in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, is collectively presented in the Vedānta Sūtra. They are:

1. Upakrama upasa h ra
2. Abhy sa
3. Ap rvat
4. Phala
5. Arthav da
6. Upapatti

This shows that the Upakrama and Upasa h ra together count as one li ga, Abhy sa, Ap rvat , Phala, Arthav da and Upapatti.

Sri Madhus dana Sarasvat teaches the arrangement of the six li gas in the Advaita Siddhi. In the six li gas are grouped into two consisting of three li gas each which have distinct applications.

The first group is the Ap rvat , Upapatti and Phala and the second group contain Upakrama upasa h ra, Abhy sa and Arthav da.

In the first group, by the Ap rvata mark we come to know that the subject discussed is not known from any other source and is known from this text alone.

Upapatti or logically reasoned presentation helps us know that the subject is firmly established without being contradicted/rescinded.

The above two li gas become meaningful only if the subject discussed/delineated bears a specific fruit/benefit (phalam). In the absence of this specific fruit (found mentioned in the text under consideration) the former two marks are rendered redundant. Thus is explained the first group.

It is possible sometimes that a text is seen to discuss several topics and they appear to be supported by reasoned presentation and the benefit too is specified clearly.

In such a situation it becomes impossible to ascertain on firm grounds that such and such is the purport of the text. Here lies the utility of the second group.

Among the remaining three li gas (constituting the second group) even one would be sufficient to determine the purport.

Thus by noticing the upakrama-upasamh ra mark, or by observing the Abhy sa mark or by seeing semantics one can determine the purport of the text.

By this treatment the particular topic discussed in the context of the text becomes determined as not a subsidiary of any other topic but enjoying the status of being the main topic.

Applicability of M m s Rules of Interpretation

The application of M m s Rules of Interpretation although is primarily focused with the interpretation of many Hindu Scriptures like Vedas, Sm ties, ruti s etc, its application in modern times also cannot be ignored. There are two reasons for the application of M m s principles to law: (1) The M m s Rules deal with the Brahma a portions of the ruti, i.e., the portion which laid down injunctions, and the law, too, being largely in the form of injunctions was attracted to them; (2) M m s is a practical subject, and the law, too, being practical was inclined to incorporate them. The great commentators like Viñj ne vara (author of the Mitak ara), J mutv hana (author of the D yabh ga), Nanda Pa it (author of Dattak M m s), V caspati, N lkan ha, etc., were all

profound scholars of Mīmāṃsā, and they regularly used the Mīmāṃsā Principles when confronted with any difficulty regarding interpretation of the Śmṛities (which contained the law in those times).

Talking about the application of Mīmāṃsā Rules of Interpretation in the interpretation of the statutes and laws of Nepal, it is not found so much used. But in the context of India, the use of Mīmāṃsā Rules of Interpretation has been used for exploring the meaning of the legal provisions. The Supreme Court applied one of these principles after quoting a 'loka'. In this regard, the Supreme Court of India in the case of UP Bhoodan Yagna Samiti, UP V. Braj Kishore, observed: "In this country, we have a heritage of rich literature, it is interesting to note that literature of interpretation also is very well known. The principles of interpretation have been enunciated in various lokas which have been known for hundreds of years."

Kinds of Vedic texts

A division of the Veda is put forth on the basis of the variety of Vedic statements in accordance with the manner in which they refer to dharma. The Veda is fivefold, being either injunction (vidhi) or sacrificial formula (mantra) or name (n madheya) or prohibition (ni edha) or explanatory statement (arthav da). That part of the Veda which intimates a thing not known (by other means) is called "Injunction."

Injunction has a sense in consequence of its enjoining a matter having a certain purpose in as far as it enjoins the matter as not established by any other means of proof; e.g. in the Vedic passage "he who is desirous of paradise is to offer the agnihotra;" which injunction enjoins an oblation having for its purpose (the attaining of) paradise which is not settled by any other means of proof; so that the sense conveyed by the passage is "he is to realize paradise by means of the Agnihotra-oblation". When on the other hand the (sacrificial) action is already settled by some other means of proof, an injunction merely enjoins some secondary matter (gu a) with a view to that action. For e.g. in the passage "he is to perform the oblation by means of sour milk." Here, the oblation itself being already established by the injunction "he is to offer the Agnihotra", there is only enjoined sour milk with a view to the oblation (as the material to be used for the oblation); so that the sense is "he is to realize the oblation by means of sour milk."-Where both things are non-established (i.e. in the case of neither the sacrifice nor any secondary matter pertaining to the sacrifice being established by a previous injunction), the injunction enjoins something particularized (or specialized; vi i ṭa); e.g. in the injunction "he is to sacrifice by means of soma"; here, the soma as well (which is the material of the sacrifice) as the sacrifice itself not being established (by any other injunction), there takes place the injunction of that sacrifice which is particularized by soma (as its material so that, by means of the possessive indication contained in the word soma,

the sense of the sentence is "he is to effect the result by means of the sacrifice distinguished by soma.").-Nor is it to be objected that (the passage being interpreted in the aforesaid manner) there takes place a split of the sentence (v kyabheda) the word "somena" enjoining two things; for there are not enjoined two separate things, but only one particularized thing (viz. that particular sacrifice for which soma is used).-Nor again is it to be objected that the passage "somena yajeta" merely enjoins soma as the material of that sacrifice which itself is already established by the other passage "he who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice by means of the jyoti oma," so that the sense of the injunction would be "he is to realize the sacrifice (the jyoti oma) by means of soma"; it being pleaded for this interpretation that it allows us to dispense with the assumption of possessive indication (matvartha-lak a ; by which term is understood the denoting a thing by something else connected with it, as a quality etc.; as when the word "soma" is made to denote a sacrifice in which soma is used). For the passage referring to the jyoti oma is an injunction intimating a claim (adhik ra-vidhi) and this cannot be taken as an originative injunction (utpatti-vidhi; if the passage about the jyoti oma could be taken as the one containing the primary, original injunction of the soma-sacrifice, the passage somena yajeta" might be taken as a gu a-vidhi and thus "somena" would not have to be explained as meaning somavat y gena; but as the purport of the passage about the jyoti oma is not simply to enjoin the soma-sacrifice but to intimate the claim

which the sacrifice has to the fruit of the sacrifice, we are compelled to take "somena yajeta" as the originative injunction of the soma-sacrifice and therefore to explain "somena" by "somavat y gena").-To this reasoning it might be objected that the passage about the jyoti oma may be taken as comprising an originative injunction as well as an injunction intimating a claim as this is avowedly the case with other passages as, e.g. the passage "he who desires cattle is to sacrifice with the udbhid." But we answer: It is not so. In the apparently parallel case which you adduce (viz. the passage about the udbhid) we assume the double nature of the injunction because such an assumption is unavoidable, there being no other statement originative of the sacrifice (while in the case of the soma-sacrifice there are two injunctions; the instances are therefore not parallel). And moreover if we explain the passage about the jyoti oma as containing two injunctions it would have to be taken as intimating the sacrifice itself and its connection with its fruit and this would be a manifest split of the sentence; better than which is the assumption of the passage enjoining something particularized (a sacrifice particularized by soma), by means of our attributing to the word soma the power of possessive indication.-

Injunction is of four different kinds, being either originative injunction (utpattividhi), applicatory injunction (viniyogavidhi), injunction of a claim (adhikavidhi) and injunction of performance (prayogavidhi).

A. ORIGINATIVE INJUNCTION (utpattividhi)

That injunction which merely indicates the general nature of some action is called originative injunction as, f.i. the passage "he is to offer the agnihotra-oblation." In injunctions of this kind the sacrificial action itself occupies the place of the instrument, so that the sense of the passage is "he is to realize the object of his desire by means of the agnihotra-oblation." But, it may be objected, the two forms (aspects; r pa) of a sacrifice are the material (offered) and the divinity (to whom the material is offered). How then can the passage "he is to offer the agnihotra-oblation", in which neither of these two forms is mentioned be considered an originative injunction, the word "agnihotra" (which seemingly indicates the divinity of the sacrifice viz. agni) being merely a name (and not indicating the divinity) according to the principle of (the existence of another scriptural passage) declaratory of it; (which; principle will be explained in the chapter on namadheya). To this objection we reply: The passage is an originative injunction although neither of the two forms of the sacrifice is mentioned in it. Otherwise the passage "he is to perform the oblation by means of sour milk" would have to be considered as the originative injunction (of the agnihotra) as it contains a statement of one of the two forms (viz. the material) and then the passage "he is to offer the agnihotra- oblation" would be purpose-less.

That injunction which intimates the connexion of some subsidiary matter with some principal matter is called applicatory injunction (showing how the subsidiary matter is to be applied to the principal matter). As e.g. the passage "he is to perform the oblation by means of sour milk" which enjoins the connexion, with the oblation, of sour milk the subsidiary position of which is intimated by the third case-affix (the case-affix of dadhna showing that sour milk is to be used as an instrument and therefore is merely subsidiary to the action whose instrument it is). So that the sense of the passage is "he is to realize the oblation by means of sour milk". In injunctions of some secondary matter (gu a) that which is expressed by the root (as "juhoti" in the above example) occupies the position of the object to be accomplished (so that "juhoti" is properly explained by "homam bh vayet". -In an utpatti-vidhi and an adhik ra-vidhi on the other hand the root denotes the instrument; agnihotram juhoti=agnihotra- homena i tam bh vayet).'

Sometimes the root expresses the abode of an action as e.g. "he is to perform the oblation for him, who is desirous of strength of the senses, by means of sour milk"; where the sense is "he is to realize strength of the senses by the instrumentality of sour milk"; and if now the question arises "wherein does it (the instrumentality of sour milk) reside?" the oblation which is mentioned close by steps in denoting the abode.

Injunctions of this kind are assisted by six means of proof, viz. direct statement (ruti); power (linga); sentence, syntactical connexion (v kya); interdependence (prakara a); place, order (sth na) and name (sam khy). Applicatory injunctions assisted by these six means of proof intimate subsidiary relation; the subsidiary position of something consists in its being accomplished by the action of some agent engaged in the pursuit of some other result (so f.i. the pray jas are performed by a sacrificer offering the new moon sacrifice with a view to obtaining paradise); the same subsidiary position is expressed by the term "pararthyā" "existing for the purpose of something else."

1. DIRECT STATEMENT (RUTI)

Direct statement (ruti; literally "text") we define as irrespective or independent words (words which intimate their sense directly without any intermediate steps of the nature of those required by the other means of proof).

Direct statement is of three different kinds being either injunctive (vidh tr), denotative (abhidh tr) and applicative (viniyoktri).

1.a. Injunctive (vidh tr)

The first class belong the direct statements contained in optative forms etc. (the optative form directly indicating the bh van).

1.b. Denotative (abhidh tr)

To the second class belong statements as those about the rice-grains (viz. sentences like "vrihin avahanti". "vrihin prok ati" etc., where the word "rice-grains" directly produces the idea of the corresponding thing and its connexion with the bh vana).

1. c. Applicative (viniyoktri

If finally from the mere hearing (the mere statement) of a word a connexion (between some primary and some subsidiary matter) is understood, we have an applicatory ruti.

ruti of this latter kind is again threefold, being either direct statement by means of case-affixes, direct statement by means of one denotative word (or element of a word) and direct statement by means of one pada (in the restricted grammatical sense).

1.i. Direct statement by means of case-affixes

Direct statement by means of case-affixes expresses the relation of a subsidiary, as e.g. in the passage "he is to sacrifice by means of rice grains" where by the direct statement of the third case-affix the subsidiary relation of the rice-grains to the sacrifice is expressed. This subsidiary relation is here brought about by the rice-grains forming the original substance out of which the cake is made (which latter stands in direct

subsidiary relation to the sacrifice); in the same way as the animal (offered in the animal sacrifice) stands in subsidiary relation to the sacrifice in consequence of its being the original substance from which the parts actually offered viz. the heart etc. are taken. In the passage "he is to buy the soma by means of a tawny, one year old (cow)" the quality of being tawny is by the direct enunciation of the third case affix shown to stand in subsidiary relation to the act of buying; this subsidiary relation takes here place by (the quality's) defining a substance viz. the cow, not directly: the latter not being possible on account of the immateriality of a mere quality. Again in the passage "he sprinkles the rice-grains with water" the sprinkling stands in subsidiary relation to the rice-grains, as appears from the direct enunciation of the second case affix. And, it is to be observed, this sprinkling is not for the sake of the rice-grains considered in themselves as they would be perfect without the sprinkling, but has the purpose of bringing about the transcendental result (ap rva), which would not be brought about were the sacrifice performed without sprinkling the rice-grains with water. In the same manner it is to be understood with reference to all subsidiaries that the subsidiary relation has the purpose of contributing towards bringing about the transcendental result. Let us take another passage. "Thus I seized this bridle of the right; with these words he is to take hold of the bridle of the horse." Here the direct enunciation of the second case affix shows the mantra to stand in a subsidiary relation to the bridle of the horse.

Or another passage. "When he offers the oblation in the havan ya-fire." Here the seventh case affix shows that the havan ya stands in auxiliary relation to the offering. Thus in other cases too direct statement by means of case-affixes points out the proper application (of subsidiary matters).

1.ii. Direct statement by means of one denotative word

In the sentence "pa un yajeta"- "he is to sacrifice by means of an animal" direct statement by means of one denotative word points out the subsidiary relation in which singularity and masculinity stand to the karaka; while again direct statement by means of one denotative word points out the subsidiary relation in which the number expressed by the verbal termination of "yajeta" stands to the bh van .

1.iii. Direct statement by means of one pada

One the other hand direct statement by means of one pada points out that this number stands in subsidiary relation to the sacrificial action (for the sacrificial action as well as the singular number is expressed by the one pada "yajeta.")

Nor is the following objection to be raised "how can the immaterial number stand in subsidiary relation to the bh van ?" for this is possible in consequence of the number defining an agent. This agent again is to be

supplied by inference. For the verb expresses the bh van only; but the bh van cannot take place without an agent and therefore it leads to the inference of the latter.

2. POWER (LINGA)

Direct enunciation is stronger than suggestive power (linga) and the other proofs (by which one thing is shown to be subsidiary to another); for in cases where the subsidiary relation is established by suggestive power there is no verbal statement to be found which would directly teach the application (of a secondary matter to a primary one), but such a statement has to be formed (viz. from the sentence containing the linga); and in as far as in the latter case an applicatory injunction has to be assumed while in the case of direct enunciation such a one is already actually existing, the power of linga etc. which is founded on an assumption is set aside by the power of the direct enunciation. For this reason we do not conclude at once on the ground of suggestive power that a verse (apparently) addressed to Indra (i.e. a verse containing a mention of Indra's name or one of his attributes etc.) is really to be used for addressing Indra; but rather decide if we find at the same time a direct enunciation as e.g. "with a verse bearing Indra's mark he addresses the G rhatya" that in consequence of the direct enunciation of the second case termination (g rhatyam) the verse is subsidiary to the act of addressing the G rhatya-fire.

Power residing in words (the power words possess to denote or point out something) is called linga. As it is said "the power of all words is named linga". By power the same thing is understood as by the technical term r̥hi (conventional meaning; i.e. a word has the power of denoting that thing as whose name it has been settled by convention and tradition) and it can therefore not be said that linga does not differ from sam khy (name); for linga which bases altogether on conventional meaning is different from name (sam khy) which consists in words the meaning of which is to be made out from the meaning of their constituent parts. Therefore, the mantra "I cut grass for the seat of the gods" can only be taken as being subsidiary to the cutting of ku a-grass and not to the cutting of ulapa-grass and other kinds of grass, since from the power residing in the words "I cut etc." it appears that the mantra is able to declare the cutting of ku a-grass only.

In the same manner in other places too the application of a subsidiary matter is to be learned from suggestive power.

Power (linga) has greater force than syntactical connexion (v̥kya) and the following means of proof. Let us take for an example the following mantra: "I make a pleasant seat for thee, I make it very lovely with a stream of ghee; on this, the immortal one, sit down, repose on it propitiously minded of marrow of the rice-grains". Here the first half of the mantra (I make a pleasant seat-ghee)

is to be considered as subsidiary to the act of making a seat for the sacrificial cake, on account of the power of the words "I make a seat", and (the decision to what act the different parts of the mantra are subsidiary) is not to be made according to syntactical connexion (In the above mantra the two halves form one syntactical whole, the connexion being effected by the word "tasmin" (on this) beginning the second half. It might therefore be maintained that the whole undivided mantra is subsidiary to one act, either the making of a seat for the cake or the placing of the cake on the seat; or else that both acts are to be accompanied by the whole mantra. But here *linga* steps in and shows that one half belongs to the preparation of a seat and the other half to the placing of the cake.

3. SYNTACTICAL CONNEXION (V KYA)

By sentence or syntactical connexion (*v kya*) we understand common employment and by this term we understand the connected enunciation of two words denoting two things which in reality stand to each other in the relation of principal and subsidiary although this is not indicated by second case affixes etc. directly indicating the one of the two things to be the thing to be accomplished by the other etc. (which relations are directly indicated by *vibhakti-ruti* etc.) Take e.g. the passage "he whose sacrificial ladle is made of par a-

wood hears no evil sound." Here we see from the connected enunciation of the quality of consisting of par a-wood' and the ladle that the former stands in subsidiary relation to the latter. Nor is it to be said that the circumstance of being made of par a-wood is purposeless as the ladle could be made also in a different way (i.e. from some other kind of wood). For the word ladle intimates at the same time the peculiar transcendental result to be accomplished by it (by a ladle made of par a-wood). So that the sense of the passage is "By its being made of par a-wood he is to realize the peculiar transcendental result connected with the ladle, by means of carrying in it the oblation after it has been taken out of the vessel (by avad na)." As it thus appears that if the ladle is made of par a-wood then the transcendental result to be brought about by it ensues and not in any other case the circumstance of its consisting of par a-wood is not purposeless. The phrase "by means of carrying in it the oblation after it has been taken out of the vessel by avad na" (i.e. the last clause of this phrase) is necessarily to be used as otherwise the quality of being made of par a-wood might be extended to sruva, sruck etc, also (for these implements also might be denoted by the word "juhu"-explained as a yaugika "h yatenay "-and in them also the oblation is carried, but not when it has been taken out of the vessel in the manner called avad na).

This quality of the ladle of being made of par a-wood although it is given in the text in a detached

(an rabhy dh ta; a rule which stands by itself, out of connexion with some particular sacrifice to which it might be referred; so that it must be considered as a general rule) is to be referred only to all the fundamental forms of the sacrifice (prak ti) not to their modification (vik ti); for with regard to the latter it is already settled by an express rule (viz. by the general principle that a modification is to be performed in the same way as the fundamental form of which it is a modification) and thus there would be a useless repetition (if we directly referred the statement about the ladle having to be made of par a-wood to the modification also).

A fundamental form of the sacrifice (prak ti) is that one where we find a set of direct rules extending over all the subsidiary things (requisite for the sacrifice). Of this nature is, e.g. the dar ap r am sa-sacrifice, in immediate connexion with which we find all the requisite subsidiary matters stated in the text.-A mere modification (vik ti) on the other hand is that form of sacrifice where there are no direct rules with regard to the subsidiary matters, as e.g. the oblation made to Surya (sauryam carum nirvapet); there some of the subsidiaries are settled (not by direct rules given for this special sacrifice but) by transfer (atide a; by transferring or extending the rules given for the fundamental form to the modification). Detached injunctions are injunctions of general validity (while rules which are not detached but under the influence of some prakara a refer to that

particular sacrifice only with which the prakara a connects them).

Syntactical connexion as a means of settling subsidiary relation is of greater weight than prakara a and the rest. Thus, e.g. with regard to the mantra (forming a part of the s ktav ka) "O Indragni you accepted this offering etc". This whole mantra is on account of its forming one syntactical whole to be taken as subsidiary to the newmoon-sacrifice only and not on account of prakara a, as subsidiary to the fullmoon-sacrifice as well. (The s ktav ka belongs by prakara a to the dar a-sacrifice as well as to the p r am sa-sacrifice. It however contains mantras which by their linga are marked as belonging to either of these two sacrifices exclusively; so e.g. the mantra "indragni idam havir ajushetam avivridhet m maho jy yo'kr t m" which by the word "indra- gni" is shown not to be applicable to the p r am sa-sacrifice. It might however be maintained that it is sufficient to leave out the one word "indr gni" and that then the remainder of the mantra is to be used at the p r am sa-sacrifice too, with which it is connected by prakara a. This opinion however is impugned by the Mim msists who maintain that the syntactical connexion binding "indr gni" to the remainder of the mantra is stronger than prakara a and that consequently the whole mantra has to be left out at the p r am sa-sacrifice.)

4. INTERDEPENDENCE (PRAKARA A)

Prakara a means interdependence (ubhay k mka a; mutual desire; mutual want of a complement). An example is afforded by the following passage connected with the pray yas "he is to offer the samidh". As in this passage no special fruit (of the offering) is mentioned, the sense merely being "he is to realize by means of offering the samidh", there arises the question "what (is he to realize)?" originating in the want of something to which the offering of the samidh might contribute. And again after the passage about the dar ap r am sa-sacrifice has given rise to the idea "he is to realize paradise by means of the dar ap r am sa" there raises the question "how (is he to realize paradise)" originating in the want of something which may contribute towards bringing about the desired result. And thus by mutual interdependence the subsidiary relation in which the pray jas stand to the dar ap r am sa is established.

This prakara a is of two kinds, great prakara a (mah prakara a) and included prakara a (av ntara-prakara a).

4.1.Great prakara a (mah prakara a)

This is to be under-stood that kind of prakara a which refers to the principal bh vana (i.e. the energy productive of the fruit of the entire sacrificial action).

This great prakara a establishes, e.g. the subsidiary relation in which the pray jas etc. stand to the dar ap r am sa. Great prakara a takes place with reference to the fundamental forms (Prak ti) of the sacrifice only, as there only the relation of interdependence or mutual want is found (viz. if a fundamental form of the sacrifice is enjoined there arises at once they want of subsidiaries by means of which the sacrifice can be accomplished; at the same time statements regarding subsidiaries give rise to the question to what sacrifice these subsidiaries belong). The case is different with regard to the modifications (of the fundamental forms). For there, by the principle of transfer expressed in the words "a modification is to be carried out in the same manner as its fundamental form" they want of something indicating how the action is to be performed is already satisfied and it is therefore impossible that the proper application of the new subsidiaries should be settled by interdependence (there being in this case no mutual want, but a want on one side only viz. on the side of the subsidiaries.) Therefore, the application of the new subsidiaries is in the case of a modification settled by place (sth na) only, not by prakara a.

4.2.Included prakara a (av ntara-prakara a)

Included prakara a is to be understood prakara a connected with the creative energy belonging to the subsidiary parts of the sacrifice. Included f.i. establishes

the subsidiary relation in which the act of stepping forward (abhikrama a) stands to the oblations called pray jas.

Prakara a of this kind is only known by the circumstance of an injunction being inserted in the middle of two other (sandam a; the inserted injunction being grasped as it were by the two encompassing injunctions as by the two limbs of a pair of tongs). For if this peculiar position is not found all the subsidiaries mentioned (among them the stepping forward) would be taken as expressing the mode of action of the energy productive of the general result (of the sacrifice) and would then be subsidiary to the principal action (as the pray jas are). By the term sandam a is to be understood the position of an injunction between two subsidiaries enjoined with reference to someone subsidiary. An example is furnished by the act of advancing (towards the havan ya; which forms a part of the sacrificial action of offering the pray jas). For there at first a matter subsidiary to the pray jas is mentioned in the words "he is to pour (the butter) out of the upabh t (into the juh); for splendour etc."; (after that comes the passage "he for whom knowing this the pray jas are offered pushes his enemies out of these worlds; stepping forward he is to offer them for victory"); and after this passage again a matter subsidiary to the pray jas is enjoined in the words "he who knows the coupling of the pray jas etc". For this reason the stepping forward which is mentioned in the middle of two things subsidiary to the pray jas is to be

considered as itself subsidiary to the latter. For after the idea has arisen that a contribution towards the sacrifice is to be made by means of bringing about a transcendental result by the pray jas, there raises the question "how is the trans-credencial result to be brought about by means of the pray jas?" and this want of something teaching the mode of action is satisfied by the stepping forward etc. which actions are enjoined in the middle of matters subsidiary to the pray jas. Nor can the objection be raised that the productive energy connected with the subsidiaries does not stand in need of a mode of action being pointed out; for such a need actually exists this particular kind of productive energy participating in the general nature of productive energy.

Prakara a directly teaches the application of actions only and only by means of the latter the application of materials, qualities (which are connected with the actions). When f.i. with regard to the energy tending towards the realization of a certain fruit expressed in the passage "he who desires paradise is to sacrifice" they want of some mode how to bring about the result arises we have to take the set of actions which are mentioned in the sacred text in proximity to the above passage and with regard to which no fruit is mentioned (for if some special fruit were mentioned the set of actions could no longer be considered subsidiary to some other action); this set of actions which stands itself in need of something towards which it might contribute is to be connected with the above passage as

indicating the mode of action. That actions only can satisfy the want of the mode of procedure is a matter of common experience. For if with regard to sentences like "the hand is to cleave by means of the axe" the question is asked "how (is the cleaving performed)?", the proper answer does not lie in the word "hand" although enunciated, but rather in the raising and lowering of the axe, the sense being "he is to cleave by raising and lowering the axe by means of the hand"; and thus the hand is connected with the act of cleaving only by means of the raising and lowering as is known to everybody.

5. Place, Order (sth na)

Prakara a has greater weight than position (sth na) and the following means of proof. For this reason the acts like dicing etc. which are enjoined in the passage "he is to play at dice with a R janya" are although they are read in the holy text in proximity to the abhi ecan ya-ceremony and therefore would on the ground of position be subsidiary to the latter, in reality subsidiary to the r jas ya-sacrifice on the ground of prakara a.

By position (sth na) is to be understood equality of place. It is of two kinds, being either equality of place according to the text (p has de ya) and equality of place according to the performance (anu h na-s de ya). The term "krama" (order of succession) has the same meaning as sth na (position).

5.1. Equality of Place According to the Text (p has de ya)

Equality of place according to the text again is of two different kinds, (1) being either text according to number and (2) else text according to proximity.

An example of text according to number is offered by the following passages: "he spreads a cake on eleven potsherds to Indr gni" and "he spreads a cake on twelve potsherds to Vi v nara". With regard to these passages which are found in the text in the given order the application of the y jy and anuv kya mantras (indr gni rocana diva etc.) is settled according to "text according to number", i.e. the first mantra is applied to the first sacrificial action, the second mantra to the second action. For if with regard to the mantra read in the first place the question arises "to what purpose does it serve"?, the sacrificial action enjoined in the first place presents itself first as they both occupy corresponding places. And so with regard to the second mantra also.- That things subsidiary to a modification, which things are enjoined with reference to subsidiaries of a fundamental form and stand in the middle of two injunctions, belong to the modification is to be concluded from "text according to proximity." So f.i. in the case of the oblations called manahomas (Taitt. S. II. 3.9.). For as with regard to them they want of something to which they may refer arises, the transcendental result consequent on a certain modified form of the sacrifice

naturally connects itself as fruit (with these oblations), because this modified form readily presents itself (the modified form of the sacrifice which is mentioned in the holy text close by the manahomas is the kamyē ṭi the originative injunction of which is contained in the words "vai vadevim s mgraḥa m nirvaped gr mak ma ").-If on the other hand (instead of the named oblations being considered subsidiary to a certain modification) an independent fruit were assumed for them (they being considered to produce a special ap rva of their own) their being mentioned in the sacred text in immediate proximity to some modified form would be purposeless.-

5.2. Equality of Place According to the Performance (anu h na-s de ya)

Equality of place according to the performance shows f.i. that the different details stated with regard to the sacrificial animal refer to the animal sacrificed to Agni omau; for the sacrifice of the animal offered to Agni omau is performed on the aupavasathya day and on the same day (i.e. among the description of the ceremonies to be performed on that day) the details concerning the animal sacrifice are stated. And as now there arises the want of something towards which these details might contribute the transcendental result produced by the animal sacrifice which presents itself as

something to be achieved naturally connect itself as that which is to be realized (by means of these details).-

Position (sth na) is of greater weight than sam khy (name). For this reason the mantra about purification (undhadhvam daivy ya karma e etc.) stands in subsidiary relation to the s nn yya-vessel only as it is read in proximity to these vessels, and does not on account of the title "pauro a ikam" (i.e. referring to the sacrificial cake; the name of that chapter which treats of the offering of the sacrificial cake) stand in subsidiary relation to all the vessels connected with the sacrificial cake.

6. Name (sam khy)

"Name" (sam khy) are to be understood words the meaning of which is found by decomposing them into their elements (yaugika abdah).-It is of two kinds belonging either to the language of the Veda or to common language. An example of the former kind is furnished by the Vedic term "hot camasah", from which we conclude that the hot stands in subsidiary relation to the drinking of (the contents of) the cup called camasa. (The term "camasa" which has to be derived from the root cam "to sip" and signifies the form which the soma a drunk shows that the soma contained in the cup is to be drunk by the hotr; for which circumstance a more direct rule is not given). The word " dhvaryava" on the other hand which belongs to common language points out that

the adhvaryu stands in subsidiary relation to different things (mentioned in the dhvaryava k da)'. This is a short statement of the power of sam khy .

B. APPLICATORY INJUNCTION (Viniyogavidhi)

Thus, we have shortly explained the six means of proof, direct enunciation etc. assisted by which injunctions of application-as f.i. he is to offer the dar ap r am sa-sacrifice contributing towards it with the samidhs the proper application of subsidiary matters. These subsidiaries are of two kinds being either accomplished things or actions. By accomplished things we understand species (j ti), substances (dravya), numbers (samkhya) etc. All these have a visible purpose only. Subsidiary actions are again of two different kinds, being either secondary (gu akarma) and primary (pradh nakarma).

These same two classes of actions are also called actions contributing (towards the general result of the sacrifice) through an intermediate step (sannipatyopak raka) and actions contributing (towards the general result) immediately and directly (r dupak raka).

By actions of the former kind we understand actions enjoined with reference to some substance etc. which latter is itself subsidiary to some other action. Of

this kind are, f.i. the beating of the rice-grains (in order to detach them from the husks) sprinkling with water etc. These actions are either such as have a seen effect or such as have an unseen effect or such as have a seen as well as an unseen effect. To the first class belongs, f.i. the beating of the rice-grains (the effect of which is their being detached from the husks); to the second class belongs, f.i. the sprinkling with water (which does not produce a visible effect on the rice-grains); to the third class belong (the actions referring to) the animal, the sacrificial cake etc., for these actions produce an unseen result in as far as they comprise the offering of a certain material (viz. the material offered in the sacrifice), while at the same time in as far as they are performed with regard to a certain divinity they produce a visible result viz. the remembrance of the divinity. By an action contributing directly (r dupak raka) we understand an action which is merely enjoined, without reference to any substance etc. As f.i. the pray jas. Such actions are of use only in originating the highest trans-credential result (param p rva; the transcendental result produced by the sacrificial actions in its totality); while the action contributing through an intermediate step are of use also for the outward form of the sacrifice by means of their producing a modification (samsk ra) of the material of the sacrifice and of the divinity (whereby produce the so-called utpattyap rva." The same kind of actions are also called inherent actions (rayikarma; viz. inherent in some substance, divinity etc.). Herewith we have given a short account of the injunctions of application.

C. PRAYOGA VIDHI (Injunction of Performance)

Prayoga-vidhi, injunction of performance, is that injunction which intimates speediness of performance. This kind of injunction (is not a separate one, there being no passages which are merely prayogavidhi and nothing else but) consists simply in the injunction of the main sacrificial action (as f.i. "he who is desirous of paradise is to offer the dar apur amasa- sacrifice") which forms one syntactical whole with the sentences enjoining subsidiary things (the pray jas etc.); for this (injunction of the main action etc.) causing the execution of the main action with all its subsidiaries enjoins speediness of the performance which latter expression means as much as absence of delay (or pause), as there is no special mean- of proof for delay. Nor must it be objected that there also is no special means of proof for the absence of delay. For if (the things enjoined in the different injunctions were to be done with delay, they could not be done connectedly (together saha) and that they are to be done connectedly is understood from the circumstance of the injunctions referring to the chief action and its subsidiaries forming one syntactical whole Just as we see that in common life two things which are done with delay (as f.i. the one thing to-day the other to-morrow) are never said to be done "together" (or "connectedly")- This absence of delay is obtained when a fixed order is followed; for otherwise there aeries doubts regarding the order of consecution of the different actions and the

whole performance is spoiled. Therefore an injunction of performance enjoins, for the purpose of bringing about speediness of the performance of what it enjoins, at the same time a fixed order which order is to be taken as a special attribute of the things enjoined (if it were not taken as a mere attribute of the things enjoined but as an independent thing the prayogavidhi would be open to the reproach of v kyabheda). For this reason "injunction of performance" is also defined as that injunction which teaches the order of the subsidiaries. By "order" (krama) we understand a particular kind of extension or rather (extension being applicable to coexistent things too) the relation of (different things) being earlier and later with regard to each other. For settling this order of succession (of different actions) we have six means of proof, viz. direct enunciation (ruti), sense (artha), text (p ha), position (sth na), principal matter (mukhya), procedure (prav tti).

1. Direct enunciation (ruti)

Direct-statement is a verbal expression indicating order. And it is of two kinds, that which indicates order only, and that which indicates it as a qualification of other things. Of these, the statement "Having prepared the grassbrush, he prepares the vedi" indicates order only, because the preparation of the vedi etc. is enjoined by another statement. But the statement "The first draught is for the vasat -maker (the hot priest)" indicates order as a qualification of something else. For it cannot

enjoin order alone in supplementary allusion to the draught, because that would break the unity of the subject matter.

This direct-statement is stronger than the other modes-of evidence. For they prove order by implying direct-statement. And that is why it is said that the A vins' cup is offered in tenth place, because of the statement "That of the A vins is offered tenth," although by text-order it would follow that it should be offered third.

2. sense (Artha)

But order by sense (artha) is that in which the decision (as to order) is based on the purpose (to which the things are applied), as in the case of the agnihotra-oblation and the rice-gruel cooking. For here, because the rice-gruel serves the purpose of the oblation, its cooking is performed first, on the basis of its purpose. And this is stronger than order by text. For if one performed (the acts in order) according to text (the agnihotra first), the establish purpose (of the rice-gruel) would be annulled, and it would have (only) an invisible

purpose. For if it were performed after the oblation it could have no visible purpose (which is contrary to the principle that an invisible purpose should be assumed only when no visible one is discoverable).

3. Text (p ha)

Order by text is the order of textual statements which indicate things. And from this the order of the things is inferred. For in the order in which the verbal statements are recorded, in that same order they produce, when read, the ideas of the things (of which they treat); and because the order of performance of these things is according to the order of the ideas of them.

This text (p ha) is twofold, text of the mantras and text of the Br hma a-passages. The order f.i. which is settled for the cake offered to Agni and the cake offered to Agni omau by means of the order in which the yajeya and anuv kya mantras are read in the text, is founded upon mantra text. (The injunction referring to the agni omiya-cake is found in the second anuv ka of the Taittiriya-br hma a, while the passage enjoining the agneya cake occurs in the third anuv ka. From this it might be concluded that at the fullmoon-sacrifice the agnishomiya cake is to be offered before the agneya cake. The order however of the mantras accompanying the two offerings, as found in the mantra-k a, establishes the contrary.)

The order of succession of the pray jas which is derived from the order of the text of certain injunctions (viz. "he offers the samidhs" "he offers tan nap t" etc.) is based on the order of the br hma a-text. For although the br hma a-passages may be said to have fulfilled their purpose by enjoining a certain thing, nevertheless in the absence of some other passage pointing out the

order of succession of the pray jas etc., the same br hma a-passages are to be accepted as pointing out the order of the succession as well.

4. Position (sth na)

When things occur at different places in an archetype, but must by explicit injunction be performed at the same place in a modification, and their order is determined by the rule that that one, in the original place of which they are (all) performed, shall be performed first, and the other-two¹⁴³ afterwards—that is order according to position (sth na).

Position means presentation (appearance, coming-in). For the thing in the original place of which they are (all) performed naturally is the one which presents itself first when the thing that immediately preceded it has been performed; so it is proper that it should be performed first. That is why, when at the S dyaskra (a one-day soma-sacrifice) the agni omiya, savan ya, and anubandhya (animals) all have to be sacrificed together at the place belonging to the savan ya (in the archetype), the savan ya is sacrificed first, because in this place, just after the A vins cup, it is the savan ya that most naturally presents itself; and the other two afterwards.

To explain more fully: in the jyoti oma there are three animal-sacrifices, the agni om ya, savan ya , and

anubandhya. And they occur at different points: the agni om ya on the fast- (first) day, the savan ya at the time of the pressing, and anubandhya at the end. Now the S dyaskra is a variety of soma-sacrifice; and, because (its deity is) 'unmanifest' (unspecified), it is (to be regarded as) a modification of the jyoti oma. Hence all three of these animal-sacrifices are established by the rule of transfer at the S dyaskra. And the fact that they are all performed together in it is indicated by the statement "He shall offer the animals together." And the fact that this common offering occurs in the place of the savan ya follows from its being near the main action (the soma-pressing), and from the fact that (by this means) the removal from the proper places is equal.

For if they are offered in the place of the savan ya, the agni omiya and anubandhya are removed each from its own place only. While if they were offered in the place of the agni omiya, the savan ya would be removed from its own place only, but the anubandhya would be removed not only from its own proper place, but also from the place of the savan ya. And if they were offered in the place of the anubandhya the same would be true of the agni om ya.

And so, since all must be offered in the place of the savan ya, the savan ya must be offered first. For the place of the savan ya is immediately after the Asvins' cup, since in the archetype it is enjoined right after the cup to the A vins, in these words: "Having offered the

cup to the A vins and having tied round the sacrificial post with a triple cord he presents the savan ya animal for Agni."And so in the S dyaskra also, when the A vins

Cup has been offered, it is the savan ya that naturally presents itself next. So it is proper, on account of its position, that it should be offered first, and the other two afterwards, as stated (in Jaimini).

5. Principal matter (Mukhya)

Order founded on the principal matter (mukhya) we understand the order of the subsidiary matters belonging to some performance in as far as it is settled by the order of the principal matters. For in whatever order the principal matters are performed in the same order the subsidiary matters belonging to them are performed, since in this manner all subsidiary matters are distant from the principal matters in the same degree. If on the contrary the subsidiary matters were performed in an inverse order (compared with the order of the principal matters) the consequence would be that some subsidiary matters would be as near as possible to their principal matters and others again as far away as possible; and this would of course be improper, as it would interfere with the connectedness of actions intimated by the injunction of performance. Therefore, the order of succession of the principal things determines the order of the subsidiaries as well.

That is why, with that (ghee) which remains from the fore-sacrifices, first the oblation (of the cake) to Agni is besprinkled, and afterwards the sour-milk to Indra, because the (main) sacrifice to Agni comes before that to Indra. For thus the two acts of sprinkling are separated each from the main act to which it belongs by an equal interval, namely by one intervening act, because between the besprinkling of the Agni-oblation and the sacrifice to Agni there intervenes (just) the besprinkling of the oblation of the Indra-sacrifice, and between the besprinkling of the oblation of the Indra-sacrifice and the Indra-sacrifice their intervenes (just) the sacrifice to Agni.

And so first the Agni-oblation is besprinkled, then the Indra-oblation, then comes the sacrifice to Agni, then that to Indra; such is the order establish by order of the principal acts. But if first the Indra- oblation were besprinkled and then that to Agni, then, since (as explained above) by reason of the order of the verses of sacrifice and invitation the Agni-sacrifice must be performed first (before that to Indra), it would follow that the Agni-sacrifice and its subsidiary the besprinkling of the (Agni-) oblation would be too near together, while the Indra-sacrifice and its subsidiary the besprinkling of the (Indra-) oblation would be too far apart. And this would be improper. Therefore it is proper that the order of sprinkling with the remains of the fore sacrifices is determined by order of the principal acts.

And this order by principal acts is weaker than order by text. For order by principal acts is dependent on the determination of the order of the main acts, which is dependent on other modes-of-evidence, and hence its determination is delayed (or indirect), while order according to text is not so, because it is dependent on merely the order of the text of the Veda, which is independent. Therefore it is more powerful.

That is why, although the (cake) to Agni, the whispered offering, and the (cake) to Agni-Soma are offered in (that) order, the portioning of the butter of the whispered offering is not performed first (before the cake to Agni-Soma), according to order of principal acts, because this is weaker, but after (that) by order of text, because that is stronger.

And this order by principal acts is stronger than order by procedure. For when order by procedure is adopted many subsidiaries are separated from their main acts, but when this (order by principal acts) is adopted they are near them. As for instance: in the new- and full-moon rites first the (cake) to Agni is performed, then the collected-offering (samnayya, of sour-milk and milk). And certain subsidiaries of the latter are performed first. Now if, adopting order by procedure, all its subsidiaries were performed first, then the subsidiaries of the (cake) to Agni, then the (cake) to Agni itself, and then the collected-offering; in that case the subsidiaries of the

latter would be separated from their main action by two performances, viz. the subsidiaries of the (cake) to Agni and that itself. But when, although some of the subsidiaries of the collected-offering are (necessarily) performed first (by direct statement); nevertheless all the rest are performed after the performance of the subsidiaries of the (cake) to Agni, according to order of principal acts, then all the subsidiaries of both the (cake) to Agni and the collected-offering (except those of the latter performed on the first day) are separated (from their principals) by one unrelated thing in each case. For the subsidiaries of the (cake) to Agni are separated from

their principal by the subsidiaries of the collected-offering and the latter are separated from their principal by the performance of the (cake) to Agni. So there is no (unequal) remoteness. Therefore order by principal acts is stronger than order by procedure.

6. Procedure (prav tti)

On the other hand it is of greater authority than order founded on procedure (prav tti); for in the case of order founded on procedure many subsidiary matters are distant from the principal matter while they are near to it in the case of mukhya krama (about prav tti-krama see further on).

If in the case of several principal matters (or actions) being performed together and the subsidiary

actions connected with them having to be performed seriatim, the order of succession of the second, third etc. subsidiary actions is regulated according to the order of the subsidiary action performed first, that order of succession is called order according to procedure (prav tti). So f.i. in the case of the subsidiary actions connected with the animal sacrifices offered to Praj pati (during the v japeya where seventeen animals are offered to Praj pati), with regard to which we read "having offered the vai vadeva oblation they proceed with the animals for Praj pati". In this sentence the animals meant for Praj pati are, as pointed out by the third case termination, enjoined, together with the actions constituting the mode of procedure, as having to be offered at one time. Consequently they (the sacrifices of the animals) as well as the subsidiary actions connected therewith as the leading on, the tying to the sacrificial post etc. (of the victims) have to be performed together (or connectedly, saha). This performing together becomes, with regard to (the actual sacrifice of) the praj patya animals, possible by performing the actual sacrifice (of all of them) at the same time as one divinity (viz. Praj pati) is fixed (for all of them). On the other hand it is impossible to perform all the subsidiary actions as the leading on, the tying to the sacrificial post etc. at the same time and the only method of performing them together is therefore to perform them in such a manner as to separate the subsidiary actions to the least possible degree from the principal actions. For this end one performs at first the leading one of one animal and after

that the leading one of the second and follows the same order with regard to the tying to the post etc. And thus selecting from among the animals about to be offered to Prajapati a certain one, one begins with it and performs the same subsidiary action with regard to all animals; after this one performs the second subsidiary action on the same animal on which the first one had been performed and again proceeds following the same order with regard to all other animals. The order of succession determined according to this principle is called order of succession according to procedure. It is of less weight than order of succession founded on direct statement etc.-Here with we have given a short account of injunction of performance by defining the six different kinds of order of succession.

D. INJUNCTION OF A CLAIM (Adhik ravidhi)

Injunction of claim or qualification (adhik ravidhi) is that kind of injunction which intimates the ownership with regard to some result which is brought about by some action. By "ownership" it is meant the position of one who enjoys the result.-To this class of injunctions belongs e.g. the passage "he who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice"; which passage while it enjoins the sacrifice with regard to paradise intimates the state of enjoyment of the result consequent on the sacrificial action by him who is desirous of paradise.

Another example is the passage "he whose houses Agni should burn down after he has constructed the holy fires, is to offer to the merciful Agni a cake on eight potsherds." This passage enjoining a certain sacrificial action on the occasion of a conflagration etc. intimates the ownership of him who acts on the mentioned occasion with regard to a result which consists in averting a calamity and which is produced by the sacrificial action.

In the same way the passage "he is daily to perform the sandhya" intimates the ownership of him who leads a pure life, observing the proper times for all his duties, with regard to a fruit viz. the avoidance of disaster which ensues on the proper performance of the sandhya.

This kind of ownership with regard to some result belongs to him only who is distinguished by the necessary qualification (*adhik ra*). By qualification we understand that which, in the passages containing injunctions, is mentioned as a distinguishing attribute of the person (whom the injunction concerns). This is, in the case of those sacrifices which are performed for the fulfillment of a certain wish, the wish for the particular result; in the case of the sacrifices performed on a special occasion the ascertainment of the occasion; in the case of acts of permanent obligation as e.g. the performance of the sandhya the circumstance of the man leading a pure life and observing the proper times for all his duties. For

this reason to the passage "a king who is desirous of the kingship of the heavenly world is to perform the r jas ya-sacrifice" notwithstanding its enjoining (the r jas ya) with a view to the kingship of the heavenly world does not intimate that the enjoyment of the result will be obtained by anyone who desires the kingship of the heavenly world, but only by him who being at the same time a king is desirous of the kingship of the heavenly world; for the passage contains a clear statement of the kingly dignity being a necessary attribute of the qualified person. Sometimes a necessary attribute of the qualified person is to be understood although it may not be directly stated as an attribute of the person. This is the case e.g. with regard to the knowledge dependent on the injunction enforcing the study of the Veda. (This knowledge is a necessary qualification for anyone who wishes to perform sacrifices) since all the injunctions of sacrifices as they require a knowledge of the matters (used in the sacrifice) are given for those only who have acquired a knowledge of these matters in consequence of complying with the injunction inculcating the study of the Veda. In the same manner the quality of being provided with the sacred fires-which quality is obtained by the first construction of the fires-is a necessary qualification for all sacrificial acts which are to be effected by means of the holy fires; for as all these sacrifices cannot be performed without the fires the injunctions prescribing them can be given for those only who by the construction of the fires have acquired the attribute of being owners of the sacred fires.

In the same manner capability (to perform the duty is an understood qualification); for the injunction applies only to those who are capable (by bodily strength and health, mental power etc.) to carry it out, according to the principle expressed in the words "power (of understanding on the part of the hearer) co-operates with the verbs expressing a certain sense" (the verbs although possessing a certain sense have no effect on a person not able to understand it.)-Herewith we close the discussion of that part of the Veda which is denoted by the name "Injunction".

Unit V: - Kashmir aivism and Indian Aesthetics

-General survey of Literature on Kashmir aivism: gama, spanda and pratybhijñ schools- Preceptorial lineage: Vasugupta- Som nanda- Utpaladeva- Lak ma agupta- Bh tiraja- Abhinavagupta- K emar ja - Scriptural tradition: ivas tra- ivad i- varapratybhijñ k rik (viv ti, vimar in , viv tivimar in), Pratybhijñ h daya, Spandak rik , Tantr loka -Major concepts of Kashmir aivism reflected on Indian aesthetics: Pratybhijñ , 36 tattvas, malas, aktis, bh sa, prak a, vimar a, carva , vi r nti, prakhy and up khy , bimbapratibimbav da, v c: par , pa yant , madhyam , vaikhar ; pratibh , sah daya

K shmir aivism and Indian Aesthetics

The worship of iva or Rudra goes back to the Vedas. In the Yajurveda we have the atarudr ya. The Taittiriya ra yaka tells us that the whole universe is the manifestation of Rudra. Some of the Upani ads, the Mah bh rata and some Pur as glorify iva or Rudra. The sacred literature of the aivas is called aiv gama. Shrikantha places it side by side with the Vedas. Madh vach rya refers to the four schools of aivism— Nakul shap shupata, Shaiva, Pratyabhijñ and Raseshvara. Besides these we find mention of two more

sects, K p lika and K l mukha, in Yamuna's gamapr m ya. Shaivism of the 'Shaiva' type is further divided into Vira Shaivism or akti-vi i dvaita and Shaiva Siddh nta. The former is also known as Ling yata or atsthala. We may select here Shaiva Siddh nta as the representative of the Southern Shaivism and Pratyabhijñ or K shm ra Shaivism as the representative of the Northern Shaivism and briefly deal with these two.

Shaiva Siddh nta recognizes eighteen gamas. From the fifth to the ninth centuries many great Shaiva saints like Sarhbandar, Appar and Sundarar flourished in South India whose hymns constitute a magnificently rich devotional literature. The collection of these hymns is called Tirumurai. M ikkav sagar (seventh century) has written his famous Tiruv sagam. Meyka ar, the author of the ivajñ nabodham, who belongs to the thirteenth century, is regarded as the first systematic expounder of the Siddh nta philosophy. His disciple Arulnandi Shiv -

ch rya is the author of the famous work ivajñ nasiddhiyar. Shrika ha Shiv ch rya (fourteenth century) has written a commentary on the Brahmas tra, which is commented upon by Appaya D k ita in his Shiv rkama id pika, in the light of Shaivism in general, though not strictly according to the Siddh nta philosophy.

Shaiva Siddhanta calls itself 'Shuddh dvaita', the name which Vallabha's school bears. But whereas Vallabha means by the word 'Shuddha' 'that which is free from the impurity of M ya' (m y sam-bandharahita) and by the word 'Advaita' 'the Non-dual Brahman', Shaiva Siddhanta takes the word 'Shuddha' in the sense of 'unqualified' and the word 'Advaita' in the sense of 'Dvaita devoid of duality which means that difference is real in existence but inseparable from identity in consciousness. This means that though matter and souls are real yet they are not opposed to iva but are inseparably united with Him who is the supreme reality. This suggests the influence of Ap thaksiddhi of R m nuja. But whereas R m nuja makes matter and souls only the attributes of God, Shaiva Siddhanta agrees with Madhva in giving them substantive existence.

iva is the supreme reality and is called Pati or the Lord who possesses the eight attributes of 'self-existence, essential purity, intuitive wisdom, infinite intelligence, freedom from all bonds, infinite grace or love, omnipotence, and infinite bliss'. Just as the potter is the first cause, his staff and wheel is the instrumental cause and clay is the material cause of a pot, similarly iva is the first cause, his akti is the instrumental cause and M ya is the material cause of this world. The relation of iva and akti is that of identity (t d tmya), though it is the power of the Lord. This akti is conscious, unchanging and eternal energy and is known as Svar pa akti. Like the shuddhasattva and the Prak ti

of R m nuja, Shaiva Siddh nta also believes in pure matter (shuddha or s ttvika jagat) and defiled matter (ashuddha or pr k ta jagat). The material cause of pure creation is called Mah m ya or Bindu or Vidya, while that of defiled creation is called M ya or Ashuddha Bindu. Mah m ya and M ya both are the material (ja a) powers of the Lord and are called Parigraha akti which is different from the Svar pa akti which forms the essence of the Lord. The Lord is omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient and performs the five functions of creation, preservation and destruction of the universe and obscuration (tirodh na) and liberation (anugraha) of the souls.

The individual souls are called Pashu for like cattle they are bound by the rope of avidy to this world. The soul is really an all-pervading, eternal and conscious agent and enjoyer (ichch -jñ na-kriy yukta). It has consciousness the essence of which is in the act of seeing. It is different from the gross and the subtle body and the sense- organs, etc. The bound souls mistake themselves as finite and limited in will, thought and action and in liberation are restored to their original nature.

The fetters which bind the souls are called Pasha and are threefold — Avidy , Karma and M ya. Avidy is one in all beings and is beginning- less. It is also called avamala or the impurity which consists in the false notion of the soul to regard itself finite or atomic

and confined to the body and limited in knowledge and power. It is avidyā because it makes the soul ignorant of its inherent glory and greatness. It is māyā because it makes the soul mistake itself as atomic and finite. It is the bondage (pashutva) of the beast (pashu). Karma is produced by the deeds of the souls and is subtle and unseen (adṛśya) and is the cause of the union of the conscious with the unconscious. Māyā is the material cause of this impure world. The souls are of three kinds according as they are tainted with one or two or three of these impurities. The highest souls are tainted with the māyā only; the next with the Karma māyā also; and the last with all the three— māyā, Karma māyā and Māyā. They are called respectively Vijñānakalā, Pralayakalā and sakalā. In order to obtain release the soul has to get rid of these three impurities. And for this God's grace is absolutely essential. The Divine Grace is there for us all without the asking for it for the Lord desires that all the souls should know Him; it is only for us to avail of it or not.

After the removal of the Pāśha, the soul becomes one with Īva. It becomes co-pervasive with Him and shares His glory and greatness. It is not conscious of its individuality (which is there) on account of the experience of Bliss. Meykāra says that just as salt dissolves into water and becomes co-pervasive with it, similarly the liberated soul merges in God and becomes co-pervasive with Him. It attains the status of Īva, though the five functions of creation etc. are reserved for

the latter alone. The essential quality or svar palak a a of the soul is to identify itself with its object and become co-pervasive with it (taddharmadharmi). its essence (svar pa) is its co-pervasiveness with the infinite iva. Thus the bound soul identifies itself with matter and the liberated soul with iva and realizes its own pure nature.

The binding aspect of ava-mala when it is called P sha is accidental (ta astha) and therefore can be removed, but ava-mala itself is eternal. ava-mala, in the case of the liberated, keeps the world away and thereby indirectly helps them in their Shiv nubhava. S yujya is the real liberation. J vanmukti is admitted. The ethical virtues are emphasized as the preparation for receiving God's grace. Siddhiyar says: 'They have no love for God who have no love for all mankind.'

K smir shaivism is also known as Pratyabhijñ or Trika or Spanda system. iva-s tra (said to have been revealed to Vasugupta), Vasugupta's (eighth century) Spandak rika, Som nanda's ivad i (ninth century), Utpala's Pratyabhijñ s tra (tenth century) Abhinavagupta's Param rthas ra, Pratyabhijñ - vimarshini and Tantr loka, and K emaraja's ivas tra- vimarshini and Spandasandoha— are some of the most important works of this system. The system claims to be based on the Shaiva gamas.

K shm ra Shaivism admits thirty-six tattvas or principles of cosmic manifestation. Through the five

important aspects of ākti known as chit, nanda, ichch , jñāna and kriya arise iva, ākti, Sad iva, Ishvara and Shuddhavidya, the five transcendental tattvas. That aspect of ākti which makes the Infinite appears as finite is the sixth Māya tattva. It gives rise to the five kañchukas — power (kalā), knowledge (vidyā), attachment (rāga), time (kāla) and space (niyati). Through these Māya makes the Infinite iva appear as finite Puruṣa which is the twelfth tattva. The rest of the twenty-four tattvas are the same as Prakṛti and its twenty-three evolutes recognized in the Sāmkhya system.

iva is the only reality, the one without a second. He is infinite Consciousness and absolute independence (Svatantrya). He creates everything by the mere force of His will. He is the subject as well as the object. He is the foundation of all knowledge and all proof and disproof equally presuppose His existence. 'He makes the world appear in Himself as if it were distinct from Himself, though not really so; even as objects appear in a mirror. . . . By His own wonderful power (ākti) inherent in Him, God appears in the form of souls and constitutes objects for their experiences. The only reality is the unlimited pure self, the one and only substratum of the universe, whose activity or vibration (spanda) is the cause of all distinctions. The changing manifestations of iva do not stain His purity and unchanging nature since He transcends His own manifestations (bhāsa). iva is the transcendental eternal background of this universe. In

this transcendental aspect He is Vishvott r a. In the immanent aspect He is called Vishv tmaka. The immanent aspect is Sv tantrya or akti which is conceived as a Power of Self-consciousness by which iva manifests Himself as this universe on His own transcendental background. His akti has infinite aspects, most important of which are chit, nanda, icch , jñ na and kriya. M ya is neither the material cause of the universe nor the principle of illusion. It is that aspect of the power (akti) of iva through which He manifests Himself as many. The individual soul is pure consciousness and as such identical with iva. It is the ultimate reality under conditions of self-limitation. Plurality of souls is not final. Apart from iva, the world is not; different from iva, the soul is not.

Recognition (Pratyabhijñ) of this reality is essential for obtaining liberation. A love-sick woman cannot get any consolation and joy even though her lover may be present near her unless she recognizes him. The moment recognition dawns she becomes all joy. This is also the meaning of the famous formula 'tat tvam asi'. Recognition at once overcomes bondage. The liberated soul becomes one with iva and ever enjoys the mystic bliss of oneness with the Lord. J vanmukti is admitted.

The worship of akti also dates back to the Rigveda where she is praised as 'the supporter of the earth living in heaven. 'Um of golden hue of the Kena is the 'Great Mother of the Universe. The Shaivas made

her the consort of Śiva. The various Purāṇas describe her greatness. She is known as Śakti, Devī, Cāruṅgī, Cāmuṅḍā, Durgā, Umā and Mahāmāyā. Śakti is the power of Existence, Knowledge and Bliss of Brahman and is inseparable from it. Śakti may be taken as male, female or neutral. Śiva is the pure indeterminate Brahman, while Śakti, the power of Māyā, makes him determinate, endowed with the attributes of knowledge, will and action. Saundaryalahari says: ‘Śiva, when he is united with Śakti, is able to create; otherwise he is unable even to move. Śiva, without Śakti, is a Shava, a corpse. Śakti is the life of Śiva as she is his wife. The whole world of matter and souls exists potentially in Śakti who is the inseparable power of Śiva. Māyā or Prakṛti, the matrix of the world, lies within Śakti. The souls mistake themselves as finite and many due to the influence of Māyā. Liberation is due to the knowledge that the so-called soul is non-different from Brahman. Knowledge of Śakti leads to this knowledge. Liberation means ‘dissolution in the blissful effulgence of the Supreme. Jīvanmukti is admitted. The mystic side of Yoga is emphasized. Mantra and Tantra are sacred, secret and divine. Awakening of the Kuṇḍalin and piercing of the six Chakras is practiced. Nādayoga is glorified.

The Śakti Tantra is divided into three schools—Kaula, Samaya and Mishra. Bhaskarāyā, the author of Saubhāgyabhāṣkāra, the commentary on Lalit sahasraṇama, and Lakṣmīdhara, the commentator on the Saundaryalahari are the eminent Śakti writers.

Some Kaulas are called V ma-m rgi and are generally believed to be indulging in abominable and ghastly practices. Though most of the Kaulas must have indulged in such practices on account of their ignorance, yet the real significance of these practices like the five Mudr s lies in their spiritual interpretation. Kula means akti or Ku alini and Akula means iva. He alone is therefore a Kaula who succeeds in uniting akti with iva. He is a J vanmukta, a Sthitaprajña for whom mud and sandal paste, enemy and son, wood and gold, life and death are the same. External marks are useless. Kul r ava Tantra says: 'If the mere rubbing of the body with mud and ashes gains liberation, then the village dogs who roll in them have attained it'. The highest is the union with Brahman; the middle is the meditation on Brahman; the lower is the praise of the Lord and the recitation of hymns; and the lowest is the external worship.
